More than a century after Billy Mitchell’s air power demonstration sinking the decommissioned German battleship Ostfriesland, the vulnerability of U.S. naval vessels to air attack remains a source of controversy and concern.
Following Mitchell’s demonstration, Navy leaders were quick to point out that the doomed ship was stationary and undefended during the test—and promptly began efforts to develop the fleet air defense necessary to protect ships from air attack. Commander Alexander Van Keuren observed the tests and subsequently submitted a secret report to the Navy’s General Board in which he concluded, “We must see that the least possible number of shots are fired by hostile airplanes and that those that are fired go very wide of their mark.”1 Those efforts accelerated during World War II, continued during the Cold War, and persist today. Defending the fleet from aircraft, and later guided missiles, remains a fundamental consideration in naval doctrine and has driven an imperative to engage attackers at ever-increasing ranges from the defended units.
The U.S. Navy’s Fleet Problems during the years between World Wars I and II helped verify the requirement to defend the fleet from air attack as well as a mechanism to develop the corresponding methods. The key performance characteristics for fighter aircraft, as well as the need for fighter aircraft to maintain a combat air patrol (CAP) overhead defending ships, was developed and refined during these exercises. Thus, the U.S. Navy entered World War II with an air defense doctrine that kept fighter aircraft aloft within visual range of the defended ships when enemy contact was possible.
Doctrine Put to the Test
The interwar air defense doctrine received its first large-scale test during the Battle of Coral Sea, the first of four clashes between U.S. and Japanese aircraft carriers in 1942. The defensive air engagements on 7 and 8 May 1942 were triggered when American radar detected inbound Japanese aircraft, which allowed the USS Lexington (CV-2)’s fighter director to vector U.S. F4F Wildcat fighters to intercept the attackers at ranges between 20–40 miles out. However, largely because the air search radar did not give accurate altitude information, many of the fighters failed to effectively intercept the Japanese aircraft.2 Additionally, poor communication discipline among the controllers and pilots made defensive coordination difficult. On the day the Lexington was sunk, just three of the 17 fighters aloft were able to attack Japanese aircraft before they could deliver their weapons.3
The Battle of Midway followed Coral Sea by less than a month, which did not allow sufficient time to develop new air defense tactics or doctrine. Luckily, more effective fighter control resulted in improved results. On 4 June 1942, following the tremendously successful attack on the Japanese Kido Butai by SBD Dauntless dive bombers from the USS Enterprise (CV-6) and Yorktown (CV-5), the sole remaining functional Japanese aircraft carrier, the Hiryu, launched two waves of dive and torpedo bombers. Those aircraft eventually found the Yorktown and badly damaged her. However, unlike at Coral Sea, the attackers paid a heavy price. Once again, the inbound Japanese were detected by radar and intercepted by U.S. CAP fighters approximately 20 miles from the Yorktown. The first Japanese attack consisted of 18 unescorted Type 99 Val dive bombers, and only eight made it through the fighter screen. Two of the bombers landed hits on the Yorktown, but all were eventually destroyed by ship antiaircraft artillery. The Yorktown quickly repaired the damage and continued with the fight.4
The Hiryu’s second attack wave consisted of ten Type 97 Kate torpedo bombers. Again, American fighters were vectored by radar and made contact at approximately 12 miles out. Six Japanese aircraft were shot down by the F4F Wildcats, leaving approximately four attackers to make torpedo runs on the Yorktown. Two of their torpedoes hit the Yorktown’s port side, causing massive damage and an eventual “abandon ship” order. None of the Japanese aircraft survived the attack—a marked improvement in American defensive performance from the Battle of Coral Sea.5
The next major carrier battle occurred 23–25 August 1942 during the Battle of the Eastern Solomons. Increasing the number of fighter aircraft on board each carrier after Midway (growing from 18 to 36), the U.S. fleet was able to launch 53 fighters, including nine in a CAP station 40 miles from the USS Enterprise (CV-6) and Saratoga (CV-3) and along the expected Japanese attack route.6 Radar again detected the inbound Japanese aircraft, and initial contact was made 33 miles out. However, poor communications discipline again precluded effective fighter direction, this time egregiously so. Despite the large fighter cover and ample warning provided by radar, 30 of 36 Japanese dive bombers survived to attack the Enterprise and her escorts, scoring three hits and badly damaging the carrier.7
The final of 1942’s four carrier duels took place at the Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands, 26–27 October 1942. Largely because the U.S. Navy had not yet been able to digest the lessons from the previous battles, the results were similar. American CAP fighters intercepted Japanese attackers from the Shokaku, Zuikaku, Junyo, and Zuiho and thinned their ranks without stopping their successful attack, which sank the USS Hornet (CV-8) and damaged the Enterprise.8 Thus ended the series of critical 1942 carrier duels between Japanese and American navies. 1943 came and went without another carrier-on-carrier battle as both sides licked their wounds—enabling the U.S. Navy to make several important air defense improvements that would pay huge dividends in 1944.
Stacking the Deck
Based on lessons from 1942, the Navy created the Combat Information Center concept on board all combatant ships to assist decision making in the heat of battle. Radar had existed in the fleet since the beginning of the war, but rapid improvements also led to more accurate information as well as better information displays to facilitate three-dimensional awareness. Importantly, the Pacific Fleet also quickly developed standardized doctrine and training to better utilize these tools throughout the fleet.9
By 1944, American fighter pilots were generally superior to their Japanese enemies. Largely due to the Navy’s ability to rotate aviators back and forth between combat duty and stateside training tours, they retained their hard-won experience for use during the last year and a half of the war. In contrast, Japanese pilots generally remained in frontline units, and therefore their ranks gradually diminished over the course of the grueling Solomons Island campaign of 1943. The American pilots leading 1944’s combat air patrols were rested combat veterans and more than a match for the Japanese neophytes, many of whom had learned to fly in the preceding year.10
Finally, the Americans rapidly introduced a superior fighter aircraft starting in 1943—the Grumman F6F Hellcat. While its predecessor, the F4F, was a useful aircraft and generally on par with the famous Japanese Mitsubishi A6M2 Zero, the F6F was superior in most attributes-- especially in climb rate, speed, and survivability.11 Furthermore, they were introduced in significantly greater numbers than before, with U.S. industry hitting its stride at home and new Essex-class aircraft carriers regularly joining the fleet starting in May 1943.12
NATIONAL ARCHIVES.
Thus, when massive carrier battles resumed with the Battle of the Philippine Sea, experienced American veterans awaited in massive CAP formations, assisted by well-trained fighter directors operating advanced shipboard radar systems, with superior fighter aircraft and a roughly 2:1 numerical advantage. The predictable result during 19–21 June 1944 was dubbed “the Great Marianas Turkey Shoot.” The Japanese lost 480 planes, including 92 percent of their carrier aircraft, along with the three largest of their six remaining aircraft carriers. On the other side of the rout, the Americans lost just 130 aircraft (mostly due to fuel starvation following a long-range strike during the evening of 20 June). In fact, the Americans lost just 50 planes in action and recovered all but 76 of their aircrew.13
Fleet Defense in the Missile Age
While U.S. carrier battle groups were able to project power inland with relative ease during the conflicts in Korea and Vietnam, the Royal Navy experienced high-intensity combat at sea that had not yet been seen in the Cold War. The 1982 Falklands War between Great Britain and Argentina demonstrated that fleet air defense was feasible in the missile age but was fraught with risks. Largely dependent on naval air power, with sorties made by shore-based aircraft hampered by the sheer distance from Ascension Island to the battlefield, the Royal Navy was forced to defend itself from the onslaught of Argentine attack aircraft.
There were several structural limitations to the Fleet Air Arm component. It lacked organic airborne early warning (AEW), relying on ship-based radar instead.14 This was partially due to the assumption that Cold War combat would take place close to home in the North Atlantic, within range of shore-based aircraft that could provide the requisite support.15 Additionally, the air wing was unable to extend its range by furnishing its own air-to-air refueling capability, given the limited existing deck space on the vertical/short takeoff and landing carriers.16 Furthermore, the Harrier was intended to fight off Soviet warships and support troops ashore in Northern Europe, and possibly individual Soviet aircraft, while Royal Navy surface ships served as the primary air defense assets.17 Overall, this Royal Navy task force was designed for antisubmarine warfare and warding off high-flying Soviet bombers, not managing sea-skimming attack aircraft and cruise missiles.
The ocean ceased to be a sanctuary for the British Task Force upon its arrival in the South Atlantic. Argentina was able to exploit British satellite communications, enabling it to direct a Boeing 707 to provide a better fix on the location of the fleet.18 This reconnaissance aircraft then proceeded to direct Argentine fighters to the fleet, an innovative use of their limited aerial scouting assets. Additionally, Argentina’s “Fenix” Squadron, a group of unarmed Learjets that would fly toward the British fleet at high altitudes to simulate a Canberra bomber raid, with the intention of distracting Harriers on CAP. Fighters with longer range and dedicated AEW could have mitigated these threats.
The Royal Navy floundered trying to effectively relay data from surface ship intercept radars to fighter aircrews. Their insistence on strict radio emissions control made it more difficult for Harriers to safely operate around the fleet.19 This was a direct consequence of the minimal fleet air defense role of the Harrier going into the conflict. The loss of the missile destroyer HMS Coventry illuminated the hazards of a naval task force steaming without proper AEW and fighter direction. Operating in the littorals of the Falkland Sound to support the amphibious invasion, the Coventry struggled to identify oncoming Argentine attack aircraft due to the limitations of its radar in detecting targets moving over land.20 The Coventry was also worried about shooting down friendly aircraft, as she detected the enemy aircraft but knew that Harriers were also in the air.21 Strong shipboard defense systems and modern fighters lose much of their utility if they cannot be deconflicted.
Although the Harrier armed with Sidewinder missiles was considered a “great surprise” in the conflict, the Fleet Air Arm quickly learned that the missile era and precision weapons did not negate the need for massed fires.22 The Sidewinder, including the updated AIM-9L supplied during the war by the United States, was not always effective, whether due to technical problems or pilot error.23 Harriers flown over the Falklands only carried two missiles, restricting their ability to deal with large numbers of targets or beat countermeasures. After the war, the Harriers were modified to carry four Sidewinders, a reflection of the need to bring massed fire to the fight for fleet air defense. Overall, British technological, training, and numerical advantages enabled them to overcome operational deficiencies even in a war they were not optimally equipped for. Dedicated fighter direction/deconfliction, patrol range, and missile payload, as well as the omnipresent need for AEW, were the primary capabilities that the Royal Navy discovered it required. These areas were recognized as constraints by Task Force commander Admiral Sir John Foster “Sandy” Woodward from the beginning of the conflict. A more mature fleet air defense system would have served them well in the Falklands and in any potential conflict with the Soviet Union.
Shoot the Archer
While war raged in the South Atlantic, the U.S. Navy was already well on its way to revolutionizing its own fleet air defense operations. Outer Air Battle (OAB) functioned as a vital tactical component of the Maritime Strategy developed by the Navy during the 1980s. Its aim was to counter Soviet Naval Aviation bombers and patrol aircraft, which threatened the fleet with antiship cruise missiles.
U.S. fleet air defense in this era reflected the reality that outer, area, and self-defense systems individually were insufficient, but collectively formed an effective, layered defense. The F-14 Tomcat, guided by the AWG-9 radar and armed with AIM-54 Phoenix air-to-air missiles, was intended to track and engage numerous targets simultaneously from a distance. Thus, Tomcats were tasked with shooting the archer, greatly reducing the number of missiles that ship-based defense would have to deal with. E-2C Hawkeyes played an important role in early warning and vectoring the air wing’s fighters and tankers, while the EA-6B Prowler helped to jam enemy radars in the air. A-6 Intruders served as tankers to increase the range and time on station of the Tomcats. New Aegis-capable Ticonderoga-class cruisers and older warships with the New Threat Upgrade armed with the recently developed Phalanx close-in weapons system and the Mk-41 vertical launch system promised a formidable last line of defense against any cruise missiles that leaked through the fighter screen.
Efficient use of these advanced systems became paramount as their high costs made employing them in overwhelming numbers impossible. Using a diverse array of sensors—ranging from satellites detecting chatter on the ground between Soviet pilots and exhaust from their bombers at cruise altitudes to land-based over-the-horizon radars—the Navy pieced together the ability to vector its CAP in a more specific direction.24 This made fighting OAB far more feasible as Tomcats and supporting aircraft could be vectored toward the Soviet bombers.
Extensive training took place to ensure that these platforms could work well in conjunction with each other. The Navy Fighter Weapons School became a hub of innovation for all carrier air wings by conducting experiments in fleet air defense tactics.25 Particular emphasis was placed on ensuring Tomcat and Hawkeye aircrews could manage the complexities of OAB through the TOPGUN and TOPSCOPE courses.26 The fleet practiced these tactics as well, with carrier battle groups training in Norwegian fjords, in the shadow of Alaskan and Japanese islands, and performing operations under strict emissions control policies, all with the purpose of hiding from Soviet assets.
The Soviets were quite aware of the limitations of OAB. They understood that the F-14, due to weight restrictions when landing aboard the carrier, usually would only carry four AIM-54s, versus the touted six. Given that Soviet Naval Aviation planned to launch saturation attacks to overwhelm the defenders, a few extra missiles could have made the difference.
The Navy sought to make OAB more resilient. To maximize the range and number of Tomcats on station, “Chainsaw” tactics were implemented using S-3 Vikings as tankers and communication relays, supplementing KA-6s and E-2Cs in those roles.27 Soviet Naval Aviation had significant jamming capability that was aimed at hampering OAB. Using “Vector Logic,” or simple radio calls that triggered immediate and planned responses, added a degree of durability to this complex fleet air defense architecture.28 Lastly, with the E-2C controlling much of the aircraft aloft, the carriers could remain relatively silent, enhancing their survivability.29 This often practiced and analyzed operational concept was never tested in combat between Americans and Soviets, as the Cold War ended peacefully. However, there are still lessons to be learned. This case is particularly relevant given that there is talk of both “resurrecting” and “dusting off” OAB tactics to confront modern threats posed by peer competitors.30
Despite the disparate nature of the combatants and technologies involved in these cases, several similarities emerge that can be treated as requirements for effective fleet air defense. Proper fighter direction was essential in all cases, whether guided by picket destroyers or airborne early warning platforms. The Navy’s investment in the new E-2D, with air-to-air refueling capability, as well as increasing squadron sizes from four to five aircraft, demonstrates the continuing relevance of its command-and-control mission. As World War II progressed, the Navy altered its proportion of aircraft on the flight deck, reflecting the need for more fighters to defend the fleet. During the Cold War, increasing the number of air-to-air missiles, be they Sidewinders or Phoenixes, was seen as necessary to deal with waves of enemy strike aircraft. Indeed, some argue that Super Hornets, being able to carry three times as many air-to-air missiles as antiship weapons, should shift their focus to providing air defense. Also, the integration of surface ship defenses and sensors, in the form of rapidly improving radars in World War II and Aegis during the late Cold War, added a desperately needed layer of protection. In all instances, increased CAP range enabled the air wing to destroy “archers” before they could employ their weapons and granted the fleet more operational freedom to maneuver. These histories are instructive for those studying and practicing fleet air defense in an era of pressing air and missile threats to the fleet.
1. John T. Kuehn, America’s First General Staff: A Short History of the Rise and Fall of the General Board of the Navy, 1900–1950, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2017), 124–33.
2. “Combat Narratives: The Battle of the Coral Sea: Consisting of the actions at Tulagi, May 4th; off Misima, May 7th; and in the Coral Sea on May 9th, 1942,” Naval History and Heritage Command, 2017, 14–22.
3. “Combat Narratives: The Battle of the Coral Sea: Consisting of the actions at Tulagi, May 4th; off Misima, May 7th; and in the Coral Sea on May 9th, 1942,” Naval History and Heritage Command, 22.
4. Samuel Eliot Morison, The Two-Ocean War: A Short History of the United States Navy in the Second World War (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1963), 157.
5. “Combat Narratives: Battles of Midway June 3–6, 1942,” Naval History and Heritage Command, 2017, 26–30.
6. Norman Friedman, Fighters Over the Fleet: Naval Air Defense from Biplanes to the Cold War (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2016), 155.
7. “Combat Narratives: The Battles of Savo Island 9 August 1942 and the Eastern Solomons 23–25 August 1942,” Naval History and Heritage Command, 2017, 48–54.
8. Morison, The Two-Ocean War, 190–96.
9. Trent Hone, Learning War: The Evolution of Fighting Doctrine in the U.S. Navy, 1898–1945 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2018), 228–32.
10. Craig L. Symonds, The Battle of Midway (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 360–61.
11. David Sears, Pacific Air: How Fearless Flyboys, Peerless Aircraft, and Fast Flattops Conquered the Skies in the War with Japan (Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press, 2011), 259–60.
12. James D. Hornfischer, The Fleet at Flood Tide: America at Total War in the Pacific (New York: Bantam Books, 2016), 3–6.
13. Morison, 342–45.
14. Friedman, Fighters Over the Fleet, 375.
15. Friedman, 375.
16. Friedman, 376.
17. Friedman, 377.
18. Friedman, 378–79.
19. Friedman, 378–79.
20. Friedman, 379.
21. Friedman, 379.
22. Friedman, 380.
23. Friedman, 378.
24. Norman Friedman, Network-Centric Warfare: How Navies Learned to Fight Smart Through Three World Wars (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2009), 215.
25. Brad Elward, TOPGUN: The Legacy: The Complete History of TOPGUN and Its Impact on Tactical Aviation (Atglen, PA: Schiffer Publishing, 2021), 205–08.
26. Elward, TOPGUN, 205–08.
27. Friedman, Fighters Over the Fleet, 388.
28. Friedman, 388.
29. Friedman, 388.
30. Elward, TOPGUN, 463.
