The Great White Fleet Sails On: Naval Shows of Force in the Domestic Arena

“Speak softly and carry a big stick.” President Theodore Roosevelt’s aphorism is often exalted as the highest maxim of an assertive and engaged American foreign policy. What are often overlooked, however, are the effects that Roosevelt’s “big stick” policies had on the domestic audiences to which he addressed his momentous words. Indeed, informed analysis of the apotheosis of this expression of global engagement, the cruise of the Great White Fleet between 1907 and 1909, finds that “show of force” operations in a democracy are critical to not only deterring adversaries in the international arena, but also to preparing the proverbial domestic field (to include both the general public and their elected leaders) in advance of major conflicts. Without significant public displays of modern warfighting capabilities and raw force, the tangible and intangible elements upon which military success rest are but moot, for there is little for the electorate and policymakers alike to pass judgement on and correspondingly increase funding for. In the context of rising regional tensions in the modern day, actions such as that fleet’s notable voyage should be considered instructive as democracies again contend with the increasing likelihood of future great power conflict.

The Environment

The 16th of December 1907 was a crisp winter day in the maritime mid-Atlantic. The heavy seasonal rains and fog that typically obscured portions of the Chesapeake Bay had abated to reveal a massive development: a titanic naval armada preparing to get underway from its base in Hampton Roads, Virginia. Tasked by the Navy Department and President Roosevelt himself, 16 first-class battleships of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet and their escorts were on the cusp of undertaking one of the most impressive naval endeavors to date: an around-the-world-cruise to show the American flag in foreign ports, engage with partners and allies, rehearse tactics and operations, and test new technology. The force was putting to sea to accomplish one thing: display American naval might.

It had certainly taken some time to reach this point. It was not until the aftermath of the Spanish-American War at the end of the 19th century that Congress and the Navy Department committed to the construction of ships with “the highest practicable speed and the greatest radius of action.”¹ This commitment was evident by the time the Great White Fleet assembled in 1907, with the 13-inch guns on board ships from the Illinois and Kearsarge classes representing “the most powerful ordnance for vessels of this class,” and the 12-inch guns of the Connecticut, Maine, and Virginia classes following close behind—to say nothing of the 8-, 7-, 6-, 5-, and 3-inch guns that comprised these ships’ secondary batteries. In terms of displacement, the largest of these vessels, the Connecticut-class battleships, were estimated to be 16,000 tons. At the other end of the spectrum, the Kearsarge class displaced more than 11,500 tons.² Even the smallest capital ship of the flotilla was still 17 percent larger than a Ticonderoga-class guided missile cruiser, the largest pure surface combatant of the modern-day Navy. 

Added to this battleship-heavy might was a varied assortment of torpedo boat destroyers, fleet auxiliary ships, and other vessels necessary for sustained operations on the high seas. On board the decks of these ships stood the more than 14,000 sailors who represented vast swaths of the American populace of the time. 

Thus, the four-mile-long armada of warships, all gleaming with fresh coats of buff and white paint, set off from Norfolk on a journey that would last 14 months. Bound initially for the West Coast of the United States, the fleet would ultimately proceed to New Zealand, Australia, Japan, Ceylon (present-day Sri Lanka), and other Far East nations, transit the Suez Canal and the Mediterranean Sea, make a stop in Spain, and finally cross the Atlantic en route to its original port in Hampton Roads by 1909.³ It would cover more than 43,000 miles and make stops in 20 ports of call on six of the seven continents of the globe.⁴

Perhaps even more pronounced than the environmental conditions on that frosty December day, however, were the geopolitical circumstances. In the wake of Japan’s successes during conflicts with other regional powers at the turn of the 20th century, the world in general—and the Pacific nations in particular—were witnessing a substantial buildup within the Imperial Japanese armed forces and a tangible shift in the regional balance of power. The Japanese government had dictated harsh terms under the Treaty of Shimonoseki following its victory over Chinese forces during the Sino-Japanese War (1894–5), which resulted in the cession of the strategically important Port Arthur to the victors. After Russia eventually assumed control of the port via alternate means, Japan doubled the size of its army and naval forces, a move that provoked European countries with interests in Asia to reassess their alliances and allocation of forces in the region. These shifting tides resulted in a hardening of relations between Russia and Japan, which ultimately led to the opening of hostilities between the two nations. 

On the morning of 4 February 1904, Japanese naval forces successfully undertook a surprise attack on Russian forces at Port Arthur. Predictably, Russia surged naval assets to the region, but the logistical and engineering problems that had long plagued Russian fleet operations resulted in the arrival of a force that was damaged, undersupplied, and ill-prepared in every sense. As such, it was no surprise that the Japanese fleet under the command of Admiral Togo annihilated the Russian force at the Battle of Tsushima Strait in May 1905. This victory, along with Great Britain’s simultaneous need to concentrate its forces in European waters to contend with shifting power balances there, left much of the Pacific open to the influence of a newly risen expansionist regional power.⁵

Such developments did not go unnoticed on the opposite shores of the Pacific. Indeed, President Roosevelt, operating in the popular conceptual framework developed by Alfred Thayer Mahan, knew that developing a “national character—a people’s propensity for nautical endeavors” was crucial at this critical point in global history.⁶ As early as the 1890s, Roosevelt, then Assistant Secretary of the Navy, had been in communication with Mahan. He had asserted that,

We should build a dozen new battleships, half of them on the Pacific Coast; and these battleships should have large coal capacity and a consequent increased radius of action. I am fully alive to the danger from Japan, and I know that it is idle to rely on any sentimental good will toward us.

As President less than a decade later, Roosevelt knew that the responses of the United States with regard to the tensions with Japan and broader pressures around the world would have to be undergirded by a universal belief that the United States could and would secure its vital interests. As Elihu Root, Roosevelt’s venerable Secretary of State, observed, the President was firmly convinced that “a very rich people incapable of defending its independence and its citizens against aggression” might allow “some other nation of predatory instincts” to take advantage of it.⁷ Put differently, Roosevelt and other policymakers within his administration correctly assumed that the challenges posed by revisionist powers must be met with measured means demonstrating both capability and credibility.

The President and the naval minds around him recognized that he must use his “bully pulpit” to great effect, highlighting the tangible benefits of free and open seas both to the United States and liberal nations around the world. In this sense the Roosevelt administration had been active, providing assurances to Australia and other allies in the region regarding the durability of American support in the face of potential conflict.⁸ However, words and signaling alone were insufficient. American leaders would have to set a visual stage that would justify the dramatic increase in acquisitions that would be necessary to protect Western interests in the face of increasing threats.

Impress the People

The foreign policy implications in the global arena having thus been established, these observations still beg the question: What was the primary motivation that led policymakers to authorize this relatively uncharacteristic deployment of naval forces? A commentator might assert that Roosevelt’s foremost goal was to intimidate foreign powers on the international stage with a most bombastic of display of the proverbial American “big stick,” thereby provoking others and risking an avoidable war. A more reasoned analysis, however, reveals that the true goal was to inspire awe. This much was evident by 16 December 1907, when citizens and sailors alike lined the Hampton Roads waterfront to send off the assemblage of ships. Indeed, the seven days before the Great White Fleet’s actual departure, popularly referred to as “Navy Farewell Week,” had been filled not only with the requisite coaling runs, stores onloads, and other necessary logistical exercises, but also with balls, luncheons, receptions, and other social engagements. Prominent members of civil society from New York, Washington, Baltimore, and Richmond journeyed to Norfolk to partake in the festivities.⁹ The President himself, later viewing the scene of the fleet getting underway from aboard his official yacht, summarized it best: “Did you ever see such a fleet? Isn’t it magnificent? Oughtn’t we all feel proud?”¹⁰

It is also instructive to analyze the themes and tones of domestic print periodicals from that period, for these publications represented the primary means of widespread social and political communication at the time. As the noted scholar James Reckner observes, “the American public avidly followed the fleet’s progress, and in newspapers and magazines tens of millions read detailed reports about the nations being visited” and the operations being conducted.¹¹ The Times Dispatch (Richmond, Virginia) and National Tribune (Washington, D.C.) ran prominent stories highlighting the ships and men on board them in the months leading up to the fleet’s sailing.¹² The Washington Herald featured a full front-page feature that highlighted the armada the day before its departure.¹³ The Washington Times proclaimed in bold letters across its front page on departure day, 16 December, “FLEET STEAMS SOUTHWARD AS CANNONS FIRE SALUTE TO COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF.”¹⁴ Such accolades continued well beyond the day that the Great White Fleet got underway. Periodicals from as far away as California, Kentucky, and Washington state regularly featured updates and profiles over the course of the 14 months of the Great White Fleet’s global tour.¹⁵

All these anecdotes and evidence being taken together, it must be assumed, then, that the American public was the most important target of this endeavor. “My prime purpose,” Roosevelt would later say of the mission, “was to impress the American people; and this purpose was fully achieved.”¹⁶

Results of the Cruise

Above all, it is most important to appreciate the point that the effects of the Great White Fleet’s cruise transcended the realm of mere rhetoric, for the goodwill fostered within the domestic populace served only to achieve a more tangible end. This fact was perhaps most pronounced in terms of the Navy’s budget at the time. Between 1899 (the year immediately after the Spanish-American War) and 1908, the last full year of the fleet’s voyage, the average annual budget for the Navy stood at just over $113 million. There was a marked increase, however, in 1909, the year that the Great White Fleet returned to its home port in the Chesapeake Bay. For that annum, a Congress reveling in the success of the expedition authorized $125,729,000 to the maritime component of the armed forces. The contemporary observer may look lightly upon this figure since modern-day budgets are measured in billions, rather than millions, of dollars. One must appreciate, however, that the budget for 1909 represented an almost 15 percent increase from the previous year . This fact is remarkable when compared with the current Fiscal Year 2024 Navy budget request, a figure that is characterized by an increase of just 4.5 percent. Further, this shift proved to be durable, for Navy budgets never again fell below the baseline set by the post–Great White Fleet environment.

One may count such budgetary increases as hollow or otherwise reflective of domestic economic pressures, such as the high rates of inflation that the world faces in the 21st century. This, however, does not account for the fact that during the same period as the budget increases, the Navy experienced substantial growth in terms of its most prized assets: ships. Growing by only ten vessels during the five years preceding the Great White Fleet’s return, the Navy expanded itself by 37 ships in the period between 1909 and the outbreak of World War I in 1914. Furthermore, Navy leaders were able to utilize the increased funding to focus investments in two of the most promising platforms of the day: destroyers and submarines. The numbers of these two platforms increased by 212 percent and 125 percent, respectively. Recognizing that battleships would not be sufficient forever, naval leaders translated contemporary successes into more advanced assets that would be vital in future fights.¹⁷

In sum, the voyage of the Great White Fleet was not a display of force solely intended to intimidate, coerce, or cajole actors on the international stage. Rather, it was an expression of a policy that recognized the fact that future geopolitical challenges (in that case, Japanese expansionism) could only be successfully contended with if the American public and their elected leaders were willing to increase their investment in naval power in the most demonstrable of ways. This end could only come about if those Americans outside the ranks of the Navy were able to experience the might and grandeur of a unique American armada representing its country’s interests abroad. President Roosevelt and his Navy Department surmised an important lesson: All foreign policy begins and ends at its domestic roots.

Recommendations for the Modern Day

The U.S. Navy may only be a few generations removed from the global instability that led to the deployment of the Great White Fleet, but it once again finds itself in a place where global tensions demand radical improvements in the acquisition and utilization of the elements that comprise raw naval power. Similar to how the activities of the early 20th century Imperial Japanese military bred anxiety in the western Pacific, the expansionism, illiberalism, and norm-breaking behavior of the 21st century People’s Republic of China have led the United States and other democracies to consider that state and the party that controls it as the primary geopolitical threats of this day.¹⁸ Accordingly, the United States requires a larger fleet and more capable naval platforms to maintain freedom of the seas.¹⁹

The means and methods to acquire such resources, however, will only come about with the requisite level of “buy-in” from the American public that funds such expenditures, and from the policymakers who are tasked with leading in the policy space. This in turn can be seen as a function of the levels of familiarity and general understanding of the warfighting capabilities of the Navy by the public. In this sense, events such as the now-ubiquitous “Fleet Weeks,” which occur in a handful of ports and cities around the United States, should be considered as only partially sufficient, for although many of these events include tours, community relations events, and other forms of public outreach, they generally lack the displays of power that inspired domestic audiences and deterred adversaries more than a century ago.

Instead, leaders today should consider a reprise of the massive display of power that sparked the revolution in naval preparedness more than 100 years ago. A large-scale exercise or deployment that echoes the around-the-world cruise of the Great White Fleet could do much to not only assuage anxieties in the capitals of America’s partners, but also to communicate to the American public the beneficial end of maintaining the contemporary international order and the means needed to achieve it. A considerable deployment of forces and the public relations campaign surrounding it focusing on both maritime combat capabilities and the intention to uphold global norms would be in America’s best interest. Lest the critic count such a proposal as jingoistic, it should be noted that such an event could—and should—involve assets from the United States’ partners and allies, to include Japan, the United Kingdom, Australia, and any other interested party.²⁰

Challenges abound in the modern era, but the U.S. Navy and the nation that it serves can persist and succeed if attention is paid to the instructive lessons of the Great White Fleet’s sailing and other similar historical achievements. “If we dare to rise level with the opportunities offered us,” President Roosevelt would ultimately observe, “our destiny will be vast beyond the power of imagination.”