The Kaiser’s U-Boat Assault on America: Germany’s Great War Gamble in the First World War
Hans Joachim Koerver. Barnsley, South Yorkshire, UK: Pen & Sword Books, 2020. 343 pp. Plates. Charts/Graphs. Maps. Tables. Appx. Notes. Biblio. Index. $34.95.
Reviewed by Andrew G. Wilson
The Kaiser’s U-Boat Assault on America is at first glance poorly titled; rather, it is the subtitle that truly encapsulates the book—Germany’s Great War Gamble in the First World War. While the first half of the title may be commercially relevant, it is the “gamble” portion so well outlined by author Hans Joachim Koerver that makes the book both a fascinating and tragic read.
Much more primitive than their World War II cousins, the U-boats of the Great War not only represented a new, “ungentlemanly” form of warfare and technology, but also were unproven and highly controversial, even among German leaders. Drawing on official archival source material, U-boat logbooks, journals from those involved, and secondary literature, The Kaiser’s U-Boat Assault is Koerver’s considerable attempt to explain the military and diplomatic issues surrounding Germany’s decision to employ unrestricted submarine warfare against the Allies. The true contribution of Koerver’s research is not simply another examination of U-boat warfare, but rather a study of the struggle within Germany’s leadership circles regarding how to prosecute the naval and diplomatic war, which tools to employ, and who ultimately would make the decisions and deal with the attending (and, for Germany, costly) consequences.
While most readers are well aware of the U-boats’ full potential, thanks in large part to the history of the German wolf packs in World War II, it was in the first war that Germany began to experiment with this new weapon, discovering its full strategic promise too late in the conflict to affect its outcome. Though this overall storyline is widely known, the military and diplomatic struggle within Germany itself during World War I over whether to deploy the U-boat against the Allies is much less so.
As noted in his preface, Koerver contends that “German Navy and Army blunderings deliberately provoked the April 6, 1917 entry of the United States into the First World War.” Further explained is that Germany’s ruling establishment (the military, by that point) had no interest in a negotiated peace with the Allies. In essence, the German Reich was going all in on the submarine gamble—either it would win the war before the United States could have an effect on the conflict, or the war would be lost for Germany.
What sets The Kaiser’s U-Boat Assault apart is the author’s use of source material to illustrate the dysfunctional internal debates in Germany regarding the war, its possible outcomes, and how to address the multitude of decisions that needed to be made, that would have significant consequences. The German “gamble” to use U-boats to break the British naval blockade was part of what Koerver calls Tirpitz’s “desperado politics”: a political system pitting the conservative right, Pan-German element (including the military) against the diplomats and the left, with an easily manipulated Kaiser Wilhelm in the middle, unable to either direct or control the German military. In the end, unrestricted submarine warfare represented the last hopeful gasp of the German military class to retain its elevated position in German society. Instead, “Wilhelminian society . . . its rejection of reforms . . . unwillingness to adapt, and in fear for its very survival, brought about its own demise.”
Given Koerver’s illumination of the long-running political intrigues among the Kaiser, senior naval staff, and Germany’s diplomats regarding the deployment and tactics to be used by the U-boats, it is unfortunate that equal attention was not given to the numerous charts, graphs, and maps used to augment his various arguments, as they would have been even more effective in color rather than black and white.
The Kaiser’s U-Boat Assault on America is an absorbing work for those interested in both the Great War and early submarine-based strategic theory. Perhaps more important, it is an excellent illumination of a multiclass, militaristic, and diplomatically inept state trying to adapt to the realities of modern war and the exploitation of new technology—and catastrophically failing.
Hans Koerver has provided the student of Germany in World War I, and more widely, students of diplomacy, an excellent primer on the dangers of a state system in which diplomats and military leaders cannot understand or appreciate the other community’s contribution to the wider state or war aims. The risk inherent in such inability to appreciate the two realms is significant indeed. For Germany, it was truly disastrous, both at sea and at home.
Mr. Wilson is an operational representative/liaison officer for the Department of the Navy.
All Present and Accounted For
Captain Steven J. Craig, U.S. Coast Guard Reserve (Retired). New York: Hellgate Press, 2019. 276 pp. $16.95.
Reviewed by Lieutenant Commander Karen Love Kutkiewicz, U.S. Coast Guard
Disaster strikes when a ship runs aground in the Aleutian Islands facing sustained 70-knot winds, sideways sleet, and surrounding darkness. She is dead in the water, combating flooding, and heeling over 60 degrees in the waves after losing propulsion and electricity. This is the true story of the USCGC Jarvis (WHEC-725), her brave crew who battled to keep her afloat, and the Japanese trawler Koyo Maru No. 3 arriving in the nick of time and setting up the tow to keep her from running aground again and being battered against the cliffs.
The author, retired Coast Guard Captain Steven Craig, leads us through the moments that separate life from death, a ship sinking from one staying afloat, those moments running on adrenaline and past training and experience, those 105 hours from when the Jarvis runs aground to when she moors in Dutch Harbor, Alaska. These are the moments where grit and determination were the only options the crew had to save each other and their newly commissioned ship.
Craig begins the reader’s expedition in 1898, with First Lieutenant David Jarvis and his heroic actions, leading an inspiring overland rescue in Alaska, saving fishermen trapped in Arctic ice. Because of his great courage, in 1972 the Coast Guard named the 12th (and final) high-endurance 378-foot cutter after him. Craig then details the life of Captain Frederick Wooley, the Jarvis’ first commanding officer, and how his experience as a Merchant Marine master molded him into the revered captain and consummate professional known to his crew.
Craig conducted in-depth research and interviews to identify the time line and give the story fine details, making the scenes come to life. He dives into the crew’s lives, making readers feel familiar and connected to the men serving on board the Jarvis during her maiden patrol from Honolulu, Hawaii, to conduct the Alaskan fisheries mission in the Bering Sea. Readers witness how each crew member played a vital part in saving the ship and each other. Craig’s vivid descriptions of the actions of the crew brought this reviewer to tears with the line, “Help is on the way!”
I served on high-endurance cutters for five years, and I could imagine myself on board throughout this text. These Hamilton-class cutters served the nation for more than 40 years, and approximately 50,000 Coast Guardsmen crewed them. All of these ships are still in foreign service today. It is easy to imagine the scenario and put yourself in the shoes of the crewmen. Craig puts readers there, able to feel the despair, elation, and exhaustion, and smell the elephant snot.
A critique that I have is with the title. May readers will be familiar with the phrase “All present and accounted for,” so if they do not already know the story, they will be able to deduce that no one will perish in this emergency, which may diminish the suspense.
There is relatively little readable Coast Guard history, so when a good book like this one comes around, be sure to pick up a few copies for your seagoing (or wannabe seagoing) friends. This is a must-read for any cutterman, past or present, as “the lessons of the Jarvis grounding served not only to highlight the extreme dangers of the Alaskan waters, but also to illustrate the leadership, commitment, and heroic actions of a well-trained crew that saved a ship that fateful week in November 1972.” The lessons remain true to this day—leadership, ingenuity, selflessness, and devotion to duty.
With the crew who lived through this harrowing adventure in their retirement years and some having crossed the bar, bringing this crucial Coast Guard history back to the surface is vitally important to Coast Guardsmen, merchant mariners, and all seafarers. This is camaraderie. “It’s our ship.”
LCDR Kutkiewicz is a permanent cutterman with seven years of sea time, most recently as the operations officer on board the heavy icebreaker USCGC Polar Star (WAGB-10) operating in the Antarctic. She is the second Coast Guard Federal Executive Fellow to the U.S. Naval Institute.
The Eastern Fleet and the Indian Ocean, 1942–1944: The Fleet that Had to Hide
Charles Stephenson. Yorkshire, UK, and Philadelphia: Pen & Sword Books, 2020. 320 pp. Notes, Biblio., Index, Maps, Illus. $42.95.
Reviewed by Craig Symonds
Though scores of books have been written about World War II naval combat in the Atlantic, the Pacific, and the Mediterranean, relatively few books focus on the naval war in the Indian Ocean. There, British Admiral Sir James Somerville commanded a force that was both smaller and qualitatively inferior to the Japanese, so that instead of confronting the enemy head-on, it became “the fleet that had to hide,” as author Charles Stephenson puts it in his book, The Eastern Fleet and the Indian Ocean, 1942–1944: The Fleet that Had to Hide.
In this detailed and well-researched history, Prime Minister Winston Chuchill is clearly sympathetic to Somerville’s challenge. Never one of Churchill’s favorites, Somerville was charged with the task of protecting India—the jewel of the British Empire—without ever having the naval assets needed to do it. “Forever starved of resources, and for the most part forced to make do,” Stephenson writes, Somerville “nevertheless successfully defended a huge, strategically vital, oceanic area.”
Stephenson’s book covers both the strategic environment and the tactical detail of Indian Ocean operations. Churchill does not come off well here, in part because Stephenson relies heavily on the often-scathing observations in the diary of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Alan Brooke, who found Churchill’s shifting obsessions and constant meddling infuriating.
Stephenson is quite detailed when discussing naval operations. For example, he covers the Japanese raid into the Indian Ocean in April 1942 with a nearly hour-by-hour analysis. He concludes that Somerville was lucky not to have been annihilated altogether during that raid, and he might well have been but for Admiral Chuichi Nagumo’s “lackadaisical” attitude toward reconnaissance.
Somerville’s situation improved significantly in 1944 as the war in Europe wound down and the Royal Navy was able to commit more ships to his force. On the other hand, Stephenson notes that Somerville’s ability to use those new assets became more complicated with the appointment of Lord Louis Mountbatten to head the South East Asia Command. In that relationship, Somerville was occasionally a victim of Mountbatten’s amateurish enthusiasms about strategic alternatives.
The book ends with a detailed description and analysis of the little-known campaign of the Eastern Fleet against the Andaman and Nicobar Islands in the fall of 1944—essentially a diversion for the U.S. campaign in the Philippines. After that, the Eastern Fleet largely ceased to function as Admiral Bruce Fraser took command of what was called the British Pacific Fleet.
In a final encomium to the long-suffering Somerville, Stephenson concludes that he “was arguably Britain’s best, if probably least known, admiral of the Second World War.”
Mr. Symonds is a professor emeritus of history at the U.S. Naval Academy and the author or coauthor of more than 25 books on naval history.
The Shores of Tripoli
Kevin Bertram, designer; Cat Bock, Marc Rodrigue II, and Matthew Wallhead, artists. Washington, DC: Fort Circle Games. 1–2 players. 45–60 minutes play time. Ages 12+. $60.
Reviewed by William Prom
The Shores of Tripoli board game is a unique and welcome addition to the study of the First Barbary War. It not only includes the more popularly known events, such as Stephen Decatur burning the frigate Philadelphia or William Eaton’s march on Derne, but also portrays some nuances of the conflict better than many popular books on the subject.
In the game, two players “fight” the First Barbary War as either the U.S. Navy or Tripoli, or a single player leads the U.S. Navy against an event-card based Tripolitan artificial intelligence Tripoli referred to as “T-Bot.” The game is played with a beautifully crafted board depicting the North African coast, high-quality cards, and wooden ships and infantry units. Gameplay is card-driven as players build, move, and fight their fleets through each season from 1801 to 1806, with outcomes determined by rolls of the dice. Experienced players will be able to conduct the U.S. Navy’s campaign from within an hour.
As with the real conflict, the U.S. Navy and Tripoli players have different conditions for victory. From the first cards drawn in spring 1801, a player may see a clear strategy to reach one of the winning paths, but the opponent’s agency, chance, and limits on available cards can confound many grand plans. Even in the solitaire version, the player must balance a focus on the U.S. Navy’s victory parameters with ensuring the T-Bot does not reach its own first.
Winning requires planning and strategizing early in the game and taking calculated risks throughout. Passing seasons trigger different events (e.g., ships joining the American squadron, allied ships departing, Eaton forming his army, Tripoli shifting forces) that reasonably mirror the historical progression of the conflict and complicate strategies developed at the outset. To achieve victory by the end of 1806, players must prepare forces and hit certain wickets earlier in the game, all while reacting to the opponent’s moves. If well plotted, the game races to a satisfying end as the plan comes together. If not, the chance of victory unravels equally fast.
To play the conflict to a different conclusion, the game includes alternate history events, such as Eaton marching on Tripoli or the other Barbary states attacking. These did not happen but were entirely possible (after all, in the summer of 1802, false reports arrived in Washington that Tunis had declared war). The game designer notes sacrificing some historical accuracy for the sake of feasibility, but these are worthwhile trade-offs to make a compelling game.
In fact, there are several points where the game portrays the First Barbary War more accurately than many popular accounts. Instead of state-sponsored terror, Tripoli’s corsairs serve a rational state with clear objectives. Also, where many histories depict the war as an isolated conflict solely between the United States and Tripoli, the game demonstrates the complex scenario the American squadron commanders dealt with. For Commodore Edward Preble, maintaining peace with the rest of the Barbary States took almost as much time and effort as trying to end war with Tripoli. In the game, Morocco, Algiers, and Tunis can all raid U.S. merchants, and the U.S. Navy player must contend with them to achieve victory.
This game is an excellent addition to the collection of any avid gamer or fan of Age of Sail navies. The engaging gameplay and historical background are sure to spark interest in the subject for newcomers, and for those versed in the First Barbary War, the game offers the rare chance to try to “beat” history.
Mr. Prom graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 2009 with a bachelor’s degree in history, with honors, and a commission in the Marine Corps. He left the Marine Corps in 2014 as a captain and now works as a writer.
British Naval Intelligence Through the Twentieth Century
Andrew Boyd. Barnsley, UK: Seaforth Publishing, 2020. 680 pp. Maps. Diagrams. Illus. Notes. Biblio. $52.95.
Reviewed by Peter Hore
Andrew Boyd distinguished himself as a historian of the first class with his 2017 book, The Royal Navy in Eastern Waters: Linchpin of Victory 1935–42 (Naval Institute Press), in which he explained how control of the Indian Ocean enabled Britain and the Royal Navy to face down the challenge of Japan in the east, while allowing the process of defeating Italy and then Germany in the Middle East.
Boyd opens his second book, British Naval Intelligence through the Twentieth Century, with an analysis of British naval intelligence since the Battle of Trafalgar, highlights the empirical effect of the creation of the Hydrographic Office, and details of the spread of a worldwide network of submarine telegraphic cables (often under British control) from the later 1830s and from the mid-1800s. He also details the growth of a network of naval attachés to serve abroad and identifies key individuals who drew these developments together.
Boyd concludes with revelatory disclosures about submarine operations in the High North during the Cold War, characterizing them as: “They were Britain’s single most important defence intelligence contribution in the second half of the Cold War and a major contributor to GCHQ’s [the Government Communications Headquarters’] defence intelligence effort” and to the U.S.-U.K. “special relationship.” In between, there is almost no episode of Royal Navy history on which Boyd does not cast the light of intelligence history. Certainly, future historians will not be able to write British naval history without looking up what Boyd now reveals.
It is important to remember that Royal Navy Captain S. W. Roskill wrote his four-volume War at Sea in the 1950/60s without reference to the Enigma secret, and that many admirals also wrote their memoirs in the postwar period without disclosing what they knew from intelligence sources about their foe. In recent years there has been something of an overcorrection, and a gullible public tends to think, based on films, that Bletchley, Enigma, Turing, etc., won the war, but, as Boyd puts it, “the story is more complicated.”
Boyd writes sublimely and has clearly read voraciously both the primary and secondary sources, and as a former naval officer (he was a submariner) and diplomat in the Foreign Office, he has a feel for the subject under review.
However, Boyd’s great ability is to set events of a momentous century into their context, to contextualize and analyze, like the good intelligence officer he himself would have made, while entertaining the reader. It is not just this reviewer, but Andrew Lambert, Peter Hennessey, Eric Grove, Sail David, and N. A. M. Rodger who reckon that Andrew Boyd has taken his place as one of the leading naval historians of the current era. This book will become a classic work of reference, a superb, sophisticated, and comprehensive reexamination of the role and uses of intelligence and a must-read for future writers of naval history.
CAPT Hore is a former head of defense studies for the Royal Navy. He is a fellow of the Royal Historical Society.