Americans are rightfully proud of the wartime service and sacrifice of our men and women in uniform. But occasionally, while under the spell of triumphalism, we narrowly focus on the United States’ part in a conflict while skimming over the key roles of other players. This tendency stretches all the way back to the U.S. War for Independence.
I recall arguing with a friend years ago that French support was crucial to the United States securing independence from Britain. “No,” he maintained, “we did it all ourselves.” But as James Holmes points out in “Lessons from George III,” the entry of France and then Spain on America’s side transformed what had been a colonial war into an international maritime conflict.
After allowing its navy to deteriorate in the aftermath of the Seven Years’ War, Britain suddenly was forced to prioritize which parts of its far-flung empire to best protect. The North American colonies ended up ranking below the Caribbean, Gibraltar, and India, as well as the waters around the British Isles. So, the United States benefited from direct material and combat support from its new allies as well as indirect support resulting from their global maritime war against Britain.
Holmes, the J. C. Wylie Chair of Maritime Strategy at the Naval War College, is an expert on current and future U.S. challenges at sea. As the title of his article implies, the present-day Navy can learn from Britain’s predicament, including that “penny-pinching degrades numbers of hulls and battle capability in peacetime, compelling political leaders to make painful choices—or even surrender critical interests—when war comes.”
While Holmes’ article deals with strategic naval issues, the chief U.S. naval strategist of World War II—Fleet Admiral Ernest King—is the focus of Alan Rems’ article, “‘I Neglected to Consult the President.’” Ever wonder why King concurrently held two of the loftiest offices in the Navy during the war: Chief of Naval Operations and Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet? Rems’ article has the answer. As the author makes clear, King had a vision of how the Navy should be organized, was given an opening to make changes, and then went too far—in the view of Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox and President Franklin D. Roosevelt.
An artist’s perspective on Admiral King is presented in “As I Recall.” Commander Albert K. Murray, USNR, painted the portraits of numerous high-ranking U.S. naval commanders, including King, and during their long sittings picked up on little-known personality traits. While King was ill-tempered and politically tactless, Murray recounts how he discovered the admiral’s sensitive side.
The June issue included a “Naval History News” story about the March 2018 USS Lexington (CV-2) and Juneau (CL-52) shipwreck discoveries by entrepreneur/philanthropist Paul Allen’s team of undersea explorers (pp. 6–7). After the issue went to press, news broke about another fabulous Allen discovery, the USS Helena (CL-50), whose survivors’ plight was recounted by Mike Stankovich in his article “A Promise Kept” (April, pp. 34–39).
We also weren’t able in the June issue to delve into the history and methodology behind the amazing string of discoveries. But frequent Naval History contributor James Delgado does so in “Paul Allen’s Winning Season.” Delgado’s outstanding credentials include more than 40 years of shipwreck exploration experience and a stint as director of Maritime Heritage for the National Marine Sanctuaries Program at the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.
Richard G. Latture
Editor-in-Chief