Political activity by service members can be risky if it is partisan or divisive.
In recent years, a growing chorus of commentators has raised concerns about the military’s engagement in politics, from veterans endorsing candidates to active-duty soldiers using social media to criticize elected officials. However, political activity by U.S. military members is nothing new. Beginning with the founding of the republic until roughly Reconstruction, there was significant overlap between military and political leadership. The period from the end of Reconstruction through just after World War II saw the establishment and entrenchment of the military’s professional ethic against political activity. Since the end of World War II, service members increasingly have become more politically vocal, with military politicking accelerating in the past few decades with the rise of veteran endorsements.
By tracing the social history of the U.S. military’s involvement in politics across three distinct eras it is clear how, in each period, the nature of military politicking was strongly shaped by broader social forces. The military’s involvement in politics is not necessarily problematic. But political activity by service members becomes risky when it is visible, is partisan, or creates a real or perceived division between the military and civilian leadership. Today’s political activity meets many of these criteria. To manage this, civilian and uniformed leadership should address its root causes by recruiting a diverse force, refraining from politicizing the military, and strengthening civil-military education in the nation’s service academies.
Citizen Soldiers and Soldier Statesmen
From the country’s founding until after the Civil War, the military was strongly associated with politics. Many of the Founding Fathers moved readily between the political and military worlds, and nearly half of the country’s first 23 presidents formerly held the title of general. The notion of the citizen soldier defined the military.1 Military members were active in politics, lobbying Congress to remove their superiors, allegedly conspiring with politicians against the government, and leveraging political connections to enrich their personal business activities. Politicians treated the military as a source of patronage, filling the ranks with partisan loyalists.2
Ties between politicians and officers strengthened during the Jackson administration with the growing hold of populism. President Andrew Jackson frequently bestowed appointments and promotions on political allies and intervened in the daily functioning of the military. Superintendent of the U.S. Military Academy Sylvanus Thayer attempted to enforce a prohibition on political activities by cadets, but Jackson personally intervened, frequently overturning Thayer’s disciplinary decisions.3 When Jackson was elected to a second term, Thayer resigned out of concern that his ongoing dispute with the President would further damage West Point.4
The strong ties between the military and political spheres prior to the Civil War were the product of broader social conditions both within the military and beyond. In the early years of the republic, the military and political spheres were intimately intertwined in large part because a distinct military profession had not yet developed. However, this entanglement did not cause serious problems for civilian control of the military. As explained by one historian: “[T]he principal officers had moved back and forth between officership and politics. They did so without threatening civil supremacy because they were essentially civilians themselves, more than they were professional soldiers with any distinctively military outlook.”5 The civilian world and the military world largely were the same.
The surge of Jacksonian populism in the 1830s further strengthened the view that the military had a right to participate in domestic politics. It attacked the view that politics was the reserve of the privileged elites, claiming a political role for every white man. One officer from the time defended soldiers’ involvement in politics by cloaking it in the language of class: “The feeling and the opinion that an officer should take no part in politics are conceived in the most servile spirit, and inculcated by the heartless military aristocrats, whose interest it is to hold the minds of their subordinates in entire subjection to their domineering propensities.”6
Apolitical Military, Militant Politics
Scholars peg the institutionalization of the U.S. military’s apolitical ethic to the post–Civil War period.7 Led by the efforts of Commanding General of the Army William Tecumseh Sherman and his protégé Emory Upton, the military began to develop a distinct professional identity, including a norm against political intervention.8 The academies began to indoctrinate new cadets and midshipmen into the force’s emerging nonpartisan ethos.
General Winfield Scott Hancock (ironically, himself a four-time contender for the presidency) evoked this ethic when he wrote to Sherman, “The Army should have nothing to do with the selection or inauguration of presidents; . . . We of the army have only to obey his mandates.”9 Sherman moved the Army’s headquarters from Washington, D.C., to St. Louis, ostensibly to reduce the association of the military with politics.10
These apolitical pressures from both above and below forged a new professional ethic against military association with the country’s politics. Historians observe that, during this period, members of the military were so averse to politics that many even refrained from voting. According to Samuel Huntington, “Not one officer in five hundred . . . ever cast a ballot.”11 The military’s apolitical ethic also limited more direct forms of political engagement. For example, Huntington notes that from 1880 until 1952, no professional military officer was nominated as a presidential candidate.12
As in the previous era, the changes in the relationship between the force and domestic politics reflected broader changes in both the military and society and in the relationship between them. While the apolitical military ethic that emerged was a product of professionalization, it was not purely so. It also was a symptom of the military’s growing isolation from society.
Historians describe the post–Civil War period as the U.S. Army’s “dark ages.”13 The size of the military was cut, and it was tasked with enforcing Reconstruction policies and labor disputes, politically unpopular assignments that brought no martial glory. Officers bristled at being overtasked and underresourced. The military became increasingly isolated from civilian society, and officers began to withdraw from and deride politics.14 Sherman’s retreat to St. Louis was motivated not only by a noble desire to avoid entangling the military in politics, but also by a desire to escape civilian oversight. Sherman resented civilian interference and complained that Secretary of War William W. Belknap had reduced his position as commanding general to a mere “sinecure.”15 The general disdained the capital’s politics, saying: “I thank God that I am not and never was a Courtier. The Court at Washington is as debasing as at Constantinople.”16
Though soldiers were reluctant to insert themselves directly into domestic political struggles, the military still influenced domestic politics in two major ways. First, electoral campaigns increasingly adopted martial language and stylings.17 Party apparatchiks spoke of rallying the rank and file around the party standard, and waving the bloody shirt became a favored campaign tactic.18 Candidates organized mass rallies featuring “marching companies” with names like The Boys in Blue.19 Parties were arranged along military lines, borrowing the hierarchy and titles of the Army, and politicians approached campaigns like battles. Benjamin Harrison, in explaining his decision to delegate more to local party officials, sounded like an officer positioning troops: “I have acted upon the theory that I was too far from the seat of war in the East to direct the movement of our forces.”20
Second, the post–Civil War era saw the emergence of veterans and their families as a distinct political constituency. It is estimated that more than 8 percent of the country’s population fought in the Civil War and more than 2 percent of the population perished. The conflict left few families untouched. Veterans and their families had a vested interest in national politics. The Grand Army of the Republic (GAR) became the most prominent fraternal organization representing veterans’ interests in the political arena, often lobbying for veteran pensions and voting rights.
Though the GAR established and enforced strict rules prohibiting partisan political activities, it became a major political actor, and many national political figures lived and died by their votes on veteran pension bills.21 The GAR’s endorsement was crucial to any aspiring Republican politician, and GAR votes were instrumental in electing Harrison to the presidency.22 In the latter part of the 19th century, the size of the GAR’s membership and its concentration in important swing states helped decide several close national races. Five of its members eventually would be elected president.
This professional ethic of an apolitical military largely continued until the decade following World War II. For example, when General of the Army George C. Marshall was nominated as Secretary of State, he approached his selection with a staunch aversion to politics: “I am assuming that the office of secretary of state, at least under present conditions, is nonpolitical and I am going to govern myself accordingly.”23
High-Level Endorsements, Low-Level Criticism
The military entered a third political era following World War II, with the slow erosion of the norm against political activity. Dwight D. Eisenhower became the first former general elected to the presidency since the 19th century. Voting, long a taboo activity among the military, became increasingly common after World War II.24 By 1956, an estimated 40 percent of military officers voted.25 Though this was well below the 60 percent of the total population that voted, and enlisted turnout was likely even lower, it represented a significant increase from previous eras.26
The creation of the Federal Voting Assistance Program, intended to facilitate voting by Americans overseas, improved absentee voting procedures and helped promote military participation. This trend continued, and in 1984 military voter turnout reached 55 percent, for the first time surpassing that of the overall population.27 Today, active-duty members of the military continue to register to vote and cast ballots at higher rates than their civilian counterparts.28
In the past few decades, active-duty and retired military personnel also have become more vocal in expressing political views. Two major trends in particular have raised concerns. The first is the growth in veteran endorsements. retired Admiral William Crowe’s endorsement of Bill Clinton in the 1992 presidential race is believed to be the first modern instance of this trend. Since then, campaigns have engaged in something of an arms race in which they try “to squeeze as many generals as possible onto their convention podiums.”29
Second, officers have been increasingly vocal and at times disdainful in their political views.30 A recent investigation of officer behavior on social media concluded that “a striking percentage of those surveyed—50 percent in some cases—indicated their active-duty military friends have engaged in insulting, rude, or disdainful comments directed at politicians, elected officials, and the President.”31 That report noted junior officers were significantly more likely than senior officers to report observing an active-duty friend direct “insulting, rude, or disdainful comments” at an elected official, suggesting the next generation of military leaders may be even more politically vocal.32 High-profile examples of senior officers speaking out include General Stanley McChrystal and the so-called Revolt of the Generals under Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld.
As with the first two eras, the apparent recent increase in public politicking by soldiers stems from broader changes in both the military and U.S. society at large. New policy initiatives after World War II removed legal and logistical barriers to military personnel voting, providing the space for greater turnout. The comparative political activism of the military also has been attributed to a growing civil-military divide. Fewer Americans serve in the military and fewer elected officials have military service than at any time since World War II.33 The military increasingly is more conservative than the rest of the country.34 Perceptions within the military that it is misunderstood by (and superior to) the civilian world may embolden officers to be more politically vocal.
The use of veteran endorsements likely has emerged as trust in institutions has fallen. In a 2017 Gallup poll of public confidence in 14 institutions, the military scored the highest confidence rating among Americans and was one of only three institutions in which a majority of Americans expressed confidence.35 The three branches of government, by contrast, all scored low confidence, with Congress garnering the confidence of only 12 percent of respondents. Politicians, facing a credibility deficit, have attempted to ride the credibility coattails of their sisters and brothers in arms
The Social Roots of a Politicized Military
The appropriateness of political activity must be gauged against the broader social context. What matters, therefore, is not whether an active or retired service member engages in political activity, but whether that activity undermines military effectiveness, the credibility of political leadership, or the principle of civilian control.
Endorsements and social media postings are, by their nature, both highly visible and highly partisan. Commentators warn of a growing gap between the military and civilian society. Most of this political activity appears to be unrelated to military operations, though there are some high-profile exceptions.36 Given this, the risks of political activity by the military are likely greater today than in the past.
Perhaps one of the most pernicious risks is that political activity by senior officers will erode the trust of political leadership in the military. History demonstrates how fear of a politicized military can influence military strategy. President James Polk altered his military strategy in the Mexican War to minimize the role of Major General Zachary Taylor, whom he viewed as a potential political challenger. Some historians have speculated that President Lyndon Johnson may have delayed the return of General William Westmoreland to the United States for fear that the general would become a political rival.37
More recent political activity by senior officers has raised similar concerns. During his first presidential campaign, Bill Clinton was repeatedly insulted by members of the military, and the mutual distrust between the administration and senior officers affected military planning. Admiral Doug Crowder has recounted attending a meeting during the first Clinton administration between the Joint Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. When told that the chairman would likely not support a given proposal, a Joint Staff representative supposedly responded “Well, maybe it’s time we got some Clinton generals in here.”38 Other commentators suggested that President Barack Obama’s decision to appoint General David Petraeus as commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan and then as Director of the C.I.A. were attempts to forestall a potential Petraeus presidential candidacy.39
Addressing the Roots of a Political Military
To the extent that the military’s political engagement is shaped by broader social forces, the United States can take steps to manage those trends. First, the military and political leadership should attempt to recruit and retain a diverse military that reflects the society it protects. Some experts have highlighted the benefits this would bring in both closing the supposed civil-military divide and broadening the talent pool from which the military draws. But making the military more representative of society also would reduce concerns about the military as a partisan political actor. There are some encouraging signs in this regard. Evidence suggests that service members, though more conservative than the civilian population, are not strongly partisan and that younger officers are more politically diverse than older ones.40
Second, politicians must respect the military’s apolitical norms and stop using it for political ends. While many retired officers err in endorsing candidates, the candidates err in accepting, and often even soliciting, those endorsements. Instead of trying to appropriate public confidence in the military for themselves, present-day leaders should work to rebuild public trust in institutions from the ground up.
Finally, senior military leadership must continue to reinforce the norm against explicitly partisan political activity, even by veterans. Active and retired officers must refrain from partisan activity and counsel their peers who engage in it. The military also must strengthen these norms among the next generation of military leaders by improving education on civil-military relations at the service academies. One West Point instructor has observed that “professional military education fails to emphasize the normative principles of apolitical behavior and civilian control.”41
But it is not simply a lack of appropriate instruction. Too often, mentors to future officers actively demonstrate a disregard for the apolitical norm. According to one study on instruction at West Point, too many instructors had become “so comfortable with Republican Party identification that they have blurred the boundary between officership and political affiliation. Although this trend is not widespread, enough officers overtly endorse the Republican Party that many cadets apparently conflate an identification with the Republican Party with officership.”42 The academies must reinvigorate education on civil-military relations, both by institutionalizing it within their curricula in a way that speaks to the changing demographics of new recruits and by demonstrating those principles by example.
Today’s concerns of a politicized military are not new. Previous generations have grappled with similar issues. Civilian and military leaders would do well to address these underlying social structures and trends by promoting diversity, respect, and education. Throughout, leaders should return to the fundamental ethic of military service and emphasize, and seek to exemplify, what one former officer has called “servant leadership.”43
1. Russell F. Weigley, “The American Military and the Principle of Civilian Control from McClellan to Powell,” The Journal of Military History 57, no. 5 (October 1993), 36.
2. William B. Skelton, “Professionalization in the U.S. Army Officer Corps During the Age of Jackson,” Armed Forces and Society 1, no. 4 (August 1975), 447.
3. Steve Corbett and Michael J. Davidson, “The Role of the Military in Presidential Politics,” Parameters 39, no. 4 (Winter 2009–2010), 60.
4. James Lee McDonough, William Tecumseh Sherman: In the Service of My Country (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2016), 44–45.
5. Russell F. Weigley, “The American Military and the Principle of Civilian Control from McClellan to Powell,” The Journal of Military History 57, no. 5 (October 1993), 36.
6. Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1957), 207.
7. Ibid., 258–60.
8. David M. Jordan, Winfield Scott Hancock: A Soldier’s Life (Bloomfield, IN: Indiana University Press, 1988), 240.
9. Steve Corbett and Michael J. Davidson, “The Role of the Military in Presidential Politics,” Parameters 39, no. 4 (Winter 2009–2010), 61.
10. Charles A. Byler, Civil-Military Relations on the Frontier and Beyond, 1865-1917 (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2006), 103.
11. Huntington, The Soldier and the State, 258.
12. Ibid., 161–2.
13. William Addleman Ganoe, The History of the United States Army (New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, 1942), 298–354.
14. Byler, Civil-Military Relations on the Frontier and Beyond, 104.
15. Ibid., 86.
16. Ibid., 103.
17. Bill Bishop, “This Campaign Has Gone Positively 19th Century,” Slate, 17 October 2008, www.slate.com/blogs/bigsort/2008/10/17/this_campaign_has_gone_positively_19th_century.html.
18. Richard J. Jensen, The Winning of the Midwest: Social and Political Conflict, 1888–1896 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971), 11.
19. Robert J. Dinkin, Campaigning in America: A History of Election Practices (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 1989), 64; and Jensen, The Winning of the Midwest, 13–14.
20. Jensen, The Winning of the Midwest, 12.
21. Donald L. McMurry, “The Political Significance of the Pension Question, 1885–1897,” The Mississippi Valley Historical Review 9, no. 1 (June 1922), 21.
22. “The Grand Army of the Republic and Kindred Societies,” The Library of Congress, 13 September 2011, www.loc.gov/rr/main/gar/garintro.html.
23. Ed Cray, General of the Army George C. Marshall: Soldier and Statesman (New York: W. W. Norton, 1990), 587.
24. Corbett and Davidson, “The Role of the Military in Presidential Politics,” Parameters, 62–4.
25. Paul P. Van Riper and Darab B. Unwalla, “Voting Patterns Among High-Ranking Military Officers,” Political Science Quarterly 80, no. 1 (March 1965), 51.
26. Van Riper and Unwalla, “Voting Patterns Among High-Ranking Military Officers,” 51.
27. “Voting and the American Military,” CivMilBlog, 1 June 2014, www.civmilblog.com/2010/03/voting-and-american-military.html.
28. “Registration and Voting Participation Differences between the Active Duty Military and Citizen Voting Age Population,” Federal Voting Assistance Program, 11 April 2014.
29. Lawrence F. Kaplan, “Officer Politics,” The New Republic, 13 September 2004, https://newrepublic.com/article/75794/officer-politics.
30. Ibid.
31. Heidi A. Urben, “Like, Comment, Retweet: The State of the Military’s Nonpartisan Ethic in the World of Social Media,” National Defense University Press, May 2017, 1.
32. Ibid., 33.
33. Sabrina Tavernise, “As Fewer Americans Serve, Growing Gap Is Found Between Civilians and Military,” The New York Times, 24 November 2011, www.nytimes.com/2011/11/25/us/civilian-military-gap-grows-as-fewer-americans-serve.html?mtrref=undefined&mtrref=www.nytimes.com&gwh=D0F49753ACD50C254AAE55C77225C60E&gwt=pay; and Drew Desilver, “Most Members of Congress Have Little Direct Military Experience,” Pew Research Center, 4 September 2013, www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/09/04/members-of-congress-have-little-direct-military-experience/.
34. Thomas E. Ricks, “The Widening Gap Between Military and Society,” The Atlantic (July 1997), www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1997/07/the-widening-gap-between-military-and-society/306158/.
35. Frank Newport, “Americans’ Confidence in Institutions Edges Up,” Gallup, 26 June 2017, http://news.gallup.com/poll/212840/americans-confidence-institutions-edges.aspx.
36. Mary P. Ulrich, “The General Stanley McChrystal Affair: A Case Study in Civil-Military Relations,” Parameters 41, no. 1 (Spring 2011), 86–100.
37. Corbett and Davidson, “The Role of the Military in Presidential Politics,” 68.
38. Doug Crowder, “Now Hear This—Admirals (and Generals) for Life,” U.S.Naval Institute Proceedings, 141, no. 11 (November 2015).
39. Michael D. Shear, “Bringing Petraeus to C.I.A. Offers Benefits for Obama,” The New York Times, 28 April 2011, https://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/04/28/bringing-petraeus-to-cia-offers-benefits-for-obama/.
40. Urben, “Like, Comment, Retweet.”
41. Lukas B. Berg, “The Last Stage of Perfection: America’s Politicized Officer Corps and Its Apolitical Ideal,” 15, www.usma.edu/scusa/SiteAssets/SitePages/Round%20Tables/FINAL_GO_Security.pdf.
42. Jason K. Dempsey, Our Army: Soldiers, Politics, and American Civil-Military Relations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010), 175.
43. Andrew Exum, “The Dangerous Politicization of the Military,” The Atlantic, 24 July 2017, www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/07/the-danger-of-turning-the-us-military-into-a-political-actor/534624/.Editor’s note: This essay won second prize in the 2017 U.S. Naval Institute Naval History Essay Contest, sponsored with the William M. Wood Foundation.