Outnumbered by the Royal Navy, Germany’s surface fleet nevertheless waged a raiding campaign that bought time until waves of U-boats could join the Battle of the Atlantic.
The German Navy, or Kriegsmarine, played a key role during World War II by attempting to sever Britain’s sea lines of communication, providing support during littoral land operations, and taking the conflict at sea as far as the U.S. East Coast and the Indian and Pacific oceans. While the Kriegsmarine’s historical narrative overwhelmingly is dominated by the U-boat campaign, German surface warships made an invaluable contribution to the war effort that provides an astute demonstration of how a small, albeit well-equipped, navy can exercise a remarkable degree of naval power against a vastly superior opponent.
The Offensive’s Slow Start
At the outbreak of war in September 1939, the German surface fleet consisted of seven capital ships: two obsolete predreadnought battleships; two battle cruisers; and three heavily armed cruisers, or Panzerschiffe (armored ships), that were nicknamed “pocket battleships.” In comparison, the Royal Navy could deploy 15 capital ships and 7 aircraft carriers. Despite the overwhelming odds, Kriegsmarine Commander-in-Chief Admiral Erich Raeder knew from his experience in World War I that his capital ships would likely degrade into an ineffective force if left in port as a fleet-in-being. He therefore ordered plans to be drawn up for an immediate offensive against Britain’s sea lines of communication.
Before the war, Raeder had hoped to construct a fleet of 10 capital ships, 8 aircraft carriers, and 12 updated pocket battleships, along with some 249 U-boats—the Z-Plan Fleet. The strategic thought underlying the Z-Plan was that the fleet would be split into two forces: a North Sea defensive force and an Atlantic offensive force. The latter was to be divided into a series of small, asymmetrical task forces charged with attacking the enemy’s sea lines. A supply system of disguised merchant ships was to keep the task forces at optimum efficiency.1
With the Z-Plan nowhere near complete by 1939, Raeder instead hoped to throw all his available units at the British in the hope of disrupting enough merchant shipping and naval operations to provide time for the build-up of a strong U-boat force that could implement an economic blockade and practice sea denial.
Raeder faced considerable political and operational obstacles in executing this strategy. Believing he could negotiate peace with Britain, Adolf Hitler delayed orders for the Kriegsmarine to commence operations against British forces. When the order finally came, the pocket battleship Deutschland was ordered back to Germany and out of danger. Raeder reasoned that the sinking of a ship bearing such an illustrious name would be a severe blow to the morale of the German people. This left only the pocket battleship Graf Spee deployed outside the North Sea. Her crew eventually scuttled her on 17 December 1939, after the Battle of the River Plate in which she damaged three Royal Navy cruisers but was severely damaged herself. Not only was Raeder now deprived of two units in the Atlantic, but the scuttling also brought the Kriegsmarine under the German high command’s scrutiny.
The April 1940 German invasion of Norway required all available naval units for transporting and supporting troops. The operation, although ultimately a success, resulted in the loss of the heavy cruiser Blücher as well as 12 destroyers. The battle cruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau were damaged, as was the Lützow (the newly renamed Deutschland) and the heavy cruiser Admiral Hipper. Nonetheless, the Germans sank five British destroyers and damaged the battle cruiser Renown during the first engagement of the war between capital ships.
The conquest of Norway had significant strategic consequences. It forced the British Home Fleet to conduct its operations farther west in the Denmark Strait, between Greenland and Iceland, where there was less risk from German air attack, and with the seizure of French coastal ports, Raeder now had a significant geographical advantage over the British. His forces could run the gauntlet of the Denmark Strait and dock in a French coastal port, from where they could easily renew attacks on enemy sea lines of communication. The German Navy also had regained faith with Hitler, who now allowed Raeder to pursue his strategy. The significant losses to the surface fleet, however, meant that the price was high, and the fleet never fully recovered.
In October 1940, the Admiral Scheer became the first German capital ship to break out into the Atlantic during wartime.2 Showcasing the qualities of the pocket battleships, as well as the efficiency of the supply system in a voyage stretching as far as the Indian Ocean, the Scheer sank 99,059 tons before returning to Germany in March 1941. Her attack on Convoy HX 84 in the North Atlantic resulted in the sinking of five ships totaling 38,720 tons, along with the escorting armed merchant cruiser Jervis Bay. Though a relatively minor achievement, the attack caused the next two HX (eastbound) convoys to be recalled to port and held up further convoys for 12 days. The Admiral Hipper made a follow-up sortie in November and achieved meager results, but she was the first heavy German warship to successfully put into the French port of Brest, in December 1940, where she posed a more immediate threat to Atlantic shipping.
Meanwhile, disguised auxiliary cruisers were deployed into the Atlantic, Indian, and Pacific oceans. In July, one auxiliary cruiser would force the Admiralty to stop all independent shipping and divert convoys away from the West Indies, while another, the Atlantis, would sink a record 145,687 tons before meeting her end in November 1941 against the heavy cruiser HMS Devonshire.
As expected, these operations dispersed British naval power and moved focus away from U-boats. The Royal Navy dispatched three task forces, including four cruisers and two aircraft carriers, to find the Scheer. A sighting by the light cruiser HMS Glasgow brought an additional carrier and four cruisers into the hunt.
On 25 December 1940, the Hipper intercepted a convoy carrying 40,000 troops to the Middle East but was driven off after a brief engagement with British escorts. This encounter nonetheless had significant consequences, as the Admiralty rushed to assign heavy warships to escort convoys. Though fewer antisubmarine warfare–equipped vessels were diverted than was expected by the German Naval High Command, the commitment of heavy escorts underlines the Admiralty’s anxiety and the threat posed by Raeder’s surface fleet. The worst, however, was yet to come.
The Peak Period
In January 1941, the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, under the command of Vice Admiral Günther Lütjens, ventured into the Atlantic. During the operation, code-named Berlin, the two battle cruisers, aided by nine supply ships, sank or captured 116,610 tons of shipping over 60 days. It was the largest and most successful Atlantic operation by the German surface fleet during the war. Distant cooperation between the Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, and U-boats led to the tracking and interception of Convoy SL 67 on 7–8 March that resulted in the submarines sinking five ships. Before steering for France, Lütjens intercepted several more merchant ships that had been dispersed from a convoy because of a U-boat attack.
On 9–11 February, during the Hipper’s second Atlantic sortie, U-37, Fw-200 Condor reconnaissance bombers, and the heavy cruiser carried out the first successful asymmetrical operation in history against Convoy HG 30. This also led to the Hipper’s greatest success, when on the next day she sank 7 of 19 unescorted ships of Convoy SLS 64.
Dispersed as it was, the British fleet could not deal effectively with the multifaceted threat. Official historian of the Royal Navy Stephen Roskill noted that during this period surface ships caused the loss of much shipping and, “for a time, completely dislocated our Atlantic convoy circles, with serious consequences to our vital imports. Their [the Scharnhorst’s and Gneisenau’s] depredations forced the wide dispersal of our already strained naval resources, and successfully diverted attention from the returning Scheer and Hipper; while, by their subsequent arrival in a Biscay port, they became an imminent threat to all our Atlantic shipping.”3
January to March 1941 thus marks the offensive peak of the German surface fleet. No less than four heavy warships were active, and the period also marks the first successful combined sea operations. The activities of the surface fleet were particularly significant as the number of operational U-boats reached a wartime low. As such, it was left to the warships and auxiliary cruisers to keep pressure on Britain.4
The Beginning of the End
For Raeder, such results vindicated his confidence in the principles underlying the Z-Plan as well as the continued importance of the capital ship. With the battleships Bismarck and Tirpitz and the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen soon to be operational, the German surface fleet was reaching its zenith, and Raeder began plans for an ambitious all surface-fleet thrust into the Atlantic.
In April 1941, the admiral outlined plans for a new operation, code-named Rhine Exercise. Guided by the principles of the Z-Plan and having dispersed a significant proportion of the Royal Navy, the newly available warships, along with the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, would be unleashed simultaneously into the Atlantic to wreak havoc on British shipping. Furthermore, the warships were to engage their enemy counterparts, meaning that Raeder now intended simultaneously to engage Britain’s economic and naval strength. It was calculated that even with continued numerical superiority the Royal Navy would be unable to concentrate its forces, thus leaving isolated units at the mercy of superior German capital ships.
To prevent the execution of Raeder’s scheme, the Royal Air Force initiated an intense bombing campaign on the port of Brest that damaged the Gneisenau. Fortunately for the British, the Scharnhorst was suffering from mechanical problems and the Tirpitz could not be made ready in time. This left only the Bismarck and Prinz Eugen. Nonetheless, the operation commenced on 18 May, under the command of Lütjens, and ended with the destruction of the Bismarck on 27 May 1941.
The sortie of the Bismarck and her subsequent destruction is one of the most famous episodes of World War II. After a brief engagement in the Denmark Strait that resulted in the sinking of the Royal Navy’s iconic battle cruiser HMS Hood, the Bismarck and Prinz Eugen successfully broke out into the Atlantic. The loss of the Hood prompted British Prime Minister Winston Churchill to issue his order to “sink the Bismarck.” The Admiralty mobilized a force of 19 major warships drawn from the Home Fleet, Force H (stationed at Gibraltar), and convoy escorts to hunt down the enemy battleship.
While this may seem an exaggerated response to hurt pride over the loss of the Hood, when placed in the context of Operation Rhine Exercise and the success of the Kriegsmarine to date, the Admiralty’s response makes strategic sense. Indeed, had the Bismarck and Prinz Eugen made port in France, they could have linked with the Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, and Admiral Hipper and renewed the Atlantic assault.5 In a demonstration of British interwar doctrine, aircraft launched from the carrier Ark Royal crippled the German behemoth. With the Bismarck just short of air cover from the Luftwaffe, the Royal Navy was able to bring up its heavy forces to engage and eventually sink the battleship.
The loss of the Bismarck was a critical juncture in the war at sea, as it brought an end to Raeder’s surface fleet strategy and signaled the ultimate shift to purely U-boat operations. Following the destruction of the Bismarck, Hitler, over Raeder’s protests, ordered the remaining heavy warships in France to be sent to Norway for defense and to disrupt Arctic convoys to Russia or else to be dismantled. Although Raeder strongly protested and pointed out that such a move would bring relief to British forces in the Atlantic, he eventually endorsed a plan to have his remaining ships return home via the English Channel.
The incredible although historically neglected Channel Dash—Operation Cerberus—was the last tactically successful operation by the German surface fleet against the Western Allies during the war. Aided by the element of surprise, a significant concentration of naval and air forces, and a slow British response, the Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Prinz Eugen, and Admiral Hipper made it through the Channel and docked back in Germany. However, the severe damage inflicted on the heavy cruisers and the Gneisenau prevented their relocation to Norway. This venture fell to the Tirpitz and Scharnhorst.
Although a tactical success, the operation was a strategic retreat. No longer occupied by the heavy warships, the Royal Navy was able to turn its attention to enemy supply ships and auxiliary cruisers, destroying ten by the end of 1941. From then on the German war at sea would be waged only by U-boats.
The U-boat Comes of Age
By this stage of the war the German submarine campaign was in full swing, as U-boats surpassed their prewar numbers and achieved great success. Convoy attacks peaked in 1941, and in 1942 the highest proportion of shipping of the entire war was sunk. The strength of the U-boat campaign owes much to the initial effectiveness of the surface fleet. Indeed, Admiral Karl Dönitz, the head of the U-boat fleet and Raeder’s successor as Kriegsmarine commander-in-chief, recounted that “The sinking of the Bismarck was a grave loss for the navy. . . . On the other hand, the strong reaction of English naval forces proved that the strategic object had succeeded—that of keeping the English Fleet busy, added to the direct success attained by sinkings.”6
Thus, not only did the fleet tie down and disrupt the superior forces of the Royal Navy, but it also aided in the transition to the U-boat as the sole means of waging the war at sea at a time when many historians claim the days of the “big gun warships” were over.
Raeder resigned from his position as Kriegsmarine commander-in-chief in January 1943, frustrated at what he saw as Hitler’s lack of understanding of naval strategy and astonished when the Führer again threatened to dismantle the surface fleet.7 In an ironic turn of events it was Dönitz, the supposed U-boat advocate, who convinced Hitler that the big warships were still invaluable to the German war effort and thus saved the surface fleet.
He could not, however, save the fleet from the enemy. The Scharnhorst was sunk in the final engagement between the Royal Navy and Kriegsmarine surface units in December 1943. The Tirpitz was lost in 1944 following a series of raids by specially equipped aircraft. The final remnants of Raeder’s surface fleet were used while still in port to provide effective heavy gunfire support to the retreating German Army in the East. Eventually all were lost, but not before having caused a disproportionate effect on the conduct of the war at sea as a whole.
An Outsized Impact
The threat of the German surface fleet never fully materialized during World War II. Its numbers were always limited; its strategy was ad hoc. Still, the surface fleet had an impact far in excess of its size and strength during the early stages of the war. Royal Navy resources were tied down in hunting and escort duties that strained British naval power to the limit. The fleet especially proved its worth in early 1941 as U-boat numbers dwindled.
Operational flexibility and cooperation meant that Germany’s warships were able to conduct combined operations with the Luftwaffe, ground forces, and the U-boat arm, which led to remarkable successes in Norway and the Atlantic. However, a greater impact was stifled by conflicting political and strategic priorities. Gradually, the overwhelming might of the Allies wore away the surface forces. Nonetheless, the German Navy made a seamless transition to the U-boat and, for the first half of the war, directly challenged the maritime supremacy of Britain, thanks in no small part to the surface fleet.
1. Erich Raeder, My Life, translated by Henry W. Drexel (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1960), 273; “Reflections of the C-in-C, Navy on the Outbreak of War, September 3, 1939, Berlin 3 September 1939,” in The Führer Conferences on Naval Affairs, 1939–1945 (London: Chatham Publishing, 2005), 37.
2. For operational orders, see War Diaries, Naval Staff Operations Division, August 1940 (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 1947), digitalized manuscript from archive.org/details/wardiary/germann121940germ, 163. It is often claimed that the two Scharnhorst-class ships were the first. This is likely due to the change in classification of the Panzerschiffs to heavy cruisers during the war. Shipping losses are from Stephen Roskill, The War at Sea, 1939–45, vol. 1, The Defensive (London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1954), 615–16, as is information on surface fleet success and losses, from pages 604–5.
3. Roskill, The War at Sea, vol. 1, 379.
4. For an examination of Operation Berlin, see Peter Handel-Mazzetti, “The Scharnhorst-Gneisenau Team at Its Peak,” Philip Lundeberg, ed., U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, vol. 82, no. 8 (August 1956). See also Richard Garrett, Scharnhorst and Gneisenau: The Elusive Sisters (Newton Abbot, England: David and Charles, 1978).
5. David J. Bercuson and Holger H. Herwig, The Destruction of the Bismarck (New York: The Overlook Press, 2001), 224.
6. Karl Dönitz, The Conduct of the War at Sea (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 1946), digitalized manuscript from www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/Germany/KM/WarAtSea/index.html, 14.
7. Raeder, My Life, 361–65.