1812: The Navy’s War
George C. Daughan. New York: Basic Books, 2011. 491 pp. Illus. Maps. Bibliog. Index. $32.50.
Reviewed by William S. Dudley
With the bicentennial of the War of 1812 upon us, new books about it have been appearing for nearly two years. George C. Daughan’s book offers neither new information nor a new interpretation, but he does provide a smoothly written synthesis based on the published literature, mostly reflecting American historiography in secondary sources, both articles and books. Though not a naval historian by profession, Daughan previously wrote If By Sea: The Forging of the American Navy from the Revolution to the War of 1812 (Basic Books, 2008), and the present account is happily influenced by that experience.
This history, as indicated by the title, is heavily weighted toward the naval battles on the high seas, bays, sounds, and northern lakes. Although he does not ignore the land battles, Daughan spends more time and effort detailing naval actions.
In five chapters he takes readers from the American Revolution to the War of 1812, dealing with the international context that placed the United States as an awkward infant republic in a family of nations largely ruled by royalty and aristocracy. Generally Daughan handles the changing European framework very well throughout the book. The war between Great Britain and its allies and Napoleonic France and its minions dominated the scene, while the United States attempted to steer a neutral course but was caught between these great powers. The flow and ebb of American fortunes in the North American war was greatly influenced by the larger conflict.
The following 29 chapters, averaging only about 12 pages each, deal succinctly with the naval war. The author at first presents President James Madison as having virtually no trust that the small U.S. Navy could withstand Britain’s Royal Navy. Believing American privateers would swarm out to hit British merchant shipping, the president naïvely thought that although the United States was ill prepared for war, declaring it would bring about those preparations.
His strategy was to take advantage of Napoleon’s invasion of Russia while the British were distracted. This, he reasoned, would allow the United States to easily conquer Canada or at least hold it as a bargaining chip. Then he could resolve lingering disputes with Britain over the impressment of sailors and the Orders in Council that were aimed at preventing American trade with France and its allies. When the U.S. Navy’s early frigate victories became known, Madison gained a political advantage he had not expected, which brought him success in the November 1812 presidential election.
Daughan deals concisely with the naval war on the Great Lakes, granting Commodore Oliver Hazard Perry the resourcefulness and luck he needed to win on Lake Erie despite the damage to his flagship. Likewise, the author treats commodores John Rodgers and Stephen Decatur gently instead of criticizing their lack of aggressiveness in 1813. He does properly adjudge Captain James Lawrence of the U.S. frigate Chesapeake for his failure to obey orders when he decided to engage HMS Shannon, and then for his unwise tactics in that battle.
The author is kinder than most to Commodore Isaac Chauncey in dealing with his failure to come to the aid of General Jacob Brown in 1814 when his squadron was most needed at Niagara. He simply takes Chauncey at his word when he said he never promised to bring his fleet out unless Commodore James Lucas Yeo, his British counterpart, did so as well.
As difficult as the war became for the United States financially, largely because of the British blockade, American successes at Fort Erie, Lake Champlain, and Plattsburgh and the repulse of the British at Baltimore had a salutary effect on peace negotiations in Europe. The clarity of the victory at the Battle of New Orleans in January 1815, though it came after the Treaty of Ghent had been signed on 24 December 1814 (ratified 16 February 1815), reinforced images of American prowess that the early frigate victories had spread.
Daughan believes the War of 1812 was a second war of American independence, but he does not attempt to join the endless debate about who won it. Rather, he notes, by war’s end President Madison had concluded that a respectable army and navy were the best safeguards against a renewal of hostilities with Britain or any other country. From this point, the United States developed a new consensus on defense policy that, in turn, led to a beneficial change in Anglo-American relations.
The Captain Who Burned His Ships: Captain Thomas Tingey, USN, 1750–1829
Gordon S. Brown. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2011. 200 pp. Illus. Notes. Bibliog. Index. $28.95.
Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel Jason R. Musteen, U.S. Army
The pantheon of American heroes does not include Commodore Thomas Tingey, nor is he among the great names of the early U.S. Navy, in which he served for more than 30 years. Nevertheless, Ambassador Gordon Brown has shown in his latest book that Tingey deserves to be mentioned among his peers and shipmates about whom we already know so much.
It is certainly easy to understand why even a highly capable naval officer in the early days of the republic would be eclipsed by heroes such as Stephen Decatur, Isaac Hull, Charles Stewart, William Bainbridge, Oliver Hazard Perry, David Porter, John Rodgers, Thomas Macdonough, Thomas Truxton, James Lawrence, and Edward Preble. Like the nation they served, America’s naval officers during the period from 1798 to 1815 were a young, impetuous, energetic group who pursued honor and glory at every opportunity. For many, that driving attitude brought victory at sea and crowned them with laurels at home.
In Tingey, Brown presents a character who appears not dissimilar to his contemporaries in some ways. As a commodore commanding a squadron during the Quasi-War, Tingey pursued action, adventure, and the French, although he rarely found any of those in the measure he desired. Like many others, he frequently used his position for personal gain and to court influence. He even uttered one of the Navy’s memorable quotes of defiance when he refused to allow a British captain to search among his crew: “A public ship carries no protection but her flag.”
Yet for all that, we must admit that Tingey’s peripheral or supporting role in some of America’s defining moments was relatively unexciting. Even his moment of bravado falls far short of “Don’t give up the ship,” “I have not yet begun to fight,” “My country right or wrong,” “We have met the enemy and they are ours,” or “dove mi piace.” Nevertheless, Tingey was competent, decisive, and important to the successes of the Navy.
Following service at sea during the Quasi-War, he was selected to build and command one of America’s first ships-of-the-line. First he had to build a naval yard in the nation’s new and undeveloped capital city. However, the ship was canceled before she was ever begun, and Tingey spent the rest of his career building and administering the Washington Navy Yard rather than commanding at sea. Over the course of a decade, he turned the yard into one of the most important facilities in the Navy.
But even with his feet on solid ground, Tingey could not escape war. Following the defeat of Brigadier General William Winder’s American troops at Bladensburg, Maryland, in 1814, Tingey was forced, at the last possible minute, to burn the navy yard to prevent its stores and ships from falling into British hands. And then he returned to rebuild it.
The excitement is there at times, but Brown’s point is to educate rather than entertain, and to rectify some notable omissions from the narrative of the U.S. Navy and Washington, D.C. For those with just a passing interest in the Age of Sail, Thomas Tingey would not be a likely starting point. But for the scholar who wants to understand the early U.S. Navy, the early republic, and its political processes and preparations for defense, Brown’s story is an important one, and it’s well told. There is much of interest and value to glean from the construction of the Washington Navy Yard, warships, and the Navy itself. Life in the infant capital city is equally important for those who want to better understand American life and culture of the period.
Ambassador Brown should be commended for finally bringing Tingey’s story to our attention in the manner it deserves. His work is thoroughly researched, using British and American archives as well as several manuscript collections. The Captain Who Burned His Ships reminds us of the great task that lay before the United States in the early 1800s and the challenges that were overcome with hard work, ingenuity, and dedication. In that way, Tingey, who began his naval service as a midshipman in the Royal Navy, personifies the young republic.
The Rocket’s Red Glare: An Illustrated History of the War of 1812
Donald R. Hickey and Connie D. Clark. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2011. 264 pp. Illus. Maps. Notes. Index. $39.95.
Reviewed by Kevin D. McCranie
The War of 1812 bicentennial has brought a deluge of scholarship on the subject, including a new series of books published by Johns Hopkins University Press. Among them is The Rocket’s Red Glare: An Illustrated History of the War of 1812, coauthored by Donald R. Hickey and Connie D. Clark. If this volume is any indication, the collection will be very engaging and easily accessible to the reading public, while also well researched and scholarly in presentation.
The text of The Rocket’s Red Glare takes a simple narrative approach. Individual chapters focus on each year of the war, beginning with general political background and a short assessment of strategy, then telling of that year’s key events. The strong emphasis on battles and campaigns demonstrates that the book is at heart a chronicle of the military and naval history of the conflict.
From this perspective, the book is sweeping and encompasses seven specific land theaters, including the Old Northwest (the area around Detroit), the Niagara front, the St. Lawrence River, the Lake Champlain region, the Chesapeake, the Old Southwest (modern Alabama and Mississippi), and Louisiana. Other sections detail the oceanic naval war, chronicling engagements and the actions of privateers.
Although much of the book focuses on land battles and campaigns as well as naval warfare, the authors are careful to include other issues of significance. These range from the politics of the presidential election of 1812 to congressional battles over how to wage and pay for the war. Diplomacy receives sufficient coverage, especially respecting the 1814 Treaty of Ghent. The authors weave in the economic impact of the war, in both maritime commerce and the relationship of taxation and finances to U.S. government’s ability to continue hostilities. Hickey and Clark do not shy from many defining stories of this war, including Francis Scott Key and his poem “Defence of Fort McHenry,” written during the 1814 battle to defend Baltimore and later set to music and declared the national anthem, “The Star-Spangled Banner.”
In the final and perhaps most insightful chapter, the authors address the legacy of the war and how it affected the history of the continent. They recount ways in which U.S. citizens remembered and still remember this conflict, assessing the importance of historical artifacts such as Fort McHenry and the USS Constitution. Moreover, they discuss political careers that were built on reputations garnered during the war. In this category, none was more important than Andrew Jackson. From the perspectives of the other belligerents, the authors show how those in British Canada could see the fight as one that could solidify future independence, whereas in Britain, at least for those outside naval circles, rarely was it seen as more than a mere footnote.
These viewpoints notwithstanding, The Rocket’s Red Glare, while a very good book, is directed at a U.S. audience. Strategy, background, politics, even the battles are detailed much more fully from the American side than from the British, Canadian, or Native American perspectives. This is not to say that information on any of these groups is absent, but the details focus strongly on the United States. Where the book sets itself apart from others on this topic is in its lavish illustrations, including many in color. These images tell their own narrative about the war, showing key people and events that are highlighted in the text. Moreover, the oversized format of the book allows for large illustrations and the space in which to marry storytelling with visual imagery. Overall, this is an impressive and thoughtful work. Its imagery makes it an important addition to any collection focusing on the War of 1812; with its the text and images combined, it is an excellent starting place for introducing Americans to the conflict.
How Britain Won the War of 1812: The Royal Navy’s Blockades of the United States, 1812-1815
Brian Arthur. Woodbridge, Suffolk, England: Boydell Press, 2011. 328 pp. Illus. Maps. Notes. Bibliog. Index. $99.
Reviewed by Frederick C. Leiner
Most American readers do not begin with the premise that the British won the War of 1812. But after finishing How Britain Won the War of 1812, they will understand how lucky the United States was that with Napoleon defeated and the British stopped at Baltimore, by the end of 1814 the British had no real interest in continuing to fight America. Based on his Ph.D. dissertation, Brian Arthur’s book forces us to rethink that war. Arthur’s work is provocative, focused, well-researched, and cogently argued.
The first part describes how the British navy had developed the blockade system in wars against the Dutch and French for 150 years before 1812. By the time the United States declared war in June 1812, Great Britain had fully honed its techniques. Arthur ably discusses how international law (at least as the British viewed it) and advances in hygiene, logistics, and the coppering of wooden ships’ hulls enabled perfection of the close and continuous blockade.
Despite the heavy strain of blockading most of French-dominated continental Europe, beginning in 1813 the British admiralty was able to send about one-seventh of the Royal Navy’s strength across the Atlantic to stop the water-borne trade of the United States. The blockade proved an effective, inexorable weapon. Despite problems with weather, distance from bases, and navigational hazards, the obstruction of maritime trade devastated the American economy and disrupted U.S. finances to the point that in late 1814, the U.S. government became insolvent.
Arthur’s significant, original contribution is to detail connections between the loss of trade and the decline of customs duties and government revenues. To do this, he has drawn on government statistics and commodity prices. The author mixes into his economic analysis, which seems irrefutable, operational incidents and despairing accounts of American merchants. The British blockade caused shortages, gluts, and high commodity prices; a run on the banks; a depreciating currency; and an empty Treasury. By late 1814, continuing the war became impossible, and the United States abandoned all prewar goals to achieve peace.
Arthur describes the blockade as a cheap, effective, and successful system to defeat the U.S. invasion of Canada, although that seems illogical. No British blockade could have defeated a victorious U.S. attack on Canada in the summer of 1812 because blockades work slowly, and the British began theirs, of part of the American coastline only in March 1813. Rather, with its enormous navy, Britain’s blockade was its natural weapon against a distant, trade-dependent enemy. Moreover, the admiral in charge of the North Atlantic command for most of the war, Sir John Warren, called for “some decisive strokes” on the Great Lakes and New Orleans. He would not have demanded these had he thought the blockade alone would be decisive. In emphasizing the domination of the blockade, Arthur also discounts too much the role of American privateers, whose moral and financial effect on enemy merchants ultimately may have cooled British ardor for continuing the war.
The book has some minor flaws. Arthur has problems with the spelling of American officers’ names: “Rodger” for Commodore John Rodgers; “Barry” for Joshua Barney. And New Bedford is in Massachusetts, not Connecticut. Arthur errs in describing ship “ransoming” as a cash transaction, and in asserting that it was contrary to international law. In reality, the captor released the ship and “sold” the cargo back for a bill of exchange (a type of promissory note). The bill of exchange was drawn on the owners of the vessel and was guaranteed by a bond signed by the master. International prize law regarded both the bill of exchange and the bond as binding. However, these points are relatively minor and do not detract from the impact of the book.
How Britain Won the War of 1812 is an important work about the critical element of British strategy in the war. It is deeply referenced, strongly argued, and a necessary corrective to American myths. Readers will wonder what U.S. leaders were thinking in starting a war, without allies and possessing a tiny navy, against the greatest maritime power in the world. They had to know a British blockade would soon stop the foreign trade that produced the customs receipts on which the U.S. Treasury was almost completely dependent.