'Action This Day of Days'
(See C. D. Yung, pp. 20-25, June 2009 Naval History)
Michael Whitby, Senior Naval Historian, Canadian Department of National Defence
It was a pleasure to read Christopher Yung's account of the role of the minesweepers in Operation Neptune, and it is interesting to note that Canadian minesweepers were among those leading American Soldiers onto Omaha Beach. The Canadian 31st Minesweeping Flotilla was one of ten such units clearing lanes for the assault groups.
Their learning curve for this critical mission had been especially steep since only one of the 16 Bangor-class minesweepers sent to Europe had previous experience in mine warfare. When they arrived in the United Kingdom in April 1944, their Royal Navy training officer observed they "were not minesweeping minded as they had been employed solely on escort work. Some were also under the impression that minesweeping was child's play." For his part, the Canadian flotilla leader, Commander Tony Storrs, recalled British officers "sucking their teeth wondering if these Canadians are really up to it." They ultimately proved equal to the task, but only after intensive workups that stretched into late May, by which point the same RN officer considered them "efficient, keen and competent."
Although sweepers were expected to suffer grievous 30- to 50-percent casualties-the final duty of an officer on each ship was to deposit an up-to-date crew list in a green box on the jetty as the vessel departed-the 31st's passage across the English Channel to France went unopposed. Nevertheless, as the author described, their task was extremely daunting. Strong tidal currents made navigation and sweeping difficult, and although new navigational aids helped, it was the skill and seamanship of Commander Storrs and the other commanding officers that proved critical.
In all, the Royal Canadian Navy contributed some 128 vessels—including landing assault ships, destroyers, frigates, corvettes, minesweepers, landing craft, and motor torpedo boats—and some 10,000 sailors to that panorama of sea power, and they contributed to virtually every aspect of the Neptune campaign. As with the RCN's contribution to the Battle of the Atlantic, their part in a truly Allied victory proved indispensable but is too often overlooked.
'"Children of the Storm": Life at Sea in the First Six Frigates'
(See C. E. Brodine Jr., pp. 14-23, August 2009 Naval History)
Vice Admiral Robert F. Dunn, U.S. Navy (Retired)
The page 17 picture caption statement, "The Navy officially banned the practice [of holystoning] in 1931 . . . " may be true, but at least as late as 1948 third-class U.S. Naval Academy midshipmen (Class of 1951) holystoned the decks of the USS Missouri (BB-63) while on summer cruise.
Lieutenant Commander Robert Skorheim, U.S. Navy Reserve (Retired)
I was surprised to see that holystoning was officially banned in 1931. On my first midshipman cruise in 1947 on board the USS Oregon City (CA-122), I was assigned to Midshipman Deck Division 3. Every Friday morning while at sea, we holystoned the starboard deck aft. Of course the process had been greatly improved by adding a hole in the stone to which a pole could be fitted so that it wasn't necessary to work on your knees.
Editor's note: We received numerous letters from readers who spent time scouring warships' decks with holystones in the post-1931 Navy, and we stand corrected on this point. According to an 8 June 1931 article in Time magazine, "Last week the holystone passed out of Navy tradition." What the article was referring to, however, was the discontinuation of the practice on new treaty cruisers, whose expensive teak decks, the magazine claimed, were only two inches thick.
'The Pearl Harbor Warning that Never Was'
(See L. Jewell, p. 6, August; P. Ribbey, pp. 7 and 64, June; R. J. Hanyok, pp. 50-53, April 2009 Naval History)
Robert J. Hanyok
Sadly, Ms. Ribbey has characterized my article as "disinformation." As a rejoinder, she offers an inclusive narrative of the intercept and processing of the purported "Winds" message, which to her and others sympathetic to the conspiratorial view of Pearl Harbor seems airtight. The problem is that Ms. Ribbey is repeating a story that itself is nothing more than disinformation stitched together from a number of sources, such as John Toland's Infamy. These sources used "cherry-picked" material congenial to a conspiratorial thesis and ignored the numerous problems in their version of events presented by the bulk of the evidence they chose not to use. Contradictory evidence, technical errors, and out-of-context references render invalid the statements of both Captain Laurance F. Safford, head of the Navy's radio-intelligence and code-breaking unit, and senior radio operator Ralph Briggs.
I have written a documentary history of the Winds message controversy, West Wind Clear: Cryptology and the Winds Message Controversy, in which I spent an entire chapter on the myth of the message and found Safford's claims to be unsustainable. This chapter will be sufficient to reply to the details of Ms. Ribbey's letter, and I encourage her and others to read it. I will, however, address some comments on the more salient elements of the unreliable testimony of Safford and Briggs. All are noted in my book.
Safford's account of what happened with the intercept and cover-up of the purported Winds message is mortally subverted by the fact that he told a different version of the story to five boards or hearings at which he testified, as well as in a series of letters he exchanged with Alwin Kramer beginning in late 1943. At each forum, he provided conflicting information about the circumstances of the intercept, who saw or handled the purported message, and what happened afterward. If this was not enough to destroy his case, Safford admitted to the Army Pearl Harbor Board on 2 October 1944 that, because he could not recall the text of the purported message, he borrowed the three phrases from the November 1941 set-up message and thereafter presented that manufactured text as the "Winds execute" message. This action clearly illustrates the fiction at the heart of his claim.
As for Ralph Briggs, he offered no supporting evidence for any of his claims to have intercepted the Winds message. Among other parts of his story, Briggs claimed to have heard the message transmitted on the Japanese manual Morse merchant broadcast, not on a voice news broadcast as specified by the Japanese instruction of 19 November 1941. However, the alleged 4 December intercept log he claims was altered—which purportedly noted he had copied the Winds message—actually was from 2 December and shows he copied only regularly scheduled news programs. So, did Briggs copy the purported Winds phrase on 2 or 4 December? Most important, Briggs' version of the message, limited to the single phrase "East Wind Clear," contradicted Safford's version of the message, which included all three phrases.
All of the evidence from the Winds controversy has been available to the public for decades. The transcripts of the Pearl Harbor Attack Hearings before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack were released in late 1946. Although copies were made available with the hearings, National Security Agency and Naval Security Group records were released between 1977 and 1996 and can be found at the National Archives in College Park, Maryland.
'Historic Aircraft: Big Brother is Flying'
(See N. Polmar, pp. 12-13, August 2009 Naval History)
Charles S. Chase
The mention of Navy aircraft used during the Berlin airlift reminded me that a Navy GCA (Ground Control Approach) Unit was stationed in Berlin during the airlift.
These units used a combination of search radar, precision guidance radar, and redundant HF and VHF communications to guide aircraft to safe landings in sometimes very iffy conditions. I was a tech on a GCA Unit some 55 years ago and witnessed on one occasion the landing of an aircraft in such dense fog that the pilot could not taxi his plane without the assistance of a follow-me jeep.
Some portion of the credit for the success of the Berlin airlift should certainly go to the Navy GCA Unit that was stationed there.
'The Butcher's Bill'
(See T. G. Martin, pp. 24-26, August 2009 Naval History)
Captain Theodore Kuhlmeier, U.S. Marine Corps
I don't want to sound like a "sea lawyer," but in Commander Martin's otherwise excellent article about the treatment of casualties on board the USS Constitution in her engagement with HMS Guerriere, he is not accurate when he describes Lieutenant William Sharp Bush as "the first Marine Corps officer to die in combat."
Perhaps the author meant in the War of 1812, as Marine Second Lieutenant John Fitzpatrick was killed 6 April 1776 on board the Continental Navy ship Alfred in an engagement with HMS Glasgow. Lieutenant Fitzpatrick's death is depicted in one of Colonel Charles H. Waterhouse's fine paintings of Marines in the Revolution.
Correction
Because of an editing error, the book review of The Attack on the Liberty (See E. J. Drea, p. 68, August 2009 Naval History) incorrectly stated the source of the torpedo, which struck the USS Liberty (AGTR-5). The torpedo had been launched by a torpedo boat.