The stage had been set for a climactic battle in the Pacific for decades. Long before the attack on Pearl Harbor, the navies of the United States and imperial Japan had been preparing for war. The ocean’s vastness and the relative strengths of the two powers imposed certain strategic realities well known to both sides. The U.S. Navy, superior in nearly all respects, would adopt the strategic offensive and steam across the Pacific for a decisive showdown.1 The Japanese intended to reduce the strength of the U.S. Navy through a series of attritional attacks with land-based air power, light forces, and submarines.2 Eventually, at a time and place of the Imperial Japanese Navy’s choosing, a battle would be fought to decide the outcome of the war. The Japanese chose Leyte Gulf, where on 20 October 1944 the United States began landing troops, in the first step in the reconquest of the Philippines.
Before the war, both sides assumed that the ultimate clash would be fought between battle lines. To offset U.S. superiority in battleships, the Japanese adopted tactics emphasizing night combat and the use of large, powerful oxygen-propelled torpedoes. During the 1942-43 battles in the Solomons Islands, they embarrassed larger Allied forces on numerous occasions, despite their enemy’s superiority in radar.3 At Surigao Strait, the southern entrance to Leyte Gulf, this trend was reversed. By using a combination of destroyer attacks and accurate gunfire, both coached on target by advanced radar systems, the U.S. Navy achieved victory in the type of nocturnal combat preferred by the Japanese.
The Plans
Vice Admiral Shoji Nishimura, commander of the southern wing of the First Striking Force, led the main Japanese effort at Surigao. Nishimura planned to approach the strait during the day, navigate its waters at night, force his way past any opposition, and enter Leyte Gulf at dawn on 25 October.4 Once inside the gulf, his two battleships, one heavy cruiser, and four destroyers would combine with the bulk of the First Striking Force under Vice Admiral Takeo Kurita arriving from the north and destroy the Allied invasion fleet.5 Vice Admiral Kiyohide Shima, commander of the Second Striking Force, was ordered to cooperate with Nishimura, but their forces were not combined.6 Shima’s three cruisers and four destroyers would follow Nishimura through Surigao Strait.
Carrier aircraft first sighted the approaching Japanese on the morning of 24 October. That afternoon, Vice Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid ordered Rear Admiral Jesse B. Oldendorf, commander of the bombardment and fire support forces of the invasion fleet, to repulse the anticipated attack. Oldendorf’s battle plan derived directly from prewar concepts.7 While seaplanes sought out the Japanese and reported their progress, six old battleships would steam in a line perpendicular to the direction of the enemy; cruisers and destroyers would guard either flank and screen the heavy ships.8 PT boats in the southern waters of the strait would harass the Japanese and keep them off balance, and radar would track them as they closed.
Oldendorf planned for his big ships to hold fire until the Japanese reached moderate range—between 20,000 and 17,000 yards—the maximum range at which battleship action could be quickly fought to a decisive conclusion.9 Prompt action was essential, because Oldendorf’s battleships had a limited amount of armor-piercing ammunition; their magazines were mostly stocked with high-explosive shells for bombarding targets ashore. Torpedoes were also in short supply.
As the Japanese closed, Oldendorf intended to release the destroyers from either flank for torpedo runs.10 Prewar tactical doctrine had emphasized that a simultaneous attack with battleship gunfire and destroyer torpedoes could enhance the effectiveness of both. This tactic had often been accomplished in scripted exercises, but rarely in battle.
The plan was set, but Captain Jesse G. Coward, commanding Destroyer Squadron 54, had a last-minute addition.11 Coward’s seven destroyers had been assigned to patrol a narrow exit at the mouth of the strait. On the eve of battle, Coward asked Oldendorf for approval to attack with torpedoes any enemy contact heading up the strait. Although Coward was not under his command, Oldendorf quickly approved.
The result was a powerful trap that would spring on Nishimura in the narrow waters of the strait.
Initial Contact
The opening stage of the battle was fought, not by the big-gun ships, but with humbler craft—PT boats. The first of 13 three-boat sections made contact with the Japanese at 2250 on 24 October. Nishimura was then subjected to a series of PT-boat attacks as his forces advanced. Japanese destroyers proved adept at thwarting the attacks of the small craft, blinding the enemy crews with searchlights, drenching them with near misses, and spoiling their approaches to firing positions by deft maneuvering. Several PTs were damaged by near misses and direct hits. None of them delivered a successful attack on Nishimura’s force, but their frequent contact reports kept Oldendorf, Coward, and other U.S. commanders informed of its progress. The PTs would have more success against Admiral Shi- ma’s trailing warships. The light cruiser Abukuma took a hit by a torpedo from PT-137 at 0325 and dropped out of formation. By that time, Nishimura had run into Coward’s destroyers.
Before the war, the U.S. Navy recognized the potential of reducing the strength of an enemy force before the main action through a nocturnal destroyer torpedo attack. A 1940 study, Night Search and Attack, was based on two fundamental assumptions: the decisive power of destroyer torpedoes, and the extreme vulnerability of the small craft to surface gunfire.12 Unsupported destroyer attacks had to be conducted at night to allow the ships to reach firing position intact. It was therefore essential to search and find the enemy in the darkness prior to the attack.
Coward’s task was somewhat easier. Because of the narrow waters of the strait, the reports of the PTs, and his radar, he did not have to search for the Japanese before attacking. He divided his destroyers into two groups. Anticipating that the enemy ships would use the middle of the strait, each group would steam down one side and together deliver a simultaneous attack.13
At 0230, Coward headed south with five of his seven destroyers (two remained behind to guard the original patrol area) divided into two groups. The eastern attack unit, under Coward’s direct command, was composed of the Remey (DD-688), McGowan (DD-678), and Melvin (DD-680). The western, led by Commander Richard H. Phillips, included the McDermut (DD-677) and Monssen (DD-798). The McGowan obtained a radar contact at 0240; the Japanese were 18 miles away. Within five minutes, the contact had resolved into a column. Nishimura had been shifting from his approach to battle disposition. His four destroyers were now in the van; the battleships Yamashiro and Fuso followed, with the cruiser Mogami in the rear.
First Destroyer Action
At 0256, lookouts on the destroyer Shigure sighted Coward’s eastern unit. Japanese searchlight beams swept the darkness, but failed to locate the three destroyers. Two minutes later, lookouts on the Melvin, most likely aided by the searchlights, found the Japanese. Distance was just shy of 13,000 yards, long range for U.S. torpedoes.
Coward meanwhile lost contact with the western group.14 A coordinated attack was no longer possible, and the opportunity for a surprise attack was quickly passing. Coward ordered his three ships to fire torpedoes, turn away, and make smoke to cover their retreat. Range had dropped to 9,000 yards by the time the order was executed, and it was then that the Japanese found them.
A searchlight fixed on Remey, and the Japanese immediately opened fire. Coward’s three ships zigzagged at flank speed, belching smoke to conceal their withdrawal. The Japanese scored no hits.
Nishimura must have assumed that Coward’s destroyers were sighted and driven off before they were able to fire torpedoes. However, he was wrong. Shortly after 0308, Fuso was hit by at least one torpedo, probably from Melvin, and sheered out of line. Little is known about the specifics of her fate, but it is likely that the hit started a fire in her central magazine spaces.15 Within half an hour the battleship exploded and broke in two. Her flaming halves illuminated the waters of the strait for hours. No other hits were scored because of the long range and relatively poor target angle.16
As Coward’s torpedoes arrived at their targets, the Japanese sighted Phillips’ western attack group, the McDermut and Monssen, and opened fire. The two destroyers held fire to prevent the Japanese from using their gun flashes as aiming points and pressed on. At 0310 they began firing torpedoes.
Nishimura maneuvered his squadron to avoid them, but the evasive actions brought his ships directly into the path of Phillips’ torpedoes. At 0320, the leading Japanese destroyers were decimated. The Yamagumo blew up. Michishio was crippled and lay dead in the water. Asagumo's bow was blown off, but she was able to reverse course and retire down the strait. One torpedo hit the Yamashiro, but she continued on without incident.17
The search and attack, preliminary to the main battle, was over. The well-executed attack of Coward’s division reduced Nishimura’s force to one battleship, one destroyer, and one cruiser. The five destroyers proved the worth of the prewar doctrine of a nocturnal destroyer attack prior to the engagement of battle lines.
Second “Little Boy” Action Opens
As Coward’s destroyers retired up the strait, Rear Admiral Russell S. Berkey, commander of the three cruisers and six destroyers that constituted Oldendorf’s right flank, noted that Coward’s attacks had met little resistance. Deviating from the U.S. commander’s plan, he released his destroyers early.18 The Japanese were still too far away for the decisive gun battle, but Berkey believed that the opportunity for success warranted the risk of an unsupported attack.
Berkey’s decision reflects two primary emphases of U.S. Navy doctrine: the expectation that subordinate commanders would exploit favorable opportunities in battle as they presented themselves, and the necessity of keeping pressure on the enemy through aggressive offensive action.19 Moreover, his decision to attack kept the Japanese off balance and ensured that they would not recover from the initial blows.
Berkey ordered Captain Kenmore M. McManes and his ships of Destroyer Squadron 24 into the fray at 0302. They formed up into two groups. McManes himself commanded the western group, composed of the Bache (DD-470), Daly (DD-519), and Hutchins (DD-476); Commander A. E. Buchanan of the Royal Australian Navy led the eastern group: the Beale (DD-471), Killen (DD-593), and HMAS Arunta. Both of the forces attacked the Japanese from the west.
As the destroyers approached, the exploding Yamagumo illuminated the positions of the remaining Japanese ships. The Arunta, Beale, and Killen fired torpedoes between 0323 and 0326 at ranges from 6,500 to 8,700 yards. Killen scored another hit on Yamashiro; all the other fish missed. The second hit on the Japanese flagship slowed her temporarily, but she quickly regained speed.
McManes pushed his three ships farther south, then turned 180° to parallel the Japanese course. The Bache, Daly, and Hutchins fired 15 torpedoes between 0329 and 0336 at relatively long range, 8,200 to 10,700 yards. All appear to have missed because of Japanese maneuvering, a poor target angle, and the long range. McManes then looped around in a long turn to port, initially away from the Japanese and then directly toward them. At 0340, the three destroyers opened with gunfire as they continued to turn to the northward.
Their targets were the crippled Michishio and Asagumo. For nearly ten minutes the three U.S. destroyers harassed the wounded Japanese tin cans. At 0349 Berkey ordered McManes to retire toward the western shore. The battleships and cruisers were preparing to join the action, and Berkey feared McManes would foul the range. The Hutchins fired five more torpedoes before withdrawing. Asagumo was the target. She dodged the spread, but the torpedoes found Michishio, and she blew up at 0358. McManes’ destroyers continued fighting as they withdrew, eventually taking the Mogami and Yamashiro under fire.
Second Action Closes
At 0335, while McManes’ western group was firing its initial spread of torpedoes, orders had gone out to the left flank destroyers, Captain Roland N. Smoot’s Destroyer Squadron 56, to launch their attack. The torpedo run along with a big-ship bombardment would be the simultaneous attack envisioned before the war. Smoot was specifically instructed to “get the big boys.”20
The final torpedo attack directed against Nishimura’s squadron would come from three directions. The first section—Albert W. Grant (DD-649), Richard P. Leary (DD-664), and Newcomb (DD-586)—commanded by Captain Smoot, would come at the Japanese from ahead. Captain T. F. Conley would lead the second section—Bryant (DD-665), Halford (DD-480), and Robinson (DD-562)—to a position on the Japanese starboard bow. The third—Bennion (DD-662), Leutze (DD-481), and Hey wood L. Edwards (DD-663)—under Commander Joe W. Boulware, would approach from the port bow. The idea was for Nishimura’s ships to be in torpedo water no matter where they turned.
As the destroyers increased speed to 25 knots for their approach to the firing positions, the battleships and cruisers behind them opened fire. With tracers from the heavy ships passing overhead, Conley signaled: “This has to be quick. Stand by your fish.”21
The Japanese found Conley’s three destroyers at 0351 and immediately opened erratic and inaccurate fire. Their star shells fell short and failed to illuminate the destroyers effectively.22 Conley held fire to prevent the Japanese from ranging on his gun flashes and hugged the western end of Hibuson Island to make his ships more difficult to see. He planned to fire torpedoes at a range of about 8,000 yards, and by 0354 his ships were in position.23 Each destroyer fired five torpedoes, but all missed because the Japanese executed a turn to port to parallel the American battle line. Conley and his destroyers retired.
Boulware was at his firing point—also about 8,000 yards—by 0357. The Japanese as well harassed his three destroyers, but failed to score any hits. The Bennion, Leutze, and Heywood L. Edwards fired their torpedoes and retired under cover of a smokescreen. Shigure maneuvered radically to dodge, and none of the torpedoes scored.
Smoot pressed his attack closer than any other destroyer commander that night. As his three tin cans approached, he observed the Japanese turn to port and adjusted course to parallel their track and close the range. He later recalled that, “Throughout the torpedo run we were under fire from the enemy.”24 At 0404, 6,200 yards out, Smoot’s group commenced firing torpedoes. One, possibly two, of those from the Newcomb hit Yamashiro at 0411, hastening her demise.
The Newcomb and Leary turned away after firing, with shells from both sides splashing around them. All missed. Grant was not so fortunate. She was hit at 0407 by Japanese fire; “friendly” shells soon followed. By 0420 the destroyer was dead in the water, hit nearly 20 times by ships on both sides, but she would survive.
The Cruiser Line
At 0351, with Nishimura’s lead ships only 15,600 yards from Oldendorf’s flagship, Louisville (CA-28), the U.S. admiral had ordered the cruisers flanking his battle line to open fire. His battleships followed at 0353. The final element of the trap was sprung.
Before the war, doctrine held that light cruisers would guard the battle line from enemy destroyer attacks. To fulfill this role, light cruisers mounted multiple rapid firing 6-inch guns. The Brooklyn (CL-40) class was the ultimate example of the trend. With 15 guns, each capable of firing ten shells a minute for brief periods, ships such as Boise (CL-47) could literally smother their opponents in a rain of steel.
Rapid fire had worked for the Boise and her sisters off Guadalcanal in 1942 but had been problematic in 1943, when engagement ranges increased and greater reliance was placed on radar. Spotters tended to lose the target in the cloud of shell splashes on the radar screen. Often gunners chased their own shell splashes rather than the target; when firing ceased, the “target” would disappear from the screen, resulting in a false claim of a sinking.
The solution was a change in doctrine. By 1944, slow and deliberate salvo fire was emphasized for longer ranges at night. This made spotting the fall of shot much easier, but Boise reverted to old habits at Surigao, firing so rapidly that, according to an action report, her 6-inch guns “looked like heavy caliber machine gun fire.”25 Berkey had to order her to fire slowly and deliberately.26
Like most of the other cruisers, Boise focused on the largest target, Yamashiro. Minneapolis (CA-36), a veteran of the 1942 Battle of Tassafaronga where she had lost her bow to a Japanese torpedo, took the opportunity to exact revenge. The Phoenix (CL-46), Columbia (CL-56), and HMAS Shropshire joined in. Portland (CA-33), a survivor of “Friday the Bloody 13th”—the 13 November 1942 Battle of Guadalcanal—started firing at the Yamashiro but later shifted to the Mogami.27 The Denver (CL-58) and Louisville targeted Shigure; Denver hit Grant instead.28
The Battleship Line
A gunnery champion before the war, West Virginia (BB-48) had always been accurate in practice shoots, and at Surigao she would prove her accuracy in combat.29 Sunk at Pearl Harbor, raised, and rebuilt in the image of the modern fast battleships, West Virginia was now equipped with the modern Mk 8 fire-control radar. Locked on to the target at 30,000 yards, she tracked Yamashiro until, at 0352, she opened fire, the first U.S. battleship to do so. When her shells landed half a minute later, the fire control officer, Commander Robert Crawford Jr., let out an audible chuckle.30 Yamashiro had been hit amidships, and, according to an action report, her large foremast crumpled “like a sand castle.”31
About every 40 seconds West Virginia fired another salvo, each producing probable hits.32 Tennessee (BB-43) and California (BB-44), both also rebuilt with the Mk 8 fire-control radar, started firing after West Virginia's second salvo. The advanced equipment on these ships enabled them to fight in darkness at ranges once reserved only for daylight action.
The other three battleships in Oldendorf’s line—Pennsylvania (BB-38), Maryland (BB-46), and Mississippi (BB-41)—were equipped with the earlier Mk 3 fire-control radar and had difficulty locating the target. At 0359, after several nervous minutes and much consternation, Maryland fired her first salvo. She had found the target using visual bearings and ranged on the shell splashes from West Virginia. She would fire five more before being ordered to stop. Mississippi had more trouble and would get off only one salvo; Pennsylvania was never certain of the target and withheld fire. Yamashiro, nevertheless, was devastated. Fires broke out amidships, and explosions were seen on her decks. She returned the fire of the screening cruisers with her main battery, and managed to straddle the Denver, Columbia, and Minneapolis but scored no hits. Soon she was ablaze along her entire length. But Yamashiro would have a moment’s reprieve before the end.
At 0409, after receiving news of the damage to the Grant, and fearing more friendly fire incidents, Oldendorf ordered a cease-fire to give the destroyers time to clear. Nishimura took the opportunity to turn southward to withdraw. Shortly thereafter, Newcomb’s torpedo spread hit
Yamashiro, and the cumulative damage proved too much. At 0419 the battleship rolled over and sank. Nishimura and most of the ship’s crew went down with her. Firing never recommenced; no targets were left. The Mogami and Shigure were already withdrawing to the south as best they could.
Most of Oldendorf’s ships had concentrated on the largest target on their radar screens, pounding Yamashiro but leaving Mogami relatively neglected. Only Portland had fired at the Japanese cruiser, scoring a hit that killed all the officers on the bridge; Mogami slowed from the damage, but did not stop. The cease-fire order almost certainly aided the Mogami and Shigure in their escape.33
Shima’s ships, meanwhile, entered the battle area at 0420. Two of them fired ineffective torpedoes at radar ghosts to the north, but never closed the U.S. battle line. The cruiser Nachi inaccurately estimated Mogami’s speed and the two collided in the darkness. Shima then hastily withdrew his ships. Oldendorf ordered his light forces to pursue, but their departure was tardy and the follow-on Japanese force escaped.
Later on the 25th, crippled Japanese ships were dispatched, Asagumo by U.S. ship gunfire and Mogami by Japanese torpedoes. The Imperial Japanese Navy’s attempt to enter Leyte Gulf from the south had failed, and Nishimura’s force had been destroyed, except for nimble Shigure.
Foundations of Victory
Although the Japanese Navy had primitive radars and excellent lookouts, they lacked a mechanism to translate the information into a comprehensive battle picture. As a result, Nishimura and Shima were ambushed. By comparison, U.S. commanders had access to combat information centers (CICs) on board their ships. In the CICs, all information about the battle, including radar plots and communications, were centralized. Captain McManes, for example, commanded his destroyer group directly from the CIC of the Hutchins, giving him unequalled awareness of the situation around him.34
The Battle of Surigao Strait was the most lopsided night surface action since the Japanese victory at Savo Island two years before. The ability of the U.S. Navy to excel in an environment that the Japanese had once dominated was a tribute to prewar planning, technological innovation, and wartime experience. The overall conduct of the battle, including Captain Coward’s preparatory attack, Admiral Berkey’s aggressive use of his destroyers, Captain Smoot’s bold approach, and the decisive action of the battle line, was founded on prewar concepts. By 1944, CICs, advanced radar equipment developed during the war, prewar doctrinal foundations, and the costly lessons of earlier battles in the Solomons prepared the U.S. Navy to fight such a night action. Fundamental doctrinal principles had not changed; however, the methods of disseminating doctrine—and the training of individual ships and squadrons—had radically improved.35 Years of planning, wartime innovation, and lessons learned in earlier defeats laid the foundation for victory at Surigao Strait.
1. The U.S. Navy was superior in size because both the Washington Treaty of 1922 and the London Treaty of 1930 restricted the Imperial Japanese Navy to a battle fleet 60% the size of that of the U.S. Navy. The exact timing and pace of the Pacific advance was a subject of debate before the war. See Miller, Edward S., War Plan Orange (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press [Hereafter: NIP], 1991).
2. Evans, David C. and Peattie, Mark R., Kaigun (NIP, 1997).
3. The battles of Tassafaronga, Kula Gulf, and Kolombangara are all excellent examples of how a smaller Japanese force was able to use torpedoes to defeat an Allied squadron.
4. Nishimura’s daylight approach was relatively easy because U.S. carrier planes focused on the northern wing of the First Striking Force. This series of air attacks has become known as the Battle of the Sibuyan Sea.
5. For more details on the complex plan to isolate and destroy the invasion fleet see Morison, Samuel Eliot, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, Volume XII: Leyte (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1958; reprint Edison, NJ: Castle Books, 2001) and Cutler, Thomas J., The Battle of Leyte Gulf (NIP, 1994).
6. Bates, Commodore Richard W., The Battle for Leyte Gulf, Volume III (WW2 Bates-Leyte Collection, Record Group 38, National Archives [Hereafter: Bates], NA, Box 3), 150.
7. The formation used evolved out of one produced in 1941. See U.S.F. 10, Current Tactical Orders, United States Fleet, 1941 (Naval Historical Center, World War Two Command File, [Hereafter: CF], Box 272) and U.S.F. 10A, Current Tactical Orders and Doctrine, United States Fleet, 1944 (Bates, NA, Box 16).
8. Seaplanes had been an important part of night scouting before and during the war, but they failed to locate the Japanese at Surigao.
9. Moderate range as a range of decisive action initially appeared in tactical publications in 1930. See Tentative Fleet Dispositions and Battle Plans, United States Fleet, 1930 (Entry 337, Record Group 38, National Archives, Box 108).
10. Action in Surigao Strait on Morning of 25 October, 1944-report of., Commanding Officer U.S.S. Boise (World War Two Action and Operational Reports, Record Group 38, National Archives, [Hereafter: AOR), NA, Box 857), Enclosure B.
11. Coward was no stranger to night combat with the Japanese. He had captained destroyer Sterett (DD-407) through the chaos of the naval Battle of Guadalcanal on 13 November 1942.
12. Night Search and Attack, DTP 2-40, Commander Destroyers Battle Force, 1940 (Entry 336A, Record Group 38, National Archives, Box 130); Light Forces in Night Search and Attack, Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet, W.S. Pye, 24 December 1941 (CF, Box 250).
13. Bates, Commodore Richard W., Battle of Surigao Strait (Record Group 23, U.S. Naval War College Archives), 25.
14. Bates, Battle of Surigao Strait, 110.
15. Both Fuso and Yamashiro had two turrets located amidships in addition to two at the bow and two at the stem.
16. Bates, Battle of Surigao Strait, 200.
17. Morison, Volume XII, 217.
18. Action Report-Surface Engagement with Japanese Forces, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, Morning of 15 October 1944, Commander Task Group Seventy-Seven point Three (Rear Admiral Russell S. Berkey, U.S. Navy), 10 November 1944 (AOR, NA, Box 258), 11.
19. Hone, Trent, “The Evolution of Fleet Tactical Doctrine in the U.S. Navy, 1922- 1941,” The Journal of Military History, Vol. 67, No. 4 (October 2003), 1107-1148.
20. Action Report-Battle of Surigao Strait, 24-25 October 1944, Commander, Destroyer Squadron Fifty-Six, 29 October 1944 (AOR, NA, Box 622), 4.
21. Morison, Volume XII, 221.
22. Action Report for Battle of Surigao Straits, 25 October 1944, The Commanding Officer, U.S.S. Bryant, 1 November 1944 (AOR, NA, Box 257), 5.
23. Action Report, Battle of Surigao Strait, Commander Destroyer Division One Hundred Twelve, 31 October 1944 (AOR, NA, Box 257), 5.
24. Action Report-Battle of Surigao Strait, 24-25 October 1944, Commanding Officer, U.S.S. Newcomb, 31 October 1944 (AOR, NA, Box 257), 5.
25. Action Report-Battle of Surigao Strait, 25 October 1944, Commanding Officer, U.S.S. Thom, 30 October 1944 (AOR, NA, Box 256), 9.
26. Action Report, Commander Task Group Seventy-Seven point Three, 13.
27. Action Report-Surface Engagement in Leyte Gulf 25 October 1944, Commanding Officer, U.S.S. Portland, 28 October 1944 (AOR, NA, Box 1328), 6.
28. Morison, Volume XII, 227.
29. West Virginia won the battle efficiency pennant in 1925, 1927, 1932, and 1933. See http://www.usswestvirginia.org/uss_west_virginia_history.htm.
30. Action in the Battle of Surigao Straits 25 October 1944, U.S.S. West Virginia-Re- port of. Commanding Officer, U.S.S. West Virginia, 1 November 1944 (AOR, NA, Box 1508), 6.
31. Smith Jr., Myron J., The Mountain State Battleship: U.S.S. West Virginia (Rich- wood, WV: West Virginia Press Club, 1981), 129.
32. Action in the Battle of Surigao Straits 25 October 1944, U.S.S. West Virginia, 8.
33. Bates, Battle of Surigao Strait, 312-316, 318-319.
34. Bates, Battle of Surigao Strait, 158-159.
35. In the Solomons, inadequate training and indoctrination had been a factor in numerous actions. See Hone, Trent, “Give them Hell! The U.S. Navy’s Night Combat Doctrine and the Campaign for Guadalcanal,” War In History, Volume 13, Number 2, 2006, 171-199. These problems did not appear at Surigao. The “excellent state of training” allowed ships to join strange units and be effective immediately. See Action Report, Commander Destroyer Division One Hundred Twelve, 25.
