Indispensable in Every Operation

A 90-day wonder, Navy Ensign Charlie Nelson was the damage-control officer of the USS Claxton (DD-571) when she and four other ships of Destroyer Squadron (Des- Ron) 23 intercepted five Japanese destroyers at the Battle of Cape St. George in the early hours of 25 November 1943. After firing torpedoes, the U.S. destroyers were in full pursuit of the surviving enemy ships. Sixty years later, Nelson vividly recalled:

Try to imagine the situation on the main deck of a Fletcher-class destroyer at that moment. At the speed we were running, from amidships aft, the decks were almost below the surface of the ocean. The bow wave she made was over our heads, standing on the main deck, amidships in that pitch-black night. Suddenly, the ship would wrack itself into a hard turn at 37+ knots; and, immediately, all three after guns would come free from their stops and fire blindingly right in your face. Sailor, grab ahold of something strong or over the side you will go.¹

That night, DesRon 23 sank three enemy destroyers and damaged a fourth. Its destroyers were fast, maneuverable, and lethal—characteristics that define each of the more than 1,600 destroyers that have served in the U.S. Navy since 1902.

The destroyer story has roots in ancient times, when it became apparent that the surest way to sink an enemy ship was to punch a hole in her bottom. By 1000 B.C., Mediterranean naval powers were doing it with oar-powered rams. During the Revolutionary War and after, American inventors David Bushnell and Robert Fulton tried it with explosive “torpedoes,” which were set adrift or towed. In the Civil War, both North and South achieved some success. The ironclads USS Monitor and CSS Virginia could not defeat one another with gunfire, but moored Confederate torpedoes (mines) sank many Union ships, and U.S. Navy Lieutenant William B. Cushing conned his small steam launch alongside the powerful ironclad CSS Albemarle and sank her with a “spar” torpedo.

The industrial revolution spawned further developments. British engineer Robert Whitehead marketed to the world’s navies a torpedo with screw propulsion and later with a gyroscope for improved long-distance accuracy. By 1880 navies were developing fast steam-powered torpedo boats. Successes, beginning during the 1891 Chilean civil war, demonstrated these boats to be a cheap, practical way of attacking capital ships, which had no sure defense against them.² Soon navies began building enlarged torpedo-boat destroyers to defend the battle line by chasing smaller craft and overpowering them with gunfire.

The isolated U.S. Navy did not immediately follow the trend. The torpedo boat USS Cushing (introducing the practice of naming ships for deceased naval or Marine figures or civilians who contributed to the Navy) was launched in 1890, but between 1896 and 1900, only 31 more were ordered.³ On the eve of the Spanish-American War, however, Spain was preparing to send torpedo-boat destroyers to Cuba, which prompted a war plans board headed by Assistant Secretary of the Navy Theodore Roosevelt to report, “We especially need torpedo-boat destroyers and every effort should be made to procure them.” On 4 May 1898 Congress authorized construction of the U.S. Navy’s first 16 destroyers.⁴

The USS Decatur (Torpedo Boat Destroyer No. 5) of the Bainbridge class was the first commissioned, in 1902 (she was later run into a mud bank in the Philippines while under the command of then-Ensign Chester Nimitz). The Decatur was 250 feet long, displaced 420 tons, and carried two 18-inch torpedoes and two 3-inch guns. Coal-fired with reciprocating machinery, she made nearly 30 knots in speed trials. With a length-to-beam ratio of more than ten to one, she also tended to roll in anything but calm water, a characteristic for which destroyers have been known ever since.

Between 1907 and 1910, Congress authorized 26 more torpedo-boat destroyers of the 740-ton Smith (DD-17) and Paulding (DD-22) classes, later known as “flivvers” (lightweights). These carried three single or double torpedo-tube mounts and five 3-inch guns. Between 1912 and 1915, authorization followed for 26 1,000-tonners of the Cassin (DD-43), Aylwin (DD-47), O’Brien (DD-51), Tucker (DD-57), and Sampson (DD-63) classes, with armament increased to eight torpedo tubes and four 4-inch guns. All 52 of these ships were “broken-deckers,” with high forecastles, and oil-fired with steam turbines. Their overall lengths ranged from 294 to 315 feet. As the U.S. Navy’s latest construction when the United States entered World War I in 1917, they soon joined British escorts in defending convoys against attack by German submarines. Eventually, 80 U.S. destroyers (their now-shortened name) saw sub-chaser duty. Two of them accounted for the one U-boat U.S. destroyers sank during the war by damaging it with a new weapon, the depth charge. In return, U-boats sank one destroyer.⁵

The Naval Appropriation Act of 29 August 1916 had called for a navy “second to none,” capable of protecting both the Atlantic and Pacific coasts, which led to the construction of a new generation of destroyers. In a design intended to reduce rolling and pitching, six dissimilar Caldwell- (DD-69) class prototypes introduced an uninterrupted “flush” deck for increased hull strength.⁶ The follow- on mass-produced Wickes (DD-75) and Clemson (DD-186) classes were sharper, deeper, and better sea ships.⁷ By the end of the war, 11 shipyards had launched 172 destroyers of these classes, though fewer than a quarter of them had been commissioned.⁸ Construction continued until 273 flush-deckers were completed, in 1922, though many of the ships were soon laid up as the need for them had passed.

The Interwar Years

The following decade was quiet. No destroyers were built, though some were converted for other uses, such as mine laying. In 1929, crews turned to when 60 of 103 active-duty ships needed replacement because of deteriorating boilers. The destroyermen swapped old hulls for “new” ones from mothballs, transferred fittings, equipment—even masts and superstructures in some cases—and reconditioned machinery, all within a mere nine months.⁹

Foreign countries, meanwhile, continued to build destroyers. European navies experimented with new technologies but generally on ships with small displacements. Japan, on the other hand, began designing its first large “special type” destroyers: the Fubuki class, 388 feet long with six twin-mounted 5-inch guns in weatherproof gunhouses and nine 24-inch torpedo tubes. Commissioned beginning in 1928 and modified thereafter, these were the first of several powerful destroyer classes that the U.S. Navy did not match until its Fletcher-class destroyers appeared in 1942.

The 1930 London Naval Treaty set total destroyer tonnage among major naval powers, specifying that “not more than sixteen percent of the allowed tonnage . . . shall be employed in vessels over 1,500 tons. . . .”¹⁰ Lacking any modem destroyers, the U.S. Navy responded by designing its first “1,500'tonners”: the eight-ship Farragut (DD-348) class, which incorporated a raised forecastle and redesigned stern for improved seakeeping and maneuverability, plus a higher-capacity engineering plant. The class’ 341-foot hull was so “lavish” below decks that old-timers called them “gold-platers.” Topside they were fitted with a new dual- purpose director-controlled 5-inch/38-caliber gun, which proved to be one of the finest guns of World War II.

Commissioned beginning in 1934, the Farraguts were followed over the next six years by 40 more 1,500-tonners of the Mahan (DD-364), Gridley (DD-380), Bagley (DD- 386), and Benham (DD-397) classes; then 12 Sims- (DD- 409) class 1,570-tonners on a hull seven feet longer, with a streamlined pilot house and shear strake forward. Shaft horsepower reached 50,000, making some of these treaty classes the fastest U.S. destroyers ever; on trials the Grid- ley-class Maury (DD-401) made 42.8 knots.¹¹ With defense against enemy battle lines in mind, some carried as many as 16 torpedo tubes. Five 5-inch/38s were also desirable but never successfully achieved. All these ships were top heavy and, in wartime, could accommodate heavier anti-aircraft defenses only when equal weight was removed.

Concurrently, 13 Porter- (DD-356) and Somers- (DD-381) class “destroyer leaders” were built to an 1,850-ton limit, also set by treaty. Their 381-foot hulls could accommodate eight 5-inch single-purpose guns in twin mounts. These destroyers first served as squadron flagships, and then, in light of their weak anti-aircraft defenses, were refitted with the dual-purpose 5-inch/38s or deployed where air attack was a reduced threat, such as in the South Atlantic.

Fiscal years 1938 through ’40 each brought eight 1,620- ton Benson- (DD-421) class destroyers and/or nearly identical 1,630-ton Gleaves- (DD-423) class ships. On a strengthened Sims hull, these introduced a split power plant, in which their two firerooms and engine rooms alternated to minimize the likelihood that a single torpedo hit would disable the ship.

In 1941, this concept was continued in the 376¹/i-foot, 2,100-ton Fletcher (DD-445) class, which featured a longer and wider hull not bound by treaty constraints. For greater strength, designers returned to a flush deck, which was large enough to incorporate five 5-inch/38s, ten centerline torpedo tubes, and, for the first time, radar. “Fast, roomy, capable of absorbing enormous punishment, and yet fighting on,” naval historian Norman Friedman wrote of them.¹² In addition to those characteristics, yacht designer Olin Stephens later noted, “Form is always commanded by function of course, but these were beautiful ships.”¹³

Even as Benson and Gleaves production continued to a total of 96 ships, 11 shipyards ramped up to turn out 175 Fletchers and, without pause, the beamier six-gun 2,200- ton Allen M. Sumner (DD-692) and lengthened 2,250- ton Gearing (DD-710) classes. By early September 1945, builders had completed 67 Sumners (55 destroyers and 12 destroyer-minelayer conversions) plus 45 Gearings, in addition to the Fletchers. With later commissionings bringing their total to 343 ships, these three classes dominated the destroyer force for nearly three decades.

Fighting in the Atlantic and Pacific

World War II broke out in Europe in September 1939 and with it, as in World War I, a German submarine campaign against vital merchant shipping. Forty flush-deckers were soon recommissioned; 50 more were transferred to the Royal and Canadian navies beginning in September 1940. In the Atlantic, U.S. Navy destroyers found action even before the country entered the war. In addition to convoying merchant ships, their mission grew to searching for and destroying U-boats before they could strike.

Beginning in 1943, destroyer escorts (DEs) joined the destroyers in this service. They were inexpensive, quickly built ships, mounting two 5-inch/38s when available (otherwise three 3-inch guns) plus depth charges, torpedo tubes, and Hedgehogs—new antisubmarine weapons that fired patterns of explosive charges ahead of a ship. The DEs were lethal, especially when teamed with small aircraft carriers in hunter-killer task groups, a combination capable of spotting, forcing down, and keeping down U-boats until they had to surface or were sunk. Here was the winning tactic in the antisubmarine war. The probability that a U-boat would return from patrol dropped to about one in four.

The Benson and Gleaves classes, with their high forecastles, were well suited to the rough Atlantic, where they formed the majority of the destroyer force that supported landings in North Africa in late 1942, Sicily in July and August 1943, and Italy between September 1943 and January 1944. Their crews became expert at knocking out shore batteries and tank columns with gunfire, defending against enemy aircraft and radio-controlled glide bombs, and protecting landing areas from torpedo boats and submarines.

During the D-Day invasion of Normandy, 6 June 1944, destroyers closed the beach, pressing into shallow water where larger ships could not venture, some touching bottom (see Thomas B. Allen, “The Gallant Destroyers of D-Day,” June 2004 Naval History). They provided pinpoint fire against German gun emplacements and reinforcements, making all the difference for troops ashore and in some cases even taking aboard wounded troops from the beaches on their disengaged sides. Soon after the August 1944 Allied invasion of southern France, the war in Europe moved inland, and, lacking targets, most Atlantic destroyers returned home, were refitted, and steamed off to the Pacific.

In the Pacific war, U.S. destroyers were initially fortunate not to face surface action against the better-equipped and better-trained Imperial Japanese Navy. Exceptions were the 13 Asiatic Fleet flush-deckers attached to a combined American-British-Dutch-Australian fleet that was decimated during the Japanese invasion of the Dutch East Indies in early 1942. Four of the 13 were lost, two with all hands, while the crew of a third spent the war in Japanese prison camps.

The flush-deckers’ wartime legacy was only beginning, however. Before the war, 48 of them had been converted to minelayers, minesweepers, and seaplane tenders. Many saw important service. Gradually they were joined by 32 fast transport conversions, the ubiquitous “Green Dragons,” which the Marines who were transported in the ships so named because of their initial green jungle camouflage. During the war, these “APDs” participated in 61 landings and other exploits, many of which made conventional destroyer operations seem tame.¹⁴ Late in the conflict 94 converted destroyer escorts joined them.

The Battle of the Coral Sea in May 1942 and the Battle of Midway in June blunted Japanese offensives toward Australia and Hawaii. The enemy, however, was still advancing. On Guadalcanal in the British Solomon Islands, Japanese forces began building an airfield from which they could control sea lanes to Australia and New Zealand. In a surprise amphibious operation, U.S. Marines captured and finished constructing the field in early August, and for five months thereafter, the Japanese sought to regain control of it. The contest featured night surface engagements against the “Tokyo Express”—the Japanese resupply runs—plus bombardments, landings, and air and ground attacks by both sides. Fighting was continuous, and the issue was seriously in doubt until after Admiral William Halsey arrived in the South Pacific to take command.

November 1942 was the turning point. During the 12- 15 November Battle of Guadalcanal, U.S. surface forces turned back all-out Japanese attacks. Along with two cruisers, seven of 12 U.S. destroyers were lost, but so were two Japanese battleships.

In contrast, the 30 November Battle of Tassafaronga— the last major surface action of the campaign before the Japanese decided to pull back—was a stunning defeat for U.S. forces. Cruiser-destroyer task force commander Rear Admiral Carleton “Bosco” Wright had carefully planned the engagement; his lead U.S. destroyers executed an ideal torpedo approach and achieved surprise against a Japanese destroyer force inferior in strength. But one of his five cruisers was sunk and three were badly damaged.¹’ Why?

In hindsight, Admiral Wright erred in subordinating destroyer torpedo tactics to cruiser gunfire tactics (as did other U.S. commanders before and after). The root causes of the defeat, however, were technological as well, and included a fact unknown to Wright: The torpedoes carried by his destroyers had faulty exploders and ran deeper than set. They were no competition for the Japanese Type 93 “Long Lance” torpedoes. The 24-inch-diameter oxygen-propelled “fish” could deliver a 1,080-pound charge 11 miles at 49 knots (or at a greater range at lower speeds). Unsuspected by the Western powers, the capabilities made the Long Lances by far the premier torpedoes of World War II.¹⁶

Soon to arrive in the Solomon Islands to command a destroyer division, however, was Commander Arleigh Burke, who indoctrinated himself by studying action reports, including those from Tassafaronga. He proposed to his cruiser- destroyer task force commander, Rear Admiral A. Stanton “Tip” Merrill, that destroyers should not be tied to the larger ships in battle. As Burke later described his plan, the destroyers would then be free to maneuver to their own best advantage. They could then hit the enemy

with one sudden surprise after another . . . accomplished by putting two destroyer divisions in parallel columns. One division would slip in close . . . launch torpedoes, and duck back out. When the torpedoes hit and the enemy started shooting at the retiring first division, the second half of the team would open up from another direction. When the rattled enemy turned toward this new and unexpected attack, the first division would slam back in again.

Burke derived the concept from a study of the Punic Wars and the tactics of the Roman general Scipio Africans, victor over Hannibal in 202 B.C.¹⁷

Meanwhile, before Allied industrial power yielded reinforcements and the torpedo problem was uncovered, a mix of 2,100-, 1,630-, and 1,500-tonners began offensive operations up the Solomon Islands chain to the next Japanese- held islands, the New Georgia group. In July 1943, Rear Admiral Walden “Pug” Ainsworth’s cruiser-destroyer task force fought two similar battles, Kula Gulf and Kolomban- gara. As at Tassafaronga, destroyers were deployed in formation with cruisers, and the results were similar: one U.S. cruiser and one destroyer sunk; three cruisers damaged.

The destroyers were now by themselves on the “front line.” DesRons 21 and 12 and a striking force of gold-platers, briefly commanded by Burke, were turned loose to prowl for enemy destroyers and barges. Ten nights out of 14 in one interval, they ran 200 miles up the Solomons’ deep-water “Slot” in a hide-and-seek campaign to support Marines and Army troops trying to capture Japanese airfields.¹⁸ Exhausted by a lack of sleep and the tropical heat, crews counted the number of islands between them and Tokyo and felt sure they would never make it home.¹⁹ But “they never disappointed me,” wrote Admiral Halsey. “Outnumbered, out-gunned during the dark days of ’42 and ’43, they stood toe-to-toe with the best the Japanese fleet could offer—and never failed to send them scurrying home with their tails between their legs.”²⁰

In July 1943, the Navy finally admitted its torpedo problem and began correcting it. The next month, Commander Frederick Moosbrugger succeeded Burke in command of the striking force and on the night of 6-7 August found the perfect opportunity to apply Burke’s tactics. At the Battle of Vella Gulf, Moosbrugger’s six 1,500-tonners torpedoed four out of four unsuspecting Japanese destroyers, sinking three in what Burke himself called “one of the most successful actions ever fought.”²¹

In November, then-Captain Burke with his new “Little Beavers” squadron of Fletchers (DesRon 23) got his own chance—twice. At the Battle of Empress Augusta Bay, he maneuvered his destroyers independently of Merrill’s cruisers to help turn back a superior Japanese task force; at the Battle of Cape St. George his five destroyers repeated Moosbrugger’s success, ambushing and sinking three of five enemy destroyers.

These tactics were applied one more time—on a grand scale—at the Battle of Surigao Strait, 25 October 1944- There, following General Douglas MacArthur’s return to the Philippines, two Japanese forces tried to break through to the Leyte Gulf landing beaches. Under cover of darkness, three squadrons of Fletchers attacked the southern force in sequence, maneuvering so as to ensure the enemy would pass through torpedo waters, no matter which way he turned. Final score: two Japanese battleships and three destroyers sunk plus three cruisers damaged; one American destroyer damaged.

Even more pivotal was the Battle off Samar the following morning, when three Fletchers and four destroyer escorts, attacking with torpedoes and gunfire and with aircraft support, charged and held off the second, even larger Japanese force (4 battleships, 6 heavy and 2 light cruisers, plus 11 destroyers), which had surprised them and the six escort carriers they were screening. Five of the carriers survived this action at a cost of two of the destroyers and one destroyer escort sunk. The ensuing American aircraft pursuit finished the Japanese surface navy as an effective fighting force.

That same day, the Japanese sent out their first kamikazes, sinking a second escort carrier. In response, for the remainder of the war, destroyers returning home were refitted with beefed-up air defenses to counter the changing threat and sent back out to meet it.

The Pacific war continued through the Philippines and north to Iwo Jima. At Okinawa beginning in April, nearly 200 destroyers, destroyer escorts, and conversions were present as the Japanese unleashed more than 7,000 suicide planes. Aircraft were the most effective defense against them, but to provide early warning, fighter-director teams were deployed on destroyers assigned to exposed radar picket stations 40 to 70 miles offshore. There, during three months of continuous stress and desperate fighting, they faced the kamikazes’ full fury. British Prime Minister Winston Churchill later called the struggle one of the “most intense and famous actions in military history.”²² Of the 98 destroyers present, 13 were lost and only 10 escaped damage; of the 50 destroyer escorts, 2 were sunk and only 20 emerged undamaged.

By the end of the war, 1,046 destroyers, destroyer escorts, and conversions had been in commission at one time or another, manned by more than 250,000 officers and men. Some ships steamed more than 200,000 miles, operating in every climate from the equator to Greenland and the Aleutians; the nicknames of many reflecting their narrow escapes: “Lucky L”; “Lucky O”; “Lucky 13.” In total, at least 120 destroyers, destroyer escorts, and converted destroyers—about one in eight—were lost or damaged and not repaired following the war. Of the remainder, the Fletchers were laid up, and older classes were broken up, leaving only the Sumners, Gearings, and some destroyer-minesweepers in commission.

The Post-War Era

The Korean War was not a destroyer conflict as World War II had been, but destroyers and destroyer escorts still played key roles. Some Fletchers were recommissioned. Together with Sumners and Gearings, they screened carriers, supported landings, and took shore targets under fire, including trains. They then helped blockade the Korean peninsula until a cease-fire was signed in 1953. No destroyers or destroyer escorts were sunk during the war, but 48 were damaged by coastal gunfire or mines.²³

The Soviet Union, meanwhile, had begun incorporating advanced German technology captured at the end of World War II into a new breed of high-speed submarines that eventually numbered nearly 500.²⁴ Countermeasures became the U.S. Navy’s top priority, and efforts soon yielded such developments as variable-depth sonar, nuclear depth charges, target-seeking torpedoes, and sonobuoys for underwater detection and tracking. Some of these systems were carried by drone antisubmarine helicopters (DASH), predecessors of the manned light airborne multipurpose system (LAMPS) helicopters on which the Navy still relies.

Some Fletchers were modified to carry these systems, but because they lacked the internal room of later, larger ships, the modification program was halted. New destroyer escort classes designed for antisubmarine warfare took their place—Dealey (DE-1006), Claud Jones (DE-1033), Bronstein (DE-1037), Garcia (DE-1040), Knox (DE-1052), and Glover (DE-1098). The designation of these ships was changed to frigate in 1975. Guided-missile versions of the Garcias— Brooke- (DEG/FFG-1) class destroyer escorts—were succeeded by the Oliver Hazard Perry- (FFG-7) class guided- missile frigates commissioned over a 12-year period beginning in 1977. Many of the Perrys are still in commission.

Destroyer antiair warfare also evolved. Even before Okinawa, some Gearings were modified as radar picket destroyers, reflecting the growing importance of early warning. One, the experimental Gyatt (DD-712/DDG-1), became the Navy’s first guided missile destroyer in 1956, with a fire-control radar intended to feed information directly to its missile launchers mounted aft.²’

Beginning in the 1950s, new destroyers came in two sizes. The larger group, initially designated DLs and referred to as frigates, began appearing in 1951 with the Norfolk (DL-1) followed by the Mitscher (DL-2/DDG-35), Farragut (DL-6/ DLG-6/DDG-37), Coontz (DLG-9/DDG-40), Leahy (DIG/ CG-16), and Belknap (DLG/CG-26) classes. In 1975 these were reclassified as cruisers, and some served until 1994. The Bainbridge (DLGN/CGN-25) of 1962 was a nuclear- powered version of the Leahy. She was followed by the Truxtun (DLGN/CGN-35) and two California- (DLGN/ CGN-36) class and two Virginia- (DLGN/CGN-38) class nuclear-powered frigates.²⁶

The smaller group began with the 2,780-ton Forrest Sherman (DD-931) class, introduced in 1955. Derived from the Fletcher concept, these mounted three rapid-firing 5- inch/54-caliber guns on an enlarged hull with greater freeboard forward for improved seakeeping. They were followed by the Charles F. Adams (DDG-2) class, with even higher freeboard forward and guided missiles.

Collectively, these destroyers and frigates blockaded Cuba during the 1962 missile crisis and served in surface action groups and carrier task forces off Vietnam, hunting logistics craft and bombarding shore targets. There, the precision 5-inch-gun fire and fuel-efficient plane guard duty of the veteran Fletchers impressed a new generation of destroyermen.

The next advance in performance came in 1975, when the first of 31 9,100-ton Spruance- (DD-963) class destroyers introduced gas-turbine propulsion. They shared their hull design with the Ticonderoga- (DDG/CG-47) class cruisers, which were originally designated as guided-missile destroyers. Initially, the versatile Spruances’ primary mission was antisubmarine warfare, but with the addition of a vertical launch missile system (VLS) that could carry antisurface and antiair missiles, they emerged in the 1980s as multi- mission ships.²⁷ Some were also modified with accommodations for women, now standard. Four Kidd- (DDG-993) class, enlarged Spruances intended for Iran, were commissioned in 1981 and ’82.

In 1991 the Aegis guided-missile destroyer USS Arleigh Burke (DDG-51), the first destroyer named for a living person, was commissioned. Multimission ships, capable of engaging air, surface, and submerged targets—concurrently in the case of the latest construction—the Arleigh Burke-class destroyers are the most powerful and self-sufficient surface warships ever built. Both stealthy and robust, they feature a reduced radar cross-section and systems that protect against nuclear, chemical, and biological agents. The Arleigh Burkes require about the same complement as a 2,100-tonner on a hull a third longer and weighing in at 8,300 to 9,300 tons fully loaded. They are not as fast as a Fletcher or a speedy gold-plater, but, with hangars for the latest LAMPS helicopters to extend their reach, they do not need to be.

Over the past 15 years, these ships have deployed with carrier strike groups and independently. In the Persian Gulf and North Arabian Sea, their assignments have ranged from interdicting ships with embargoed cargo to launching cruise missiles during Operations Desert Storm and Enduring Freedom.

The last Spruance in commission, the Cushing (DD-985), was taken out of service in 2005—still in good condition but too expensive to operate, now that nearly 50 Arleigh Burkes have joined the fleet, and production will continue until 2010, when 62 will be in commission. Future plans now focus on DD(X), a family of advanced-technology surface combatants with a low-silhouette “wave-piercing” design.

Meanwhile, perhaps 10% of the World War II destroyer- men are still alive, their average age now passing 80. They gather at reunions for their individual ships or at events sponsored by Tin Can Sailors, the Destroyer Escort Sailors Association, and other destroyer veterans’ groups. Most have already attended their last event; others will call it quits in the next year or two.

The old-timers visit the Arleigh Burkes—as big as the light cruisers they remember—and discuss the prospect of the DD(X), which, in order to minimize rolling action, is designed to go through waves rather than over them.

“Not roll? Then how can it be a destroyer?” asks one.

“I wonder if they’ll have as much fun as we did?” chimes in another. 't'

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By Captain Russell Sydnor Crenshaw Jr., U.S. Navy (Retired)

‘Torpedo Action, Port’

Late on the night of 5 August 1943, Commander Frederick Moosbrucker’s Destroyer Task Group 31.2 sneaked into Vella Gulf in the New Georgia group of islands to intercept a Japanese reinforcement column of four destroyers. The task group was composed of three destroyers of Destroyer Division 12—the Dunlap (DD'384), Craven (DD'382), and Maury (DD- 401)—in formation with DesDiv 15’s three destroyers. In the ensuing battle, the U.S. tin cans won an important tactical victory, sinking three Japanese destroyers and damaging the fourth.

During the U.S. formation’s long approach to Vella Gulf, then-Lieutenant Russell Crenshaw, executive officer and Combat Information Center (CIC) evaluator on board the Maury, had surmised that U.S. torpedoes were consistently running too deep, and he had the destroyer’s 16 fish set to run at minimum depth—five feet.

In the following excerpt from his book South Pacific Destroyer: The Battle for the Solomons from Savo Island to Vella Gulf (Naval Institute Press, 1998), Captain Crenshaw recounts the Maury’s role in the initial stage of the Battle of Vella Gulf and how the destroyer’s torpedoes performed.

I shouted up the voice-tube, “Radar Contact, bearing 350 True, 19,000 yards.” Almost immediately, over the TBS, Dunlap reported “Skunk, three four five, nineteen thousand!” Maury’s target and its coordinates were confirmed. Over Acker’s shoulder I could see one strong pip with two or three weaker ones just north of it. This was a real contact and the range was closing fast! . . .

Medler announced, “Target course one seven zero true, speed twenty- six.”

I passed it up the voice-tube to Captain Sims. “Torpedo action, port” was his immediate reply.

Bachman got the order over the JA command circuit and reported his director, “Matched,” the CIC solution cranked in, and Torpedoman Corcoran, Director Trainer, followed the constant stream of radar bearings. The port torpedo mounts trained out to follow the director. Torpedoman John T. Olcott atop Mount 4 cranked his mount train handles as fast as he could to turn the massive mount to its firing position. Torpedoman James A. Bonds did the same on Mount 2 ... .

The captain ordered a full salvo, eight torpedoes. Being last ship in column, Maury’s target would be the left-hand contact, the leading ship. The opposing forces were closing at a speed of over 50 knots. The range was plunging. At 9000 yards torpedo speed was shifted to intermediate. Medler announced his plot was now showing a target speed of 28 knots, but the target’s course held steady at 170°T. The CIC team was working like clockwork, every man intent on his task, too engrossed to be frightened ....

At 2343, with our range to the target just measured at 6500 yards, Maury’s TBS speakers blared, “Eight William Two,” ordering each ship of the division to fire eight torpedoes to port. Captain Sims, who had moved aft to stand beside Bachman, ordered, “Fire torpedoes.” Maury’s eight port torpedoes dove into the water, one after another, at three- second intervals.

As each torpedo was fired, Medler marked the ship’s position, laid out its particular course, each two degrees to the right of its predecessor, and measured the expected torpedo run in seconds. He had started a stopwatch on the first fish and would call out when each fish crossed the enemy’s track.

As the last torpedo sliced into the water, Moosbrugger ordered, “Division One, execute upon receipt, Turn Nine”—90 degrees to the right. Maury heeled sharply to port and shuddered into the turn. Throughout the ship, each man clutched something solid and held his breath. If the ship was going to be hit by an enemy torpedo, it would be now. Once around, she would he going away with only her stern exposed—more than 10 times safer.

She was heeling 15 degrees outboard and shaking like a banshee, as the screws sucked air from the surface and the centrifugal force tugged at anything loose. Medler and Bean flattened themselves across the chart desk to keep their plotting instruments under control. After an eternity, the ship came back up to an even keel and the shaking abated. She had made it! She was running free—heading away from enemy torpedoes.

At 36 knots, a torpedo goes through the water at 1200 yards a minute, 20 yards per second. The firing range had been about 6500 yards, but the torpedo run to intercept the enemy column ranged from 3870 to 4870 yards from left to right. The first fish should hit its target 3 minutes and 13 seconds after it was fired. I shouted up the voice- tube that I would give a “mark” when each torpedo should hit ... .

“Mark first fish!” I shouted up the voice-tube—nothing.

The silence screamed!

“Mark two!”—five seconds passed, then a great tower of orange flame leapt into the sky. From the Bridge they could see three ships to the right of the flame. “Explosion on port quarter” was the laconic report from a lookout. “We hit her!” the captain shouted into the voice- tube. He wanted every man in the crew to know.

“Mark three!”—nothing.

“Mark four!”—two seconds—a second tower of flame rose to match the first.

“Huge explosion! Different ship!” the captain shouted down the voice- tube. Shock waves from the explosions shook the whole ship ....

“Mark five”—a moment’s pause— “Big explosion!”

“Mark six!”—“Tall column of fire! That is a different ship!”

“Mark seven!”—three seconds— “Huge column of fire to the right!” “Mark eight!”—nothing.

Bachman told me over the JA that three enormous bonfires were blazing on the water, flames leaping a thousand feet in the air. He couldn’t identify what type of ships they were, but he could see wreckage at the base of the flames. . . .