What If?

During six years of intensive sea warfare, World War II produced only three naval actions in which post-Washington Treaty dreadnoughts engaged in gunnery actions against enemy battleships. None of these actions—Bismarck vs. Hood and Prince of Wales, Bismarck vs. Rodney and King George V, and Kirishima vs. South Dakota (BB-57) and Washington (BB-56)—constituted a true test of the ability of the most modern generation of battleships to slug it out with their contemporaries on equal terms. (A fourth battleship gunnery duel, the action at Surigao Strait during the Leyte Gulf battle, is not considered here because no modem battleships took part.)

Nevertheless, a careful study of these actions does provide some insight into what might have happened if American battleships did chance to encounter Germany’s Tirpitz while covering convoys in 1942 and 1943 in the Norwegian Sea or if they had been able to bring the Yamato and her consorts to battle off Samar in 1944.

Design Philosophy

The U.S. design philosophy differed significantly from that of Germany and Japan. Battleships of the North Carolina, South Dakota, and Iowa classes featured a standard main armament of nine 16-inch guns, which yielded a massive broadside weight of 24,300 pounds, far in excess of any European battleship; it exceeded that of Tirpitz by 43%. The Washington, South Dakota, and Alabama (BB-60), the ships that could have encountered the Tirpitz, were four knots slower than the German vessel and the latter two were very wet in a seaway owing to their short hulls. U.S. battleships were designed to integrate radar detection and fire control sets into their battle capabilities, and their crews had become very dependent upon them.¹ Armor protection was on the “all or nothing” principle—in addition to its main battery, magazines, and conning positions, a “raft” of side and end armor covered by an armored deck protected the ship’s vitals; nothing else was armored—with the ships featuring somewhat lightly constructed superstructures. American belt armor did not extend too far below the waterline but was generally considered to combine with the deck armor to produce a very strong armored box.²

The Germans, representing European thinking, retained a main armament of eight 15-inch guns on a greater displacement than the U.S. ships; 42,000 tons compared to roughly 36,000 tons. The Tirpitz thus had a superior sea-keeping hull, which would have been a significant advantage in rough North Atlantic waters. German gunnery emphasized optical rangefinders with radar in a secondary role. The strength of the German ship’s armored box is the stuff of legends, but there was much less protection at the bow and stern and the superstructure was lightly constructed.

The Recent History

With these factors in mind, how can we picture a gunnery duel between the Tirpitz and one of the three American battleships that operated in her theater?³ One way is to survey what happened when the Bismarck fought it out with the British battleships on 27 May 1941. We can then compare this experience with that of the South Dakota in her action with the Kirishima and her accompanying cruisers off Guadalcanal on the night of 14-15 November 1942.

The Bismarck went into her final battle already weakened by two 14-inch shell hits scored four days previously by the Prince of Wales. These had opened her bows to the sea, ruptured some fuel tanks, and put one boiler room out of action. Later an aerial torpedo hit had jammed her rudders, making her all but unmanageable, and her crew was very tired. After the action was joined, the Rodney and King George V proceeded to riddle the Bismarck’s superstructure, which caused heavy casualties among the AA gun crews sheltering there and also severed the links between the optical rangefinders in the gun directors and the turrets. Forced into local control, the Bismarck’s big guns failed to score a single hit on any British ship. As the British closed the range, their 14- and 16-inch shells put the German’s main guns out of action with hits that distorted the barbettes and jammed the turrets in train. Meanwhile, her radars had all failed due to shock damage or severed electrical leads. When enough hits accumulated on her topsides, the Bismarck was doomed to defeat because all of her offensive weapons were out of action and her crew was taking massive casualties. She was scuttled and sank without having experienced a penetration of her armored box or barbettes.⁴

The experience of the South Dakota off Guadalcanal was less catastrophic but remarkably similar. In her gun duel with the Kirishima and her escorting cruisers, she suffered the loss of all of her scout planes, which were set afire and blown overboard by the blast of her after 16-inch guns. Within a very short time her radars went down because of shock damage from her big guns. The Japanese proved much more adept at finding the range by visual means and soon began to riddle the South Dakota’s superstructure, cutting electrical leads and causing casualties among the AA gun crews. As the fighting continued, the South Dakota suffered continual electrical blackouts and fires. Ironically, the Kirishima scored only one hit with her 14-inch guns, so virtually all the damage to the South Dakota was done by cruiser and destroyer armor-piercing shells, which invariably passed through her lightly constructed superstructure without exploding. With her guns in local control and firing under nighttime conditions, the South Dakota scored no hits on the Kirishima with her main armament, and it is hard to document how successful she was with her secondary battery. Her armored vitals were never in danger, however, and her command team was effectively protected by the armored conning tower.⁵ If the Washington had not been present to harass the Japanese with unobstructed counter-battery fire, the South Dakota might only have been saved by her gunners somehow managing to get the range and register heavy-caliber hits on Kirishima. Barring that, she would probably have been defeated due to an accumulation of topside damage putting her guns out of action while her hull was still sound.

The Tirpitz vs. U.S. Contenders

With these two historical examples in mind, let us proceed to pit an American battleship against the Tirpitz. For openers we can assume both ships are fully in commission and not long out of port so crews are relatively fresh. Seas are typical for the North Atlantic, moderately rough, and visibility is poor, with a grey ocean and overcast skies. With a four-knot speed advantage, the Germans can decide whether to give or refuse battle. They will also be the first to come in range at 38,880 yards. At a range of 36,900 yards, the American ship can reply. If the action takes place in 1942, the U.S. vessel will quickly lose her radars to shock. By 1943 this problem would be solved. The German optically aimed guns are on target by the third or fourth salvo. The U.S. optical rangefinders are roughly in the same league if no damage is done to them by the initial German salvos. Once the U.S. guns come into range, however, they will be much more destructive than the German pieces.

As the slugging match develops, each adversary has its topsides riddled with shells that pass through without exploding. Both crews are severely challenged to keep their fire control directors on line and their electrical circuits functional. Armor-piercing shells that detonate against the main armor are the unpredictable factor in this encounter. Perhaps U.S. 16-inch shells penetrate the German armor and explode inside the box with catastrophic effect. It is unlikely that German 15-inch shells will penetrate the American armor because of their lighter weight. The Germans, however, are more likely than the Americans to do great damage by scoring hits below the armored belt.

The crews of both ships experience heavy casualties among those sheltering in or stationed in the superstructure. Fires are a major problem. The U.S. battleship has more difficulty keeping its forward turrets in action due to seas breaking over the bow while the Tirpitz has a greater chance of losing rudder control to a lucky hit aft. Both ships have to cope with flooding, as heavy-caliber hits tear the unarmored portions of their hulls open. If the slugging match was a protracted one, topside damage eventually puts the main rangefinders out of action, degrading accuracy until hits become a matter of luck unless the range becomes very short. At this point, one or both captains, still safe because of their armored conning towers, might elect to withdraw rather than fight the action to the death.

If the battle is fought to the bitter end, the U.S. ship has a better chance of coming out on top due entirely to its heavier guns. She would have more self-inflicted damage than her German adversary, especially to scout aircraft and electronic gear, but her armor, magazines, and engines should be in better shape. The Tirpitz, with significant advantages in speed and gun range, would have been betrayed by the lightness of her main armament. In the battle she would find it harder to inflict deadly hits while her armor would be put to the severest possible test. Whatever the outcome, the winner of this conjectural duel could not help but emerge in a badly damaged condition with many casualties and a long list of design flaws to be rectified.

The Yamato vs. the Iowa class

How might an action have developed between an Iowa- class battleship and the only two modern battleships possessed by the Japanese, the Yamato and Musashi?

In this case, the previous equation is effectively reversed: The Japanese have the heavier guns mounted on the slower ship. A new factor to be considered is the difference in the rate of fire. The nine 18-inch guns of the Yamatos delivered a broadside of 37,971 pounds at a maximum range of 45,960 yards, but their rate of fire was slow. The latest model U.S. gun, the 16-inch/50-caliber Mark 7/0, mounted in the Iowa-class ships could reliably fire three times in the same amount of time it took the Japanese piece to get off two rounds.⁶

If Iowa-class ships were sent to hunt for one of the Japanese behemoths in the manner of the British pursuit of the Bismarck, prudence dictates that they operate in pairs so as to smother the enemy ship with 16-inch shells and force her to either divide her fire or allow one Iowa the advantage of undisturbed target practice. The battle could thus end with one U.S. battleship badly damaged and the Japanese ship riddled, on fire, unable to offer further resistance, and fit only to be scuttled or finished off with torpedoes.

In considering a clash between Japanese and U.S. post-treaty battleships, there is another possibility, that of a massive fleet action. Assume that instead of going after the Japanese carriers dangled before him as bait, Admiral William F. Halsey remains in the vicinity of Samar Island during the Battle of Leyte Gulf. He is then in position to send his six battleships, four heavy cruisers, and eight destroyers of Task Force 34 into battle against one Japanese super battleship, three older battleships, eight cruisers, and 11 destroyers.

Admittedly, this is not exactly a Jutland of opposing battle lines. On the U.S. side, there are at least 350 aircraft intermittently strafing and dropping high explosive bombs on their opponents. Numerous U.S. “small boys” and escort carriers are in the vicinity, trying desperately to get out of the way. The Japanese ships are quite alone except for a few Kamikazes, and worn down by the earlier loss of one super battleship and two heavy cruisers.⁷ The Japanese are also tired from fighting off constant air attacks over the previous two days, and their commander, Admiral Takeo Kurita, is in poor psychological condition to take on the aggressive Halsey and his experienced battleship commander, Vice Admiral Willis A. Lee.

In all probability, the Japanese are not aware of the approach of Halsey’s force until they sight it visually, while the U.S. commander is able to plan his approach by radar. The Americans probably come from seaward, pinning their foes against the Samar coastline. The composition of the U.S. commander’s force allows him to create a “fast wing” composed of two 33-knot Iowa-class ships, the Iowa (BB- 61) and New Jersey (BB-62), and his cruisers to forge ahead while his four remaining battleships, one North Carolina and three South Dakota types, close at their best speed of 27 knots.

The fast wing will close as rapidly on the Japanese as they can, braving fire from the nine 18-inch guns of Yamato, which outrange the U.S. guns by almost 4,000 yards. The Americans will have to endure perhaps ten Japanese salvos before they can reply at their extreme range. During this time, however, their speed and range make them hard to hit and, once within range of Yamato, make her the focus of 18 heavy weapons with more than 24 tons of steel per salvo. Their accuracy is less than perfect, because of their tubes being poorly aligned in the turrets.⁸

Meanwhile, the cruisers and destroyers accompanying the fast wing need to take on their opposite numbers, the eight cruisers and 11 destroyers, to prevent them from attacking the battleships with Long Lance torpedoes or harassing them with medium-caliber gun fire. Experience drawn from the battles around Guadalcanal has shown that these torpedoes were deadly and that medium-caliber guns could shoot a battleship’s superstructure to pieces with crippling results.⁹ If Guadalcanal is any indicator, a wild melee ensues between the opposing cruisers and destroyers, the outcome of which might well go in favor of the Japanese, who have more cruisers on the scene and far more torpedoes available.

The Larger Battle

Meanwhile, the slower battleships on each side are moving up and entering the fray. Admiral Kurita will most probably have formed a single 33-gun battle line anchored by the Yamato with the Nagato, Haruna, and Kongo adding eight 16-inch and sixteen 14-inch guns. As the Washington, South Dakota, Alabama, and Massachusetts (BB-59) come up, they bring the U.S. total to 54 great guns. Halsey and Lee will have kept the two Iowas separate from the others to preserve their speed advantage and divide the fire of the Japanese battle line. The two will keep Yamato busy, while the four slightly older battleships slug it out with three old but substantially modernized Japanese counterparts. To the best of their abilities, all the battleship formations have to ignore air attacks and the violent clashing of cruisers and destroyers in the waters around them while they concentrate on their primary targets.

In this scenario, the Japanese force is probably doomed unless its cruisers and destroyers can pull off some sort of miracle. We can assume that their shooting will be fast and accurate, but the preponderance of gun power arrayed against them is too great. They will be the first to have their upper works riddled, their crews decimated, their turrets frozen by hits on the barbettes or gunhouses, and their hydraulic and electrical leads shot away. Some of the U.S. ships will sustain the same damage, but overall, gunnery skills being equal, 54 guns can do a lot more damage faster than 33. The battle is over when the Japanese capital ships became unmanageable and unable to continue shooting. It is unlikely that any sink because of the effects of gunfire alone.

The U.S. battle fleet will probably not lose any ships, but they will need extensive repairs and refitting after this battle. For months afterward, the older battleships and cruisers will have to take up the slack and carry out fast battleship functions as best they can.

Armchair critics might find fault with Admiral Halsey, claiming that he allowed his fast battleships to sustain grave damage and take unnecessary risks for the sake of destroying a fleet of useless relics from a bygone era. Against that, he will certainly have gone down in history as the savior of the invasion force and escort carriers and as the last admiral to fight a fleet action with opposing battleships slugging it out.

Consequences of Design

All modern battleships were designed with the one really compelling lesson of Jutland in mind: A capital ship with insufficient armor risked being blown up and sunk in a gun duel. Hence the “all or nothing” philosophy regarding armor. The consequence of this design philosophy was that practically all modern battleships and even extensively modified older ships were probably unsinkable by gunfire.

Nevertheless, they could still be defeated by gunfire as repeated hits made shambles of their upper works. It was not all that important what caliber of gun did the damage. The Japanese Hiei and the South Dakota were so badly shot up by cruiser and destroyer guns that the former was lost and the latter was put out of action for months. The fate of the Bismarck simply drives home the lesson: Un- sinkable does not mean invincible. The Kirishima's loss echoed that of the Bismarck. She was shot to pieces, but her armored box never failed. It is hard to escape the conclusion that if modern battleships had been able to stage a confrontation a la Jutland during World War II, the heaviest guns would probably have prevailed but victory would not have come easily and losses on both sides would have been massive.

Another intriguing question surrounds the utility of armor-piercing shells. They were the ammunition of choice in ship-to-ship gun duels, but if they did not hit armor, they did not explode. If they did hit armor, they usually did not penetrate. In effect, armor technology had trumped shell technology. It probably would have been much more effective to employ high-explosive shells for the sake of doing greater damage to the topsides of opposing battleships. This would have flown in the face of orthodox doctrine during the World War II era, but in hindsight, a case for it can be made when we contemplate what actually put battleships out of action—namely destruction of their unarmored topsides and gun turrets.