Belleau Wood, the 4th Marine Brigade's first big fight, had occupied most of June 1918. At the legendary battle, the Marines earned international recognition that they could stand and fight on a European battlefield. Less than three weeks later, however, the U.S. 2d Infantry Division and its Marine brigade was facing a new challenge: reversing Germany's fifth major drive of 1918 by spearheading an Allied offensive near Soissons, France, that would prove a turning point in the war.
During the first week of July, the 2d Division had gone into reserve, holding the support line behind Belleau Wood and Vaux, the latter about three miles to the southeast.1 Replacements were arriving, and the less-serious casualties had begun to return to the brigade. On 13 July, the brigade commander, Army Brigadier General James G. Harbord, was promoted to major general. Colonel Wendell C. "Buck" Neville, commander of the 5th Marines, was in the hospital, and Lieutenant Colonel Logan Feland was acting commander. Lieutenant Colonel Harry Lee led the 6th Regiment. The two regimental commanders pinned on Harbord's second stars, and Harbord went off to Paris for five days' leave.2
The next day was a Sunday and, war or no war, also Bastille Day. Army General John J. Pershing's chief of staff informed Harbord by telephone that he was to take command of the 2d Division, and the sooner the better. The sleep of the division's doughboys was disturbed that night of 14-15 July by the sound of distant artillery fire from the east. From Reims to Château-Thierry and across Champagne to the Argonne, the armies of German Crown Prince Wilhelm were attacking.3 For the Germans, it was the fifth and final offensive of 1918—the last throw of the dice. Hurried along by these events, Harbord, early on Monday morning, drove back from Paris to the 2d Division headquarters, comfortably situated in the Château de Chamigny on the Marne.4
At 1855, General Marie Emile Fayolle, commanding the Reserve Army Group to which the 2d Division was assigned, issued an order placing the division at the disposal of General Charles "the Butcher" Mangin, commander of the French Tenth Army.5 At about 2030, a French staff officer arrived at Chamigny and vaguely informed the division that it would soon be moving somewhere. Later that evening, more specific orders arrived. Troops were to embus at 1600 the following day and proceed to an unnamed area subject to further orders.6 Harbord complained in his diary, "In truck movements of troops, the French never tell any one where they are going." 7
Allied Commander in Chief General Ferdinand Foch had begun concentrating troops north of Paris to counterattack the flanks of the huge German salient reaching toward Paris. General Pershing, the overall U.S. commander, would write dryly in his final report, "The selection by the Germans of the Champagne sector and the eastern and southern faces of the Marne pocket on which to make their offensive was fortunate for the Allies, as it favored the launching of the counter-attack already planned." According to Pershing, French Army Commander in Chief Philippe Pétain's "initial plan for the counter-attack involved the entire western face of the Marne salient. The First and Second American Divisions, with the First French Moroccan Division between them, were employed as the spearhead of the main attack, driving directly eastward through the most sensitive portion of the German lines, to the heights south of Soissons."8 The operation came to be known as the Aisne-Marne offensive and lasted from 18 July until 6 August. Some 270,000 American troops were involved.
About 1500 on Tuesday, 16 July, Harbord was informed that his new division headquarters would be in the Forêt (Forest) de Retz, and that the French Tenth Army, to which his own division was now assigned, was contemplating an attack. General Mangin was away from his headquarters, and Harbord had initially received no information on Mangin's intentions for the 2d Division except that it would be assigned to the French XX Corps. Now, Harbord learned that the 2d Division, as part of XX Corps, was to attack on a wide front extending south from the vicinity of Soissons. A French operations officer offered to write the 2d Division attack order; however, Harbord declined with a bit of ice in his voice.
Preparing for Battle
The 2d Division commander spent the night drafting the order. The front would be approached through the Forêt de Retz, also known as the Forêt de Villers-Cotterêts. Beyond the woods, most of the land was planted in wheat, which then stood waist high. The area was dotted with villages and farmhouses built of stone from local quarries, offering the Germans strong defensive positions. Emerging from the woods, the division would advance almost due east on a frontage of about two miles. The first objective would be a mile-long line running through Beaurepaire Farm. There, the axis of the attack would change from east to southeast. It would be an awkward maneuver. The next objective, another advance of a mile, would be to Vauxcastille. Still another mile would bring the division to the village of Vierzy.9
Harbord expected that the principal resistance would be on his right. He gave this zone to the 2d Division's 3d Brigade, which would attack with both its regiments—the 9th and 23d Infantry—abreast. He assigned the narrower left front to the 5th Marine Regiment. The 6th Marines would be in reserve. The wheat fields promised good tank country. Four battalions of French tanks, 54 tanks in all, were allocated to support the division.10
While the mimeograph machine at headquarters churned out copies of the attack order, the Marines marched from their billeting areas near Nanteuil-sur-Marne to the main highway, where they embussed in French trucks. The convoys moved forward in total darkness.11
In the morning, the Marines tumbled out of the trucks northwest of Villers-Cotterêts, near spots on the map marked Pierrefonds, Retheuil, and Taillefontaine. Mangin's Tenth Army was to break the German front between the Aisne and Ourcq rivers.12 The XX Corps was expected to penetrate deeply at the critical point on the western flank of the salient. The corps was to attack with the 1st U.S. Division on the left, the French 1st Moroccan Division in the center, and the 2d U.S. Division on the right. The 3d Brigade would advance with its two regiments side by side, the 9th Infantry on the left, the 23d Infantry on the right. The 5th Marines would attack on the left of the 3d Brigade. A group of about 30 French tanks was assigned to support the 5th Regiment. The 6th Marines, along with the 2d Engineers and 4th Machine Gun Battalion, would be in division reserve. A French squadron of 10 aircraft was to support the division in the attack—or so XX Corps promised. To ensure surprise, there would be no preliminary artillery fire. The attack would begin with a barrage that would roll forward at the rate of 100 meters every two minutes.13
The weather—cloudy, rainy, and totally miserable—favored a surprise attack. The Forêt de Retz, a magnificent blanket of beech to the north and east of Villers-Cotterêts, concealed the approach. One principal highway, with a paved center and dirt shoulders, ran through the forest, which was crisscrossed by dirt roads. During the night on 17 July, after a terrible forced march through mud and rain, the 1st Moroccan Division and the U.S. 2d Division ended up huddled in the Retz forest.14
Neville was back from the hospital in time to command the Marine Brigade. The 5th and 6th Marines were to reach the woods during the afternoon and evening. The 6th Machine Gun Battalion was to arrive about 0300 on 18 July.15 Traffic moving to the front, however, packed the main roads through the forest, and the congestion delayed the delivery of the attack orders. There was little or no time for reconnaissance or the study of maps. For miles, the infantry was forced to march in single file along a ditch dug into the clay on the right of the road, each man holding onto the belt or coattail of the man in front of him.16
Colonel Feland reported to Harbord at his headquarters late in the afternoon and received his orders for the 5th Marines. Not until 2200 did he find his regiment on the road, two miles west of division headquarters.17 More tanks, large and small, than the Marines had ever seen had been assembled in the forest along with troop after troop of French cavalry. There were also the Moroccans; according to a Marine battalion history, the North Africans' "cold-blooded manner of fighting had from early days of the war struck terror in the hearts of the Germans."18
The weather cleared, and from midnight until the dawn of 18 July the troops marched from the rear through the woods to their attack positions. Major Julius Turrill's 1st Battalion, 5th Regiment, had been billeted in Crouttes, about eight miles southwest of Château-Thierry, from 9 to 15 July, "worn out, but well satisfied" from their work in Belleau Wood.19 At 2140 on 17 July, Turrill started his march through the Forêt de Retz in an effort to reach the jump-off point before H-hour. Each rifleman was carrying two extra bandoliers of ammunition. The expected French guides did not arrive to show Turrill the way.20
The 1st Battalion was followed by the 2d and 3d. The 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, commanded by Major Ralph Keyser, would also be in the assault. After traveling all night, it had debussed at Brassaire at 1100 on 17 July. From there, it marched into the western part of the Forêt de Retz, following the 1st Battalion.21
". . . [A]t 4 o'clock only one Regiment—the Ninth Infantry—was in position on the jump-off line," says the wartime history of the 2d Division. "The attacking Battalions of the Twenty-third Infantry arrived in position at exactly 4.30, after double-timing for over a mile. The First and Second Battalions of the Fifth Marines came up on the run just as the attack started, going from column into attack formation without a halt."22
Attack orders were sketchy. None of the company commanders had maps, nor were they given much more to go on than compass bearings of their direction of attack.23 The jump-off line for the 5th Marines was about three kilometers from the eastern edge of the forest. At the jump-off time, neither the 8th Machine Gun Company nor the 6th Machine Gun Battalion had arrived. "Very well," said some unknown optimist, "we will take the Boche machine guns."24
Immediately opposite the 2d Division were the German consolidated 14th and 47th Reserve Divisions, six infantry regiments each with an average effective strength of 30 officers and 1,000 men, and with 140 light and 200 heavy machine guns. They had the support of a mixed bag of light and medium artillery, about six battalions in all.25 The Germans were tired, their rations short, and their morale none too good, but they had the trench-wise cunning born of four years of survival.26
The 2d Division's Assault
As the attack began, the 2d Division faced the 14th Reserve Division on its right and the 47th Reserve Division on its left. Initially, resistance was not strong. Two German battalions, one each from the 218th and 219th Infantry Regiments, lightly held an outpost line. The main line of resistance was a few hundred yards behind, thinly manned by two battalions, one from the 138th Infantry and one from the 17th Infantry.27 The German direct support artillery was about a mile to the rear. A second, stronger defensive line, called the "Chaudun Position," ran along the ridge east of Chaudun and through Vierzy.28
Coming through the forest, Turrill reached a roadblock marking the proximity of the front line, and turned his battalion to the northeast. He deployed the 66th Company on the right and the 17th Company on the left, and held the 67th Company in support. The 49th Company came up about ten minutes later.29
The Allied artillery fire began as Turrill's Marines were deploying, and the Germans answered with their own barrage. The battalion endured the shelling for about 30 minutes, and then went forward.30 Without machine guns, the attack was made with rifles, bayonets, and automatic rifles.31 Keyser went in on the right of Turrill. His companies, from right to left, included the 51st Company, 18th Company, 43d Company, and 55th Company.32
To the right, the 3d Brigade attacked over open ground against little resistance. By 0645 the first waves of the Army doughboys had advanced four kilometers and were crossing open fields behind a screen of tanks toward Beaurepaire Farm.33 The Marine battalions, still hampered by the woods, moved more slowly. It had been close to 0600 before the assault battalions of the 5th Regiment went over the top. The barrage continued to roll inexorably forward. The first waves, going against heavy shelling and machine-gun fire, burst through the barbed wire interlaced amid the trees, and took the first German trench line, reaching the forward edge of the woods. The companies became scattered to the north and south.34
Keyser's right flank company, the 51st, attempting to maintain contact with the 9th Infantry, met heavy resistance. In Keyser's center, La Verte-Feuille Farm was taken with the help of the French tanks. These, to the Marines' satisfaction, crushed most of the German machine-gun positions.35
By sunup, Turrill had also reached the edge of the forest. There had been snipers in trees, and machine guns to contend with, but no serious resistance. Most of Turrill's casualties had come from shells bursting in the trees. With daylight, as the Marines moved out into the open, German aircraft flew overhead, and then dove, to strafe and bomb.36 More beneficially, Turrill's line of skirmishers received the support of seven or eight light French tanks.
The 9th Infantry, meanwhile, overran Beaurepaire Farm, defended by a second battalion of the 219th. An entire German dressing station was captured intact and put to immediate use. With Beaurepaire Farm taken, the direction of advance changed nearly 45 degrees—a difficult maneuver under the best of circumstances. The change exposed the left flank of the 3d Brigade to heavy fire from German machine guns and artillery at Maison Neuve Farm.37 Nevertheless, the advance was rapid from Beaurepaire Farm to Vauxcastille. Not even direct fire from German 77mm and 150mm artillery could stop the doughboys, but losses were heavy, and units became badly intermingled.
As the advance continued, a gap opened between the 2d Division and the Moroccan Division on the left, and the left of the Turrill's line was enfiladed by machine-gun fire from the woods north of Translon Farm, which the Moroccans had not yet taken.38 Turrill pushed ahead against stiffening resistance, veering into the Moroccan zone of action. Maison Neuve Farm was on his right and the village of Chaudun on his left.39 At about 0930, the 16th and 20th companies came up from the 5th Marines' 3d Battalion, and Turrill was able to form a support with the two fresh companies and a part of the 49th Company.40 In the meantime, his own 66th and 67th Companies had reached the ravine extending from Chaudun to Vauxcastille.41
By then, Keyser's 2d Battalion had gained its objectives, having fought its way to the Chaudun—Vauxcastille ravine through heavy machine-gun fire with the aid of the French tanks. By mid-afternoon, the division was on its final objective, except for the village of Vierzy itself, which was still strongly held by the Germans. In and about Vierzy were fragments of all six regiments of the 14th and 47th Reserve Divisions with miscellaneous additions. Until now in reserve, the German 28th Division, which the Marines had fought in Belleau Wood, was moving all three of its regiments into line.42
Brigadier General Hanson E. Ely had established his 3d Brigade headquarters at Beaurepaire Farm, and at 1330 Harbord ordered him to resume the attack, with the 5th Marines as an attached reinforcement.43 About a half-hour later, Harbord moved his own division headquarters forward to La Verte-Feuille Farm. At that time, elements of the 5th Marines and the 9th and 23d Infantry Battalions held the eastern edge of the Vauxcastille ravine, the western edge of Vierzy, and the high ground north of the town. The assault battalions had halted there to reorganize.44 Regimental commanders were sent for and the attack order was issued at 1630, setting the launching time for "as soon as possible, but not later than six p.m."45
Major Maurice Shearer's 3d Battalion, 5th Regiment, moving in regimental reserve, had first occupied old French trenches to the rear of the jump-off line. Later, Shearer's 16th and 20th Companies went forward to re-enforce Turrill. His remaining company, the 47th, was used as a provost guard to escort prisoners to the rear and bring ammunition forward. With all his companies parceled out, Shearer was left with a headquarters and no battalion.46
Until now, Marine machine guns had been of little help. Major Littleton W.T. Waller Jr.'s 6th Machine Gun Battalion caught up with the 5th Marines at La Verte-Feuille Farm at about 1500. His companies were then paired off with the assault battalions and the machine guns spread along the line.47
The 3d Brigade, with a battalion of Marines attached to each of its regiments, had the mission of taking Vierzy, where the Germans were forming their new line. The 9th Infantry, on the left, was to pass north of the town, and the 23d Infantry was to take the town itself.48
Major Keyser received verbal orders to join his 2d Battalion, 5th Regiment, to the 9th Infantry. His was to be the left assault battalion in the renewed attack. With neither tank nor artillery support, Keyser went forward at about 1900 with his three depleted companies in two waves on a 500-meter front.49 He had advanced about a kilometer and a half when his left flank company encountered heavy machine-gun fire. The Moroccans, who were supposed to be on his left, had not come up.50 By dusk, the battalion had reached an old French trench line. German fire from machine guns hidden in the wheat was growing heavier, and Keyser, having neither grenades nor tank support, decided to stop for the night. The battalion halted in the old trench system and stayed there until it was withdrawn two days later. The 9th Infantry, on Keyser's right, was able to advance a mile east of Vierzy before halting for the night.51
Major Turrill, with the 1st Battalion, was to have joined the 23d Infantry's attack, but he did not receive the order until 15 minutes before the scheduled jump-off. Knowing that he could not possibly meet the jump-off time with his entire battalion, Turrill hurriedly gathered those Marines closest to him, about 150 of them, from both the 1st and 3d Battalions, and marched with this improvised company by way of La Verte-Feuille Farm to Vauxcastille. With this pick-up force and the three companies from Shearer's 3d Battalion, Turrill went forward. By early evening he had taken four-fifths of Vierzy, after which the 23d Infantry entered from the northwest and took the remainder. The 1st Battalion and the 8th Machine Gun Company then went into a position to the rear of the 23d Infantry southeast of the town.52
By nightfall of 18 July, the 5th Regiment held good positions along the ridge between Chaudun and Vierzy. That evening, Feland moved his "post of command [PC]" to Vauxcastille and in the morning to a large tunnel in Vierzy. The 2d Division's line for the night ran nearly north-south a little more than a kilometer east of Vierzy, with the left bent back to face Lechelle. The Moroccan division was on the left and the French 38th Division on the right. The Germans failed to counterattack during the night.53 Not until late in the afternoon had the ambulances arrived to clear the Beaurepaire dressing station of all its wounded. The aid station then moved forward to Vierzy. According to the short history of the 2d Division, during the unit's eight-kilometer advance that day, "Several thousand prisoners, hundreds of machine guns and practically all of the artillery, light and heavy, of two German divisions had fallen into our hands."54
The 6th Marines' Battle
Within the Marine Brigade, the 5th Regiment had done almost all of the fighting on July 18; the 6th Regiment, as division reserve, followed behind, moving up to Beaurepaire Farm early that afternoon. According to Sergeant Gerald C. Thomas, 1st Battalion, 6th Marines:
We had a very scenic day. I'll never forget it. . . . That day lancers and cuirassiers, the beautiful French cavalry, would go loping by. The artillery was displacing forward, at the gallop. On the side of the road the walking wounded were coming back. . . . About three o'clock in the afternoon, our regiment moved forward and deployed on the side of a hill. Down in front of us and off to the left was a line of artillery pieces as far as you could see standing hub to hub. I never saw anything like it, before or since. The word was, "We're going to attack." We deployed. . . . Then the word came, "Stand fast." They told us that we were deployed too far to the rear, and that the 23d Infantry was on the road in column right behind us. They passed through us. As they went by you can imagine what they said to us. They . . . went on toward the village of Vierzy.55
The 6th Marines would soon enough have its chance to fight. The ground taken south of Soissons on the 18th far exceeded French expectations. Delighted with the success of his foreign troops, General Mangin ordered a resumption of the attack at 0400 on the 19th. For the 2d Division, the objective would be the Soissons-Château-Thierry road.56
At 2200 on the 18th, Harbord had again advanced his headquarters, this time to Beaurepaire Farm, but now he had outrun his communications and had no telephone wire to the rear. At about 0200, a French staff officer brought him the XX Corps attack order for that morning, and Harbord summoned the 6th Regiment's commander, Lieutenant Colonel Lee, to his headquarters.57 The night was fairly well over before Lee reached Harbord. At about 0300 on the 19th, Harbord learned that the 6th Marines, reinforced with the 6th Machine Gun Battalion, would take over the entire division front. The artillery preparation was to begin at 0600. Passage of lines would be at 0700. The 6th Marines would advance on a frontage of about 2,300 meters. The 1st Battalion, 2d Engineers, and the 4th Machine Gun Battalion were to constitute the reserve. All heavy tanks remaining at the disposition of the division commander would be placed under orders of the attack commander. All light tanks would be held in division reserve.58
The battalion commanders were called to regimental headquarters in the field south of Beaurepaire Farm at about 0400, given maps, and told to report to Lee, who had gone forward to Vierzy to set up his PC in the town's railroad station. It was understood that the attack would be at 0800.59
Later in the morning on the 19th, Harbord sent a lengthy message to the commanding general of XX Corps. The pith of it was: "With the exception of the Sixth Marines, kept out of the fight as Corps Reserve yesterday, and the Second Regiment of Engineers, which are armed with rifles, every infantry unit was exhausted in the fight yesterday. It was necessary, therefore to make the attack this morning with one regiment, the Sixth Marines, supported by a battalion of the Engineer Regiment, a force considered by me as inadequate to the task, but no other was available."60
The 6th Regiment moved out at 0600. Working its way up through the Vauxcastille ravine, the column reached Vierzy without loss. Lee, at the railroad station, sequentially issued orders to his battalion commanders as they arrived with their units. The 1st Battalion, commanded by Major John A. Hughes, was to go in on the right; Thomas Holcomb's 2d Battalion on the left, and the 3d, led by Major Berton W. Sibley to follow in support.61 Holcomb, with a promotion from major to lieutenant colonel, was to move up to regimental second in command.62 He had orders to turn his battalion over to Major Robert L. Denig, but chose to stay with the 2d for the attack. Denig went along as an observer.63
The 6th Marines began the passage of lines at 0825. The terrain was much like that around Belleau Wood. The German positions were about a kilometer away, across open fields. The ground was practically level, with no cover, except for the waist-high wheat. It was now more golden than green, and the poppies seemed less red, as if they had faded, than they had on the fields approaching Belleau Wood.64
As then-Sergeant Gerald C. Thomas in the 1st Battalion, a future four-star general, remembered the approach march:
We moved down into the Vierzy Ravine, and then went forward, past Vierzy. My battalion came up out of the Vierzy Ravine and deployed on the edge of a wheat field. The Germans, who were over on the right on a hill, spotted us. They were about 1,800 yards away, but they started throwing machine gun bullets at us. . . . I could see Holcomb's battalion come out of the orchard way off to our left and deploy and move out. . . . We lay there, and after a while w heard rumbling. It was the tanks. . . . When the tanks passed through, the command came, "Forward." We got up and started going with them.65
Major Sibley reached Vierzy with the 3d Battalion at about 0815, and Lee ordered him to follow the 1st and 2d Battalions at a distance of about 1,000 yards. The 3d Battalion was to be followed by the 1st Battalion, 2d Engineers (Army) in reserve. Sibley understood that he was to be supported by both the 15th and 77th Machine Gun Companies. Sibley put all four of his companies, each in a column of platoons, on line: the 97th on the right, the 84th at right center, the 83d at left center, and the 82d on the left.66
Standard tactics for the "square" infantry battalions of World War I called for two companies in the assault and two companies immediately behind in support. In Holcomb's 2d Battalion, the 80th Company was the left-flank assault unit, with the 96th Company following close behind in support. To their right, similarly disposed, were the 78th and 79th Companies.67
Clifton B. Cates, a future Marine Corps commandant68 who was then a first lieutenant in the 96th Company, recalled:
So we formed for the attack and we were supposed to have had, I think it was, eight little old French tanks. So there we stayed for an hour or an hour and a half waiting for the tanks to arrive. By that time, we were getting not only artillery fire but indirect machine gun fire. . . . In fact, one hit the back of my shoulder. I thought somebody had hit me with a rock. I finally pulled it out and it was a red hot bullet. I went over to Major Holcomb and yelled to him, "Well. I got the first blesse. Here's the first wound," and I handed him this bullet and he dropped it, it was still hot.
Well, anyway we finally got under way and started the attack with these little old tanks. . . . It was the most beautiful attack that I have ever seen. As far as you could see, up to the right, there were just waves and waves of men extending up two miles. . . .69
The attack moved out in full view of the Germans. By then the commander of the opposing XIII Corps, Major General Baron Oskar von Watter, responding to orders from the crown prince, had firmed up his new line along the Château-Thierry road with the relatively fresh 46th Division. West of Tigny was the 49th Division.70
The American artillery preparation was inadequate, and the battle was a hop-scotch sort of affair, with the Marines crossing the wheat fields to reach the dubious shelter of woodlots. Because of the necessity of following the French tanks, the pace was slow. Of the 54 tanks that had begun the battle the day before, only 28 were still operational. During the morning, 11 more would be knocked out.71 With its observers overhead in "sausage" balloons, German artillery laid down a devastating fire. The slaughter was taken up by the waiting Maxims.72
After a gain of about one kilometer, the Marine line halted. The right of the line was stopped in front of Tigny, the left at La Râperie, and a gap had opened between the 1st and 2d Battalions.73
At 0855, Sibley received a message by runner from Lee telling him to reinforce the line in the center using two companies in waves and two in local support. Sibley sent the 84th Company in to the left of the 1st Battalion and moved the 83d Company to the right of the 2d Battalion to fill the reported gap. The 97th and 82d Companies remained in support.74
At 0950, Sibley reported to Lee that his attacking line was moving forward, and by 1030 his two assault companies had pushed forward almost to the Bois de Tigny north of the village, but had taken heavy casualties. At about 1100, Sibley put in the 82d Company to connect the 83d Company with the 2d Battalion, and the 97th Company to bolster the 84th Company, which was then in the Bois de Tigny. One of Sibley's officers reached Hughes, who said that he had only about 100 men left and that nothing less than a regiment would drive the Germans out of Tigny.75
At 1215, Lee sent a runner to Sibley. "Has the town of Tigny been taken by our troops?" his message asked. "If you don't know find out. If you are stopped, dig in." A half-hour later, Sibley sent runners to his companies telling them: "Hold the line you have now—dig in—get in touch with Cos on your right and left. Reenforcements coming."76 But reinforcements were not coming, and at 1315, Sibley reported to Lee that Tigny had not been taken.77
Sergeant Thomas remembered: "The Germans had massed their artillery on a hill about three or four miles off in front of us. It was all direct fire. . . . Our attack collapsed. The attack was over."78
By 1000, the 96th Company had reached a position about three kilometers east of Vierzy near Villemontoire and was digging in. The French colonials on their left flank had failed to keep up, and the company suffered accordingly. In the space of about two hours, the 96th suffered 26 killed and 56 wounded. All the company's officers were wounded early in the attack.79 According to Cates:
The Moroccans that were supposed to have attacked on our left didn't appear at all. We broke the first German lines without too much trouble. By that time though we were catching billy-hell. . . . I had just remarked to this sergeant of mine close to me, "Look at Captains [Wethered] Woodworth and [James F.] Robertson getting right together there. That's bad business." And I hadn't any more than said it when a shell hit close to them and they both went down. By that time, the other lieutenants had all been wounded and I was the only one left out of the company. I tried to take charge, but just about that time a whole bunch of Germans jumped up out of the trench and started running and our men went after them like a bunch of coyotes. With that it was bedlam. I was never able to organize them again. I kept the attack going for about a kilometer, I guess. By that time, though, we were getting terrific fire from our left flank. . . the attack just petered out. We were up near an old sugar mill. And that's when I wrote that message . . . to Major Holcomb. I think I said, "I have twenty men out of my company or out of my battalion and a few stragglers," and I wound up by saying, "I will hold." By that time though, I had a pretty bad wound across my knee.80
In Hughes' 1st Battalion, Sergeant Thomas and another Marine took cover behind a heavy iron roller the French had left in the wheat field, which had created a small depression in the ground.81 "About an hour and a half later, I looked up and there was still a lot going on," Thomas recalled. "They were dropping hand grenades out of airplanes on us. . . . What had caused us to be slaughtered was the fact that the [French] division, which was supposed to have come up on our right, was delayed. . . . There was nobody on our right except German machine guns. . . . Maybe at noon or a little after, I was able to get up and peek around. That's after the [French] came forward."82
The Marines had outrun their artillery support, and evacuating the wounded was almost impossible.83 At 1145, from his PC in the Vierzy railroad station, Lee sent the following message to Harbord:
Reports indicate growing casualties, amounting heavy, say about 30 per cent. Seventy-eighth Company by runners say have only one platoon left. All are requesting reinforcements and M.G. and Chauchat ammunition. First Battalion reports no French troops on right, and are held up 300 yards in front of Tigny. Have in line from right, First, Third and Second Battalions; Reserves, Battalion Engineers, Headquarters Company and two companies Sixth Machine Gun Battalion. Have ordered line to dig in.84
The 6th Marines' commander was told to "entrench your position and hold it at all costs."
German artillery fire was heavy for the rest of the day.85 At 1545 Lee alerted his battalion commanders that "The Division Commander directs us to dig in and hold our present line at all costs. No further advance will be made for the present. He congratulates the command on its gallant conduct in the face of severe casualties. Let me have a sketch of your position and disposition. Ammunition at crossroads 112 southeast of Vierzy. Lee"86
Throughout the day, the 5th Regiment had held the ground it had taken the previous day, harassed by enemy shelling and intermittent bombing and strafing from German aircraft lazily circling overhead. The Marines fired their rifles and machine guns at the planes with no noticeable effect. At 1400, Major Keyser received an order to report with his battalion once again to the 9th Infantry. But before he could execute it, the command was canceled and his battalion was put into the line to the right of the 6th Regiment.87
The 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, was luckier. At 1600 Turrill was ordered to take the battalion into a large tunnel at Vierzy, which gave them relief from the German shelling and bombing.88 An hour later, Harbord received word that the 2d Division would be relieved by the French 58th Colonial Division.89 At 1840, Lee sent Buck Neville, who, as brigade commander, had been given no tactical role by Harbord to play in the attack, a message reading:
Am enclosing two sketches of positions of First and Third Battalions and a statement of the C.O. Second. It is impossible to move from one position to another without drawing all sorts of fire. Losses are placed by Battalion Commanders at from 40 to 50 per cent. Their appeals for doctors, ambulances and stretcher bearers are pathetic. Cannot the ammunition trucks, and any other transportation that may appear tonight, be used to evacuate the 200 or more cases now in the Regimental D.S. [Dressing Station] under Doctor Boone? Some may be saved by prompt removal.90
Lee was not exaggerating his losses. Of the 2,450 men of his regiment who had made the attack, 1,300 were dead or wounded. Hughes' 1st Battalion had lost 11 officers. In Holcomb's 2d Battalion, only three officers remained.91 Sibley's 3d Battalion had started off that morning with 36 officers and 850 men. At the end of the day, Sibley's effective strength was 16 officers and 385 men.92
At 2005, Sibley summed up the day in a message to Lee, part of which read:
Will continue holding line until we can be reenforced or relieved. . . . In front lines canteens are practically all empty and very few remaining rations. Can water and rations be sent to us or a relief sent? We have no flares—pyrotechnics or flare pistols. Have no hand grenades. Considerable amount of rifle ammunition remaining. Also some Chauchat. Many of their Chauchats out of action because of loss of men.93
By then, the shelling had died down, and the ambulances and trucks started reaching Vierzy. At 2030, Sibley received a message dispatched an hour earlier by the 6th Regiment headquarters that he was to send back guides to bring forward a French battalion. The regimental staff officer who drafted the message ended it with an unnecessary request: "Bring in all wounded when relieved."94
A Hard-Earned Rest
In Hughes' 1st Battalion sector, the French came in at midnight, Sergeant Thomas recalled. By then he was the apparent commander of the 75th Company. "I got my 33 men. I went back to battalion headquarters," he wrote. "We made stretchers out of blankets wrapped around rifles, and we carried the wounded out. Later we may have found another 35 or 40 men at different places, but my company lost over 50 per cent. . . . We really took a shellacking."95
In Holcomb's 2d Battalion, it was much the same. "So we stayed there that night and a bunch of Frenchmen, I think Moroccans, I'm not sure, came in and relieved us," said Cates. "We lost approximately, I would say, two-thirds of the battalion in that attack."96
The 58th Colonial Division completed the relief by 0400 on 20 July. The 2d Division was to move back to its starting position in the Forêt de Retz, where it would go into bivouac. Before moving their headquarters back to Vivières, Harbord and his chief of staff stood by the side of the road and watched the division's two depleted brigades pass.97 "Battalions of only a couple of hundred men, companies of twenty-five or thirty, swinging by in the gray dawn, only a remnant, but a victorious remnant, thank God," wrote Harbord in his diary.98
After the march past, Harbord moved his HQ to Vivières.99 Here Harbord located a nice French house with clean beds. His orderly found him hot water for a shave and a good soaking in his rubber bathtub.100
By late afternoon, practically of all the division except the artillery had gone into bivouac in the woods near La Verte-Feuille Farm.101 The 6th Regiment went into bivouac near Translon Farm. The intense shellfire had weakened the trees; there was a high wind; and one Marine was killed and two seriously injured by falling branches. The Germans further treated the regiment to a shelling with long-range Austrian 130mm guns. Lee sent a motorcycle courier to brigade headquarters asking for a more favorable resting place a little farther to the rear.102
In the early morning hours, the 5th Regiment had marched back into the Forêt de Retz, about one kilometer behind the jump-off point that it had crossed two days before.103 The rolling kitchens—mule-drawn four-wheeled carts with wood-burning stoves—were waiting. On the morning of the 20th, the 45th Company reached its kitchens and had hot cakes, syrup, and coffee—its first hot food since the 16th.104 At first count, the 5th Regiment had 44 men dead, 360 wounded, and 34 missing.105 The numbers increased as returns came in.
Colonel Neville106 left Vierzy on the morning of 20 July and moved the brigade headquarters to the campsite of his old regiment, the 5th Marines.107 A day later, Harbord ordered him to displace his brigade to the woods south of Taillefontaine.108 For those Marines who still had shelter halves, two of them buttoned together made an acceptable pup tent. Neville set up his considerably more comfortable headquarters in the village itself.109
During the evening on 21 July, General Pershing came by the 2d Division headquarters and told Harbord, "It appears I have to congratulate you every time I see you."110 With these praises singing in his head, Harbord issued an effusive general order:
It is with keen pride that the Division Commander transmits to the command the congratulations and affectionate personal greetings of General Pershing, who visited the Division Headquarters last night. . . . You advanced over six miles, captured over three thousand prisoners, eleven batteries of artillery, over a hundred machine guns, minnenwerfers [sic], and supplies. . . . The story of your achievements will be told in millions of homes in all Allied lands tonight.111
The Germans bombed both the brigade and division headquarters during the night of 21 July—probably to the secret satisfaction of the Marines sleeping in the woods—but they caused no casualties.112 By the 22d, the count of prisoners taken in the two days of fighting reached 66 officers and 2,810 enlisted Germans. Those were the able-bodied ones. The number of wounded prisoners evacuated through the medical chain was unknown.113 Pershing, Pétain, and French Sixth Army commander General Jean Degoutte all hastened to send flowery compliments to the division.114
In its two-day battle, the Marine Brigade had lost at least 2,000 killed and wounded, with two-thirds of the loss in the 6th Marines.115 But the result was historic: Many believe the attack of XX Corps south of Soissons began the general retreat of the Germans and moved the war toward its end.116 Said Pershing in his final report: "Due to the magnificent dash and power displayed in the field of Soissons by our 1st and 2d Division, the tide of war was definitely turned in favor of the Allies."117
On 23 July, Harbord received orders to move his division to the vicinity of Nanteuil-le-Haudouin, virtually the same location it had left one long week earlier. By the 26th, the entire 2d had reassembled.118 About 2,000 replacements were absorbed into the brigade.119
Sources
Unless otherwise cited, the principal sources for this article are Major General James G. Harbord, Leaves From a War Diary. New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1925; Lieutenant Colonel Clyde H. Metcalf, A History of the United States Marine Corps, New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1939; Colonel Allan R. Millett, USMC (Retired), In Many a Strife: General Gerald C. Thomas and the U.S. Marine Corps 1917-1956, Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1993; General John J. Pershing, My Experiences in the World War, two volumes, New York: Frederick A. Stokes Company, 1931; Colonel Oliver Lyman Spaulding et al. The Second Division, American Expeditionary Force in France, 1917-1919, New York: The Hillman Press, 1937; Laurence Stallings, The Doughboys, New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1963; Colonel T. Dodson Stamps and Colonel Vincent J. Esposito (eds.) A Short Military History of World War with Atlas. West Point, NY: United States Military Academy, 1950; American Armies American Battle Monuments Commission, 1938, Reprinted, Washington, DC: Center of Military History United States Army, 1992; Order of Battle of the United States Land Forces in the World War: Land Forces: Divisions, Historical Office, Army War College, 1931; 2d Division Summary of Operations in the World War, American Battle Monuments Commission, 1944. Charles F. Horne (ed), Source Records of World War I, New York: National Alumni, 1923, Reprinted Edwin Mellen Press, 1998; Major Edwin N. McClellan, The United States Marine Corps in the World War, Washington: GPO, 1920, Reprinted HQMC, 1968; Major Edwin N. McClellan, ""The Aisne-Marne Offensive,"" Marine Corps Gazette, Part I, March 1921, Part II, June 1921; Major L. W. T. Waller, ""Machine Guns of the Fourth Brigade,"" Marine Corps Gazette. March 1920; History of the 96th Company, 6th Marine Regiment, in World War I, Historical Branch, G-3 Division, HQMC, 1967, Biographic files, oral histories, and similar records are now held in the Gray Research Center at Quantico (GRC).
1. The big 2d Division included two infantry brigades: the 3d Infantry Brigade, with the 9th and 23d Infantry Regiments and the 5th Machine Gun Battalion, and the 4th Marine Brigade, with the 5th Marines and the 6th Marines and the 6th Machine Gun Battalion. Division troops included a headquarters troop, the 4th Machine Gun Battalion, the 2d Engineer Regiment, and the 1st Field Signal Battalion. The 2d Field Artillery Brigade consisted of the 12th (75mm), 15th (155mm) Field Artillery Regiments, and 2d Trench Mortar Battery.
2. Harbord, Leaves From a War Diary, pp. 310-312.
3. Spaulding, Second Division, p. 106.
4. Harbord, pp. 314-317.
5. Spaulding, p. 107.
6. Harbord, pp. 314-317.
7. Harbord, p. 18.
8. Horne, Source Documents, Vol. VI, pp 269-279.
9. Spaulding, pp. 108-110.
10. Spaulding, pp. 110-111; Harbord, pp. 318-320.
11. McClellan, pp. 71-72, 76.
12. 2d Division Field Order No.15, 17 July 1918, as cited by McClellan, "Aisne-Marne Offensive," pp. 73-74.
13. 2d Division Field Order No, 15, 17 July 1918; Metcalf, p. 491.
14. McClellan, pp, 69, 71-72.
15. McClellan, pp. 69, 71.
16. Harbord, p. 317; Metcalf p. 491.
17. Spaulding, p. 114.
18. 1st Battalion, 5th Marines (Turrill) history, as cited by McClellan, pp. 82-84.
19. 1st Battalion, 5th Marines (Turrill) history, as cited by McClellan, pp. 82-84.
20. CO, 1st Battalion, report, 21 July 1918, to CO, 5th Regiment.
21. History of the 5th Regiment,
22. "A Short Account of the Second Division in the Great War 1917-1919," as cited by McClellan, p. 192.
23. Metcalf, p. 494.
24. Metcalf, p. 492.
25. Spaulding, pp. 115-116.
26. Metcalf, p. 494.
27. Metcalf, p. 494.
28. Metcalf, p. 492.
29. CO, 1st Battalion, report, 21 July 1918, to CO, 5th Regiment.
30. CO, 1st Battalion, report, 21 July 1918, to CO, 5th Regiment as cited by McClellan, 80-81.
31. CO, 1st Battalion report, 21 July 1918, to CO 5th Regiment.
32. CO, 2d Battalion, report, July 22, 1918, to CO, 5th Regiment.
33. Journal of Operations, 2d Division, 18 July 1918, as cited by McClellan, p. 78.
34. (Wartime) History of the 5th Regiment, as cited by McClellan, p.193; and (Wartime) History of the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines (Keyser), McClellan, pp. 188-189.
35. Metcalf, p. 494.
36. 1st Battalion, 5th Marines (Turrill) history.
37. Spaulding, pp. 117-118; Metcalf, p. 494.
38. Metcalf, p. 494.
39. Metcalf, p. 494.
40. CO, 1st Battalion, report, 21 July 1918, to CO, 5th Regiment; History of the 5th Regiment.
41. History of the 5th Regiment.
42. Metcalf, p. 494.
43. Spaulding, p. 123.
44. "A Short Account of the Second Division in the Great War, 1917-1919,"
45. Spaulding, p. 123.
46. CO, 3d Battalion, report, 21 July 1918, to CO, 5th Marines, cited in McClellan, p. 81, History of the 5th Regiment.
47. History of the 6th Machine Gun Battalion (Waller), p. 12, as cited in McClellan, pp. 194-195. History of the 5th Marines.
48. Metcalf, p. 495.
49. Metcalf, p. 496.
50. History of the 5th Marines.
51. History of the 5th Marines; Metcalf, p. 496.
52. History of the 5th Marines; "A Short Account of the Second Division in the Great War, 1917-1919"; Metcalf; Waller, "Machine Guns."
53. Spaulding, pp. 125-126.
54. "A Short Account of the Second Division in the Great War, 1917-19."
55. Gen Gerald C. Thomas oral history, pp. 45-48, GRC.
56. Spaulding, p. 126; Metcalf, pp. 494-496; Waller, "Machine Guns."
57. Harbord, p. 327; Spaulding, p. 126; Metcalf, pp. 494-496; Waller.
58. Field Orders No. 16, 2d Division, 19 July 1918, as cited in McClellan, "Aisne-Marne Offensive," pp. 204.
59. Sibley bio file, GRC.
60. Journal of Operations, Second Division.
61. History of the Sixth Regiment, as cited by McClellan, "Aisne-Marne Offensive," p. 206; Spaulding, p. 126.
62. In 1936 Holcomb was named the 17th commandant of the Marine Corps. He would serve through 1943, when, upon his retirement, he became the Marine Corps' first four-star general.
63. GySgt Don V. Paradis oral history, pp. 85-86, GRC. Paradis was Maj. Holcomb's runner throughout the war.
64. McClellan, p. 205; Metcalf, p. 497; Thomason, "Soissons," Fix Bayonets!.
65. Thomas oral history, pp. 48-49, GRC.
66. Maj. Bertron W. Sibley bio file, GRC.
67. Paradis oral history, pp. 85-86, GRC.
68. Cates was the 19th commandant, serving as such from 1948 through 1951.
69. Gen Clifton B. Cates oral history, pp. 33-34, GRC.
70. Spaulding, pp. 127-128.
71. Journal of Operations, Second Division.
72. McClellan, p. 205; Metcalf, p. 497.
73. Spaulding, pp. 126-127.
74. Sibley bio file, GRC.
75. Sibley bio file, GRC.
76. Sibley bio file, GRC.
77. Sibley bio file, GRC.
78. Thomas oral history, pp. 49-50, GRC.
79. History of the 96th Company, 6th Marine Regiment, in World War I, p. 56.
80. Cates oral history, pp. 33-34, GRC.
81. Thomas oral history, p. 50. GRC.
82. Thomas oral history, p. 50, GRC.
83. Metcalf, p. 497.
84. Journal of Operations, Second Division.
85. Metcalf, p. 497.
86. History of the Sixth Regiment.
87. History of the Fifth Regiment.
88. History of the Fifth Regiment.
89. Journal of Operations, Second Division.
90. Field Message No. 14, 19 July 1918, as cited by McClellan, "Aisne-Marne Offensive," p. 215.
91. History of the Sixth Regiment.
92. Sibley bio file, GRC.
93. Sibley bio file, GRC.
94. Sibley bio file, GRC.
95. Thomas oral history, pp. 52-53, GRC.
96. Cates oral history, p. 36, GRC.
97. Harbord, pp. 328-329; Metcalf, p. 498.
98. Harbord, p. 329.
99. Jounal of Operations, 2d Division, 20 July 1918.
100. Harbord, pp. 330-31.
101.Journal of Operations, 2d Division, 20 July 1918.
102. LtCol Lee Field Message 1 of 20 July 1918, to BGen Neville, as cited by McClellan, "Aisne-Marne Offensive," p. 221; History of the Sixth Regiment.