In January 1941, Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox wrote to Secretary of War Henry Stimson of his concern about the security of the fleet while in Pearl Harbor, citing the possibility of surprise Japanese attack. Admiral Harold Stark, Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), forwarded a report from the U. S. Ambassador to Tokyo, Joseph Grew, warning that a “surprise mass attack on Pearl Harbor was being planned by the Japanese.” According to the late historian John Costello, both Grew’s warning and Knox’s letter were passed to Admiral Husband Kimmel in Hawaii.
After the attack on Pearl Harbor, Admiral Kimmel and Lieutenant General Walter Short, the Army commander there, were relieved. Both retired within several months at two-star rank, and neither complained at the time. Since the end of the war, the responsibility for the disaster has been debated extensively and investigated nine times. A colloquium sponsored by the Naval Historical Foundation and the U.S. Navy Memorial presented impassioned arguments from both sides on 7 December 1999.
Those who support Admiral Kimmel’s restoration of rank noted that he was hard-working, thoughtful, and protested the lack of military assets at his disposal. He took action to upgrade fleet readiness and passed his force-level concerns to the CNO on a number of occasions.
President Franklin D. Roosevelt reduced the strength of U.S. naval forces in the Pacific theater and then diplomatically “stiff-armed” the Japanese, goading them to attack. Supporters of this reasoning cite the transfer of an aircraft carrier to the Atlantic, the movement of new forces from the United States to support the Atlantic theater, the failure of the CNO to provide patrol aircraft to the Pacific, and transfer of bomber aircraft to General Douglas MacArthur in the Philippines. As this was happening, the President became more diplomatically intransigent in dealing with the Japanese and refused to concede on key points necessary for them to assure their oil supply as they moved in Southwest Asia. Some saw this as a conspiracy to force the Japanese to attack and provide a reason to solidify U.S. support of the Allies. The weakening of the forces at Pearl Harbor, then, was deliberate.
Intelligence emanated from Washington on an irregular basis. In fact, with CNO approval, Vice Admiral R. Kelly Turner censored intelligence data or in some cases stopped its flow altogether, handicapping the Pacific Command. Warnings to Pearl Harbor in late 1941 were more vague than the data held in Washington. In addition, Admiral Stark’s method of communication to Admiral Kimmel via slow mail rather than secure telephonic communications, in conjunction with the aforementioned intelligence failures, should have focused the finger of fault on Washington.
Certain senior officers even recanted their earlier positions and sided with Admiral Kimmel. These included former CNOs Admiral William H. Standley, Fleet Admiral Ernest King, and Admiral Carlisle A. H. Trost.
Investigations faulted others, including Army Chief of Staff General George Marshall, CNO Admiral Stark, and Secretary of War Stimson, but none was treated the same as Admiral Kimmel. He was denied a fair hearing, his full rights of cross- examination were not permitted, and testimony against him was biased. As Dr. David Rosenberg stated at the colloquium, "This was a government-wide failure.”
Finally, assertions surfaced that the military presence on Hawaii was ill- equipped to handle the Japanese strike force. Admiral Kimmel did not have the guns, ammunition, or early-warning aircraft for defense. If forces had been dispersed at sea, the loss of life may have been worse. The bottom line is that the fault belongs in Washington.
Others have advanced a case against restoration of rank for Admiral Kimmel. He and General Short retired “voluntarily.” They knew an aggressive move by the Japanese might occur soon. Admiral Kimmel had warned his task force commanders. He had a message in hand that stated: “This dispatch is to be considered a war warning.” Or, as stated by Vice Admiral David Richardson during the colloquium: “All of us knew Pearl Harbor was a likely target."
The argument asserts that there is no compelling reason for rank restoration. No court-martial was convened. A vice admiral or four-star admiral’s permanent rank is that of rear admiral (two stars) unless the President nominates him for retirement at higher rank, which must be confirmed by the Senate. Loss of confidence is widely accepted as reason for an officer to be removed from command.
Errors of judgment were made in defense of Pearl Harbor. Force readiness in port was not upgraded. The base defense plan was not implemented. The fleet commander instituted no push to find the Japanese carriers. The patrol aircraft were not upgraded for extensive early- warning operations. All expected threat sectors were not searched systematically. Admiral Kimmel had recognized that the Japanese carriers were missing from port and even remarked to his staff several days before the attack that the Japanese fleet could be rounding Diamond Head.
Coordination and communications between Admiral Kimmel and General Short were weak. The record indicates that they did not speak to each other from 3-6 December 1941. Forces in Pearl Harbor simply were not on alert.
Commanders must be ready, especially when war is anticipated. Readiness at sea is only part of the problem; forces must also be ready in port. Commanders must study their prospective antagonists and act accordingly. And so, the debate concerning Admiral Kimmel and his seniors in Washington continues. Without question, Admiral Kimmel did not have all of the information available in Washington; nor did he have all the forces he wanted. But a commander is unlikely ever to have all the forces he believes necessary. Our commanders are and must continue to be accountable and prudent in the defense of U.S. forces. But the ability to command effectively in forward areas depends on support from home. When the partnership between forward commander and the country’s leadership breaks down, disaster is imminent.