It felt like the Westerplatte would turn over," a Polish veteran said of the opening salvos of World War II.1 Westerplatte, a Polish supply depot in Danzig (modern Gdansk) harbor, was the scene of a failed German commando strike in the early morning hours of 1 September 1939. This began a furious monthlong naval campaign that featured air, sea, land, submarine, and mine warfare.2 German Grand Admiral Erich Raeder once commented that "in any war with England, the German Navy could do little more than go down fighting."3 Against Poland's naval assets, however, the situation was very different. The Baltic was a virtual German lake, and it was the only area in which the Kriegsmarine exerted a decisive influence during the early stages of the war. This was in no small part because of geographical features. The Baltic is nearly an inland sea; entry can be gained only through the shallow and narrow Danish strait. This strait was easily mined, and could be covered by significant Luftwaffe units—a combination sufficient to preclude any intervention by Poland's French or British allies. The Baltic Sea's shallowness also limited the effectiveness of Poland's most notable naval threat—its submarines. In contrast, however, shallow water increased the impact of mine warfare.4
Control of the Baltic was vital to Germany. First, it safeguarded trade with Scandinavia—specifically, the flow of Swedish iron ore, which fueled Germany's war industry. Second, the Baltic was a highway for the transit of military units and supplies. Finally, it was a valuable training area for the Kriegsmarine, as it was the only open water where crews could train without interference from the vastly superior French and British navies. Throughout the war, control of the Baltic remained a top German priority.5
These factors, combined with the need for a quick decision in the east, presented the Kriegsmarine with important tasks at the beginning of the war. Fall Weiss (Plan White), the overall strategic plan for the invasion of Poland, called for a concentration of naval forces in the Baltic. Raeder, not expecting interference from the west, sent his forces against the Poles with a set of clear missions: to blockade the Bay of Danzig, neutralize Polish warships, and support the Army in its assault of the Westerplatte, Gdynia, and the Hel Peninsula.6
Control of the ports of Danzig and nearby Gdynia was essential to German plans. Danzig before the war was an international anomaly, and its conquest presented a unique situation. The Treaty of Versailles had placed the Free City under League of Nations administration, but the "special" relationship between Poland and Danzig (which included the garrisoning of Polish troops in parts of the city) was a source of friction from its inception. The city's German population disliked the rights granted to Poland, and the supposed abuse of these rights and the desire to connect Danzig to Germany by a land bridge, were Hitler's pretenses for going to war.
The Kriegsmarine's operational commander, Admiral Conrad Albrecht, had his mission made easier by events just before the start of hostilities. The political tensions of midsummer 1939 alerted Poland's intelligence organization to the high probability of conflict. On 20 August, units of the merchant marine were directed to British and French ports. Ten days later, the Polish Navy's best three destroyers, the Blyskawica, Grom, and Burza, received the coded radio message "Wykonac Pekin!" (Carry out Peking), ordering the trio to head for England at top speed. Although German destroyers and reconnaissance planes shadowed the flotilla, a state of war did not yet exist between the two powers. Consequently, the German ships soon broke off pursuit and returned to base. The Polish destroyers arrived in Britain on 1 September.7 Operacja Pekin (Operation Peking) was the brainchild of Admiral Jerzy Swirski, Poland's chief naval officer. He reasoned that three additional destroyers would have but a slight effect on the Baltic campaign, and were certain to be sunk by its conclusion. As a result the combined tonnage of Polish warships in the Baltic was less than that of Albrecht's Schleswig-Holstein, a predreadnought battleship.8
What remained of Polish coastal defenses was entrusted to Vice-Admiral Jozef Unrug. He had command of surface and submarine units, as well as the fortifications at Hel, Gdynia, and Danzig. Unrug had a mixture of naval infantry, army reservists, and volunteer militiamen—a ground force totaling about 20,000 men. These were deployed on the Hel Peninsula and in and near Gdynia. This combination gave the Poles excellent artillery positions from which they could protect the sea approaches to Gydnia and dominate road traffic along the coast.9
The most powerful batteries were placed in forested sand dunes along the Hel Peninsula, and were a vital element of Unrug's defense. Camouflaged by foliage and protected by bunkers, the largest of these were "Grecka," "Dunska," and "Cyplowa." Ranging in size from 75-mm to 152-mm, these batteries' guns were capable of sinking any ship smaller than a cruiser, and with luck could savage even larger vessels. Combined with a powerful collection of antiaircraft artillery, they were expected to exclude German vessels from the Bay of Puck, protect Gdynia, and cover mine-laying operations.10
Kriegsmarine strategists hoped to counter such actions by way of surprise and powerful air-land-sea operations. Vice-Admiral Hermann Densch commanded the German surface force. From his flagship, the light cruiser Nurnberg, he directed a task force of 38 warships and numerous support craft.11 Densch led these ships into the Baltic on the night of 31 August 1939, and deployed them for their roles in Fall Weiss. Six days earlier, the Germans sent the battleship Schleswig-Holstein and escorts to Danzig for a "courtesy visit." Officially, the purpose was to honor German World War I dead buried in the Free City. The battleship's real mission, however, was to assist in the capture of the Polish military depot at Westerplatte.
General Fedor von Bock, an important strategist at Germany's OKW (Armed Forces High Command), had suggested the "visit" and insisted on a rapid conquest of Danzig. He argued that if bypassed, the city's valuable port facilities might be destroyed by the Poles. The Schleswig-Holstein was to prevent this by using her heavy guns to bombard Westerplatte, and participate in a surprise attack on the depot. A 225-man strike force was hidden on board for this purpose. The mostly German population of Danzig would offer support as well, providing two regiments of the city's militarized police and and a small SS unit—in all about 7,000 men.12
Anchored in shallow waters so that she could not sink in case of heavy damage, the Schleswig-Holstein presented a grim sight to the minuscule Polish garrison in Danzig. The few available troops were a mixed bag of soldiers, sailors, and armed postal workers—fewer than 300 men. In addition to Westerplatte, they were split between the Polish Post Office and the railway station; these were the only bits of official Polish soil in the Free City. Westerplatte, with its 182 men, was by far the strongest position. A narrow finger of land covering the mouth of Danzig harbor, it had been fortified by the depot's commander, Major Henryk Sucharski. Heavy woods and brick walls helped cover the various bomb-proofs and machine-gun bunkers constructed hastily throughout the month of August. A 75-mm gun and 81-mm mortar represented Sucharski's only artillery support. Warsaw warned him of the expected German attack, and suggested that a few hours of "symbolic resistance" would allow for an honorable surrender.13
This option presented itself on the morning of 1 September. At 0417, Captain Gustav Kleikamp ordered the Schleswig-Holstein to fire her main batteries on the Westerplatte. As heavy explosions wiped away any drowsiness from the defenders, the special assault company poured through the strip of land connecting Westerplatte to the rest of Danzig. The Poles immediately drove them off. A second assault followed, but it too was repulsed. Surprise was not enough, and the Germans suffered 83 casualties.14
Kleikamp now ordered more bombardment, and as his ship was but a few hundred meters away from her target, almost every shell hit something. Franciszek Bartoszek, one of the defenders, said that his most vivid memory of the Westerplatte's defense was the continual noise of explosions and the constant feeling that the ground was moving. Later in the day, 150-mm howitzers and Ju-87 Stuka dive bombers added to the cacophony. Despite this rain of death and steel, Sucharski's command held out in what soon became Poland's version of the Alamo.15
Between 1 and 7 September, the Westerplatte garrison was attacked by more than 3,500 infantry and several aircraft and suffered almost non-stop artillery bombardment. Finally, on 6 September, a German engineer section managed to set fire to the remaining woods and, under the ensuing smoke, made a lodgement inside the Polish defenses. Sucharski, out of food, water, and ammunition, saw further resistance as pointless and agreed to surrender the following day. For these Poles, the war was over. The Germans, who now dubbed the place kleines Verdun (little Verdun), paid for Westerplatte with more than 300 casualties.16
Although Danzig was the scene of the earliest fighting, the conflict spread quickly to the rest of the Polish coast. The morning of 1 September saw Luftwaffe attacks against the Polish Navy's base at Gdynia. The Mazur, an old torpedo boat, was sunk, and the remaining craft fled to other ports. The smaller vessels scrambled into the Bay of Puck, while the destroyer Wicher and minelayer Gryf, the largest remaining surface ships, proceeded to the naval base at Hel.17
German destroyers arrived in the Gulf of Danzig and near Hel about the same time. Their missions were to destroy commerce off the Polish coast and search for blockade runners. During the day they stopped and searched several ships, including neutral Greek and Norwegian vessels. Polish submarines patrolled the area, and throughout the day the German vessels reported sightings. A close call came for the destroyer Erich Steinbrinck, which not only sighted a sub (the Wilk), but also the tracks of several torpedoes that passed uncomfortably close.18
It soon became apparent to Admiral Albrecht that the forces employed by the Kriegsmarine were unnecessarily large, perhaps even dangerously so. Polish submarines constituted the major threat to German surface units, especially the three German cruisers operating close to shore in the confined waters of the Polish coast. Larger and slower than destroyers, they were at risk. Also, with the Polish destroyers now safely in England, there were few good targets for such warships. Realizing these problems, Albrecht withdrew the cruisers and three of his U-boats on 2 September.19
The admiral's tactics were wise, as Polish submarines were active throughout September. Operacja Worek (Operation Bag), directed by Captain Aleksander Mohuczy, created two attack groups. The first, consisting of the Zbik, Rys, and Sep, was to cruise off the Baltic side of the Hel Peninsula. These were Poland's mine-laying submarines, and were expected to foul up German communications with some well-planted fields. The second group, with the Orzel and larger Wilk, was retained for patrol duties in the Bay of Danzig. Although no submarine launched a successful torpedo attack, Captain Michal Zebrowski's Zbik could take credit for laying the mine that destroyed the M-85, a German minesweeper.20
Magnified 100 times by false sightings, these subs and their minefields were a major headache for the Kriegsmarine. On 4 September, Rys, Wilk, and Zbik began to lay mines north of the Vistula River estuary. On 6 September, with three barrages operational, further work was interrupted by depth-charge attacks from Captain Friedrich Ruge's 1st Minesweeping Flotilla. Clearing operations followed, and it was during these that the M-85 was lost on 1 October. Despite such efforts, the Poles continued to drop mines and patrol. All the subs were damaged as a result of frequent depth-charge attacks but were repaired each night in the Gdynia yards.21
The remaining Polish surface units were not so lucky. Operacja Rurka (Operation Pipe) called for the Gryf and four smaller minelayers to sew their deadly cargoes in the Bay of Danzig. The Wicher, the only remaining Polish destroyer, was to cover this effort. Having been chased about by Stukas on the first two days of the war, the Poles finally started their mission on the evening of 2 September. The next morning, the Gryf was sighted by a pair of German destroyers, the Leberecht Maass and Wolfgang Zenker. The sides were matched evenly until 152-mm rounds from Battery Cyplowa began to fall around the Leberecht Maass. Despite smoke, evasive action, and increased speed, one shot hit the starboard Number 2 deck gun, wiping out the crew. The Germans escaped at about 0735, but the Poles had little time for celebration, for they were beset by swarms of divebombers. With no air cover, the Wicher was sunk quickly and the Gryf was forced to beach herself near Hel. This action eliminated Poland's major surface units in the Baltic.22
German forces turned against the coastal batteries. On 4 September, OKW entrusted General Leonhard Kaupisch with an ad hoc task force of 37,000 men and various naval and air units. His mission was to capture the Polish coastline and end the war in this district. The first target was Gdynia, and by 9 September he had severed all of its land links with the Hel Peninsula.23
Naval infantry played an important role in the city's defense. Also, the few remaining minelayers and gunboats provided artillery support. Even the Mazur rose from her watery grave to "donate" boiler plate and guns for the construction of "Smok Kaszubski" (Kashubian Dragon)—a homemade armored train manned by navy personnel. Still, by 11 September the city was falling. Surface ships stayed off shore, but the submarines were ordered to make for Britain or—if this was not possible—let themselves be interned in Sweden.24
The next evening, a sharp counterattack pierced the German lines north of Gdynia. This allowed key units to break out to the nearby entrenched cliff top of Kepa Oksywska. More than 7,000 troops and 30 guns were dug in at this position. As long as it held, the Germans were unable to place their artillery in a position to bombard the last remaining Polish naval base at Hel. Kaupisch drove his men forward, obtaining fire support from the Schleswig-Holstein, which was off Danzig just outside the range of Battery Cyplowa. The pounding lasted until 19 September, when a complete exhaustion of supplies forced the Poles to surrender. Victory had again been expensive, with the actions around Gdynia costing each side more than 5,000 casualties.25
At this point Kaupisch was able to turn his attention to the Hel Peninsula. Artillery joined by Luftwaffe units,started a pounding barrage on 13 September. On 21 September, the Schlesien—the Schleswig-Holstein's sister ship—arrived as a reinforcement. Four days later, the two battleships attempted to silence Battery Cyplowa. Captain Zbigniew Przybyszewski, the Polish commander, kept his guns firing throughout, until the Germans disengaged on 27 September. Next, Wehrmacht forces hit Chatupy at the foot of the peninsula. Their progress came to a temporary halt on 30 September when the Poles detonated ten tons of buried munitions. The resulting explosion nearly severed Hel from the mainland and slowed the German advance for two days. Finally on 2 October, five days after Warsaw surrendered, Unrug ordered the batteries silenced and surrendered the 5,000 men of his command.26
In the Baltic, the picture was equally grim. Gdynia's fall deprived the Polish Navy of its only significant supply depot. The 11 September order to the submariners to head for Britain was based on this reality. A few more patrols took place, but with fuel running low, escape or internment were their only options. The Wilk arrived in England on 20 September, and five days later, the Rys, Zbik, and Sep interned themselves in Sweden. The remaining submarine, the Orzel, had a more difficult journey. Stopping in Estonia to drop off her sick captain, the ship was interned illegally at Tallinn. Despite protests that the Orzel was prepared to depart within the time prescribed by international law, Estonian officials insisted on holding the sub. Guards were placed on board, and her charts, navigation gear, the breech on her deck gun, and 14 of her 20 torpedoes were removed.27
Unwilling to accept the status quo, acting Captain Jan Grudzinski organized the crew to retake their ship. Late on the evening of 17 to 18 September, they overpowered the guards, slipped cables, and sailed out of Tallinn under the fire of Estonian coast-defense artillery. Once at sea, the Orzel's crew put together a map of the Baltic from memory and sailed for England, despite the additional problem of being low on fuel. On 14 October, Grudzinski signaled the British Admiralty of his escape, and was instructed to join the Wilk, which already was in the north of Britain.28
Back in Poland, naval action shifted eastward as Germany's blitzkrieg moved towards the Pripet Marshes. The last significant Polish naval unit, the Flotylla Pinska (Pinsk Flotilla), was stationed here. Its duties were to patrol the many rivers, provide artillery support to ground units, and maintain lines of communication. Commanded by Captain Witold Zajaczkowski, the flotilla centered around four armored monitors. Augmenting them were a number of gunboats, armed cutters, and support craft. In mid-September, these ships figured prominently in the proposed development of a "national redoubt." Retreating Polish ground forces were expected to regroup in the marshlands and along the Rumanian border. The Pinsk Flotilla was to protect the northern flank of this defense.29
All changed forever on 16 September when the Hetman Chodkiewicz reported Soviet troops invading Poland from the east. After a few hours of initial confusion, the Russians' purpose became crystal clear, as their tanks and aircraft engaged several of the flotilla's cutters and gunboats. Between 18 and 21 September, Zajaczkowski directed a withdrawal to Pinsk. At this point, several vessels were scuttled, being unable to move farther westward. These actions were repeated until the last remaining ship, the Krakow, was destroyed near Kuzliczyn. From there, the sailors continued their anabasis on foot, and joined General Franciszek Kleeberg's "Special Operational Group Polesie." Forming a naval infantry battalion, they fought the Germans at Kock, until Kleeberg surrendered on 6 October.30
This was the last major engagement of the Polish Campaign. Like the army and air force, navy personnel made every effort to escape into neutral border states such as Hungary or Rumania. Some, like Admiral Swirski and Captain Zajaczkowski, ended up in London, where they helped build a new Polish fleet. Rear Admiral Ksawery Czernicki, chief of the Naval Administration in Warsaw, and his staff were not so lucky. Captured by the Russians and sent to Katyn, a year later they were executed along with 10,000 other Poles.31
How does one judge the Baltic naval campaign of 1939? What lessons could be gleaned from its many battles on land and sea? First there is little doubt that Poland's naval command did the best it could with a bad situation. Sending the three modern destroyers to England was sound policy; the Wicher and the Gryf should have gone also, although the latter's top speed of 20 knots may have made escape impossible. The entire Polish surface fleet found itself on the defensive from the first moment. A complete lack of naval aviation was the root cause, for in the confined waters of the Baltic, only submarines could survive for long without air cover. Indeed, the Polish submarines, along with the well-placed shore batteries, caused significant problems for the Kriegsmarine. Unwilling to risk damage to his ships, which would increase the already massive disadvantage against England and France, Admiral Albrecht employed very cautious tactics. Thus, the Germans deprived themselves of valuable naval artillery. A lack of true marines and landing craft also handicapped Germany's offensive. Regimental teams landed on Hel and Westerplatte could have secured these areas easily in the early morning hours of 1 September. Instead, the battles for the Polish coast were among the hardest fought of the invasion. Although defeated in the end, Polish sailors still look back to the events of September 1939 with a mixture of pride and admiration. Inferior in all but courage, they picked up the gauntlet of Nazi aggression, and defiantly hurled it back in Adolf Hitler's face.
1. Telephone interview with Mr. Franciszek Bartoszek, Polish Navy veteran, Gdynia, 29 August 1979. With special thanks to Ms. Sandra Pilatowski for translation services.
2. There are few English language histories of this campaign. Those that exist are mainly propaganda works of World War II or the former Communist government of Poland. Some have been employed, sparingly, for this essay, and can be useful, if taken with the proverbial "grain of salt." Of course the same goes for wartime German efforts like Fritz Otto Busch's Unsere Kriegsmarine im Polnischen Feldzug [Our Navy in the Polish Campaign], (Berlin: Wieden, 1940), which are mainly useful for pictorial data. Michael Salewski's Die Deutsche Seekriegsleitung, 1939-1945, Vol. 1, (Frankfurt, a.m.: Bernard & Graefe, 1970) is an authoritative start from the German end. One could do equally well with Edmund Kosiarz's Wojna na Baltyku, 1939 [War in the Baltic, 1939], (Gdansk: Krajowa Agencja, 1988) or Andrzej Rzepniewski's Obrona wybrzeza w 1939 r [Coastal Defense in the Year 1939], (Warszawa: M.O.N., 1970). The latter has summaries in English, French, and German. Dr. Rzepniewski is a world-class authority on the subject, but you might want to pass over his pre-1939 chapters.
3. Erich Raeder, My Life. Translated by Henry W. Drexel (Annapolis, Md: Naval Institute Press, 1960), pp. 280-281.
4. Charles W. Koburger, Steel Ships, Iron Crosses, and Refugees: The German Navy in Baltic, 1939-1945 (New York: Praeger, 1989), pp. 9, 11-12.
5. Karl Doenitz, Memoirs: Ten Years and Twenty Days. 2nd edition. Translated by R. H. Stevens in collaboration with David Woodward (London: Greenhill, 1990), p. 398.
6. "Aufgabe der Kriegsmarine im Krieg gegen Polen was die Blockierung der Danziger Bucht, die Ausschaltung der polnischen Seestreitkrafte und die Unterstutzung des Heeres, insbesondere bei der Eroberung der Westerplatte, Gdingens und der Halbinsel Hela." Klaus A. Maier et al., Der Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Welt Krieg [Germany and the Second World War]. Vol. 2, (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1979), p. 159. See also Edward Kosiarz, Poles on the Seas, 1939-1945. (Warsaw: Interpress Publishers, 1969), p. 20; Bertil Stjernfelt, Westerplatte, 1939. tran. Klaus-Richard Bhme. (Freiburg: Verlag Rombach, 1978), p. 41.
7. On the destroyers escape, see Henryk Baginski, Poland's Freedom of the Seas, (Kirkaldy: Allen Lithographic Co., Inc., 1942), pp. 99-100; Zbigniew Flisowski, "At Rest From Combat," Military History (October 1991), p. 66; Kriegstagebuch der Seekreigsleitung [War Diary, Operations Division, German Naval Staff, 1939-1945] (Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1984), p. 17; Kaswey Pruszynski, Poland Fights Back, tran. Peter Jordan, (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1941), pp. 31-32. Piaskowski, p. 63, reproduces the official order for "Operation Peking" in Okrety Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej, 1920-1946 [Ships of the Polish Republic, 1920-1946], (Albany, N. Y.: Sigma Press, 1981). The 39 escaping Polish merchantmen ranged in size from small coastal steamers, to liners like the M/S Pilsudski and Batory. Donald Steyer, "Polish Merchant Navy, 1926-1939," tran. Leon Szwajcer, Acta Poloniae Historica, Vol. 23 (1971), p. 126.
8. Ibid.
9. For a biographical sketch of Unrug (1884-1973), see Piaskowski, Kroniki, pp. 10-11. On the command, see A. D. Divine, Navies in Exile, (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1944), p. 12; General Mieczyslaw Norwid-Neugebauer, The Defense of Poland, (London: M. I. Kolin, Ltd., 1942), p. 63; Steven Zaloga, The Polish Campaign, 1939, (New York: Hippocrene Books, 1985), p. 141.
10. Good maps of the Hel batteries are found in Piaskowski, Okrety, p. 67, and Zdzislaw Wasko and Rafal Witkowski, Regularne Jednostki Wolska Polskiego . . . Marynarki Wojennej [Exact Unit History of the Polish Armed Forces . . . The Navy], (Warszawa: M.O.N., 1976), p. 57. Nice photos are found in Izabella Trojanowska, The Hel Peninsula: Tourist Guide, tran. Betty Przybylska, (Gdansk: Krajowa Agencja Wydawnicza, 1979). For more details see, Editorial Board, Historia Militaris Polonica, (Warsaw: M.O.N., 1977), p. 548; Jerzy Smolenski, Morze i Pomorze, (Gdynia: The Baltic Institute, 1935), pp. 17-18; Admiral Jozef Unrug, "Wie die Polnische Kriegsflotte Entsanden ist 1918-1939" [How the Polish Fleet was Established, 1918-1939], Marine Rundschau, Vol. 4 (1966), p. 205.
11. J. Rohwer and G. Hummelchen, Chronology of the War at Sea, 1939-45. (New York: Arco Publishing Co., Inc., 1972), p. 1; M. J. Whitley, Destroyer! German Destroyers in World War II. (London: Arms and Armor Press, 1983), p. 99.
12. Nicholas Bethell, The War Hitler Won, (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1972), p. 1; David Irving, The War Path, (New York: Viking Press, 1978), p. 224; Richard M. Kennedy, The German Campaign in Poland, (Washington: Dept. of the Army, 1956), p. 78; Herbert S. Levine, Hitler's Free City, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973), pp. 21, 148, 150; Stjernfelt, p. 69, 73; Richard A. Woytak, On the Border of War and Peace, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979), p. 85.
13. International Commission of Military History, Records of the Second International Colloquy on Military History, (Brussels, 1975), p. 189; Levine, pp. 150, 154; Woytak, p. 92.
14. Donald S. Detwiler, ed., World War II German Military Studies: A Collection of 213 Special Reports on the Second World War Prepared by Former Officers of the Wehrmacht for the United States Army. Vol. 15 (New York and London: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1979), p. 78; Seekriegsleitung, p. 22; Stjernfelt, p. 73; Zaloga, pp. 141-142.
15. Bartoszek Interview; Bethell, p. 2; Woytak, p. 118; Zaloga, ibid. Stjernfelt, ibid., is probably the best source for the Westerplatte story, however, Zbigniew Flisowski, Westerplatte (Warszawa: M.O.N., 1989), is also very good. It is in Polish, but has English, French and German summaries.
16. General Klinbiel, "German Engineers in the Polish Campaign," The Military Engineer, Vol. 182 (Mar.-Apr. 1940), p. 116; Pruszynski, p. 37; Janusz Przymanowski, Polish Roads to Victory, (Warsaw: Interpress Publishers, 1975), p. 29; Wasko, pp. 52-54; Zaloga, p. 142.
17. Walton L. Robinson, "Poland's Navy Fights On," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, No. 478 (December 1942), p. 1683.
18. Whitley, p. 100; Baginski, Poland's Freedom of the Seas, pp. 101-102.
19. Baginski, p. 100; Kennedy, p. 73; Janusz Piekalkiewicz, Sea War: 1939-1945, tran. Peter Spurgeon, (Dorset, England: Blandford Press, 1987), p. 17; Seekriegsleitung, pp. 8-9; Stjernfelt, p. 42.
20. Hans von Bachmann, "Die Polnische U-Boat-Division im September 1939," Marine Rundschau, Vol. 67 (1970), pp. 19-23, 34; Piaskowski, Okrety, p. 46; Wasko, pp. 50-51.
21. Bachmann, ibid. See also, Friedrich Ruge, "Von der Tatigkeit der Kriegsmarine insbesondere in Minensuchbotte im "Kampf gegen Polen im Herbst 1939," Nauticus, Vol. 24 (1941), pp. 42-59.
22. Divine, p. 11; Koburger, p. 23; Kosiarz, pp. 22-23; Kriegstagebuch der Seekriegsleitung, p. 25; Piaskowski, Okrety, p. 64; Rohwer, p. 2; Rzepniewski, pp. 326-327; Whitney, p. 100; Zaloga, p. 143.
23. Kennedy, p. 114; Zaloga, p. 144.
24. Baginski, pp. 97, 100-101; Divine, p. 12; Kennedy, pp. 114-115; Kosiarz, p. 36; Rohwer, p. 4; Zaloga, p. 102.
25. Bethell, p. 134; International Commission of Military History, p. 181; Kennedy, p. 115; Kosiarz, pp. 30-31, 36; Pruszynski, p. 37; Zaloga, p. 145.
26. Two good accounts of the battle for Hel are Hans Bachmann, "Der Kampf um Hela (1. September - 1. Oktober 1939)" [The Battle Along the Hel Peninsula (1 September - 1 October 1939)], Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschhau, Vol. 20 (1970), pp. 275-296 and Antoni Seroka, 32 i.e. Trzydziesci dwa] dni obrony Helu [Thirty-two Dawns in the Defense of Hel], (Olsztyn: Pojezierze, 1979). See also Bethell, p. 134; Divine, pp. 13-14; International Commission of Military History, p. 181; Kennedy, p. 115-116; Kosiarz, p. 37; Rzepniewski, pp. 528-529; Wasko, p. 56; Zaloga, p. 145.
27. Piaskowski, Okrety, pp. 46, 68; Wasko, pp. 51-52.
28. Orzel's famous hand-drawn chart can be seen at London's Sikorski Museum. Part of it is reproduced in Piaskowski, Okrety, p. 71. See also Piaskowski, ibid.; Wasko, ibid. Naval historians unused to Polish can trace the story of the Orzel, and all other Polish ships, from this point onward. Now associated with the Royal Navy, all Polish captains were expected to turn in reports in their native tongue and English. Copies of these can be found in London's Public Record Office (P.R.O.). They are filed under ADM 199/80, 807, 1178, 1187, 1854.
29. Jerzy Pertek, Marynarze Generala Kleeberga [General Kleeberg's Sailors], (Warszawa: Ksiazka i Wiedza, 1986), presents a good account of the Pinsk Flotilla in 1939. See also Wasko, pp. 59-60. I was only able to consult vol. 3, footnotes and charts, of Jozef Wieslaw Dyskant, Flotylle Rzeczne w Planach i Dzialniach Wojennych II Rzeczypospolitej [The Second Republic's River Flotillas in the War Plans and Action]. 3 Vol. (Warszawa: Wojskowy Instytut Historyczny, 1991)]. This, however, may well be the definitive work on the Pinsk flotilla. The bibliography in vol. 3 is exhaustive! See pp. 272-276 for a complete list of warships and supply vessels available in 1939.
30. "Guerrilla Bands in North Poland," The Times, (3 October 1939), p. 7; Pertek, pp. 118-132, 186-188; Stanislaw Piaskowski, Polish Naval Historian, to John Dunn, Albany, N.Y., 19 June 1982, personal files of author; Wasko, ibid. For more on "Special Operational Group Polesie," see Jan Wroblewski, SGO "Polesie," 1939, (Warszawa: M.O.N., 1989.
31. Piaskowski to Dunn; Piaskowski, Kroniki, p 11. For a concise look at Poland's navy-in-exile, see Michael A. Peszke, "The Polish Armed Forces in Exile. Part 2 (Second Installment) July 1941-May 1945," Polish Review, Vol. XXXII, No. 2 (1987), pp. 133-174.