Ambassador to de Gaulle

Stationed in London after the Pearl Harbor disaster in his new capacity as Commander of U.S. Naval Forces in Europe, Admiral Harold Raynsford Stark was approached in May 1942 by U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull, who requested that Admiral Stark contact General Charles de Gaulle to seek permission for the United States to use the territories under Free French control for a variety of purposes. The admiral acquitted himself so brilliantly that British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden suggested—half in jest—that he also should handle British relations with the troublesome French general. Stark soon became the de facto U.S. ambassador to de Gaulle.

Under directives from President Franklin D. Roosevelt, the United States considered de Gaulle a military—not a political—leader. Admiral Stark was designated as representative for the U.S. government for military consultations with General de Gaulle and the French National Committee in all matters concerned with the conditions of the war. Stark reported to Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox. Stark was appointed 9 July; Vichy issued a protest on 13 July. General Charles L. Bolte, named to represent the U.S. Army, soon was assigned to different tasks, leaving Stark as the only military representative.

Preparations for the landing in North Africa were under way. Could de Gaulle prove useful, or would he be a handicap? In September, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) directed a Joint Intelligence Committee to prepare “an estimate of the military effects of a policy of political recognition, or nonrecognition, of General de Gaulle.” Following an extensive inquiry from official sources, the committee concluded that “there are no important military advantages to be derived from political recognition of de Gaulle, but serious disadvantages would result therefrom.” The JCS decided that de Gaulle was not to be involved in the North African operation.

On 24 September 1942, Stark offered a lunch for a few of de Gaulle’s aides. The conversation turned to the possible attitude of the French population and officers in France and North Africa on an eventual U.S. operation. The officers of the Vichy armed forces were described as blindly loyal to Marshal Philippe Petain, then head of Vichy. A majority among them felt that Petain secretly was posing as much resistance to the Germans as the situation permitted. One attendee remarked that resistance might be merely symbolical if a U.S. operation were carried out with overwhelming force and were announced as intended to clear Germans and Italians out of North Africa. He stated further that General de Gaulle secretly already had sent representatives to win over officers of the army and air forces in North Africa.'

From August 1940 to June 1942, de Gaulle and the British worked at cross purposes, neither side fully aware of the other’s motives and intentions. The issue was settled in August 1942, when de Gaulle assumed the functions and duties of a de facto government, particularly in relation to the territories held by the Free French. Major Desmond Morton, personal assistant to Prime Minister Winston Churchill in the War Cabinet, was concerned that the Free French Committee as then constituted would not be acceptable to French leaders in North Africa, and that as a consequence the situation might present great difficulties for the French, British, and U.S. governments.

As the North Africa operation was under way, on 8 November, Churchill invited de Gaulle to a lunch, also attended by Eden and Morton. The British had expected all sorts of difficulties; the meeting instead was described by Stark as “more or less a love feast.”² De Gaulle said his only objective was to win the war and that, if necessary, he would step back or accept command of a tank corps under General Dwight D. Eisenhower, or work under General Henri-Honore Giraud, or do whatever might help. Giraud had been a prisoner of war in Germany, and had escaped; he was a higher-ranking general than was de Gaulle. The next day, de Gaulle repeated to Stark the substance of his conversation and suggested that a liaison mission be sent to North Africa to confer with Giraud and assure Eisenhower of 100% French participation. Stark made it clear that all decisions were up to General Eisenhower, the ]CS, and ultimately the President.

Stark assured Knox on 9 November that de Gaulle had taken no offense at not being told in advance of the expedition, and he agreed that Giraud was the proper man to be chosen to head French forces. Stark also felt there could be no doubt about de Gaulle’s good will toward the United States. In conversations with de Gaulle’s aides, Stark was urged to suggest that the Free French forces be combined with the forces under Giraud.

Eisenhower’s deal with Admiral Jean-Louis-Xavier- Francois Darlan, Vichy’s top man in North Africa, outraged the Free French. “One does not get into France by infraction,” de Gaulle proclaimed at a moment when his mood was particularly dark.³ The Free French mood was somewhat soothed by a statement from Roosevelt to the press that Darlan represented a “temporary expedient.”⁴ The French read this to mean that Darlan would be gotten rid of at the first opportunity. On 18 November, Stark sent the official text of the declaration to de Gaulle. In a letter of the same day to Knox he wrote:

One immediate effect was that de Gaulle canceled a press conference he was to hold this afternoon, and in which we understand he was to have been rough— to put it mildly. As indicating the complete change of heart after getting [the text of] the President’s broadcast they mentioned to Kittredge, . . . that they wondered if they were to appoint Giraud as High Commissioner in North Africa for Fighting France, would it meet with our approval. . . .⁵

French Unity as the Key

The main task Stark assigned himself—assisted by Ambassador John Gilbert Winant, who took a very realistic view of the Free French affair—was to decide how to deal with de Gaulle and try to convince him he could play a great role if only he contributed to unity of action among all Frenchmen. Stark wanted de Gaulle to agree that Eisenhower had no choice but to act the way he did—the primary objective being to beat the Nazis and the Fascists. In his conversations with de Gaulle and also in correspondence to Knox, Stark made a determined effort not only to approve of Eisenhower’s policy, but also to excuse Darlan, who had “withstood pressure as regards the French Navy” and that given Marshal Petain’s immense popularity in North Africa, could only act by pretending he did so in the name and the tacit consent of the Marshal.⁶

On 26 November, Stark saw de Gaulle at his request. De Gaulle noted that the fundamental unity of purpose inspiring U.S. policy should not be confused or lost sight of because of occasional differences over methods and strategy to be used to achieve the common ends. He explained:

France has passed through many reverses and trials in its long history but never one of more tragic significance than the present disastrous situation. They [have], however, profound confidence in the intentions and leadership of President Roosevelt and of the American people. . . . [M]ore than a military decision and a military victory must be sought in this total war. . . . The United Nations must seek a total victory to maintain the most precious values and open the way for a new period of political and moral as well as material progress.⁷

De Gaulle emphasized the necessity for maintaining the essential structure of the developing France. He made a determined effort to convince Stark, and through him the United States, that thanks to the Resistance movement, the new France would be more democratic and liberal than the old. Stark was impressed with the general’s arguments, because he based his agreement on the necessity for unity of objectives. De Gaulle stressed that it was only an illusion that men with whom it might have been convenient to deal at a certain moment could ever represent the France of tomorrow; to hold onto that illusion was to open the way to disaster.

Stark considered it imperative that de Gaulle go to Washington to explain his position to President Roosevelt. At de Gaulle’s suggestion, Stark spoke with General Georges Catroux and General d’Astier de la Vigerie, a Resistance leader, to tell them he thought it would be useful to take them to Washington. Stark believed Catroux would prove of much benefit to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. He found that both generals “are realistic, both are sound, both agree that they would have done what Eisenhower has done”—that is, come to terms with Darlan.⁸ But they also believed that as soon as it could be done without military detriment, Darlan should be relieved because his continued U.S. sponsorship would not be understood by the French people, would spread confusion, and would not be conducive to unity of action or purpose.

A Lost Opportunity

On 17 December, Stark called on de Gaulle to inquire whether he wished to present any statement or memorandum of questions that might be discussed with the President, should de Gaulle visit Washington in January. He indicated he would want to place himself entirely at the President’s disposition to answer his questions. De Gaulle then must have surprised the admiral. He said he fully agreed with the immediate decisions and arrangements in North Africa made by General Eisenhower for military reasons to permit the expeditionary force to establish itself as quickly as possible, with a minimum of local resistance and a maximum of local support in launching a local attack on Axis positions in Tunisia and in Tripoli. De Gaulle explained that by appearing to support the Darlan group, the Allied command in North Africa was preventing a natural evolution of opinion toward the real image of France—a fighting France.

Free Frenchmen repudiated Darlan and refused to associate with him in any way. Were it not for U.S. support, he soon would disappear. De Gaulle explained that his role was to express the opinion and resolves of all true patriots and to preserve the unity of the historic tradition of the true France. He added that President Roosevelt had a unique and universal burden of responsibility—not only for and to his own people, but for people everywhere.

The murder of Darlan on Christmas Eve postponed the trip; this set in motion a series of misunderstandings that lasted to the end of the war and that could have been clarified in an honest exchange of views and positions. Stark was eager for Washington to understand de Gaulle for what he stood for rather than concentrating on the negatives, including his bad temper and sense of self-importance. On 1 March 1943, Stark prepared a paper to invite Washington to take another look at the general. He wrote:

General de Gaulle . . . held high the flag of France, doomed otherwise to fall completely beneath the German domination. . . . General de Gaulle must not be underestimated in any final working out of France’s place among free nations. The French would certainly never forgive any ungrateful handling of General de Gaulle. ... It would be unwise to fail to recognize the things the General stands for as it would be to inflict them on any part of the French empire. . . .⁹

Stark hoped to convince Washington that de Gaulle was important to the Allies because the Resistance in France supported him—a point he stressed in his communications with Washington. The Free French had the same objective—to convince both the United States and Britain that the French Resistance was behind de Gaulle.

On 15 May, Stark received a copy of the French Resistance Council’s message to de Gaulle, which renewed the assurance of the Resistance party’s “absolute devotion to the principles for which you stand, and from which you can never waver without clashing with French opinion.”¹⁰

Advice from Afar

With de Gaulle in North Africa engaged in a contest of will with General Giraud for control of French policies, Stark was limited to trying to make sense of the situation from afar. Knox still counted on him for information. In a 22 June letter to Stark, Knox wrote: “Personally, I have been out of patience with de Gaulle for a long time. . . . [A]s a statesmanlike leader of his people he leaves much to be desired. I hope we can get on with the war now and have done with French politics until the war is won.”¹¹

Stark’s main concerns in the summer of 1943 were Anglo-American divergences over recognition of the French Committee of National Liberation. He pointed to the problem in an 25 August letter to Vice Admiral F. J. Home, Vice Chief of Naval Operations, in which he quoted the new Free French Commissioner for Foreign Affairs, Rene Massigli, as saying that U.S. opposition resulted only in reinforcing de Gaulle’s position.

In November, Stark had a series of conversations with General de Lattre de Tassigny, the future commander of the reorganized French Army in the war against Germany, who had managed to escape from prison in France and make his way to London. The General went to great length to explain that people in France were at a loss to understand U.S. policies toward de Gaulle, and that the French feared that U.S. political and military leaders were informed inaccurately about the present situation and current opinion and action. De Tassigny stressed that “the vast majority of the leaders and members of the Resistance movement who are building the foundations of a reconstructed France look upon de Gaulle as the symbol of their aspirations and programs, and the natural political leader of the French revival.”¹²

Distance from the North African scene did not reduce Stark’s interest. On 5 April 1944, he prepared a lengthy memorandum on “Instructions to Resistance Movements in France from General de Gaulle and the French Committee of National Liberation.” On 12 April, he followed up with an equally lengthy “Plans for a National Insurrection in France.” He was anxious that these events should be documented thoroughly and brought to the attention of the military in Washington and on the ground.

One of Admiral Stark’s last undertakings as witness and participant in the de Gaulle story was to insist that Washington did not underestimate de Gaulle and the role he was bound to play in liberated France. In a 10 July 1944 letter to Undersecretary of the Navy James Forrestal, who shared Knox’s dim view of de Gaulle, Stark noted that:

In general when I represented our government here, de Gaulle invariably gave me favorable answers on many things I asked of him; some of them rather tough ones. . . . On the other hand, he asked us for a number of things in which we gave him little or no satisfaction in one way or another. . . . When he went to Algiers I told Ike Eisenhower I was delighted to pass de Gaulle on to his tender care, but that if he didn’t watch out, and unless Giraud was a very smart man, he would one day wake up and find de Gaulle in complete command. That’s exactly what happened. There is no doubt that de Gaulle has a deep and intense patriotic love of France. To defend France I think he would do anything. No feelings of interallied solidarity will ever weigh with his defense of what he considers French interests. . . ¹³

Stark had achieved an understanding of his subject seldom reached by independent observers—an understanding greatly lacking in Washington. He was instrumental in demonstrating that there was no alternative to de Gaulle when it came to liberating France. Eisenhower reached the same conclusion independently as a result of his experience in North Africa. He had assured de Gaulle, before leaving for London to prepare for the Normandy invasion, that once in France, he would deal exclusively with him. The defense establishment finally circumvented President Roosevelt’s unrealistic views on the role of France. The Free French knew how much Stark had done for them.

De Gaulle, whose many virtues seldom included gratitude, appreciated Stark’s efforts, noted in a letter that concluded with these words: “I beg you to believe in the gratitude I feel for the task which you have accomplished, in the spirit of the most intimate, most confident, and most fruitful Allied cooperation."¹⁴