While writing his book, The War with Spain, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts wanted to credit the Secretary of the Navy with the U.S. Navy’s efficiency in preparing for the war with Spain. However, Secretary John D. Long did not want history to record that the Navy was overprepared at a time when President William McKinley sought to preserve peace. Therefore,
Senator Lodge asked Long for permission at least to give credit to Assistant Secretary of the Navy Theodore Roosevelt for his famous telegram to Commodore George Dewey on 25 February 1898, preparing the Asiatic Squadron for action in the Philippines.1 Long agreed, and Assistant Secretary Roosevelt was “naturally delighted to shoulder the responsibility.”2 So, history has remembered Roosevelt as the individual most responsible for the Navy’s preparedness. It is time Long gained recognition for his role, because it was his administration of the Navy Department that led to the United States’ victory.
President McKinley selected Long for the Secretary of the Navy post to represent New England, continuing the tradition of naming cabinet members who did not possess expert knowledge, only the quality of being a good administrator.3 Long was one of only three members to survive the pressures that the McKinley administration faced in its first two years.4
Long held his subordinates to strict accountability but also provided an atmosphere that allowed his people to do their jobs as they saw best.5 He saw himself as the civilian head of a military organization, ready to carry out the policies of the President through his able lieutenants, the civilian administrators, and the men of the U.S. Navy.
One such lieutenant was his assistant, Theodore Roosevelt, whom Long regarded as the “best man for the place.”6 Roosevelt did not become the Assistant Secretary of the Navy based on his knowledge of naval affairs. At the time of his appointment, Roosevelt was New York’s police commissioner, at odds with New York Republican leader and U.S. Senator Thomas C. Platt. Senator Platt wanted Roosevelt out of his state and asked President McKinley to give New York greater representation in his cabinet. However, the President hesitated to make the appointment because he was afraid that Roosevelt would have “preconceived plans which he would wish to drive through the moment he got in.” The President agreed reluctantly only after Roosevelt assured him that he would not take any action inconsistent with administration policies.7
From the beginning, Long was open-minded toward Roosevelt. Once together they got along well professionally. Long’s daughter Margaret described their relationship as “always friendly.”8 Likewise, Roosevelt thought of Long as “a perfect dear,”9 and “one of the most high-minded, honorable, and upright gentlemen 1 have ever had the good fortune to serve under.”10 Although he had cause for concern because Roosevelt’s “ardor sometimes went faster than the President or the department approved,” Long’s conservatism complemented his assistant’s radicalism." While they disagreed on occasion, they never suffered a serious rift until 1912, when Long criticized Roosevelt for starting the Bull Moose Party, which split the Republicans and allowed the Democrats to capture the presidency.12
Whenever the weather became seasonably hot in Washington, Long took extended vacations for health reasons, trusting Roosevelt, always with explicit instructions, to take care of the department’s business. Roosevelt’s enthusiasm for being the “hot weather secretary”13 was evident when he wrote to a friend, “The Secretary is away, and I am having immense fun running the Navy.”14 At the same time, Roosevelt took his responsibilities seriously, remained in constant communication with Long, and avoided making policy contrary to his superior’s instructions.15 He was sensitive to the possibility of being perceived as usurping Long’s authority and always concerned about what Long thought of his work at the department.16 Senator Lodge, Roosevelt’s confidant, assured him that he need not worry because Long had told him that he was “entirely satisfied” with all of Roosevelt’s work.17
Long and Roosevelt disagreed over the rate of expansion for the U.S. Navy. In his first year at the Navy Department, Roosevelt advocated building 6 battleships and 75 torpedo-boat destroyers, accusing Long of being “only lukewarm about building up our Navy.”18 Long favored building at a slower pace to control the Navy’s growth.
Cuba was a topic of concern for the McKinley administration and was frequently discussed in cabinet meetings. Long knew clearly that the President sought to preserve peace, but was determined to prepare for war.19 Long also preferred peace, but when war came he accepted his responsibilities and administered his duties with tenacity and sound judgment. Roosevelt, however, was militaristic and urged Long for the Navy to strike a quick blow against the Spanish.20 For the most part, Long was patient with Roosevelt, but at times he grew tired of his assistant’s advocacy for war.21
Beginning in the fall of 1897, Long described the Cuban situation as “an earthquaky condition.”22 Long had to appoint a successor to Acting Rear Admiral Frederick G. McNair of the Asiatic Squadron. There were two command positions open: the European and Asiatic Squadrons. Three officers were brought to his attention—Commodore E. O. Matthews, chief of the Bureau of Yards and Docks; Commodore John A. Howell, commandant of League Island Navy Yard; and Commodore George Dewey, president of the Board of Inspection and Survey. It was generally believed that Commodore Matthews would receive command of the more prestigious European Squadron, leaving Commodores Dewey and Howell to compete for command of the Asiatic Squadron. Commodore Arent S. Crowninshield, Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, “whose advice had great weight with John D. Long,” was responsible for routine officer assignments and opposed Commodore Dewey.23
Howell was one number ahead of Dewey on the Navy’s seniority list.24 It is true that Roosevelt worked on behalf of Commodore Dewey to get him appointed command of the Asiatic Squadron. But Long decided that he did not want to take Commodore Matthews away from the Bureau of Yards and Docks, leaving Commodores Dewey and Howell for either command. Long ordered Dewey to relieve Admiral McNair in command of the Asiatic Squadron on 21 October 1897. He recognized Dewey as a better choice, as he wanted a decisive officer to execute naval strategy in the Philippines against Spain if it became necessary.25
The probability of war forced Long to maintain the Navy Department on a “semi-war footing.” Long’s preliminary measures for war were made quietly so as not to arouse public excitement.26 He ordered the Commanders-in-Chief of the European and Asiatic Squadrons in January 1898 to retain all men whose enlistments were due to expire. He then concentrated the European Squadron at Lisbon, Portugal, and directed the USS Helena, then on her way to the Asiatic Station, to join it.27 Furthermore, Long advised the Commander-in-Chief of the South Atlantic Station of the critical condition of affairs in Cuba, and ordered him to concentrate his forces on the north coast of Brazil.28 Finally, Long ordered additional materiel to be stockpiled in case war began sooner than desired.
In the meantime, President McKinley directed Long to send the battleship USS Maine to Cuba in January 1898. The Maine was well received when she sailed into Havana harbor. All appeared to go well until 2140 on 15 February 1898, when the Maine exploded, killing more than 260 men.29 Long’s daughter Helen woke her father at 0100 the next morning, giving him the bad news. Long recalled, “It was almost impossible to believe that it could be true, or that it was not a wild and vivid dream.”30
Three days later, Long appointed a Board of Inquiry to investigate and report on the cause of the disaster.11 The increased tension over the incident took a toll on Long, who suffered from nervous anxiety and sleep deprivation. Therefore, he decided to take the afternoon of 25 February 1898 off, leaving Roosevelt in charge of the department as acting Secretary of the Navy in his absence.32
Whenever Roosevelt was left at the Navy Department as the Acting Secretary, he did “everything in my power to put us in readiness” for war with Spain.33 That afternoon, at the height of the crisis, was no exception. Roosevelt went about in a feverish hurry—ordering coal, ammunition, and other supplies, and relocating ships throughout the world. His most famous order was cabled to Dewey, ordering him to concentrate his squadron at Hong Kong and to “keep full of coal.”34 Uncharacteristic of his actions was that he ignored Long’s orders not to do anything other than to watch over the department’ responsibilities.
When he returned the next day, Long remarked “I find that Roosevelt, in his precipitate way, has come very near causing more of an explosion than happened to the Maine. ... He means to be thoroughly loyal to me, but the very devil seemed to possess him yesterday afternoon.”35 Long canceled most of Roosevelt’s orders because they upset plans already in place. All Roosevelt did was disrupt the routine of the department that Long had already established and the movements that in some cases had already begun.36 The one order that Long did not cancel was Roosevelt’s cable to Dewey, because it was an order that fit into Long’s overall preparation for war, and was based on naval planning that dated back to 1895.37 Roosevelt simply moved things along faster than Long and McKinley anticipated. Roosevelt admitted he had made a mistake. Because no serious damage had been caused, they were able to have “a good laugh over it.”38
Long continued his preparations on 3 March 1898, issuing orders for the Navy Department to purchase ships around the world for two reasons—to provide the U.S. fleet with the necessary assets to conduct war and achieve victory, and to prevent the Spanish from purchasing ships to use against the United States.39 On 9 March, Congress passed an emergency bill appropriating $50,000,000 for national defense, a portion of which went to the purchase of ships.40 Responsibility for buying ships fell to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy. Between 16 March and 12 August 1898, Roosevelt, and his successor Charles H. Allen, purchased 102 vessels at a cost of more than $21,000,000.41
Long also increased the enlisted force of the Navy. In order to fill manpower requirements, Long used men already trained in the naval militia from several states. The governors of those states granted leaves of absence to their men to temporarily enlist in the U.S. Navy. Approximately 4,000 officers and men were added to the Navy’s roll and were assigned to duty in the Auxiliary Naval Force, the Coast Signal Service, and on board ships of war.47
As a final measure, Long authorized the creation of the Naval War Board. Its duties included the collection of military information, advising the Secretary of the Navy on naval strategy and operations, assisting him in the conduct of the war effort, and gathering information on Spanish naval forces and movements. Originally, the board consisted of Roosevelt, who acted as chairman; Rear Admiral Montgomery Sicard; Commodore Crowninshield; and Captain A. S. Barker. Roosevelt and Captain Barker departed prematurely for other assignments, while Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan, who had retired, returned to serve on the board for the greater part of the war.43
Meanwhile, the Board of Inquiry investigating the Maine disaster concluded that she had been destroyed by an external explosion from a submarine mine. Responsibility for the mine could not be determined.44 Spain also conducted an investigation and concluded that the Maine had been destroyed by an internal explosion.45 The United States rejected Spain’s conclusion, and Congress declared war on 21 April 1898.46
The strategy Long adopted had two main objectives: the defeat of the Spanish in the Philippines and control of the sea in the Atlantic Ocean.47 Long urged President McKinley to strike in the Philippines soon after the declaration of war. But the president remained reluctant until 24 April 1898, when he authorized Long to cable Dewey to attack.48
Soon after Dewey’s victory, Roosevelt resigned and went on to fame as a Rough Rider in the First Volunteer Cavalry. Long did not think well of his decision. He believed Roosevelt had “lost his head to this unutterable folly of deserting the post where he is of most service and running off to ride a horse.”49 After he had retired from public life, Long noted, “Roosevelt was right, and we, his friends, were all wrong. His going into the Army led straight to the presidency.”50 In resigning, Roosevelt said, “I don’t suppose I shall ever again have a chief under whom I shall enjoy serving as I have enjoyed serving under you, nor one toward whom I shall feel the same affectionate regard. ... I have grown not merely to respect you as my superior, but to value your friendship very highly.”51
Long deserves to be remembered more for his contribution to the Navy’s preparedness than history has awarded to him thus far. His guiding hand is evident throughout the entire period prior to the opening guns of the war. It is only natural that a headlinemaker such as Roosevelt— whom the press adored because of all the good copy he generated—would overshadow the modest gentleman that was Long. But it was John D. Long’s administration of the Navy Department that led to its efficiency in preparation for war against Spain.
Footnotes available upon request.
