Friendly Target

"Friendly fire, isn't" is a maxim used to hide a multitude of human failings. Such incidents were—and are—the result of the growth of weapon technology and human inability or willingness to control them. All martial conflicts are evolutionary processes where coordination and cooperation evolve from the result of disaster.¹

About 0330, the U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Point Welcome (WPB-82329) lay to in Market Time Patrol Area 1A1, three-quarters of a mile south of the 17th parallel.² The officer of the day, Lieutenant (junior grade) Ross Bell, and helmsman, Gunner's Mate (GM) Second Class Mark D. McKenney, watched aircraft illuminate contacts outside the Cua Tung (the mouth of Ben Hai River). Boatswain's Mate (BM) Billy R. Russell had observed the same contacts on radar. Lieutenant Bell started both engines and moved farther south. Moving at five knots, he resumed patrolling 1A1's 13 miles of coastline.

Within minutes, the aircraft began illuminating the patrol boat.³ Lieutenant Bell sent GM McKenney to awaken Lieutenant (junior grade) David C. Brostrom, the commanding officer, but before Lieutenant Brostrom arose, the first firing run hit the cutter. In later testimony, Lieutenant Bell said he saw no identification signals from the aircraft. Lieutenant Bell attempted to turn on the navigation lights, but the second firing run "wiped out the bridge completely," killing Lieutenant Brostrom and one other and wounding five, including Lieutenant Bell.

Yellow Bird 18, a B-57 from the 8th Bombardment Squadron, made these attacks following a Sky Spot mission where it dropped its bombs, presumably on watercraft, on the Cua Tung just north of the DMZ. Target designation came from Blind Bat 02, a C-130 from the 21st Troop Carrier Squadron, whom Yellow Bird 18 asked if it had any gun targets. Blind Bat reported negatively until alerted by Spud 13, a U.S. Army OV-1 Mohawk with side-looking radar from the 131st Aviation Company. Spud 13 and its relief, Spud 14, notified Blind Bat of a large target that ran south at increased speed from the 17th parallel. Both Mohawks had "painted" three to five targets at the Cua Tung River and possibly mistook the Point Welcome as one of the group. At 0340 Yellow Bird 18 made the first "tail attack," firing 800 rounds of 20mm ammunition that "left him [the boat] burning." Following Yellow Bird's second attack, the patrol boat's engines were opened to maximum speed of 18 knots that Blind Bat's pilot later estimated to be 30-35 knots.

Out of ammunition, Yellow Bird 18 climbed to 10,000 feet and observed the boat "steadily taking evasive action," and "not going in any particular direction." Boatswain's Mate Chief Richard H. Patterson took command and initiated evasive movements that were remarkable, considering helm control had been shot away.

The patrol boat (WPB) remained operational, and Blind Bat 02 called for another strike. A flight of two F-4C Phantoms (Coyote 91 and 92) of 480th Tactical Fighter Squadron was finishing a route in the Tally Ho sector. In position for the attack, Coyote 91 carried two Mark 81 (250-pound) GP bombs; Coyote 92 had two "cans" of cluster bomb units (CBU-2A). Coyote 91 estimated that the "ship" was between two and two-and-one-half miles south of the Cua Tung and "south of the DMZ river [Cua Tung]." However, because it was "still north of the DMZ," this position gave the target greater legitimacy under the Tally Ho rules of engagement.

Coyote 91 waited at 10,000 feet while Coyote 92 prepared at 3,000 for an attack. Evidently Coyote 92 had some doubts about the target's origin and made a recognition pass at 1,500 feet blinking his navigation lights—the only one to do so. He received no reply, not knowing the WPB had lost all signal capability. Coyote 91 also questioned Blind Bat 02 about their position within South Vietnamese waters. Blind Bat 02 acknowledged the position and claimed he had followed the ship from farther north. The WPB's southeasterly direction was Chief Patterson's decision to "run for the dark," knowing he could not outrun nor continue evading the aircraft; he decided to beach at the Cua Viet and get support from Xray Alfa (South Vietnam Junk Force base).

Coyote 92 made his first attack from stem to bow, missing by 500 feet, but his second may have exploded two or three bomblets on the port stern. Coyote 91 made three bomb runs west to east. His first missed by 150 feet, the second was dry, the third missed by 50 feet to starboard.

Following Yellow Bird's strafing runs, Chief Patterson ordered all personnel below decks for protection and first aid for the wounded. As the Point Welcome moved south, Chief Patterson thought the boat was sinking from a bomb hit, but did not know that Yellow Bird's second attack had shot away the forced-draft blowers to the two diesel engines. Thinking the boat about to sink and reaching the Cua Viet, Chief Patterson ordered the crew to abandon ship, placing the seriously wounded in life rafts.

The crew entered the water as Blind Bat continued to illuminate the area—now a rescue scene. Led by the chief petty officers, the crew moved toward the river mouth in two groups. One group was about 200 yards away when it came under small-arms fire. The other group was under mortar from the north—.50-caliber and other fire—from one of Xray Alfa's junks and received small-arms fire from the south, presumably from the Viet Cong. Because of the incoming fire, the first group headed back to the WPB and was retrieved by the Point Caution (WPB-82317).

The Point Caution's commanding officer picked up five survivors at 0455 and called for a medical evacuation. He sent three men to the Point Welcome for a damage assessment, and although they found a small fire, all the machinery was functional and running. By 0510 they extinguished the fire, and within the hour Xray Alfa's junks transferred the wounded to the hospital at Phu Bai. Also on scene were the cutters Point Lomas (WPB-82321), Point Orient (WPB-82319), and PCF-15. The USS Haverfield (DER-393) was sent to provide support in case of attack.

The Point Welcome arrived at Da Nang at 1615, 11 August 1966, just 12 hours after the last attack. This was not the last incident. On 16 August 1968, the PCF-19 received three rocket hits, sinking the boat and killing five; the cutter Point Dume (WPB-82325) and the PCF-12 were attacked by an unidentified aircraft, and both the USS Boston (CAG-1) and HMAS Hobart (DLG-39) were attacked with loss of life in the same area.⁴ The rules of engagement, or at least coordination, were not sufficient.

The Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) convened an inquiry, headed by Colonel Samuel L. Reid, U.S. Army, which uncovered inconsistencies in interpretation and communication among the agencies and their rules of engagement.

The board questioned the Point Welcome crew on key points about their knowledge of recognition and challenge codes and the WPB's position. Although unstated, the initial insinuation was the WPB crew was somehow at fault. However, Chief Patterson, BM Russell, GM McKenney, and ET2 Virgil G. Williams verified that the Navy supplied each WPB with challenge codes each month. Not totally satisfied with the answers, the board closely questioned Chief Patterson. He was asked if he was aware of any other type of recognition rules used by anyone other than Market Time forces. His impression was that the codes, given by Commander Task Force (CTF) 115 (Market Time) applied to all U.S. aircraft, ships, and land units. He added the WPBs used their navigation lights for emergencies. Chief Patterson verified—as did the others—the WPB was at Patrol Area 1A1's northern edge, but well south of the 17th parallel. Chief Patterson said previous illuminations occurred in the same general area by a helicopter, but after firing two red flares, they left. Each Coast Guardsman understood the basic emergency identification signal was the two red flares.

The path of investigation became more difficult as the board turned to the Point Welcome's administrative commander, Lieutenant Commander Howard I. Istock, Commander, U. S. Coast Guard Squadron One, Division 12. In function and by design, the cutters assigned to Operation Market Time had two commanders. While on patrol, they followed the operational control of Commander Task Group (CTG) 115.1, but off patrol they were under the administrative control of Commander Istock. Illustrating this separation, and the often-adversarial relationship between CTF 115.1 and his task unit commanders, was Commander Istock's 1 August 1966 war diary entry. He protested CTF 115.1's deletion of Coast Guard Division 12 and the PCF commander as information addressees on all "spotreps and other messages." This meant that each task unit commander had to wait for the patrol debriefs for any information.

Commodore Istock corroborated the three separate challenge and recognition systems. He added the WPBs had radio communications with Market Time patrol aircraft over the 277.8 mcs frequency. He made strongly worded weekly reports to CTG 115.1 of other incidents and warned that without coordination meetings, a serious event would occur. He presented extracts from his report to CTF 115.1. The week of 10-16 July 1966, an Air Force plane resorted to dropping a message asking a WPB to come up on 44.5 mcs. For nine months, the spotter had tried to reach the WPBs but did not know they guarded 46.5 mcs. Commander Istock noted that "more coordination between Market Time and other efforts [agencies/services] in I Corps is necessary." He warned, "Lack of liaison in these matters will lead to eventual disaster. Too many near misses have already occurred."

Commander Joseph D. Nolan, U.S. Navy, Commander CTG 115.1, defended the Navy's position. When asked about Commander Istock's reports, Commander Nolan acknowledged receipt and forwarding to III MAF or I Corps; however, he had no requirement to inform CTF 115. He had no recollection of the number of illumination incidents. He did not investigate or ask the individual boat commanders how they made their estimations. He dismissed the complaints after finding it difficult to "judge the seriousness" or "how they were illuminated or how they use their estimations" of the incidents. Later, Captain Clifford L. Steward, U.S. Navy, CTF 115, confirmed he saw no such reports. Commander Nolan, who assumed command in May when CTF 115 decentralized operational control of Market Time areas, also found recognition confusing; for the length of the investigation he called the WPBs "WPVs." Ironically, changes to the recognition codes were available but classified "Top Secret." CTF 115.1, not having top-secret facilities, read them at III MAF, acknowledged the changes, and apparently did not share this with his task units.

Apart from internal, organizational difficulties, Commander Nolan revealed a further breakdown in interservice coordination. When asked what standard procedures were in place for CTF 115.1 to talk with the various aircraft control agencies, he testified there were none.

Although no one claimed responsibility for authorizing the strike, the authority fell on Blind Bat 02. Blind Bat 02 claimed making "a few passes for identification," and understood the use of his beacon and navigation lights as signals as he flew over. Watercraft were supposed to respond by turning on deck or navigation lights or displaying "parallel lights approximately amidships maybe slightly forward or a red rotating beacon or a red flare fired from the stern." The F-4 pilots expected to see a "series of green lights in a horseshoe or 'U' shape on the bow of the boat" or some sort of flare. A red flare would have been the best choice, because Blind Bat admitted that because of his fear of being shot down, he did not descend below 4,500 feet, and did not turn on his lights. Blind Bat also was unlighted during previous identification passes. He considered Yellow Bird orbiting at 6,000 feet with lights and aero beacon flashing adequate. The board never asked Blind Bat's mission controller how he identified the guns but missed the three-foot-high call letters painted on top of the bridge and the decidedly U.S.-style 14-foot-long boat on deck. Under the board's questioning, Blind Bat admitted, "I don't know whether he saw our signals [Yellow Bird's] or not."

The version told to 7th Air Force investigators had Blind Bat picking up a "large target" after notification from Spud. Blind Bat on a northerly heading dropped four flares and found the boat. It dropped two flares in a second pass, and then one flare every two-and-a-half minutes in the third. Because the Point Welcome did not respond to the flare passes, Blind Bat called in the strike.⁵

Blind Bat misinterpreted the rules of engagement set by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which allowed strikes on a hostile vessel if it was military and in RVN or Thai internal or territorial seas. And it had to be engaged in "attacking or acting in a manner which indicates with reasonable certainty an intent to attack U.S./friendly forces or installations, including the unauthorized landing of troops or material on friendly territory," laying mines, or "engaged in direct support of attacks against RVN or Thailand."⁶

Testimony also revealed physical identification problems. Pilots and crews had briefings of boat types—but not the WPBs that had been patrolling the area for over a year. The half-light caused by the flares made identification more troublesome for Yellow Bird 18's pilot. However, descriptions may have been a moot point. All the aviators testified that they had never heard of Operation Market Time—nor were they aware the Coast Guard shared seaward patrol areas with the Navy. This lack of recognition and operational knowledge melded with an incorrect briefing at Dong Ha that there were no friendly craft in the area.

The 7th Air Force took a defensive position. Colonel I. B. Jack Donalson, U.S. Air Force, commander of Task Force Tiger Hound/Tally Ho, said Blind Bat 02 was the airborne battlefield command and control controller (ABCCC) and had fragmentation orders to supplement daily orders and could authorize striking fleeting targets. Colonel Donalson was responsible for North Vietnam operations and was unsure of the rules for actions in South Vietnam. Following 11 August, he ordered no attacks on watercraft inside the DMZ unless it attacked the aircraft, was engaged in supporting enemy troops, or originated in North Vietnam.

The 7th Air Force's operations officer testified Blind Bat was not an ABCCC for night flights, but more of a mission or traffic controller. He outlined Air Force awareness of the many versions of rules of engagement, but as director of strike plans, he had not heard of Market Time operations in the DMZ area. He could not say the whole 7th Air Force did not know about it, but was not aware of any attempts to coordinate actions in common patrol areas. The 7th Air Force investigating officer, Colonel Carl E. Taylor, U.S. Air Force, concluded "this incident was caused in large part by an overlap in areas of responsibility in Tally Ho and Market Time."⁷ However, the 7th Air Force never turned over the results of its investigation to the MACV board of investigation. Nor was it asked to do so.

But coordination between 7th Air Force and the naval forces was practically nonexistent. Only one naval officer was assigned to the 7th Air Force with the primary function as liaison for Tally Ho, making it the only operation that had Navy-Air Force cooperation. The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, underscored this, saying, "this incident is an apparent lack of tactical coordination between operational commanders."⁸ The 7th Air Force investigation also concluded that the Point Welcome did not know the "correct MAROPS challenge/response for air to surface," and that given "two means of identifying themselves to aircraft" by turning on running lights or by voice communications, "the vessel did neither."⁹

CTF 115 and his staff were just as unsure of the rules of engagement in the DMZ and just as unfamiliar with Air Force operations orders. Created in April 1966, CTF 115 was unaware there was an overlap of operations in the DMZ. Captain Stewart, the last witness, recommended a "common set of rules or a common set of identification signals" and the formation of a group to study the problem.

Changes were made. MACV Chief of Staff, Major General W. B. Rosson, U.S. Army, ordered a review of all orders, instructions, and mission directives to provide coordination and interchange of information to develop training programs that emphasize recognition and identification of friendly and hostile watercraft. The investigating board also found no one person, or organization, at fault—but a system that showed no signs of concerted effort that combined with misinformation and misperception to cause the strike. Strike orders for watercraft in SVN were now cleared through the Coastal Surveillance Groups.

Patrol boat crews also learned. They replaced procedures and the call letters on the top of the bridge with a white star. The reaction and performance of the Point Welcome crew displayed what could be expected from men with professional and high-quality character and training. These qualities continued, making the Coast Guardsmen the most professional among the coastal warfare groups.

The Point Welcome incident probably saved lives in the years ahead, as the loss of lives forced awareness for cooperation of effort. Friendly fire probably will continue, but if it can be prevented by simple administrative functions, then perhaps the tragedy was not in vain.