By the 1840s, the low village surrounding Ambriz Bay in southwest Africa consisted of a few legitimate—and a greater number of illegitimate—slave-trading stations called barra- coons. In these warehouses, humans captured by native merchants were held for trade with slave ships coming from Portugal, Spain, Brazil, and the United States. Ambriz had been a notorious slave trading station since the Portuguese began their colonization of the Congo Kingdoms in the early 16th century.1
Slave trading began in the United States as early as 1619 but did not flourish until the turn of the next century. The introduction of rice and indigo culture in South Carolina and the expansion of tobacco production in Virginia transformed slave trading into a fixed institution. The slave trade also was important to the economy of the Northern Colonies, which built and sailed most of the ships used to transport slaves. In fact, the term “Middle Passage,” which generally refers to a passage from Africa to the West Indies, came from three-cornered voyages originating in New England: From New England’s many ports, ships carried to the West Indies much needed food and other commodities and a miscellaneous assortment of goods. The captains of these vessels exchanged their cargoes for rum and next proceeded to Africa to barter their rum for slaves, whom they transported to the West Indies. There they disposed of them for rum, sugar, molasses, and other tropical products. The sugar and molasses were carried to New England, distilled into rum, and—along with trinkets, bar iron, beads, and light-colored cloth—taken to Africa and exchanged for Negroes.2
The economy of the colonial United States depended upon the slave trade, although events leading up to the political and ideological revolution of 1776 sparked the beginnings of the abolition of slavery. Rhode Island set all slaves in the state free in 1774. Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and the rest of the New England states followed in turn. The slave trade was even abolished in the southern states, although slavery itself was not. The new U.S. Congress outlawed the African slave trade in 1808 and declared it to be piracy punishable by death in 1820. The British Parliament emancipated all slaves in British colonies in 1833. France followed in 1848, and the Spanish-American republics abolished slavery as soon as each became independent of Spain. By 1854, slavery was legal only in the United States, Brazil, and the Spanish and Dutch Caribbean Islands. 3
Brazil abolished the slave trade in 1827, but it continued legally under the Portuguese flag at the rate of 90,000 per year until 1842.4 This Brazilian market attracted “the matured villainy of the world,” and not a few of its practitioners were American. Ships built in Maryland (the infamous Baltimore Clippers), Maine, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Connecticut, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, New York, and Virginia took part in the trade in the 1840s and were manned with U.S. crews.5
The relationship between Britain and the United States was strained during the 1840s. Britain had reversed her position from being a slave trading nation to being dedicated to abolishing the trade. The United States, on the other hand, remained conflicted but strongly influenced by the policies of its slave-owning planter states.6
In autumn 1841, a slave mutiny took place on the U.S. schooner Creole, wherein the mutineers seized the vessel and compelled the crew to sail it into Nassau harbor in the British Bahamas. The United States demanded the return of the Creole and its cargo, but Britain refused on the ground that a slave was free as soon as he set foot on British soil. A solution of sorts was found in the Web- ster-Ashburton Treaty of 1842, which (in addition to ending a boundary dispute between the United States and Canada) provided for the final suppression of the slave trade by calling for the joint cruising of U.S. and British warships off the coast of Africa. If a slaver hoisted U.S. colors, she could be pursued by a U.S. ship; if she showed any other colors, she could be pursued by the British.7 Article 8 of the treaty provided that both the United States and England should “maintain in service, on the coast of Africa, a sufficient and adequate squadron or naval force of vessels, of suitable numbers and descriptions, to carry in all not less than 80 guns, to enforce separately and respectively the laws, rights, and obligations of each of the two countries for the suppression of the slave trade.”8
Until 1857, however, the U.S. squadron never consisted of more than seven ships, and the average was less than five. The British squadron, on the other hand, never numbered less than 12 and averaged 18. Furthermore, the U.S. squadron was based on the Cape Verde Islands, which were almost 3,000 miles and at least a month’s sail from the southern slave-trading area. Even with a combined average of 23 ships, effectively patrolling more than 4,000 miles of African coast was impossible.9 Between 1837 and 1862, U.S. officers arrested only 106 vessels for violation of the slave trade acts—an average of four a year.10 The Navy Department’s response to pressure from Southern congressmen was less than impressive itself. Its orders to Matthew Calbraith Perry, Commodore of the African Squadron from 30 March 1843 to 20 December 1844, made it clear that the Navy’s first mission was not to suppress the slave trade but to protect the growing American-West African commercial trade and the sovereignty of U.S. vessels from search by the British. The commodores were instructed almost incidentally to go through the motions of suppressing the slave trade and to do even that much with great restraint.
Before 1859, the U.S. Navy operated under a technological lag. The British had begun using small steam-driven, screw- propelled vessels, which could outrun any sailing slave ship. In 1845, the British Admiralty conducted tests to compare the abilities of two steamers of comparable horsepower. The screw- driven HMS Rattler beat the paddle-wheel driven HMS Alecto in both long and short races. As a result, Rattler was assigned to the British African Squadron in 1849. She was sailing with her stacks concealed off the coast of South Africa near Ambriz on 22 April 1850 when her lookouts spotted a short-masted, suspicious-looking brigantine approaching Ambriz Bay.
A month earlier, on 21 March, the U.S. brigantine Excellent lay at anchor beneath Sugarloaf in Rio de Janeiro Bay. Her master, Bruce McKinney, went ashore to make final arrangements for its departure. William Temple, the first mate, was a known slaver who had even testified to the U.S. consul in Rio about procedures used to purchase and load slaves.11 McKinney swore that the Excellent was bound for California, obtained the ship’s papers necessary to clear Rio, and documented her as being owned by a Henry King. The Excellent got underway that afternoon and sailed northeast for one month under no flag until she arrived off the coast of Africa near Ambriz on 22 April, when she was seen and approached by Rattler.'2 When the
Excellent saw the formidable British warship make steam and bear down on her, she broke out and flew the Stars and Stripes. The relationship between the United States and Britain was so sensitive that Rattler elected not to board the Excellent and broke off its pursuit. The Excellent stood into Ambriz Bay, and anchored close off the barracoons.
Out of sight of the Excellent, Rattler found the U.S. sloop of war John Adams, which also had been cruising off Ambriz Bay.13 Upon hearing of the Excellent’s activities, the John Adams’s Commander, Levin M. Powell, sailed directly into Ambriz Bay on 23 April— showing no colors. The Excellent was lying at anchor off a barracoon, and apparently not believing the John Adams to be a U.S. naval vessel, again flew the Stars and Stripes to avoid being boarded and searched. The John Adams immediately flew the Stars and Stripes herself, put two boats over, and promptly seized and searched the Excellent without a struggle. McKinney, Temple, and their crew were arrested and moved to the John Adams for questioning. There is no record of any slaves having been on board the Excellent when she was seized, but her configuration, behavior, false papers, position, and stores unequivocally revealed her to be a slaver. Commander Powell designated Lieutenant Guert Gansevoort as master and commander of a four-man prize crew and charged him with taking the Excellent and her crew back to the United States.
As soon as Lieutenant Gansevoort brought the Excellent into port, his prisoners were taken into custody and indicted for the criminal offense of having voluntarily served on a slave trading vessel. McKinney and the rest of the crew were released on bond and denied that the Excellent was engaged in the slave trade. In fact, McKinney was so confident that he would not be convicted and outraged that he had even been apprehended that he filed a claim to recover his chronometer, four charts, and his Bowditch. Equally confident and outraged, the rest of the crew filed claims for mariners’ wages for the period from when they signed on in Rio until 19 June 1850, when the Excellent arrived in Norfolk. The U.S. District Court, however, objected to all of the claims on the ground that the voyage itself was illegal, and the case was tried 1 November 1850. The prize crew gave evidence of the circumstances and location of the capture of the Excellent, the falsity of her papers, the inconsistencies of the testimonies of her master and crew, and finally of her cargo and appurtenances. After the month-long voyage from Brazil to Ambriz and then almost two months from Ambriz to Norfolk, the Excellent still had among her provisions on board 35 full casks of water, one lot of planks, one lot of wood, 40 bags of Farina, eight bags of rice, two drums of fish, three bags of clothes, nine deck tubs, and 40 pans. Each of these items had a particular and known use in the slave trade: The planks and wood were used to construct extra decks on which to pack slaves. Farina was known as “slave food.” The rice and fish were considered to be treats useful in dispelling suicidal despondency among slaves. The tubs were used for “sanitation” below decks and the pans for feeding.14
There is no record of how long the court deliberated, but its judgment was set out in no uncertain terms: “The brigantine Excellent . . . [was] forfeited to the United States. The claim of Bruce McKinney was disallowed and rejected. The crew had no lien against the vessel for mariners’ wages, because the voyage was illegal. Accordingly, the Marshal was directed to sell for cash the brigantine Excellent . . . and pay the proceeds into the registry of the court.” Notices of the sale were published in the Norfolk Beacon and attached to the masts of the ship. The sale took place by auction on Friday, 29 November 1850, at 1100 on Southgate’s Wharf. The net proceeds of the sale after payment of expenses for advertising, wharfage, stowing sails, “holding and winding chronometer,” and other miscellaneous costs was $995.94. Although McKinney, Temple, and the crewmen were indicted, records do not indicate that they ever were brought to trial.
After 1850, with the advent of screw propulsion and the application of more ships, the British Africa Squadron increased its rate of capture substantially—having an appreciable impact on the slave trade. The U.S. African Squadron did not have such results. It seized only 26 more slavers off the west coast of Africa between June 1850 and June 1861, at the average rate of 2.47 slavers seized per year. Of those, only 12 were confiscated, at the average rate of 1.14 slavers confiscated per year.15 The illegal slave trade between Africa and Brazil, Cuba, and the United States was restrained somewhat but continued essentially unabated until the outbreak of the Civil War. In addition, there were continued incidents of smuggling of Negroes from Angola onto Cuba, Brazil, and the barrier islands of Georgia and South Carolina even after the war.16
What was the significance of the capture and condemnation of the brigantine Excellent in the larger context of the U.S. African Squadron’s mission? The capture of the Excellent was an exception to the clear conclusion that the U.S. African Squadron was ineffective in suppressing the African slave trade. A tremendous amount of research and controversy have gone into the question of how many slaves survived the voyage out of Africa to the New World.17 Contemporary scholarship favors more conservative estimates than earlier ones—putting the number at 9.5 million.18 To that number must be added the approximately 1.5 million who died on board and others who died in Africa before embarkation.19 Slave traders took an average of 40,000 slaves from Africa each year for 420 years. The magnitude of these numbers places in perspective the lack of commitment of the United States Government and the Navy Department to suppress the African slave trade and ultimately bring it to an end.
1. Basil Davidson, The African Slave Trade (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1981), p. 304.; Warren S. Howard, American Slavers and the Federal Law, 1837- 1862 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963), p. 336. Reprinted in 1976 by Greenwood Press.
2. Peter Duignan and Clarence Clendenen, The United States and the African Slave Trade, 1619-1862 (West- port, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1978), p. 72.
3. Duignan and Clendenen, The United States and the African Slave Trade, 1619-1862, p. 72; Howard, American Slavers and the Federal Law, 1837'1862, p. 336; Samuel Eliot Morison, The Oxford History of the American People (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 1153. Reprinted with corrections 1972.
4. J. Holland Rose, Man and the Sea: Stages in Maritime and Human Progress (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1936), p. 288.
5. Davidson, The African Slave Trade, p. 304; Lieutenant Andrew H. Foote, U.S. Navy, Commanding U.S. Brigantine Perry on the coast of Africa, 1850-1851, Africa and the American Flag (New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1854), p. 390.
6. Morison, The Oxford History of the American People, p. 1153.
7. Foote, Africa and the American Flag, p. 390; U.S. House of Representatives, Instructions to African Squadron 31st Congress, 2nd session, House Document 104, 1859.
8. U.S. House of Representatives, Instructions to African Squadron 31st Congress, 2nd session, House Document 104, 1859.
9. Daniel P. Mannix in collaboration with Malcolm Cowley, Black Cargoes: A History of the Atlantic Slave Trade, Viking Compass ed, 10th Printing (New York: The Viking Press, 1962), p. 306.
10. Howard, American Slavers and the Federal Law, 1837' 1862, p. 336.
11. U.S. Senate, 31st Congress, 2nd session, Senate Document 6, 1856.
12. U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. Record of the Case of The United States versus The Brigantine Excellent (Philadelphia: National Archives and Registration Administration, 1850), p. 90.
13. Officers of the Deck, Log Book, USS John Adams (Washington D.C.: National Archives and Registration Administration, 1849-1850).
14. Davidson, The African Slave Trade, p. 304; Mannix, Black Cargoes: A History of the Atlantic Slave Trade, p. 306.
15. Howard, American Slavers and the Federal Law, 1837-1862, p. 336.
16. Davidson, The African Slave Trade, p. 304; Mannix, Black Cargoes: A History of the Atlantic Slave Trade, p. 306.
17. Howard, American Slavers and the Federal Law, 1837-1862, p. 336.
18. Davidson, The African Slave Trade, p. 304.
19. Ibid.