The bottom line of a recently released report by Under Secretary of Defense Edwin Dorn on the Pearl Harbor commanders still holds that (at Pearl Harbor) Admiral Husband Kimmel and Lieutenant General Walter Short “did not demonstrate the judgment required of people who serve at the three- and four- star level.” And while acknowledging others as equally and even more at fault than they, “there is not a compelling basis for advancing either officer to a higher grade.”
The media has, in general, fixed on these points, and thus, regrettably, missed others. While this is, true enough, Dorn’s final judgment, such shallow interpretation of it neglects the rest of his thoughtful and careful analysis. In fact, minus only a symbolically sought-for restoration in rank, the U.S. military leadership has now, in writing, officially rehabilitated these last two holdovers among the victims of the Japanese at Pearl Harbor. Dorn states that other defense officials, senior in the chain of command to the Pearl Harbor commanders, were not only aware of the probability of attack but “were neither energetic nor effective in getting that warning to the Hawaiian commanders.”
This refers in part to an early-morning conference that fateful Sunday in Washington, when the Naval Intelligence chief, Rear Admiral Theodore S. Wilkinson, urged the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Harold R. Stark to telephone Kimmel with news that Japan was going to do something drastic at 1300 local time.
This call would have awakened Kimmel at about 0300 Hawaii time, enabling him to set up the welcome that the Japanese attack force should have received. Such preparation probably would not have saved many ships, but it would have saved lives, and it could have made the attack more costly to the enemy. Admiral Stark, however, refused to make the call and instead attempted first to reach President Franklin D. Roosevelt and then, General George Marshall. Unable to reach either, he sat for some three hours in his office, doing nothing, waiting for an attack he knew must be coming—somewhere.
While Dorn indeed recommends against the “restoration” that Kimmel supporters have been fighting to achieve for more than a half-century, his report comprehensively clears the air about the entry of the United States into World War II. Viewed dispassionately, even though it does not restore the commanders’ pre-Pearl Harbor ranks, it does something more important: it restores their honor.
The report officially—and for the first time publicly—confirms the charge that Washington, aware through intercepted Japanese coded messages that U.S. relations with Japan were terminal, should have so informed the Pearl Harbor commanders. While it makes much of the 27 November “war warnings,” the report honestly admits that these were inadequate. At the same time Washington was failing Kimmel and Short, however, it was making background information available to the commanders in the Philippines, General Douglas MacArthur and Admiral Thomas C. Hart. Since the facts about this have long been clear, Dorn says only that not keeping Pearl Harbor better informed was a grave error.
The report characterizes Washington’s handling of the information at hand as showing “ineptitude, unwarranted assumptions, misestimates, limited coordination, ambiguous language, lack of clarification and lack of follow-up.” This, in summary, is what “revisionist” historians have been saying for years. Dorn goes on to say in several places that “responsibility . . . should not fall solely on the shoulders of Admiral Kimmel and General Short; it should be broadly shared.” Again, revisionists could not agree more.
Although the Department of Defense now is willing to admit that others were also at fault, it makes no effort (and says it should not) to determine whom these other individuals might be, or what might be appropriate punishment for their dereliction. To this there can be no realistic objection. We had, after all, a war to win, and sacrificing Kimmel and Short allowed everyone else to get on with the job.
The Dorn Report is, therefore, a great deal more than half a loaf. It states officially that because the Pearl Harbor commanders were standing where the blow fell, the punishment is justified. The report even minimizes this, on the grounds that retirement at the two-star level is better than being cashiered entirely.
But that is not where the problem lies. Historical justice demands that the disgrace be lifted. Alone among all the others who also merited censure, Kimmel and Short were punished, their lives and careers ruined—and here the Defense Department has at last spoken plainly, confirming that the Pearl Harbor commanders were guilty only of not taking extraordinary initiative and choosing instead to follow orders closely from Washington. Their honor should not be sullied for this. We can today mark that our nation has officially forgiven them whatever fault they might once, unjustly, have had to carry alone.
