“Naval Academy Memories”
(See O. North, J. M. Poindexter, pp. 8-16, September-October 1995 Naval History)
Victor Gray
As a proud graduate of the Naval Academy (1962), 1 was appalled to see the article on “Naval Academy Memories” in which “notable” alumni celebrate the school’s 150th anniversary. By what criteria were Oliver North and John Poindexter judged to be among the school’s 20 most “distinguished" alumni credited with “notable contributions in military and government service.”
Didn’t the Academy and the nation suffer enough as a result of their “contributions?” Must we be reminded yet again at this time of justifiably proud celebration of the ridicule suffered by our alma mater as a result of the handiwork of these “distinguished” gentlemen? Must true heroes like Jeremiah Denton, James Lovell, James Webb, and John McCain suffer their company on the pages of Naval History ?
You owe your readers an explanation for your decision to honor North and Poindexter and for omitting in your pithy bios of them any mention of the disgrace they brought upon themselves, the Service, and the Academy. Such omissions are unforgivable in a journal devoted to history, which, after all, is the endeavor of searching for the truth about the past. As Albert Einstein once said, “The search for truth demands that we not conceal any part of what we recognize to be true.”
Editor’s Note: The preceding is representative of several letters we received—none positive—on this topic. Our intention in publishing “Naval Academy Memories" was to include the most well-known graduates of that institution, without passing judgment on their political views or their post-Academy careers.
“Resurrecting the Kimmel Case”
(See F. L. Schultz, pp. 43-46, July-August 1995 Naval History)
Edward R. Kimmel
At Senator Strom Thurmond’s Capitol Hill meeting in April 1995. General Counsel of the Navy Steven S. Honigman stated three principal reasons why Admiral Kimmel’s rank should not be upgraded. The first was that the historical record does not establish convincingly that President Roosevelt, General Marshall, or others in Washington deliberately withheld information from Admiral Kimmel and General Short.
Supporters of Admiral Kimmel made it clear at the meeting that this is a non issue and is irrelevant to the question under consideration—namely, whether Admiral Kimmel should be posthumously awarded four-star rank. The Kimmel family agreed. Kimmel supporters stated that Admiral Kimmel’s posthumous advancement should not be held “hostage” to the reputation of President Roosevelt or General Marshall. If Counsel Honigman has evidence of such a conspiracy, even though not “convincing,” fairness dictates that he make that evidence available to the Kimmel family.
Counsel Honigman’s second point was that Admiral Kimmel and General Short were responsible for failures in Hawaii that contributed to the unreadiness of the forces under their command to detect and defend against the attack and that those failures were detailed in the 1946 report of the Joint Congressional Committee.
In this connection, Counsel Honigman asserted that Admiral Kimmel enjoyed due process before that Committee; that he was represented by counsel; that he testified at length; and that he had the right to call and question witnesses. This is in error. It is true that Admiral Kimmel was represented by counsel and testified at length, but he had no right to call and question witnesses. These matters were within the province of the Committee counsel, members of the Committee, and the chairman of the Committee, just as in any legislative hearing. In contrast to what he could do before the Naval Court of Inquiry, Admiral Kimmel’s counsel could not cross examine, for example, Admiral Harold R. Stark, Chief of Naval Operations, or Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner, Director of Navy War Plans, or General Marshall, or any other witness before the Committee. Only the members of the Committee and Committee Counsel were entitled to ask questions of witnesses. If Admiral Kimmel had been so entitled, he would have called Admiral Allan Kirk, Director of Naval Intelligence until October 1941, and Radioman Ralph T. Briggs, who filed an affidavit with the National Archives stating that he received the “Winds Message” at the Cheltenham Naval Radio Station and that he was ordered by his commanding officer not to testify before the Congressional Committee. If he had been so entitled, Admiral Kimmel certainly would have called many others.
Counsel Honigman then asserted that while the Committee report specifically found that Admiral Kimmel and General Short were not guilty of dereliction of duty, it did find that they made numerous errors of judgment—the most significant being dependence upon an inadequate system of command by mutual cooperation.
Frequently, Counsel Honigman referred to Admiral Kimmel as “Commander-in- Chief” in such a context that it would seem that he labored under the mistaken belief that Admiral Kimmel commanded all the armed forces stationed in Hawaii and was responsible for the defense of Hawaii. This was simply not true. Kimmel supporters pointed out that the Army (General Short) was responsible for the defense of Hawaii. Kimmel had quite a different mission—to attack the Japanese bases in the Marshall Islands in the event of war.
Kimmel supporters pointed out there was no unified command in Hawaii. Admiral Kimmel could not tell General Short what to do and vice-versa. The Committee report notes that in Washington, the Army and Navy had been arguing over the concept of “unity of command” for more than a year before the Pearl Harbor attack and could not agree. This is simply the way joint Army-Navy commands were structured in 1941, not only in Hawaii but also at other joint Army-Navy operations.
Admiral Kimmel and General Short definitely conferred on defense plans, which, incidentally, had been acknowledged by Admiral Stark to be models for both services to follow, as well as the existing situation that included their respective 27 November 1941 “war warning” messages. In the words of the Navy Judge Advocate General, Admiral Gatch, the two were of like mind, and no additional amount of conferring would have changed their views but rather would have reinforced each’s own estimate of the situation.
In response to the War Department’s 27 November 1941 message, General Short advised the War Department that he had alerted against “sabotage,” but he received no comment. Admiral Kimmel already had in place what he considered to be an adequate alert. The adequacy of Admiral Kimmel’s alert level was addressed in great detail at the meeting by his son, Captain Thomas K. Kimmel, who also pointed out that on the morning of the attack all antiaircraft batteries on all the ships were manned and firing within four to seven minutes.
Kimmel supporters detailed at great length the “Magic” intelligence available in Washington and which Washington had failed to forward to Hawaii. In particular, they pointed to the intelligence that indicated Pearl Harbor was a likely target for attack—namely, the “ships in harbor/bomb plot” messages exchanged between Tokyo and the Japanese Consul in Hawaii. They also detailed other “Magic Intelligence” available in Washington that had not been forwarded to Hawaii, that showed the growing tenseness of relations between Japan and the United States.
Kimmel supporters pointed out that Kimmel had been assured by Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Harold R. Stark that he would receive all pertinent information and that this commitment had been ignored. There were plenty of plans for defense, but no one, in particular Admiral Stark and General Marshall, rang the bell so the Hawaiian commanders could implement them.
Counsel Honigman asserted that the destroyer Ward attacked a Japanese submarine an hour-and-a-half before the Japanese attack, and yet this was not transmitted in sufficient time to enable preparations to be made for the attack. Captain Edward L. Beach, U.S. Navy (Retired), outlined for Department of Defense representatives the frustrations and delays involved in encoding and decoding messages, concluding that an hour-and-a-half was not adequate time for performing these operations when coupled with the inevitable delays associated with transmission and receipt of a message.
Counsel Honigman then referred to the endorsement to the report of the Naval Court of Inquiry by Admiral Ernest J. King, pointing out that Admiral King believed that Admiral Kimmel had adequate intelligence and warnings from Washington in his possession so that he should have judged more accurately the gravity of the danger to Hawaii. Admiral King pointed to the 24 November 1941 “hostile action possible at any moment” message and the “war warning” message on the 27th. Kimmel supporters pointed out that the “war warning” message warned of a Japanese amphibious attack on the Philippines, Korea, and Thai peninsulas (Southeast Asia), and that no mention was made of Hawaii. Since the “war warning” message came after the “hostile action possible at any moment,” Kimmel’s supporters said it merely confirmed what the Hawaiian commanders already knew and directed attention away from Hawaii, particularly when coupled with other messages directing them to ferry planes to Wake Island.
Counsel Honigman also referred to Admiral King’s reference to the 3 December message reporting Japanese destruction of codes, which Kimmel supporters said was just what one would expect if Japan was to embark on an aggressive move in Southeast Asia.
Professor Gannon noted that Admiral King had told Admiral Kimmel in 1944 at the conclusion of the Naval Court of Inquiry that he believed Kimmel was guilty of dereliction of duty, because he had not instituted long-range aerial reconnaissance. However, Admiral King stated that he had not read any of the testimony given before the Court. Professor Gannon then proceeded to address the aerial reconnaissance problem (reiterating what he had written previously in Proceedings in December 1994), concluding that Admiral King’s position was completely unjustified.
Counsel Honigman’s third point had to do with accountability and finality of administrative actions. Suffice it to say that those present all agreed with the principle of accountability; however, Admiral James Holloway pointed out that the principle of fairness also is involved in light of the information not sent to the Hawaiian commanders, effectively blindfolding them, and the well-known deficiencies in equipment for both the Army and Navy in Hawaii. He went on to say that the problem was to get a proper balance between these two important principles. Deputy Secretary of Defense John Deutch embraced this.
Finally, Counsel Honigman addressed the principle of finality of official actions. This subject was addressed at great length by historian John Costello, pointing out that history was constantly being revised in light of new information and evaluation of old information and that to invoke a “finality” concept was not consistent with what he understood to be justice in the United States.
Kimmel supporters pointed out that the U.S. Navy, by its own past actions, shows that it ignores the “finality” principle whenever it suits it to do so—i.e., the Iowa explosion, the Pueblo incident, the McVey court-martial, and subsequent commutation of sentence and promotion.
“‘If It’s Lost, . .’”
(See C. Cussler, p. 20, July-August 1995 Naval History)
Mark M. Newell
Clive Cussler’s remarks concerning the discovery of the Confederate submarine Hartley demonstrate why he has such a sterling reputation as a writer of fiction.
The last search for the Hunley began in 1972 when I convinced the South Carolina Sons of Confederate Veterans (SCV) that the submarine could be found. A nonprofit corporation—the Confederate States Historical Foundation, Inc.—was formed to organize the search. Extensive archival and field research followed. The evidence produced supported my hypothesis that the Hunley had survived its attack on the USS Housatonic and was lost somewhere within the approaches to Maffitt’s Channel.
With a possible resting place for the Hunley determined, attempts were made in 1974 to hire Norman Scott’s Expeditions Unlimited to search with a proton magnetometer, but the SCV was unable to pay for search. Nevertheless, the SCV and I continued to gather field and archival data. In 1980, after Mr. Cussler contacted the University of South Carolina (USC) seeking information for his own search for the Hunley, he was referred to me. I suggested he search areas in Maffitt’s Channel for a ‘target’ that would register from 800 to 1,200 gammas on a proton magnetometer, the strength of the magnetic signal for a mass of metal the size of the Hunley. As the search report reveals, the wrong areas were searched and the targets that were located were insufficiently examined—so it was no surprise that this effort, conducted in 1980 and 1981, was unsuccessful.
In 1984, I joined the staff of USC’s South Carolina Institute of Archaeology and Anthropology (SCIAA) as an archaeologist and, in 1990, began work on a doctorate in underwater archaeology at the Institute of Maritime Studies at St. Andrews University, Scotland. I was the only person authorized by state and federal authorities to conduct excavations on targets that might prove to be the Hunley. In 1992, I began speaking with Mr. Cussler about his possible support for my research on the Hunley. Mr. Cussler agreed to support a joint project under the umbrella of USC. Plans for the work—and a contingency plan in the event the submarine was found—were developed and approved by the relevant authorities and leading underwater archaeologists.
Mr. Cussler’s task on the joint project was to run the proton magnetometer over areas which I, as principal investigator, had selected. To do so, he hired Wes Hall and Ralph Wilbanks. I objected to their participation in a project of such importance. In 1985, Hall had been charged with looting rifles from a sunken Confederate blockade runner off North Carolina; the case was dismissed on a technicality involving the search warrant. Wilbanks was a former employee of the SCIAA. Apparently convinced that I had replaced him, he had attacked my character and work. Nevertheless, Mr. Cussler insisted on hiring both. During the final hours of their field work, conducted in August 1994, they finally looked in the Maffitt’s Channel area and discovered the only target matching the Hunley’s mass and size. After a cursory examination by the archaeology team— which included diver Harry Peccorelli—a return was scheduled for September. It soon was determined that more than likely the Hunley had been discovered. In order to protect the target from damage or reoxygenated water, it was decided to examine it with ground-penetrating radar in June 1995. But in May 1995—without the knowledge of USC—Peccorelli, Hall, and Wilbanks excavated the target and found the Hunley. Informed of the discovery, Mr. Cussler called a press conference, again without USC’s knowledge.
Soon afterward, USC contacted the news media and made known its important role in the discovery. Mr. Cussler then began a campaign of negative publicity against me as well as an effort to keep the recovery project and the Hunley away from the State of South Carolina. By the way, the idea of a cofferdam was advanced by Charleston News & Courier reporter Bobbi Young—and there was no friction between state and federal officials until Mr. Cussler’s recent actions.
Mr. Cussler’s claims that he searched for the Hunley for 15 years are false. In a July 1995 letter to the National Park Service, his own field director Walter Schob, admitted that the 1980-81 search of a few weeks “was limited.” Mr. Cussler’s approval of my work is clearly indicated by his direct financial support and in letters to me. Although he correctly states that I am a journalist, Mr. Cussler omitted that I have submitted my doctoral dissertation—the product of ten years of research and field projects—to St. Andrews University.
All too often lost in the controversy is the Hunley herself. In video footage given to the media, Cussler’s team is shown opening a huge excavation over the submarine. There is no indication of professional archaeological controls and clear evidence of the breakage of the encrustation on the submarine’s surface. This activity— and the admitted “testing” of the hull with a pointed steel probe—has compromised severely the stability of the metal. Worse, collectors have offered up to $100,000 for pieces of the Hunley.
Until quite recently, Clive Cussler’s contribution to the search for the Hunley was appreciated by the underwater archaeological community. His recent actions, however, have endangered one of this country’s significant naval treasures.