The Marine Corps preaches that we train as we fight, but the F/A-18D community is not afforded that opportunity. It is too busy practicing missions that it is unlikely to execute in combat. In its six years of existence, the F/A-18D (Delta) community has rapidly become the "Jack of all trades, master of none." The F/A-18D is arguably the most versatile multi-role strike fighter aircraft in the U.S. inventory. However, the Marine Corps does not focus Delta training appropriately. Because the F/A-18 community's senior officers have come from other aircraft communities, many of them with "fighter" backgrounds believe that training to the air-to-air mission, a mission we are less likely to perform in combat, better prepares us to handle a dynamic. changing flight environment in such other mission areas as close air support and forward air control (airborne) [FAC(A)]. This roundabout approach reduces the amount of training time available for the missions that we are likely to execute in combat. As the new aviation campaign reduces flight time, we cannot afford to spend that time outside of our primary mission areas.
Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron I (MAWTS-1) is one of the guiltiest parties in undermining the Delta training program. MAWTS-I carries the most weight at the Training and Readiness (T&R) Manual review conferences. Usually, its recommendations are accepted by the other members of the conference because its mission is to develop aviation tactics for the fleet squadrons. The most rigorous certification for F/A-18 aircrew conducted by MAWTS-I is the one for Air Combat Tactics Instructor (ACTI). This certification is overemphasized to the point that aircrews perceive that the certification itself establishes their credibility. Much more effort is put into this certification process by MAWTS-1 and by the fleet squadrons than is exerted for any other certification. The Delta community would be better served by emphasizing the Night Tactics Instructor and Forward Air Controller (Airborne) Instructor certifications; however, these work-ups currently are not given nearly the emphasis of an ACTI certification.
The T&R Manual neither reflects adequately nor weights appropriately the missions we will execute in combat. Based on its use in the Gulf War and tasking during training exercises, the F/A-:18D is expected to conduct primarily FAC(A), tactical air control (airborne) [TAC(A)], and aerial reconnaissance. However, just under 20% of the combat readiness percentage (CRP) is allocated to these three missions.
Only F/A-18Ds conduct FAC(A) and TAC(A), and we are much less likely to conduct offensive anti-air warfare missions than our single-seat counterparts. However, at a T&R Manual review conference that I attended in 1995, the guidance from the Training and Education Division, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, was that the manual will continue to be the same for both aircraft models. MAWTS-I and VMFAT-101, the F/A-18 T&R manager, proposed changes that only addressed the CRP values-not the actual missions flown. These parties indirectly acknowledged the difference in mission priorities through the changes in CRP values and flight refly factors. The numbers were massaged to minimize the effect of not flying some of the missions on either community's CRP. This statistical manipulation does nothing to improve either community's combat readiness.
Another difficulty is that, in the eyes of group- and wing-level commanders, a squadron's performance is almost entirely based on such statistical data as CRP and flight-hour goals. The new aviation campaign may relieve the requirement to fly an exact number of flight hours during a fiscal year, but the campaign plan does not directly address the issue of CRP. At present, CRP, which is derived from sorties flown per the T&R Manual, drives squadron operations; however, squadron operations do not always improve combat readiness. The F/A-18 T&R Manual contains so many sorties and missions that a Hornet squadron's CRP is normally much lower than that of other aviation communities. The solution from the general-officer level was to increase the CRP that a Hornet aircrew attains at the Fleet Readiness Squadron by 10%. This does not solve, or even address the real problems involved; it only makes the numbers appear more even across the board.
Instead of appeasing higher echelon commands with numbers, squadron operations and commanding officers must strive for better training to improve overall combat effectiveness. Having completed three unit deployments to the Western Pacific, mostly working in the operations department, I saw the politics of CRP first hand. The primary goal of all three operations officers was to raise CRP as much as possible. On my third deployment, the Group required all squadrons to provide a weekly training report that reflected the squadron's CRP. The interest was not in better preparing the aircrew for combat; it was to increase the CRP value. As a training officer and schedule writer, I was pressured to be unrealistically imaginative. The end result was that we put training codes on the schedule that would increase CRP-not necessarily increase combat readiness-even when the sorties could not be completed correctly.
The leadership must come to grips with the employment of the F/A-18D and how it differs from the F/A-18A/C. We must train to the anticipated combat tasking-not just the capabilities of the aircraft. Apparently, no one is willing to delete missions from the F/A-18D's mission statement. Until someone takes charge and directs the training priorities correctly, we never will attain the F/A-18D's maximum combat effectiveness.