As winter faded to spring in Annapolis, the Class of 2011 eagerly awaited the transition from midshipman to officer. The expectations of those joining the U.S. Marine Corps, and the responsibilities they will assume, are particularly poignant. We must meet a physical, mental, and moral standard established by the old Corps and embodied by today’s Corps—currently forward-deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan.
The fresh second lieutenants of the Class of 2011 will be given the daunting task of leading Marines who have multiple deployments and years of experience. The Corps is currently redefining itself yet again for a new generation in the face of domestic political tensions and in a climate of instability abroad. As new junior officers we will be at the forefront of efforts to maintain efficiency and institutionalize lessons learned from years at war. Along with physical and mental preparation, future officers must heed Lieutenant General John A. Lejeune’s timeless advice and “cultivate in their hearts a deep abiding love of the Corps and Country.”1
Future Conflicts’ Implications for Junior Officers
The strategy, tactics, and technology of war have changed dramatically in the past decade. It is safe to assume similar evolutions will continue throughout my career in the armed forces. In 2006, General David Petraeus succinctly clarified the paradigm shift in war: “America’s overwhelming conventional military superiority makes it unlikely that future enemies will confront us head on. Rather, they will attack us asymmetrically, avoiding our strengths . . . and come at us . . . the way insurgents do.”2
The current penchant for regime-change abroad, coupled with the United States’ murky doctrinal stance on intervention, necessitates a rapid military-response capability never before seen in our history. Globalization and the Internet have been forged into a double-edged sword, used simultaneously as a vehicle for mobilizing democracy in one country while connecting terrorists in another. Retired Army General Stanley McChrystal recently described how today’s typically tech-savvy terrorist networks operate: “Their leaders use cell phones and the Internet to issue orders and rally their fighters, they aimed to keep dispersed insurgent cells motivated, strategically wired and continually informed, all without a rigid or targetable chain of command.”3
Our military must be prepared to meet the demands of future wars in both a strategic and tactical sense. Tactically, our leaders on the ground, particularly junior and noncommissioned officers, must complete the mission while maintaining an appreciation for the potential implications of their split-second decisions. Strategically, our military and civilian leaders must, as former Marine and policy analyst Nathaniel Fick argues, reconcile the values for which we are willing to use military force to preserve and defend.4
The Marine Corps Identity
When General James Amos recently became the 35th Commandant of the Marine Corps, Defense Secretary Robert Gates challenged him to “define the unique mission of the Marines going forward.”5 General Amos responded that the Marines “fill a void in our Nation’s defense for an agile force that is comfortable operating at the high and low ends of the threat spectrum, or more likely ambiguous areas in between.”6 That mission establishes the Marines as the vanguard of our armed forces, ready for battle, “any clime, any place.”
The Marine Corps’ focus on maneuver warfare and its bias for action at both the strategic and tactical level are what distinguish it from any other operating force available to our country’s leadership. According to General Amos, the Marines provide America’s decision makers with a highly capable “middleweight, expeditionary force in readiness” able to function as, “our nation’s crisis-response force” as well as “participate in joint and combined operations of any magnitude.”7
The Marines maintain those capabilities by emphasizing bias for action cultivated by “value-based training,” allowing leaders on the ground to operate independently and effectively apart from higher command in today’s challenging and convoluted battle spaces. To realize the Commandant’s vision, the Corps must maintain its functional naval capabilities as “sea-based forces organized, trained and equipped to conduct operations in the littorals.”8 Additionally, it must maintain its current high state of readiness and efficiency in the face of inevitable cuts to the overall defense budget. It is essential junior officers appreciate what it means to be a Marine as well as take ownership of the Commandant’s vision for the Corps going forward. Lieutenant General Victor H. “Brute” Krulak aptly captured the essence of theMarine Corps’ constantly redefined yet resolute identity and mission by stating “when trouble comes . . . there will be Marines—somewhere—who, through hard work, have made and kept themselves ready to do something about it, and to do it at once.”9
Eager to Learn, Ready to Lead
Shoot, move, and communicate. Those principles are often mentioned as the essence of tactical leadership. Today, however, Marines often operate in urban areas where friend and foe are indistinguishable. The leader’s “ability to understand the changing environment of conflict” plays an increasingly vital role in the success or failure of the mission, particularly in the broader context of today’s counterinsurgency efforts.10 For junior officers “it’s hard to read the political nuance of an area when you can’t read the street signs.”11 Consequently, leaders must ensure that their subordinates are not only tactically and technically proficient but also culturally adept. According to General Petraeus, “cultural awareness is a force multiplier.”12
In commenting on leadership, Marine Major and Navy Cross recipient Brian Chontosh pointed out that combat amplifies both your strengths and weaknesses; it is applying your skills—based in your character and morals— “in a time of extremis.”13 Thus a leader’s character and moral values must be established well before the first round is sent downrange. Those moral values and character foster unit cohesion, something on which combat effectiveness depends. Ideally, unit cohesion should be established, shaped, and tested in rigorous training exercises closely approximating real-world scenarios.
As leaders, it is crucial to understand we are responsible for the culture of our unit. Subordinates will take cues for their actions based on how we, as officers, carry ourselves. Indeed, wrote Marine Master Sergeant C. V. Crumb in a 1957 essay, “few junior officers realize how closely they are observed and how easily a few unguarded moments can cause a serious loss of respect [that is] detrimental to a smooth working relationship.” Master Sergeant Crumb goes on to say leaders should be, “fair, firm, and friendly, but never familiar.” Subordinates must also be granted a degree of freedom of action that leader would want from superiors.
Freedom of action can be fostered by appropriatedly utilizing commander’s intent, which is accomplished by communicating guidance and an end state, not micromanaging subordinates. This freedom of action is particularly essential today. As General Petraeus also points out: “The relatively junior commissioned or noncommissioned officers often have to make huge decisions, sometimes with life or death as well as strategic consequences, in the blink of an eye.”14
Very shortly this intimidating responsibility will be in the hands of the Marine officers from the Class of 2011. We must strive daily to strengthen our bodies, refine our intellects, and sharpen our characters. The welfare of human life may soon hinge on our preparation, decision-making, and leadership.
1. LTGEN John A. Lejeune, “Relations between Officers and Men,” Marine Corps Order No. 29, 14 August 1920. Marine Corps University: Lejeune Leadership Institute. http://www.mcu.usmc.mil
2. GEN David H. Petraeus, “Learning from Counterinsurgency: Observations from Soldiering in Iraq,” Military Review, January-February 2006, p. 2.
3. McChrystal, Stanley A. “It Takes a Network: The New Frontline of Modern Warfare,” Foreign Policy, March/April 2011. <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/02/22/it_takes_a_network>.
4. Nathaniel Fick, “Leadership Lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan.” USNA Character Speaker. 2011
5. GEN James F. Amos, “Prepared Remarks for the George P. Shultz Lecture,” Office of the Commandant of the Marine Corps, 8 February 2011. http://www.marines.mil
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. GEN James F. Amos, “Commandant’s Planning Guidance 2010,” Office of the Commandant of the Marine Corps, p. 5. http://www.marines.mil
9. Victor H. Krulak, First to Fight, (Annapolis, MD: Blue Jacket Books, 1984), p.xv.
10. Petraeus, “Learning from Counterinsurgency,” p. 11.
11. Fick, “Leadership Lessons.”
12. Petraeus, “Learning from Counterinsurgency,” p. 8.
13. MAJ Brian Chontosh, “Combat Leadership.” USNA Character Speaker. 2011.
14. Petraeus, “Learning from Counterinsurgency,” p. 9.