The Navy's long-awaited Advanced SEAL Delivery System (ASDS) is in rough waters.1 The U.S. Special Operations Command, which sponsors the program, has cancelled plans to acquire a fleet of the submersibles in the near term. This action brings into question the submarine community's long advocacy of submarine force increases based on the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance mission.
Vice Admiral Eric T. Olson, the Deputy Commander of the U.S. Special Operations Command, on 30 November 2005 said that the single ASDS delivered to date "is not ready from a reliability perspective" to enter production, and "We are canceling investment in hulls two and beyond at this point." Speaking at the command's headquarters in Tampa, Florida, Olson said that there is "no good answer" for when additional submersibles might be ordered.
The ASDS program had been called into question last fall when several members of Congress began asking tough questions about the program, which was initiated in 1994. Representative Rob Simmons, a Connecticut Republican, on 14 November 2005, said that the Navy had spent 11 years and $578 million on the craft. He urged the Navy to halt the program, saying "We throw good money after bad by staying the present course."2
According to a Navy official, the lead vehicle was to have cost $230 million.3 A spokesman for Northrop Grumman, which built the ASDS, recently stated that the program is neither late nor over budget because "the program has been rebaselined" by the Navy.4 The original contract with Northrop Grumman called for the lead submersible to be delivered in 1997.
Representative Simmons, whose congressional district contains the Electric Boat shipyard at Groton, has also called for the Navy to reopen competition for the follow-on submersibles. Obviously, a new competition should include the Northrop Grumman-owned Newport News, Virginia, shipyard, which also constructs submarines. Some naval officers have voiced concern that the existing ASDS design is becoming rapidly outdated, as evidenced by several recent changes and proposals, such as replacing part of the craft's aluminum stern fairing with a titanium structure.
The U.S Special Operations Command has now deferred all spending for additional ASDS submersibles while trying to fix the first one. Unquestionably the command wants these craft but the problems-some affecting design-must be corrected before funds will be spent on additional units.
The first ASDS was accepted by the Navy in Annapolis in June 2003 and was delivered to the fleet at Pearl Harbor later that year. Reportedly, the Navy had a requirement for 11 of the vehicles although only six were planned for construction. The first ASDS underwent extensive-and trouble-plagued-trials, including a deployment in 2004 aboard the attack submarine Greeneville (SSN-772). The Greeneville took the craft from Pearl Harbor into the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf.
The problems, some encountered on the deployment, include the rapid depletion of the craft's lithium-ion batteries, failure to meet acoustic goals (primarily propulser noises), non-pressure hull structural problems, and questions about whether the craft could withstand prescribed shock tests.
The ASDS was initiated to provide a practical means of carrying SEALs and other special forces from an offshore submarine to an inshore position to carry out clandestine missions. Today this is done by rubber boats on the surface, or by the Navy's few Mark VIII swimmer delivery vehicles (SDV). The Mk VIII is a fiberglass "wet" vehicle that can carry eight SEALs wearing individual self-contained breathing apparatus, one of whom pilots the vehicle. They are slow and limited in range. There are about a dozen in the Navy's inventory.
The ASDS can carry its passengers in a dry, warm environment, with more gear, for a considerably greater distance (see Table 1). The craft has three compartments—the forward control space, amidships lock-in/ lock-out chamber, and aft SEAL space. Top and bottom hatches are provided to the lock-in/lock-out chamber for both ingress and egress to the vehicle. Among the craft's several unusual features are folding communications mast and periscope. (The craft is not large enough to be fitted with conventional telescoping devices.)
Battery-powered electric motors drive the craft's main propulser, a shrouded propeller. Four small, trainable thrusters, two forward and two aft, provide precise maneuvering and hover capabilities needed for mating operations with submarines.
The Navy had planned to carry the ASDS on the after deck of seven modified submarines of the Los Angeles (SSN-688) class, the special mission submarine Jimmy Carter (SSN-23), the new Virginia (SSN-774) class and the four ex-Trident submarines that are being converted to cruise missile-special operations ships (SSGN).5 After many delays, the second ASDS was to have been delivered in 2010 with a total of six craft to be in service by about 2015.
Now there is no schedule for the construction of additional submersibles. This could have an impact on the U.S. submarine force. The current force level goal for attack submarines—established shortly after the Cold War ended—is 48 SSNs, recently reduced from the 55-submarine level of the past decade. The Navy now has just over 50 attack submarines. The four converted Trident SSGNs will join the fleet during the next few years, but the current program of constructing one SSN per year means that the force level will drop precipitously, possibly to as few as 35 submarines within a decade.
The submarine community has been calling for more attack submarines, based in large part on a 2000 study sponsored by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. On the basis of peacetime requirements for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), the study concluded that unspecified future threats require 68 SSNs in 2015 and 76 SSNs in the 2025 time frame to meet all the "highest operational and collection requirements" by military commands and intelligence agencies.6 But there has been no move by either the Department of Defense or the Navy to increase the building rate and a decision earlier this year by the Department of Defense precludes increasing SSN production for the remainder of this decade.
Virtually all statements by the submarine community calling for an increase in SSN force levels as well as the justification for converting the four Trident missile submarines have described the converted SSGNs with one or two ASDS submersibles on deck. Without the longendurance ASDS, the large 18.750-ton SSGNs would have to send in SEALs and other special forces by the slower, shorter-range Mk VIII wet vehicles or by rubber boats. Thus, further delays or cancellation of the ASDS program could have significant implications for the future Navy.
1 SEAL = Sea, Air, Land (learn).
2 William Matthews, "House member urges cutting minisub buys," Navy Times, 5 December 2005. p. 24.
3 See Gregg K. Kakesako, "Minisub at Pearl will carry SEALs close to targets." Star-Bulletin (Honolulu). 6 May 2000; based on interview with Cdr Joe Fallone, USN. program manager.
4 Matthews, p. 24.
5 These submarines can also carry the Dry Deck Shelters (DDS). which can house the SEAL delivery vehicles and swimmers-a single Mk VIII or 20 SEALs can be accommodated in each shelter. The shelters are mounted on the after deck of specially configured attack and SSGN transport submarines, the former carrying one and the latter two DDS.
6 "Unclassified Release of the 1999 CJCS !Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff] Attack Submarine Study." Information Paper, Department of the Navy. 7 February 2000.