After failing her Board of Inspection and Survey review, the USS John F. Kennedy (CV-67) underwent extensive last-minute repairs to get her ready for deployment to the Middle East, and her commanding officer was relieved.
If the press reports are to be believed, the skipper's relief was deserved. The debacle occurred on his watch; he was accountable, and that is as it should be. After reading between the lines of the newspaper reports, however, I believe a large share of the blame should be placed on the shoulders of the ship's chief petty officers. If I were the John F Kennedy's new captain, I immediately would relieve (and recommend immediate retirement for) the command master chief and the senior chief in each department. And that would be just for openers.
I am a veteran of several Board of Inspection and Survey reviews, on one occasion serving as the ship's maintenance and material management coordinator. There is no secret to getting through one of these inspections: the keys are having an accurate and up-to-- date current ship's maintenance project and a fully functioning planned maintenance system. If the documentation is correct and honest, the inspection will go well. If not, the inspection will be a disaster—as apparently was the case on board the John F. Kennedy.
The Board of Inspection and Survey is, in my experience, expert at uncovering those things that many ships' companies would rather not have uncovered. While preparing for an inspection, acting on the basis of my own experience, I advised my commanding officer and members of the chief's mess on the importance of documentation. While the ship had, I believed, a solid and accurate current ship's maintenance project, I charged my fellow chiefs to go looking under every rock. The procedure was simple: find something wrong and write it up. Full disclosure in the inspection process works wonders.
Unless the John F. Kennedy's chiefs were ordered by their superiors not to document their work centers' discrepancies, they are responsible for the ship's current woes. Even if they were acting under such orders, they were derelict in their duties by obeying what would have been patently illegal orders.
There have been numerous reports in the papers of low crew moral. This is a basic leadership function and it starts on the deck plates. No one expects the chiefs to be the ship's cheerleaders, but competent management and inspired senior enlisted leadership are essential. The senior and master chief petty officers failed in their leadership of the more junior chiefs. I also suspect there was a "don't rock the boat" mentality.
The chiefs on the John F Kennedy apparently failed to heed the words of our creed that they "be the fountain of wisdom, the ambassador of good will, the authority in personal relations as well as in technical applications."
I have, over the years, heard several chiefs complain that their level of responsibility is not what it should be. They complain that they lack respect from the wardroom. In each case, I would counter that responsibility and respect must be earned through performance and seizing the initiative. Chiefs are initiated, not anointed.
While serving as an instructor at Fleet Training Group at Guantanamo Bay, I had the opportunity to observe many ships undergoing refresher training. Top-performing ships always had strong chief's messes; the poorer performing ships invariably had weak ones. I once overheard a destroyer's commanding officer state he would rather have a weak wardroom and a strong chief's mess than the other way around.
A good chief stands on principles, takes his responsibilities seriously, and is not afraid to lock horns with his division officer. A good chief seizes the initiative, acts on instinct born of experience, and provides leadership to his subordinates. A good chief petty officer strives to live up to the creed and to represent his brotherhood honorably.
As for the John F Kennedy, I can only ask, where were the chiefs?
At the time of his retirement in 1995, Senior Chief Jackson was senior enlisted advisor and assistant officer in charge of the Surface Ship Antisubmarine Analysis Center at Norfolk, Virginia.