"We Can't Afford to Leave the Media Alone"
(See K. Kalogiannis, p. 97, July 2000 Proceedings)
Second Lieutenant Rod Schenker, U.S. Marine Corps—Captain Kalogiannis states that the "skirmish" in Mogadishu in which 18 Rangers were killed was "militarily insignificant." He goes on to imply that the real damage came from the media and the public misinterpreting the event—a problem to be fixed by proactive media relations. But if the Ranger's defeat was insignificant, logic dictates that their mission and their lives were equally insignificant in the eyes of their leaders and policy makers. If this thought troubles you less than a media-relations issue, you may be missing the big picture.
I disagree that "Today's public expects `clean' solutions to often complex problems." Civilians I have talked to don't expect fighting to be clean; they only expect some connection between casualties and the protection of interests vital to this nation. That Somalia lacked this connection became painfully clear once there were bodies to account for. No public-relations machine—least of all a military one—should have attempted to put a positive spin on the Mogadishu tragedy, or sheltered policy makers from the consequences of their careless misuse of military power.
The loss of 18 soldiers was insignificant only to those who do not feel compelled to study the simple lesson paid for in their blood—those who view our warriors as pawns in a fickle game of empire to be sacrificed to the fleeting and futile "humanitarian" mission of the day. Only this view allows one to propose fixing such tragedies with better media manipulation by training warriors to be advocates for the policy which risks their lives without requiring any real commitment from its authors or the American public.
This cure would compound the disease. Instead, let the creators of the policy be its salesmen. Let the warriors fight the battles and tell the truth.
"Don't Make SWO the Default"
(See I. Scaliatine, pp. 87-88, July 2000; T. Darcy, pp. 20-22, August 2000 Proceedings)
Lieutenant (junior grade) Trevor Laurie, U.S. Naval Reserve—This article provoked much debate in my wardroom and was very well received. I think that Mr. Scaliatine has hit the nail on the head by suggesting the creation of a "0000" designator community for poor performers to fill many of the jobs now held by the fleet support community or other jobs that require an officer's presence, whether they are warfare qualified or not. Send a failure from a training pipeline to this community as opposed to making them surface warfare officers (SWOs) by default. Imagine a future Navy in which the phrase "Well, if I don't get accepted to that I can always be a SWO" or "I failed out of flight school, so I guess I am a SWO now" is no longer heard. The possibility of this makes me ecstatic!
The fact that officers can fail out of the other communities and become SWOs by default is offensive and derogatory to those individuals who entered the surface community as a first choice. I can only imagine the howls of protest if someone in aviation training said "Well, surface did not work out, so I guess I will fly." Can you imagine the way that this individual would be lambasted for this comment? Well, SWOs have to put up with such comments as part of everyday business.
Perhaps a solution lies in forcing each community to develop programs for those officers who failed in their respective training programs. Aviation, for example, would create jobs in either aviation maintenance or other related jobs for those officers who fail their training pipeline. Submariners could send their failures to a host of shore-based jobs until the termination of their obligated service. This would be the best deal for the Navy as the failures would stay off of a ship's bridge and would provide a service to the shore-based components of the Navy.
What could SWOs do within their own community to raise the standard and create a better sense of belonging and usefulness? There needs to be some sort of weeding-out process in the development of SWOs both in terms of the community's sense of self and also from a safety aspect. Who wants an obvious screw-up driving the ship during an underway replenishment? So how can we do this in a practical, fiscally sound way? I would propose that we make the initial course that SWOs go through, such as the Surface Warfare Officers School Division Officers Course (SWOS DOC) in Newport, RI, a difficult course that would be designed to fail people who cannot hack it. As it stands now, there are no failures from SWOS DOC. The running joke during my tenure there was that no matter how hard you tried, there was no failing out of SWOS.
What message does that send to future SWOs? It tells them that what they do takes little intelligence and that anyone can do it. I vehemently disagree with those perceptions. Shipdriving does take skill and intelligence, and from what I have seen, not everyone is cut out to do this. It is not possible to make every officer in the Navy a competent mariner, yet the powers that be have decreed that this is the very path that the Navy will take.
My argument is simply that the SWO community has to change in order to keep its most talented and gifted officers. This change should consist of two parts: refuse to take the failures from the other communities and initiate reforms from within. This plan would provide the SWOs with a sense that what they do is an exclusive job that not everyone can do. By creating a sense of exclusiveness and importance, the SWO community would foster the careerism and camaraderie that is essential to getting the best out of the junior surface warfare officers. Everyone wants to feel as though their work is valuable and that what they do is important. We are not getting that message in the surface community. Once that message is put out and absorbed, then you will see more career-minded individuals taking the cone.
"Mid-Grade Enlisted Raise Could Ease Hard Feelings"
(See T. Philpott, p. 90, August 2000 Proceedings)
Gunnery Sergeant G.J. Michaels, U.S. Marine Corps—A House staffer is quoted as saying "How does this fit in with pay table reform? Did we do the [1 July] reform wrong? Did we shortchange people?" I cannot comment on the pay of officers, but I can offer the following on enlisted pay in the Marine Corps.
Equating early promotion with performance is fatally flawed, especially in a military where there is no balance across military occupational specialties (MOSs) vis-a-vis advancement. Targeting "fast-track" promotees with increased pay to reward performance is grossly unfair in a system where the playing field is slanted toward specific MOSs. For example, in the intelligence field, promotion to staff sergeant is relatively fast in comparison to promotion to the same rank in the infantry. An intelligence Marine may expect to be promoted, by regular promotion, to staff sergeant in six years, whereas the infantry Marine may wait ten or more years for the same promotion. This is not a function of performance, as both promotions are "regular," or "time-in-grade" promotions. Some MOSS—owing to billet vacancies, numbers, needs, and attrition—promote faster than others.
All one must do to see my point is read the promotion authorities that are published monthly for each rank for sergeant and below, and research the promotion board data for staff sergeant and above that are published annually. Accelerated and meritorious promotions exist, but in such a low percentage that they cannot be used as a justification to target pay raises for early advancement.
So, did the 1 July reform shortchange people? Yes: it gave me two dollars extra per month, and in essence, told me, and many others, that had our performance been better, we would have attained the rank earlier.
"Do We Still Need Navy CSAR?"
(See G. Rucci, pp. 58-61, July 2000 Proceedings)
Captain Dan Bell, U.S. Navy, Commander, Helicopter Wing Reserve—This article afforded well-deserved recognition to the Protectors of HC-9. Those aviators maintained the Navy's combat-search-and-rescue (CSAR) capability across two decades, and in that role introduced night-vision-goggle (NVG) flight and combat helicopter tactics to naval helicopter aviation.
Commander Rucci's discussion of the reserve helicopter combat support (HCS) component of Navy CSAR force structure (HCS-4 and HCS-5) is somewhat one-dimensional in nature. It does not address the fact that the squadrons have different mission requirements and deployment objectives from the active-duty helicopter antisubmarine (HS) community. As a result, the squadron's organization is based upon the Lamps MK III community model with independent, self-deploying detachments. They are required to support CSAR operations from the carrier, from surface combatants, and deployed ashore. The squadrons also are tasked to support autonomous shore-based naval special warfare (NSW) operations. The squadrons are manned to support these detachments with suitable ratings and personnel. As a result of this model, the carrier battle group commander or fleet commander-in-chief has a wide variety of options in how to use his forces. For example, during Operation Uphold Democracy, one HCS detachment was based ashore at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba and another was forward deployed on board surface combatants in the coastal waters of Haiti. During Desert Storm, HCS detachments were forward-deployed along the border of Iraq, where they provided CSAR/NSW coverage for the Red Sea carrier battle group, well beyond the range of organic CSAR capability.
Although it is true that the reserve HCS community no longer is composed of Vietnam or even Desert Storm veterans, we are satisfied that the corporate memory is ingrained with the lessons learned from those conflicts. I might add that as a community we are more than pleased with the qualifications of those young aviators now applying for our program.
Often, our applicants have CSAR experience from the fleet or other services. If not, they are highly qualified LAMPS MK III, H-46, or HS community members with more than 2000 flight hours. That is a wealth of experience to build upon. In reserve HCS squadrons, we focus our training on NVG flight in overland environments. Coordination and deployment with Navy SEAL teams is commonplace. Joint training with the Air Force as well as compatibility training with the carrier airwings is standard operating procedure. It is no doubt a slow process to build and maintain a highly qualified NSW aircrew, but our reservists are dedicated to those squadrons and this mission. It requires a substantial sacrifice of time to complete intensive training requirements and maintain proficiency. The reserve HCS squadrons are not the "Pros from Dover," but they are well-trained mission specialists whose capabilities in a difficult overland environment are well respected across all service boundaries. I believe that the squadron's deployment history and safety record speak for themselves.
There is still much we can do to improve reserve/active integration. I have recommended that we relocate HCS-5 from NAWS Point Mugu to Naval Amphibious Base Coronado. This will maximize HS/HCS community integration, improve squadron maintenance and training support, and locate the squadron with the SEAL teams and ships they are tasked to support.
"The Credibility Crisis"
(See E. Donnelly, pp. 42-48, August 2000 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Thomas W. Strother, U.S. Navy (Retired)—This article was awesome! Hooray for Ms. Donnelly for addressing the issues few have the guts to take on. Her article outlines why so many of our senior leaders in the Department of Defense and the Navy enjoy so little respect from the troops they lead. I do not think her article went far enough, however, for she failed to explore fully what this lack of trust in the senior leadership has done in the area of retention of highly skilled, highly qualified, highly motivated people, especially male surface warfare officers (SWOs). I would extend Ms. Donnelly's thesis—that lack of credibility is causing subordinates to distrust their leaders—to the realm of surface warfare officer retention.
For about 12 years, I have believed that few senior SWOs had the guts to address honestly all issues surrounding the expansion of opportunity for women in the Navy in general—and the SWO community in particular. This lack of honesty has caused much frustration and caused many to jump ship. The failure of senior SWOs to protect the careers of those already in the boat while opening up more boat spaces for women has really hurt retention.
There are billets for women in the military, but not a lot of honest study has gone into evaluating how women can be included. How can we increase the number of billets for women without displacing loyal seafaring men? That is the challenge, and thus far it has been badly mishandled.
"Bring the Marine Prowlers Home"
(See T. Hofer, pp. 33-36, August 2000 Proceedings)
Rear Admiral John P. Cryer, U.S. Navy—Major Hofer's arguments for bringing the Marine Corps Prowlers under the operational control of the Marine Corps don't wash under scrutiny of current approved joint doctrine, and contains several points that should be addressed.
The history of Navy and Marine Corps Prowlers thankfully is one of close cooperation. With a common fleet replacement squadron that includes Marine instructors and an executive officer, we train our aircrew identically. The Prowler community (Navy and Marine) has spoken with one voice during its annual operational advisory group process. The Navy and Marines have agreed on every item of significance regarding weapon system improvement, sustainment and deployment, and together, form a very close, like-minded warfare community.
Major Hofer asserts that utilizing the Marine Corps Prowlers in the current joint arena diverts them from their primary purpose, which is to support the Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF). It should be evident that no service operates in a vacuum, and that joint warfighting is here to stay. The MAGTF has developed a doctrine for the Marine Corps that serves this elite organization well, but this cannot be an end to itself. From small-scale contingency to major-theater war, U.S. forces will fight jointly, relying on all services to provide what the warfighting commander-in-chief (CinC) requires. It makes no sense to keep Marine Prowlers out of the CinC's operational purview because of MAGTF doctrine—especially when there are too few Prowlers to meet national tasking.
Regarding national tasking, it's important to note that Program Decision Memorandum 1 (PDM-1) issued by the Secretary of Defense in August 1995 designated the Secretary of the Navy (including the Marine Corps) as responsible for the tactical electronic warfare mission for the entire Defense Department. In addition, the Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force all have signed a memorandum of agreement regarding this arrangement, which includes specific responsibilities for scheduling and operations. This occurred, in response to the U.S. Air Force's decision to retire the EF-111A aircraft. Although the Department of the Navy stood up four additional squadrons and plans to stand up a fifth for the expeditionary mission, there simply are not enough EA-6B aircraft available to assume this mission without using the Marine Corps assets. Regarding the utilization of Marine Prowlers as Major Hofer suggests, having four squadrons to support one deployment (with a resulting 3:1 turnaround) is a luxury we cannot afford, and would result in significantly overdeploying Navy squadrons. The global planning process that schedules all Prowlers has one focus: the needs of the warfighting CinCs. That's the way it should be.
The Marine Corps continues to lead the way in expeditionary warfare, and has provided much of the roadmap that Navy expeditionary squadrons have learned from. It's an overstatement, however, to conclude that the Marines have sole ownership of the expeditionary mission. Navy and Marine Corps Prowler squadrons operate exactly the same intermediate maintenance vans in place in Saudi Arabia, Germany, and Japan. In fact, during Operation Allied Force, sailors and Marines operated these vans together. Navy Prowlers were first to deploy to Prince Sultan Air Base, Italy, and continue to train with the Air Force for missions that might take them anywhere.
The Prowler has a unique capability that warfighting CinCs cannot operate without. No-fly zone operations, in which we ask our fighter and attack pilots to penetrate missile engagement zones, require the kind of electronic attack over-watch the Prowler provides. The payoff has been almost ten years of operating no-fly zones in Iraq without a single loss, and operation Allied Force in which we flew 38,000 combat sorties with only two aircraft and no aircrew lost. The Prowler is truly a national asset, and a credit to the services that operate it: Navy, Marines and with the inclusion of some of their aircrew, now the Air Force. In the future, when the CinC determines the requirement, I have no doubt the Prowlers, Marine or Navy, will be there, as they always have been.
"Stop the Revolution; I Want to Get Off"
(See B. Toti, pp. 30-33, July 2000 Proceedings)
Captain John L. Byron, U.S. Navy (Retired)—Even though I disagree with Commander Toti's criticism of Lifting the Fog of War, by Admiral Bill Owens, I applaud him for raising the important topic of defense reform.
There are three reasons to consider reform: our current strategy is too costly, yet cannot change easily inside the existing military structure; the threats of the future will be too agile, elusive, and asymmetrical for our current military; technology is changing faster than the current military and its archaic procurement system can keep up.
Our current defense levels are unprecedented. One can find no previous time of pure peacetime (no nation-threatening wars looming) with defense spending more than a small fraction of its current post-Cold War level. A central reason for debating change and seeking military reformation is that the odds are much greater for Defense declining further than for the increase needed to fund the current wish list.
What will happen in the next administration? In either case, it just isn't in the cards to see a defense increase of the size needed to improve our military without reform. Commander Toti says that we have an expensive strategy. Indeed—and we can't afford it, which is why he should be praising Admiral Owens's call for radical reformation.
When you push advocates of higher defense spending to say why, you hear of asymmetrical threats, non-national terrorism, economic warfare, and other dangers which are proving to be something that our existing force-on-force mentality can't handle.
We will continue to need true force, but we also must shift spending to new technologies. We need savings so we can develop and deploy a new military that is equally prepared to cope with our more likely foe, the non-peer (probably non-national) opponent with simple commercial access to existing technology, a set of smart kids, and no allegiance to conventional military-think. Such an enemy could turn our existing force-dominant military machine into an impotent observer watching our national values and economic system take serious hits. An unreformed military will opt for the status quo, without the infusion of new strategy, new technology, and new military thinking needed to defeat a future smart opponent.
This changing nature of the threat combined with flat (at best) defense spending are the two key reasons that Admiral Owens's call for reform is so necessary. He presents a deep and well-nuanced argument for profound military change. His argument takes criticism because—of necessity to reform—he attacks our sacred services. He would replace service power with a more effective mechanism for defense management, based in an integrated force approach that embraces technology with the fervor of the business world, overriding the military's fear of new and different priorities that might challenge current programs.
But why can't the services reform themselves? History makes clear that no service will give way to another unilaterally: the fight for dominance is all consuming. Even more pressure comes from the constituencies within the services, the communities that passionately believe that their brand of force is essential to victory and deserves highest priority. The services face too much internal pressure and are too competitive between themselves ever to be the source of meaningful change. Thus, I think Commander Toti's article's most serious shortcoming is his attack on the need for a revolution in military affairs (RMA). Without such a powerful theme, without some appealing mechanism to blow through service opposition, the odds in favor of useful reform are pretty slim.
And RMA alone is not enough; it will fail without its essential sister, the revolution in business affairs (RBA). Even if we could define the reforms needed in strategy and force structure, the military's antiquated procurement system could never design, procure, and support the reformed military with the speed and accuracy the new threats and new technology require. Why must radical reform be forced on the services? Because our services are noncombatants in the two revolutions before them, unwilling to face the challenges of RMA and unable to revamp their own internal systems to implement RBA.
Defense proponents have not convinced the public: that the military has either the problem or the solution right, that it understands the changing nature of the world; and has adapted to the new threats—nor that it is capable of running its own affairs with the competence of modern business. Nor have proponents shown that more money would fix things.
And the military is not helping itself with its growing distance from the public in social values and its steady transformation into a right-wing advocacy group favoring only one political party. This increased radicalization and politicization have opened a gap between the military and the citizens that makes the military argument in this time of peace even less well heard and understood. Certainly there's a case for defense—the military just isn't making it very effectively inside the U,S. system.
Admiral Owens would be quick to say that his grand thesis is not the final answer, but the importance he attaches to rethinking our existing military paradigm is vital to our future defense. Technological challenge, the changed nature of the threat, and an inability to fund our current strategy all say we must reform our military. This is an important debate.
"The Zumwalt-Class Destroyers"
(See N. Polmar, pp. 87-88, August 2000 Proceedings)
Editor's Note: Lockheed Martin is incorrectly identified as part of the DD-21 Gold Team. In fact, Lockheed Martin is part of the Blue Team. We and Mr. Polmar regret and apologize for this error.
"Rethinking the Naval Postgraduate School"
(See J. Graham, pp. 46-49, July 2000; R. Thomas, p. 16, August 2000 Proceedings)
Admiral Stan Arthur, U.S. Navy (Retired)—To the extent which the themes articulated in Commander Graham's article are true, they should be an embarrassment to the Navy.
It is true that some naval officers do not place graduate education sufficiently high in priority, as we face an increasingly complex operational environment with demographic and technological changes coming at an increasing rate. The Naval Postgraduate School's added focus in curricula on operational requirements, as opposed to subspecialties of the shore establishment, is recognition of these challenges. The establishment of the Systems Engineering and Integration and the Information, Systems, and Operations master's-level curricula are evidence of this movement.
To be sure, the Navy must reevaluate career paths in light of the increasing complexity of the battlefront and find time for dedicated education tours. It also must develop the capability to build on the basic master's-level education with career-long certificate-level education. Unfortunately, the proposals put forth by Commander Graham do not get to the heart of the matter—the Navy leadership's increased appreciation and the embracing of graduate education. This will mean providing naval officers with the time and access to accredited and Navy-related education over their entire careers.
"The Enemy [Below] . . . the Brass Above"
(See J. Brower, p. 33, June 2000 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Charles S. Gramaglia, U.S. Naval Reserve—I disagree with the logic, details, and conclusions of this article. If the Navy is ordered to integrate the submarine fleet sexually, it will happen. Nevertheless, our flag officers are obligated to argue strongly and convincingly for policies that will improve the U.S. Navy as a war-fighting entity and a tool of national security. To do otherwise would be a fundamental failure of leadership. The flag officers always must provide the president with their honest professional assessment, instead of telling him what he wants to hear. It is especially crucial during peacetime that flag officers have the moral courage to disagree with popular political trends. If they do not, how can we trust our military leaders to make candid, although unpopular, decisions during wartime? The flag officers can lose the policy battles, but they must never shy away from them. It is their professional opinion that the introduction of women into submarines—no matter how skilled—will degrade our combat capabilities.
Why should our civilian leaders completely disregard the policy recommendations of our flag officers? Brower impugns their professionalism and motives by stating, "it's more about keeping everyone at the top male." Even as he slanders my most senior colleagues, Brower conveniently ignores the fact that the aviation and surface warfare communities have been entirely opened to female officers. Despite the author's charge that "there is no prospect for a woman to [become) a service chief of staff," only three of the ten most recent Chiefs of Naval Operations have been submariners. It stands to reason that female aviators and surface warriors have unlimited opportunity in the Navy. I find it telling, however, that the author appears more concerned about the careers of a few female flag officers than with the well-being of the thousands of women within the enlisted ranks.
It is unfortunate that, while advocating his position, Brower chose to attack the integrity of those officers who disagree with his policy recommendations.