Since entering the fleet, Aegis cruisers have established strong air-defense credentials-and also demonstrated significant, simultaneous multimission warfare capabilities.
In the Gulf of Sidra in 1986, the USS Yorktown (CG-48) functioned as Force Antiair Warfare (AAW) Commander, directing surface and air engagements against hostile Libyan patrol boats and aircraft. During the same operation, the USS Ticonderoga (CG-47) controlled Navy strike aircraft that were targeting Libyan surface-to-air missile sites. In 1991 during Operation Desert Storm, the Aegis cruisers Bunker Hill (CG-52), Mobile Bay (CG-53), and Princeton (CG-59) fired Tomahawk missiles against tactical targets but also controlled more than 65,000 aircraft sorties during which no friendly-vs.-friendly aircraft losses occurred. Aegis cruisers, and now Aegis destroyers, have made major contributions during almost every recent conflict or crisis, including the recent NATO campaign in Kosovo.
Operation Allied Force, which began on 24 March 1999, was no different. Domination of the skies over the former Yugoslavian Republic kept Serbian forces in check and allowed diplomatic pressure to work to end the conflict. Once again, the performance of two Aegis ships stationed in the Northern Adriatic during the campaign contributed to the success of the air operation
The USS Philippine Sea (CG-58), backed by the guided-missile destroyer Gonzalez (DDG-66), commanded the NATO combat air lanes leading into and out of Kosovo. The Gonzalez was on station when the Philippine Sea arrived on 23 March. The NATO coalition operating off the shores of Kosovo included more than 20 naval surface combatants from the U.S. and other nations. The Philippine Sea was assigned as Air Defense Commander (ADC), making her responsible for maintaining an accurate air picture, assigning engagement responsibilities, and providing area air defense to the NATO combatants.
As ADC, the cruiser established the air picture over Kosovo by tracking and controlling the air lanes from the North. U.S. and allied fighter and bomber aircraft were flying sorties from Aviano Air Base in Italy. Only after all U.S. and allied aircraft entering the airspace were queried and identified were they permitted to enter the skies over Kosovo. The Gonzalez, along with U.S. Air Force and NATO airborne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft, helped the cruiser maintain the air picture as a continuous stream of aircraft flowed in from nearby air bases. The other surface forces operating in the north contributed to maintaining the air picture by searching the coastline for hostile Yugoslavian patrol boats posing a surface-to-surface cruise missile threat. Once an accurate air picture was built, the Philippine Sea transmitted these data to all the other combatants within the theater of operation, and fused the track inputs from U.S. and allied air and surface assets into one, near-real-time air picture of the battle space—a responsibility normally performed by a carrier.
The Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71) Carrier Battle Group (CVBG) arrived in the theater of operations several weeks after the start of Operation Allied Force, but was stationed south of the Strait of Otranto in the Ionian Sea. Commander Sixth Fleet decided to put the carrier there because the northern air routes for U.S. and allied air strikes were well established and the addition of carrier air power would have caused a major coordination problem, disrupting the normal schedule. Also taken into consideration was the potential cruise missile threat originating from shore batteries and the small fleet of Serbian missile patrol boats. A missile hit on the carrier would have provided Milosevic's forces with a moral victory, perhaps adding new resolve to their defiance.
The CVBG's arrival with the Leyte Gulf (CG-55), Vella Gulf (CG-72), and Ross (DDG-71) signaled the beginning of carrier-based air strikes from the south. The Leyte Gulf served as the ADC for the newly arrived battle group while the Vella Gulf and the Ross assumed plane guard and "shotgun" duties for the carrier. Aircraft flew daily strike sorties while the carrier broadcast her own air picture data to the other participants. Northbound strike aircraft updated the carrier via Link 4A and voice nets, transmitting timely information to the carrier. Once these aircraft reached the Northern Adriatic, they checked in and linked air track information with the Aegis ships on station before continuing into Yugoslavia. In addition to directing the attack runs from the north, the Philippine Sea integrated the stream of strike aircraft originating from the carrier and their tracking inputs to establish one, cohesive combat air picture.
"We commenced operations with 366 aircraft executing 40 missions the first night. Seventy-eight days later, NATO had assembled a force of more than 900 aircraft.... During the air campaign NATO forces flew over 38,000 sorties," General Wesley Clark, U.S. Army, commanding the overall operation, told the Senate Armed Services Committee earlier this year.
Once the Philippine Sea completed the daunting task of identifying the hundreds of aircraft, it was essential to disseminate this information to the rest of the surface combatants. In conjunction with U.S. Air Force and NATO AWACSs, the Philippine Sea and the Gonzalez collected track data via voice nets and Link 16.
Without the Link 16 picture transmitted by the AWACSs, surface combatants would have lacked an important warning to defend themselves and the rest of the coalition against missile attacks. The AWACS aircraft also helped to avert several friendly-on-friendly engagements. Air Force, Navy, and NATO units coordinated track numbers and missions via the Link to develop the air picture in near real time. After tracks were identified and deconflicted, the Philippine Sea and the Gonzalez passed them to U.S. and allied surface combatants via Links 16 and 11.
In addition, the two Aegis ships together fired more than 70 Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles (TLAMs) against targets in Yugoslavia without any effect on their ability to sustain the air picture and serve as ADC. During the initial stage of Operation Allied Force, several salvos of knocked out air-defense sites, radar facilities, and power stations, which permitted manned U.S. and allied aircraft to proceed inland at substantially lower risk. Once Yugoslavia's air-defense infrastructure had been destroyed, the air barrage continued with synchronized TLAM and aircraft strikes.
The Aegis combat system was designed to destroy enemy missiles and aircraft. Later, as the threat changed, the combat system evolved to gain capabilities in more warfare areas. As a result of this multimission capability, the CinCs are quick to reassign Aegis ships to potential hostile areas. The ability to conduct simultaneous multi-mission warfare projects a positive and engaged U.S. image to reassure allies and encourage regional stability, while remaining relatively independent of host nation support.
Maintaining the air defense picture normally has been the responsibility of the aircraft carrier operating on station. In this case, however, the two Aegis ships in the Northern Adriatic—on station early in the operation—were able to accomplish the mission. Operation Allied Force proved that not only could the U.S. and its allies carry out a high-intensity, lower-risk campaign, but also that our Aegis surface combatants could respond rapidly to dynamic multimission combat requirements and fill the void when carrier presence and support is unavailable.
As we enter the 21st Century battlefield, we must address changing threats. Dramatic strides in electronics, computers, software programming, data management, and stealth technologies dictate that our current systems must be modernized. Because of the prohibitive costs to design new systems, we must design and build from a perspective of modernization, not just replacement.
In the not too distant future, joint forces will require new Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (TBMD) capabilities such as the Navy Area and Navy Theater Wide System. Navy Land Attack Tomahawk missiles and 5-inch/62 gun munitions must be fielded to support expeditionary forces. Improved force protection sensors and missiles such as the SPQ-9B, the Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM), SPQ-9B, and Nulka must be installed. Improved command-and-control capabilities with new battle management and command and control such as the Area Air Defense Capability (AADC) must be filled and on station to plan and execute warfare much more rapidly. A cooperative engagement capability (CEC) will improve the integrated air picture while allowing netted firing units to achieve higher probabilities of kill using fewer missiles.
The Cruiser Conversion Program will enable the Aegis cruisers to meet the new threats and address the problem of rapidly emerging new threats. Capitalizing on its inherently strong command-and-control capabilities, vertically launched missiles, and sophisticated sensor suites, the program will enable the Aegis fleet to continue to carry out its mission anytime, anywhere.
Captain Jenkins, a surface warfare officer, commanded the USS Philippine Sea (CG-58) during Operation Allied Force.