Lifting the Fog of War
Admiral Bill Owens with Edward Offley. New York: Ferrar, Strauss & Giroux, 2000. 280 pp. App. Notes. Index. $25.00 ($22.50).
Reviewed by Michael Hughes
This is an insightful, must-read book for those who care about the future of the U.S. military---or, more broadly, anyone who cares about the future security of the United States. As a former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Bill Owens certainly has the credentials to assess the current state of the military. In Lifting the Fog of War, he and co-author Edward Offley argue forcefully and eloquently that "the U.S. Military is in serious trouble today."
The book defines the nature of the problems facing the military, makes a compelling case as to the severity of the situation, and concludes that action must be taken to avoid a disastrous collapse in military capability. In Admiral Owens' view, the United States still is building a military associated fundamentally with the industrial age-instead of exploiting the information revolution. As a result, U.S. military forces have significant redundancy and are neither well integrated nor particularly well suited for the challenges confronting them in the new century. Furthermore, we face an immediate and dramatic defense budget crisis: many military platforms planned by the services cannot be acquired within today's fiscal constraints. Without resolution of these problems, we soon will have "a military that will still be able to mount impressive parades. It just won't be able to fight very well."
Admiral Owens cites numerous reasons for this crisis, including lack of consistency in national leadership, lack of a coherent national security strategy, and post-Cold War lethargy. His real culprits, however, are the services themselves. The failure to rationalize strategy, the maintenance of a redundant force structure, the inability to exploit information technology adequately, and the lack of interoperability in today's forces come from "the darker side . . . of unique military identity."
The proposed solutions should come as no surprise. Admiral Owens would "eliminate all authority for defining budget and procurement requirements from the military services." He proposes creating a joint requirements committee responsible for setting all U.S. military requirements. Furthermore, all operating forces would be assigned to "Standing Joint Force Commands," and all military support functions would be consolidated. Finally, military education and training would be transformed "to root out military service unilateralism and rivalry."
The rationale for such dramatic steps lies in Admiral Owens' conviction that the "Revolution in Military Affairs" and a cost-effective implementation of "system-- of-systems" technology can be achieved only with service parochialism removed. He envisions information technology applied in the system-of-systems approach, providing "dominant battlespace knowledge, near-perfect mission assignment, and immediate/complete battlespace assessment." Thus, the "fog of war" can be lifted and victory assured. It all ties together in a very neat package-perhaps too neat a package.
For Carl von Clausewitz (who first used the term "fog of war"), fog was associated with the frictional differences between war in theory and war in practice. He saw war in practice as a complex interaction of government policy, military genius, and national will. Technology dominance neither answers the need for coherent government policies nor ensures the support of the nation. In Vietnam, Lebanon, and Somalia, the United States failed to achieve its political objectives despite overwhelming technological (and firepower) dominance-by misinterpreting the nature of the struggle, underestimating the enemy's will, and overestimating the political stamina of Americans.
Admiral Owens would centralize all requirements development into one overarching committee, certainly increasing the potential for a single theory of war to dominate and innovation to wither. The fog of war still will exist; competition between the services is healthy and some redundancy is a prudent precaution. Operationally, he envisions a commander exercising control over "thousands of square miles" through a system-of-systems approach. This centralized approach to war might well create an Achilles' heel for asymmetric attacks on information flow.
Admiral Owens' last troubling theme is his implicit lack of trust in the uniformed military. He points to its "elitist attitude" and "an unreasoned, blind commitment to existing doctrine or structure." His lack of faith is evident in the limitations suggested for uniformed participation in the policy and planning process. The uniformed military has much more to contribute than simply executing orders.
Is there need for change? Absolutely. The requirements-development and acquisition processes must be modified to eliminate duplication and ensure interoperability, but the Office of the Secretary of Defense and joint organizations in place today could drive such change with committed leadership. It is unclear whether the draconian organizational changes Admiral Owens advocates are either necessary to build information-age warfighting capability or worth the risk of eviscerating the services. We did, after all, win the Cold War.
Admiral Owens urges us to debate "the impending collapse of our military capability." This book is an excellent first volley in such a debate.
Technological Change and the Future of Warfare
Michael O'Hanlon. Washington: Brookings Institution, 2000. 210 pp. Charts. Notes. Bib. Index. $18.95 ($17.05); paper.
Reviewed by Admiral Archie Clemins, U.S. Navy (Retired)
This book looks at the defense establishment through the eyes of Joint Vision 2010. Considering the capabilities that Joint Vision 2010 portends for the end of the decade, the book provides an insightful look at whether or not the tenets can be attained from a physics standpoint, whether a revolution in military affairs (RMA) can be achieved, and whether our national security policy will change as a result of Joint Vision 2010. While most of us think that it is necessary and useful to have a vision that is somewhat beyond our reach, Michael O'Hanlon views Joint Vision 2010 as a vision too far.
Joint Vision 2010 focuses on information superiority, dominant maneuver, precision engagement, full-dimensional protection, and focused logistics. All of this implies "light, agile, deployable main combat forces; very accurate and lethal long-range firepower; and highly effective missile defenses." O'Hanlon supports investments in computers, networks, communications, and connectivity while urging another look at the needed hardening. I suggest that our Cold War communication systems were not very hardened from the outset. Focused investments in computers and networks (including tactical battlefield networks) will lead to enhanced battlefield capability, approximating an RMA. O'Hanlon does not address, however, any of the knowledge management or e-commerce capabilities that would help the support-and-logistics side of the equation. Information superiority or dominance is not assured, in that adversaries will have improved access to many of the same areas we do.
There will be evolutionary improvements in many fundamental technologies, but none approaching RMA capability, Using a laws-of-physics approach, O'Hanlon lists several conclusions for the next two decades: the oceans will not become transparent; we will not be able to see through foliage; changes in the basic designs of ships, aircraft, and vehicles will occur at evolutionary-not revolutionary-rates; helicopter transport will be better, but similar to today's capabilities; rocket technology will improve modestly; ships will improve but remain slow, visible, and vulnerable; and infantry combat operations likely will remain difficult.
Consequently, "no technologies on the drawing boards, laboratories, or test ranges will permit the United States to become an isolationist global power, basing the vast preponderance of its military on its own territory and striking intercontinentally when necessary." I could not agree more. Forward presence will continue to play an important role in our national security policy.
In sum, the greatest RMA potential lies "in focusing on military capabilities that make maximum use of modern electronics and computers. . . . This systems-of-- systems approach (end-to-end capability) to military modernization . . . places emphasis less on major weapons platforms than on what they carry and how they are networked." I agree completely.
Admiral Clemins recently retired from the Navy as Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet.
The Price of Honor
David H. Hackworth. New York: Doubleday, 1999. 490 pp. $25.95 ($23.35).
In his first novel, David Hackworth has given us an exciting tale. He paints with a broad brush-from Somalia to the Balkans, to the wilds of Montana and Washington, D.C.-arranging combat, political chicanery, and romance around Captain Sandy Caine, the hard-charging leader of a Special Forces "A" Team. Sandy Caine is the last in a long line of distinguished West Pointers-distinguished, that is, with the exception of his father, Lieutenant Alexander Caine, who was killed in Vietnam under murky circumstances. Through a combination of his father's comrades-in-arms and conflicting war stories (official and otherwise) the son, a hero in his own right, becomes obsessed with investigating the sullied reputation of the father he never knew.
We are quickly treated to Captain Caine's hard, highly professional Army mates and a host of the author's usual suspects: less than upstanding senior officers; devious politicians; and retired military men harnessed to the defense industry. Starting with what first appears to be a fictional rendition of Mark Bowden's Blackhawk Down (Atlantic Monthly, 1999), the plot races far beyond Mogadishu, as Sandy takes his intrepid turn fighting foes abroad and ex-CIA/Delta Force hit men at home. Plentiful action is not limited to the battlefield. Along the way, he falls in love with the tough, attractive correspondent, Abigail Mancini, who is ready to face danger with the best of them. Sandy and Abbie have some steamy romantic encounters, and the expertise demonstrated by such a young officer leads one to wonder what they are teaching at West Point and Fort Bragg these days.
The supporting cast of characters includes a senator who received the Medal of Honor in Vietnam and hungers for the presidency, a hip lesbian journalist, a sleazy Cajun wheeler-dealer, and the unbending grandfather and endearing housekeeper/surrogate mom who raised Sandy. They and many others merge into an engaging saga of multiple scenarios and intricate conspiracies.
With The Price of Honor, Hackworth has stepped from journalism to fiction, a transition that experienced writers tell me is not easy. While description and dialogue are excellent, much of the troops' operational lingo could be lost on civilian readers. The wording is tight and precise for the most part ("Ten men. Down the rat-hole. For nothing."), but occasionally it wanders down "B" Movie Lane (". . . a silvery laugh that made him think of wind chimes . . ."). Several of the characters are thinly veiled figures that are all too familiar. For example: the President, identified as a "draft-dodging skirt-chaser," is named Wilton (get it?). Finally, a more relentless editor might have helped to reduce the size of this novel, without reducing the scope.
The narrative nonetheless sweeps you up in cleverly devised, James Bond-like adventure and a wild climax. As it turns out, the story is as much about the gossamer aspects of honor as it is about the price to be paid for it. We probably will hear more of Sandy Caine. Soon, I hope.