Commander William Earl Fanin, Class of 1945, Capstone Essay Contest
In January 1781, a scratch force of American militia, dragoons, and regulars met the infamous "Butcher" Tarleton and his veteran regulars and Loyalists in battle in the wilds of northwestern South Carolina at Cowpens—and achieved one of the most remarkable victories for the young American nation during the Revolution.
The cold January morning air bit at the column of red-coated soldiers making their way through the forest. It had been raining for several days and they were miserable. They had been without food for two days and had managed only four hours of sleep the previous night. Up ahead, a rifle shot rang out and another soldier fell to the harassing fire that had been ongoing for several hours. A squadron of dragoons clattered by, their drawn sabers flashing in the early morning light as they pursued the unseen shooter, but they soon returned empty-handed. The men grumbled and pressed onward.
A report from the leading elements rang out: the Americans were ahead. A green-jacketed lieutenant colonel flashed by on his mount to reconnoiter the American lines, and before long, welcome word came to drop packs and fix bayonets. The tired soldiers dressed their lines on the orders of their sergeants and began to step off in cadence with the drum.
What the small British army did not realize was that American Brigadier General Daniel Morgan lay in wait ahead at a small crossroads called Cowpens, South Carolina, with remnants of the American Southern Army. His force, comprised primarily of militia riflemen with a small core of regulars, would destroy Lieutenant Colonel Banastre Tarleton's army of regulars and Loyalists in just a few short hours on 17 January 1781. Morgan was able to use the principles of mass, maneuver, and the dynamic relationship between offense and defense to defeat battle-hardened regulars of the British Army. Because Morgan took into account many of the human factors of combat as well, he achieved a total victory over his opponent.
The road to Cowpens was long and arduous for the Americans. With no end in sight for the war of attrition in the northern colonies, the commander of the British Army in North America, Lieutenant General Henry Clinton, opened a second front in the southern colonies by taking the city of Charleston in May 1780. His handpicked commander in the south, Lieutenant General Charles Cornwallis, initially was successful, and his army began pushing through the Carolinas for Virginia. After defeating the American army under Major General Horatio Gates at the Battle of Camden in August, Cornwallis sent Tarleton and his British Legion dragoons after the retreating Americans. Tarleton (given the nickname "Butcher" by his adversaries) then pursued and harassed the fleeing militia for 22 miles." The remnants of the American army regrouped and were placed under the command of Major General Nathanael Greene, who promptly divided his small force into two groups, one under his command and the smaller under Morgan. His orders to Morgan were to harass the left flank of Cornwallis's army and try to defeat piecemeal any units that were sent out after him.
Morgan, a Virginia backwoodsman by birth, never was a professional soldier and made no attempt to be one. He was an intelligent tactician who through years of experience developed an uncanny appreciation for terrain. Immediately on taking command of his small army, he ordered his light cavalry commander, Lieutenant Colonel William Washington, to stage a series of raids on British outposts to draw out patrols. At the Battle of Hammond's Store, Washington was able to ambush a battalion of Georgia Loyalists, killing more than 150 of them. This defeat inflamed further Corwallis's anger at his soldiers' inability to control his flanks. He immediately dispatched his most aggressive commander, Tarleton, and his British Legion to take care of the problem, ordering, "Wipe him out. Catch him and smash him!" Tarleton set out with his men and a four-day supply of rations to catch Morgan before he could withdraw and strike again.
With a head start, Morgan, anticipating that the British would pursue him no matter the time and cost, lured Tarleton over difficult terrain and almost impassible rivers. As Tarleton's men began their fourth day of forced marching and finished off the rest of their supplies, they faced two more days of heavy marching before they would intercept Morgan's army. The wily Morgan chose his route carefully, for every day his men were nearing American-controlled territory, supplies, and safety, while the British army grew correspondingly weaker. When it became apparent Tarleton would not break off pursuit, Morgan resupplied his army at Cowpens and prepared a battle plan that would maximize his units' firepower and take full advantage of terrain. He arranged his men in three parallel lines of skirmishers, militia, and Continentals, with his dragoons in the rear.
During the long night, Morgan met with all his unit commanders and explained his defense-in-depth strategy and his intent for the battle. His 1,600 regulars and volunteer militia would require careful coordination if they were to succeed at defeating the veteran British army. Morgan's command consisted of about 300 Continental regulars from Maryland, Virginia, and Delaware, about 125 Continental and state dragoons under Washington, and a large force of militia and some state troops numbering about 1,200 from Virginia, the Carolinas, and Georgia.
Morgan then went about the ranks throughout the night, reassuring his militia soldiers about their upcoming battle. His personal touch raised their confidence in his leadership because they believed he was one of them and would take care of them. His actions also increased the morale and cohesion of the units under his command and dispelled their fear, allowing them to sleep well on that cold night.
In contrast, on the night of 16 January, Tarleton called a halt to rest his weary men, who had been on the march for almost 24 hours straight. On gaining intelligence that Morgan was encamped at Cowpens, he woke his soldiers at 0200 and marched about four hours to the battlefield where Morgan was prepared to receive him. Morgan faced an army of battle-hardened regulars who had almost three years of service in America. The forces under his command consisted of four companies each of the 7th Regiment of Foot, the 71st Regiment of Foot (Fraser's Highlanders), and the 16th Light Infantry Regiment. In addition, there were about 400 infantrymen of the British Legion, composed mostly of Loyalists from New York and Pennsylvania, about 170 dragoons of the British Legion and the 17th Light Dragoons, and two small 3-pounder guns. In total, there were about 1,100-1,200 men at Tarleton's command.
Tarleton used his dragoons as his leading element to try to catch several of the American scouts, but he did not send out any reconnaissance elements of his own. Instead, he relied on local Loyalists to inform him as to the layout of the terrain and Morgan's disposition. Tarleton's unpreparedness proved the seeds of his defeat: his fatigued soldiers faced a well-rested and -supplied force on ground of the enemy's choosing.
To relieve his troops of the harassing rifle fire, Tarleton ordered his screening element of dragoons to drive off the skirmishers while he deployed his infantry and artillery in a battle line. As the small dragoon force at the van prepared to charge, the skirmishers fired and killed 15 of the dragoons, breaking their charge before it began. The accurate rifle fire caused a surge of fear along the British lines. One British officer wrote, "An expert rifleman can hit the head of a man at two-hundred yards. I am certain, that provided an American rifleman were to get perfect aim at 300 yards at me, standing still, he would most undoubtedly hit me unless it were a very windy day."
With his initial attack checked, Tarleton ordered his infantry forward. On seeing the British infantry, Morgan's skirmishers fired another volley targeting the officers and then retired. The retiring skirmishers reformed with the militia battle line that Morgan formed downhill of the advancing British. Morgan knew the British infantrymen tended to shoot high, and giving them the high ground meant most of their musket fire passed over the heads of his men. Morgan also kept his dragoons as his reserve because their superior mobility and mass meant they could be used for counterattacks to support his battle lines wherever they were weakened by the British assault.
The fatigue of Tarleton's men became evident when the 71st became tangled with the left flank of the 7th Regiment, and the Highlanders were forced to stop and redress their lines, forcing Tarleton to put them in the reserve, diluting his mass. Tarleton also made the mistake of dividing the 17th Light Dragoons into two weak flanking groups.
The American militia, who began to volley fire as the enemy came into range, all possessed rifles with a much longer range than the Brown Bess muskets of the British. The standard British tactic against American militia was to close rapidly with the line, issue a single volley, and then conduct a bayonet charge supported by dragoons. At Cowpens, a creek and ravine on either side covered the militia line's flanks, preventing cavalry or infantry rushes. The American militia sharpshooters went after officers and noncommissioned officers, the critical vulnerability of the British infantry. As the officers and front ranks began to fall under the withering rifle fire, the disciplined British regulars increased their rate of march and redressed their lines to fill the gaps. The British received yet another volley from the militia lines and finally issued one of their own and charged. Following the plan laid out by Morgan, the militia units began a hasty withdrawal to simulate their fleeing the battlefield and they reformed behind the American regulars.
Tarleton and his tired British forces began to press at the retreating militia, thinking the Americans were in full flight. The reduced number of officers on the infantry line could not keep order as their tired and shocked men ran off after the militia trying to avenge their fallen comrades. The detachment of dragoons on Tarleton's right flank charged headlong after the fleeing militiamen and began to cut them down. Morgan sent his dragoons under Washington in a massed charge to stem the British cavalry attack. The American dragoons outnumbered their British counterparts by a factor of four to one and swept through the attacking British cavalry and caused the survivors to flee the field. Washington then regrouped his mounted soldiers and waited for new orders.
The charging British infantry outpaced their artillery support, and before the officers could regain order, the redcoats encountered the massed fire of the waiting American regulars. The officers began to redress their lines under fire and this was where the British discipline began to payoff. Tarleton committed the Highlanders from his reserve to attack the left flank of the Americans and they began to roll the flank.
A company of Virginia regulars held the left flank of the American line and began to take heavy casualties. In reaction to the impending flanking movement, the commander of the line, Lieutenant Colonel John Howard, ordered the company to reorient itself perpendicular to the current line of battle to refuse the flank to the British. The din of battle and the death of their commander, combined with a direct volley by the 71st Highlanders, caused the order to be misinterpreted and the Virginians about-faced and began marching to their rear. As the Virginians left the line, the company adjacent to them also about-faced. This domino effect traveled all the way down the American battle line and every regular unit began to withdraw to the rear. At the same time the other half of the 17th Light Dragoons charged into the American rear trying to strike at the now reformed militia lines. This was the critical moment of the battle with victory for either side hanging in the balance. In the event, Tarleton did nothing and gave Morgan a chance to reform his lines and retake control of the situation.
The 17th Light Dragoons assault immediately was beaten off by the mass of Washington's entire unit, giving the American officers time to regain control of their soldiers. Having defeated the British dragoons for a second time, Washington said to Morgan, "They're coming on like a mob! Give them one fire and I will charge them." The initiative shown by Washington, Howard, and the militia commanders made the next moment possible.
At approximately 0745, the American regulars, some 500 strong, immediately about-faced and fired a volley from the hip right into the face of the charging Highlanders. Before the Highlanders could recover they were struck by the full might of Washington's dragoons from the flank. As the British officers tried to rally their men, the American regulars and the militia line charged into the disordered ranks. The center of the line, the British Legion infantry, having faced withering American fire for almost an hour, had had enough and began a full-fledged panicked retreat. The Highlanders, true to their veteran form, managed to form a pocket. Completely surrounded, with no help on the way and 9 of his 16 officers dead or dying, Major Arthur McArthur, the commander of the Highlanders, ordered his soldiers to ground their weapons. The American dragoons pursued the fleeing infantry but followed Morgan's orders to take prisoners. In a futile effort to rally his dragoons and cover the withdrawal of his reserve, Tarleton and his aides rode into battle and entered personal combat with Washington. Washington's saber was broken during the encounter and Tarleton's horse was shot out from under him, ending the encounter. Tarleton then left the field with the remnants of his command behind.
Tarleton suffered a total defeat at Cowpens; in almost every aspect of the battle he was outthought and outmaneuvered. Morgan used his dragoons to counterattack at key points in the battle to stem the British attack. His reverse slope defensive strategy cost him only 12 regulars killed and 60 wounded and about the same number of militia casualties. In return, he killed about 150 soldiers and 39 officers, wounded 229 soldiers, and captured 600 more. The British were dealt their biggest defeat since the Battle of Saratoga and the war in the south was changed forever.
The Battle of Cowpens shocked the British chain of command and forced them to realize that the Americans' desire to fight was anything but over. Cornwallis fully expected Tarleton's force of regulars to destroy Morgan's seemingly ragtag army. But because Morgan did not ascribe to the conventional rules of war and took full advantage of Tarleton's brashness, he lured the "Green Dragoon" into a trap and destroyed his army by using mass, maneuver, and the shock effect of unexpected counterattacks. The battle is a lesson to any commander that any force, properly led and using simple rules such as mass applied to a critical vulnerability, can be as destructive as the best trained and led force in the world.
Lieutenant Larsen is attending The Basic School at Quantico, Virginia.