To understand where China and its Navy might be headed, it is useful to look at where they have been.
Most of the world's navies share significant common ground, understanding each other better than ground or air counterparts do. Thus, it is not surprising that Westerners routinely ascribe views similar to their own to China's maritime strategists, and attribute to the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLA[N]) the roles and missions we might expect to execute in its place.
There is no major nation, however, that is more unlike Western society than the People's Republic of China. The unique product of history, geography, demography, and political philosophies very divergent from our own, the Chinese neither, think nor act like we do. Deng Xiaoping observed, "Our army is different from the armies of other countries, including other socialist countries, because our experience has been different from theirs." For the Western naval observer, the very nomenclature "People's Liberation Army Navy" and its peculiar status as a subset of the army should indicate entry into unfamiliar territory. Understanding the PLA(N) requires stepping outside our frame of reference and taking an open-minded look at the Middle Kingdom.
One must begin with history. China's written records go back more than 15 dynasties and are supplemented by oral pass down of earlier events. Scholar Jonathan Spence explains, "no other society has maintained its vitality or kept so meticulous a record of its own doings over such a long span—close to 4,000 years—as has China. One can plunge into that record at any point and find events, personalities, moods that appear to echo the present in haunting ways."
China has long been governed by absolutist rule. Within the cyclic rise and fall of its successive dynasties there are common themes that continue to have an impact on contemporary Chinese thought. The change of dynasties was never the result of a mere failure to produce an heir or a palace coup d’état. Transition was cataclysmic, stemming from a massive breakdown in social order. Common causes included excessive corruption or infighting among the imperial staff, the state's inability to respond to the massive natural disasters that plague China, famine, rebellions, or foreign invasions. Each period of dynastic change saw great turmoil in the country and terrible suffering among the nation's population. Typically, millions of people perished.
Out of this disruption new power centers emerged, and eventually one individual would amass sufficient authority to proclaim himself emperor. Because the emperor was considered to be the "son of heaven," early Chinese political theorists were challenged to justify how a new line could claim legitimacy in succeeding the previous dynasty. Their solution was the "Mandate of Heaven," which held that heaven blessed China's emperor only so long as he ruled in the interest of the nation. If he failed to do so, he was liable to be replaced.
This notion carries on, implicitly reinforced by the subsequent work of Confucius, who defined key societal relationships as requiring loyal obedience from the junior but benevolent oversight from the superior. Even Confucius accepted absolute government unquestioningly, wanting only that men chosen for their scholarship and moral merit advise the autocrat.
After creating a dynasty, it invariably was necessary for the new regime to reestablish control over all of China, and to deal with encroaching neighbors who might have taken the opportunity to expand during China's disunity. This often took decades to complete. But except for these border contests, China generally pursued peaceful foreign policies. Believing themselves to be the "Middle Kingdom," located below heaven but above other earthly nations, the Chinese were convinced of their cultural and intellectual superiority. Thus, it seemed only natural to have little interest in the outside world, and to expect those nations that contacted China to pay deference. From these beliefs arose the tribute system, China's preferred method of foreign relations. Leaders of adjacent countries periodically sent emissaries to the Chinese capital to present tribute and kowtow to the emperor. In exchange, they were lavishly entertained, given expensive gifts, granted lucrative trading privileges with an otherwise closed China, and assured of noninterference in their national affairs. Some contemporary writers construe this as evidence of a Chinese commitment to regional hegemony, but it more likely reveals China's longstanding internal focus, preoccupation with matters of prestige, and ability to secure "win-win" solutions.
This stability collapsed in the l9th century as Western contact with China expanded, producing a century of humiliation the Chinese will not forget. "Egalitarian Westerners" considered the kowtow debasing and bristled at China's trade restrictions. Matters came to a head when Britain, concerned about balance of trade, went to war to force China's markets open to its opium. The result was the first of a long series of unequal treaties imposed by outsiders that forced significant trade concessions, exempted foreign citizens from Chinese law, and claimed territorial concessions. This foreign intervention had a tremendous negative impact on China, disrupting everyday life, weakening government control, and facilitating a series of large-scale rebellions that are estimated to have claimed 60 million lives. The Japanese invasion of China in the 1930s was the most egregious foreign intervention, and left the deepest scars on the Chinese psyche (especially coupled with Japan's 1894 humiliation of China over Korea), but the impact of other Western actions should not be underestimated.
The final imperial dynasty, the Qing, collapsed in 1911. Although the period from 1911 to 1949 is called "Republican China," it saw anything but representative government. After less than a year under Sun Yat-Sen, the country began fragmenting under competing warlords. Eventually, two groups emerged to vie for control: the Kuomintang (KNIT) under Chiang Kai-Shek and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) led by Mao Zedong. Initial advantage lay with the KMT. Chiang had a large military, was well equipped, supported by Western advisors, and comprised the internationally recognized government. With only the illequipped, rag-tag Red Army, the Communists nevertheless waged an epic struggle, winning control of the country in 1949 and founding the People's Republic of China.
Even the relatively recent Communist "dynasty" already has seen two massive societal disruptions. First, during the poorly conceived "Great Leap Forward" of 1958-1960, "some 20 to 30 million people lost their lives through malnutrition and famine." Just as the country was recovering, Mao unleashed the radical excesses of the "Cultural Revolution," turning youthful Red Guards against the established social fabric and wreaking havoc on the nation. Deng Xiaoping was subject to public humiliation, purged, and exiled to a rural tractor factory.
Today, China is a unique blend of "ancient China and contemporary Marxism," with the former almost certainly the more important. From their long, painful history, modem Chinese can draw several key lessons:
- Social stability is an overriding concern. Even citizens with only the most basic educations are aware of the devastation inflicted on everyday folk by the upheavals of the past and are eager to avoid repetition.
- China's core territorial integrity is not negotiable. This includes Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan, and Tibet. The PRC specifically reserves the right to use force vis-A-vis Taiwan, which is considered strictly an internal issue. China also makes a firm case for its South China Sea claims, but has expressed a commitment to peaceful resolution and an openness to bilateral development with other claimants."
- International respect is craved to assuage the memories of past humiliations.
- Continued economic growth is essential. The Communist Party leadership has staked its legitimacy on bettering the lives of the everyday citizens and maintaining territorial integrity.
These consensus positions are reflected in the missions assigned to the PLA by documents such as the 1982 Constitution and 1998 defense white paper:
- Resist aggression and defend the motherland. This is a traditional responsibility of any military.
- Defend the nation's sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity. These missions include preserving national honor, maintaining social order, preventing Taiwan's independence, and most important, keeping the CCP in power. The PLA swears allegiance to the party, not the state. On paper there are parallel state and party military supervisory bodies, but it is the party organizations that have real authority. One of four major PLA branches—a level above the navy and air force—the General Political Department ensures military loyalty to the CCP.
- Support the nation's economic modernization. This includes conversion of military facilities to civil use, large-scale use of military personnel in support of agriculture and civic engineering projects and disaster relief, training personnel for future civilian employment, focusing improvements to Chinese military systems on domestic self-reliance, and keeping overall defense spending down.
- Improve China's military capabilities. Defense was one of the "four modernizations"—along with agriculture, industry, and science and technology—advocated by Zhou Enlai in 1975 and subsequently implemented by Deng Xiaoping. Deng made it clear to the military, however, that defense modernization was the lowest of these priorities and that the PLA must be subordinated to the general interest. Significant manpower reductions already have been implemented, rationalized by the long-term promise of a higher technology force replacing one of sheer mass.
For most of its history China has been an inwardly focused land power. At its 1 August 1927 inception, the PLA had only ground forces; it fought a guerilla war from inland bases while the KNIT (and later the Japanese) controlled the coast. With the Communist victory in 1949, the new People's Republic inherited remnants of the KMT's various forces and the PLA(N) was established. Concerned about both U.S. and Taiwan threats, Mao indicated interest in a stronger navy, but the PLA(N) remained a coastal defense force with lower priority than ground and air forces. This was logical, given China's status as a poor, underdeveloped country with tremendous manpower. Mao committed the nation to a defensive strategy of "People's War," planning to fall back to the interior until the adversary was overextended and could be overwhelmed by the simple mass of a large albeit poorly equipped Red Army. To support this strategy, he ordered the relocation of key industry to interior positions. The PLA(N) thus remained a secondary force comprised largely of coastal patrol craft and modest diesel submarines.
Several convergent factors subsequently would lead to enhanced PLA(N) status:
- The Sino-Soviet rift deepened in the 1960s, making the U.S.S.R. China's primary threat. By the mid 1970s the increasing power of the Soviet Pacific Fleet gave the Chinese leadership real concern, and Soviet access to Cam Ranh Bay after South Vietnam's fall heightened these apprehensions.
- Deng's decision to pursue economic modernization and open China to foreign investment resulted in the rapid concentration of industry along the coast, the only accessible areas given the country's poor transportation infrastructure. But the development of land attack cruise missiles and precision weapons for carrier aircraft made these new economic centers increasingly vulnerable, a point the 1991 Gulf War drove home.
- The 1982 Law of the Sea treaty permitting expanded territorial sea claims and the establishment of a 200-nauticalmile exclusive economic zone, coupled with a growing population demanding more food and energy, placed more emphasis on offshore water resources.
These factors highlighted the unsuitability of an inland People's War doctrine and led to an updated strategy with a greater focus on "local" or "limited" conflicts." Fundamental to this was the need for active defense—aggressive and flexible response rather than a falling back into the hinterlands. Some Westerners see a more aggressive China, but the new doctrine explicitly retains the call for " striking only after being attacked."' For the PLA(N), this requires the ability to operate several hundred miles offshore, to prevent the launch of seaborne strikes against China's economic centers.
Finally, the PLA(N) has gained additional credibility as a key organ of Chinese military diplomacy, hosting a number of significant international visits in the past two decades and making several overseas goodwill cruises to Russia, Southeast Asia, and the Americas. The conclusion of an agreement on military maritime safety between the United States and China is hailed by political leadership on both sides as a tangible sign of improved Sino-U.S. relations.
From these developments one might conclude that the PLA(N) would undergo rapid modernization, but there continue to be significant constraints:
- Military modernization ranks behind overall economic development, and China's economy is weaker than is commonly perceived. After Deng's reforms, significant productivity gains were made in agriculture and then in industry as foreign corporations shifted low-tech production (clothing, shoes, toys, consumer electronics, etc.) to China from higher cost regions. But these "easy" gains have been realized, existing infrastructure is largely tapped out, the rate of new investment is dropping, and growth in gross domestic product is slowing considerably. Even by their own commonly overstated figures, China's 1997 gross domestic product was only U.S. $980 billion, approximately one-eighth that of the United States."
- Much of China's economic growth was accompanied by significant inflation, with double-digit rates for most of the late 1980s and early 1990s. Defense spending has risen steadily, but much, maybe even all, of the increases went to rising personnel costs.
- The PLA(N) is comparatively better equipped than the other services, which have massive quantities of obsolete equipment. The ground forces, for example, have very limited mobility and virtually no transport helicopters.
- Even if resources were available to procure higher technology equipment, China's low-tech society (three-quarters of the population are rural peasants) and poor secondary education system cannot produce the skilled personnel needed to operate it.
For all of these reasons, China's actual naval modernization has been quite modest. The PLA(N) has built only three destroyers of the newer Luhai and Luhu classes and four Jiangwei frigates. These ships are all that would be considered "modem," that is, roughly equivalent to Western ships fielded 20 years ago. The rest of the fleet, even some units commissioned in the past five years, are much less capable. Two Sovremennyy-class guided-missile destroyers are reported to be under contract from Russia, and although they would be a significant enhancement, this class also was first fielded by the U.S.S.R. 20 years ago, and is based on the Kresta hull design several decades older still. The PLA(N) has only three replenishment oilers, one for each regional fleet. And while the option to use force against Taiwan remains government policy, the PLA(N) "Jacks the capability to provide even a small portion of the necessary amphibious lift."
Submarine production also remains modest. Most units being commissioned are Ming class, a modified version of the almost 50-year-old Romeo design. Four Kilos have been purchased, but despite the PLA(N)'s numerical advantage, overall submarine capabilities lag other regional navies such as Australia, Japan, and Korea. Despite Western preoccupation with China's military modernization, at least one Chinese strategic thinker concedes that his country actually is losing ground to the West.
The Chinese think very differently from Westerners, but they are quite rational if one understands their frame of reference, and there is less disparity of opinion between China's political/party leaders, the military, and even common citizens than one finds in the West. We can draw several conclusions from this look at China:
- The PLA(N) will continue to enjoy growing prestige, especially with the Chinese public. But because it plays a limited role in keeping the CCP in power and almost none in maintaining internal security, the Navy will remain second to the ground forces in the party's eyes.
- The PLA(N) will continue gradual modernization, relying primarily on indigenous construction but adding small numbers of foreign-built platforms that will enhance overall qualitative levels (and facilitate reverse engineering efforts). New platform procurement will at best maintain current force levels. Focus will continue on building submarines, medium-sized destroyers, and frigates able to operate several hundred miles offshore, and on gradual modernization of the PLA(N)'s air forces. Generally, technology levels will continue to lag advanced Western navies.
- The PLA(N) will not build (or buy) an aircraft carrier in the foreseeable future unless there is either a major unexpected improvement in the Chinese economy or a significant downturn in relations with the United States and regional nations. (If Japan were to field a carrier, China probably would feel compelled to attempt to follow suit as a matter of prestige.) Otherwise, improvements in long-range power projection will be modest efforts to ensure credibility with other regional nations with competing South China Sea claims.
- Combat missions will continue to focus on offshore defense of the Chinese coast, developing a credible capability to blockade Taiwan, and protecting China's offshore maritime claims.
- The PLA(N) will remain the most visible implement of Chinese military diplomacy, continuing to host foreign visits and making periodic goodwill cruises throughout the Asia-Pacific region, with an occasional foray to Africa, Europe, and the Americas. A global circumnavigation might raise international prestige early in the new millennium.
Commander Glazier is a surface warfare officer with tours in political-military affairs on the staffs of the Pacific Fleet and Seventh Fleet Commanders. He has served at sea in three destroyers and a cruiser and currently commands the George Philip (FFG-12).