Can network-centric warfare deliver on all the promises its proponents have made? If it is to have a chance, the Navy must move past easy assumptions and focus on the details—from bandwidth to network reliability to security—that will be its foundation.
Network-centric warfare. What is it and can it really satisfy the Herculean assertions of its advocates? Are we really on the verge of a new age in the conduct of military operations? To date, network-centric warfare has received a tremendous amount of attention, and there are tremendous benefits to be gained in adopting this philosophy, but as a result of the top-down force-planning approach employed in its development, several technological, conceptual, and philosophical issues critical to its ultimate success have received insufficient attention.
As indicated by the name, network-centric warfare refers to warfare centered on a vast, complex information infrastructure, linking geographically dispersed war fighters at all levels to increase force synergy, combat power, and effectiveness. The physical infrastructure is envisioned as a global information grid providing backplane connectivity and support for communications and computation. In addition, two virtual segments—a sensor grid and an engagement grid—will provide connectivity for sensor and shooter interface with the global information grid. This network presumably will provide for rapid global information dissemination and transfer, enabling theater and global "information superiority."
This description illustrates the enormous power and potential generally associated with network-centric warfare, as well as the ambitious nature of this proposal. Its capabilities and characteristics can be translated into additional achievable combat advantages—most notably, drastically improved battlespace awareness achieved through a common operating picture, massing of effects for geographically dispersed forces, self-synchronization of decentralized elements, and increased speed of command to enable enemy "lockout." These advantages, when combined with the information superiority resulting from exploitation of the network infrastructure, will contribute greatly to achieving the goal established by "Joint Vision 2010": full-spectrum dominance through the synergy of dominant maneuver, precision engagement, full dimensional protection, and focused logistics.
Indeed, if its objectives are achieved as advertised, network-centric warfare will be the requisite impetus to ensuring the attainment of the visionary goals of "Joint Vision 2010." But as with most proposals, this one is sound only if the underlying assumptions are valid. In this case, a number of brash assumptions are being made, several of which are tied to the implementation requirements associated with network-centric warfare.
Questionable Conceptual Assumptions
In this era of rapid technological advance, the idea that the technological aspects of establishing this global network will be relatively trivial and not worth a more detailed investigation is widely accepted. Somehow, the specific details will just fall into place. Generally this view is justified by citing commercial accomplishments, such as the evolution of the Internet. The logic follows that this success will translate directly into military application mainly through the use of commercial-off-the-shelf technology. Concepts of operation and strategies are developed with heavy reliance on information technology resources available today, the current rate of technology advance (both in the military and the commercial sector), and a firm belief that that rate of advance will persist well into the foreseeable future.
The assumption that technology will continue to advance at remarkable rates is reasonable; historically, however, the rate of productive implementation and application within the military and government has been unable to keep pace. This lag easily could result in the development of production-level systems with extremely lengthy acquisition cycles despite requirements to support operational concepts and strategies focused on near-term implementation and objectives. Project extensions and cost overruns are not unfamiliar within the government acquisition process, especially in projects based on highly speculative, leading-edge technologies, which often do not materialize or yield the capabilities expected. It is possible that contractor and research facility assurances of technology development and timely project completion will be nothing more than hollow promises.
Attempting to ride the wave of leading-edge technology and assuming that the commercial sector's ability to rapidly leverage advances in technology can be extended to military applications often is misguided. Military applications frequently are different in system specifications, including employment and location of operation. Oversimplification of what will be required for implementation can prove extremely costly and predestine failure.
Despite these development challenges, there is little argument that technology will continue to offer substantial improvements in efficiency and productivity and that its integration will remain key to maintaining a military advantage. But we must exercise caution and understand its limitations. This idea is echoed by retired Marine Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth W. Estes, who asserts that "smugness over technology reflects the current euphoric U.S. situation—a burgeoning economy and technological superiority," which "tends to obscure the possibility that technological advances may not be realized in combat any more than they were in previous eras of general technological advances."
Challenges
Several areas of development crucial to the effective implementation of network-centric warfare deserve increased attention as we work to determine the viability of this ambitious warfare concept. These particular areas form or support much of the foundation of network-centric warfare and will present formidable challenges on the road to completion.
Network Architecture Complexity. Network-centric warfare relies heavily on an extremely complex yet powerful network extending to all regions of the globe, both sea and land, providing near-real-time data throughput to all nodes. Inherent in such a vast, dynamic network are numerous architecture and security issues. One of the most obvious is complexity. A favorite reference for many network-centric warfare enthusiasts is Metcalfe's Law, which asserts that the power of a network is proportional to the square of the number of nodes. However, another attribute of networks that increases with the number of nodes is complexity, which in turn boosts the demands levied on system administrators and operators. Marine Colonel T. X. Hammes captured the essence of this issue when he stated, "I would suspect that systems managers would add a corollary: the complexity of a system is proportional to the cube of the number of nodes."
With the success of the Internet and the general lack of appreciation for the tremendous efforts required to construct and administer a network, complexity often is viewed as insignificant. Nothing could be further from the truth. This issue will require a substantial augmentation of personnel with requisite expertise, an extensive communications infrastructure, and both hardware and software standardization to establish a solvent network architecture and associated support structure. All of these requirements appear to be within the grasp of current and future technology, but the fact is that many of these difficulties remain unresolved, despite a relatively significant history of networking within the military. Our apparent inability to apply current technologies to existing problems effectively does not add credence to our ability to implement network-centric warfare.
Network Reliability. We should consider the ramifications of developing strategic, operational, and tactical doctrine centered on—and establishing a high dependence on—a single resource, in this case a supernetwork. Given the military's historical difficulties in maintaining operational capacity in the wake of primary system failure and acknowledging that network-centric's information grid is jointly populated and deeply imbedded in the military's joint vision, the implications of reliability take on new meaning. There are a myriad of extremely sophisticated devices and network interfaces that must be employed to achieve harmony within this system of systems, and the liability associated with system complexity cannot be ignored. If large-scale dependency is established, system-wide or segment outages could result in significant force degradation and, in extreme cases, complete paralysis throughout all the services.
Critical Nodes and Communications Links. Despite efforts to minimize and protect critical nodes and links, these elements will pose a substantial vulnerability for system segment failure and hostile attack. The disruption of key network nodes and links through physical destruction, denial (jamming), or intrusion could isolate whole network segments or theaters—hence, the importance of a secure and reliable communications infrastructure. At this time, however, the only actual or planned hardened (antijam) military satellite communications system remotely capable of dedicated support for this network is MILSTAR, and it would support only extremely low data rates. Anticipated future upgrades will approach acceptable data rates, although, again, this resource is purely speculative. Numerous project schedule extensions have been experienced to date because of lags in technology implementation. These project delays and substandard support (e.g., bandwidth, number of customers, etc.) may eliminate MILSTAR as a service provider. Regardless, MILSTAR will not be capable of providing sole support and therefore much of the crucial communications infrastructure will be contracted out to non-hardened, commercial resources.
Even knowing that commercial communications links provide critical service worldwide and in spite of numerous international treaties that prohibit physical or electronic attack of satellite systems, nations under duress may conclude that loss of satellite communications within their own or surrounding countries is preferable to allowing the U.S. military to exploit this technological advantage.
Bandwidth. Current and near-term MILSTAR bandwidth support cannot address the anticipated tremendous requirements of network-centric warfare. Many systems are designed under the premise that bandwidth is available or will be prior to system fielding; i.e., unlimited bandwidth is just around the corner. Army Lieutenant General Douglas D. Buchholz, director of command, control, communications and computer systems, J-6, the Joint Staff, maintains that "one major flaw in battlefield information systems emerges from burgeoning bandwidth challenges and warns that many information systems are being planned or procured without sufficient thought given to bandwidth needed for their function." He adds that "the fallacy is that all these things are being bought assuming there is bandwidth. I know full well there isn't, but I can't quantify how short we are, and therein lies the major flaw."
Another key consideration, assuming the number of satellite systems grows and bandwidth becomes less of an issue, is the cost of telecommunications support. Teledesic, for example, has plans for 280 satellites (assuming the project makes it off the drawing boards) and virtually unlimited access to any location on the globe with tremendous two-way throughput. The question is whether its intended customer base will be able to afford it. Recent cost projections associated with the Navy's new IT-21 initiative indicate that 80% of the total cost will be tied to recurring telecommunications costs. Bandwidth never will be free, and the staggering costs associated with access and the quality of service required will add to the ongoing funding burden.
Data Fusion and Filters. The vast network-centric-warfare information grid will encompass two primary subnetworks—the sensor grid and the engagement grid. The sensor grid will form a link interface backbone to provide a virtual connection for all national, theater, and tactical sensors to enable distribution of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance information throughout the battlefield. The myriad of sensors supporting this effort collect enormous amounts of intelligence. This information subsequently must undergo processing prior to distribution to convert raw data into acceptable formats for storage and follow-on fusion with other products. Fusion is essential to eliminating inaccuracies and redundancies and to correlating same-target information, which reduces system loading to prevent saturation and generate a more usable end product at the destination node. A consistent, efficient fusion process that can accept the wide range of sensor inputs and properly fuse the information to provide an accurate and consolidated data presentation thus far has eluded system developers, as information can be linked and related in numerous ways. Many Internet enthusiasts insist that current search engine technologies would be sufficient for customized information extraction, but in fact, these tools—as well as the end user—quickly would be overwhelmed by the vast information stores available. Similarly, filtering will be important in preventing information flooding at the end user. Considering the pivotal role the sensor grid will play in achieving a high state of battlefield awareness and ultimately information superiority, the ability to dynamically fuse and filter information will be critical and will pose a monumental challenge to the overall success of network-centric warfare.
Multilevel Security. To make all-source information available across the battlefield, we must address network multilevel security. The segregation of information into different levels of classification with varying user access levels historically has posed problems. The need for information security can be counterproductive and can conflict with operational requirements. The intelligence community has been studying this issue for some time, and although great strides have been made, a solution has not been demonstrated. This issue also must be resolved if we are to fully leverage the vast quantities of sensor and intelligence information.
Force Control and Decision Making. Expanding and deviating expectations and conceptual misunderstandings could plague implementation. How will the network-centric-warfare concept change over time and what operational requirements will be introduced? Is self-synchronization of decentralized elements the goal, or will centralized remote force control from the desktop be adopted? The current network-centric warfare concept stresses the former, but networking will provide a new and possibly irresistible avenue for timely, direct, long-range control. How will network-centric warfare support the strategic level, and will it provide an adequate interface to theater-level command and control? These contentious questions should be examined, as they may have bearing on an efficient system design.
Another proposition that has arisen is automated command and control. Humans make tactical decisions based on problem simplification and pattern recognition; could artificial intelligence and neural network technology help to produce faster, more consistent decisions? Will human intervention remain paramount, or is automated force and fire control on the horizon?
Conclusion
The benefits of integrating network technology in military applications are enormous and essential to maintaining a forward-looking, superior military force, but further clarification of expectations and a firm realization of system limitations and utility are essential. Information technology is a tremendous tool, but it is an evolving process that has experienced its fair share of failures and setbacks. This is not to say that research and development should be abandoned but rather that a more realistic balance between speculation on future development and current reality should be adopted to ensure that a product or system will be realized on schedule.
Finally, we need to understand that military operations are only remotely comparable to business operations. Despite information technology's contributions in the commercial sector, the analogy drawn between business productivity and measures of warfare effectiveness should be approached with caution. Obviously, the basis for risk in the military extends far beyond company financial success to include human life and national security, neither of which can be taken lightly. Unlike the commercial community, our system of systems will not address many of our current military inefficiencies and growing concerns. The fog of war and situational uncertainties always will be present on the battlefield, and we must strive to mitigate their effects without introducing our own adverse contributors such as information inundation, user overdependence, and system vulnerabilities to asymmetrical threats.
Despite the change in force planning expressed by Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jay Johnson as "a fundamental shift from ... platform-centric warfare to something we call network-centric warfare," unless we reevaluate our expectations, solidify technology fundamentals, and look beyond our "rose-colored glasses," this enterprising new concept will fail to realize its true potential.
Commander Jenik is attending the Naval Command and Staff course at the Naval War College.