On 1 November 2001, the Navy announced the end of the DD-21 program that was initiated almost a decade ago to develop a specialized land-attack destroyer. In its place, the Navy has established a new DD(X) program "to more accurately reflect the program purpose, which is to produce a family of advanced technology surface combatants, not a single class."
From the DD(X) effort a family of programs is expected to evolve, among them a large CG(X) cruiser and smaller littoral combat ship (LCS). Also evolving will be a series of system upgrades for aircraft carriers as well as surface combatants.
The change appears to be another move by the Department of Defense to put off a "final" decision on procurement of the Navy's next surface combatant, i.e., the successor to the Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class. After several earlier postponements, the two industry teams competing for the DD-21 now face further delays. The teams were to submit their final proposals to the Navy in November, with selection of the DD-21 design and the lead construction yard scheduled for June 2002.
The Blue Team is led by General Dynamics with its Bath Iron Works shipyard and Lockheed Martin's Government Electronic Systems; the Gold Team is centered on Northrop Grumman's Ingalls shipyard working with Raytheon Systems. While an accelerated DD(X) competition is promised, with new proposals being developed by the industry teams, there are many unanswered questions.
Under the now-abandoned DD-21 full-service-contractor approach, the winning team was to undertake the design, be the lead construction yard, and manage the life-cycle support for the class. Reportedly, the Navy now proposes that the winner of the down-select become the "design agent" for the DD(X). A subsequent competition would be held for detailed design and construction of the ships. Compared to the DD-21 all-inclusive approach, this could permit a requirements creep as additional improvements or even systems are added without a total contractor responsibility being imposed.
The irony is that the DD-21 was planned as the first ship of a family of surface combatants known by the generic term SC-21, for surface combatant for the 21st century. The DD-21 was a land-attack destroyer, intended primarily to support forces ashore with cruise missiles and advanced gun systems, and the follow-on "cruiser" of the SC-21 family was to emphasize antiair warfare/missile defense.
The reasons for the shift from a specific warship-DD-21to a DD(X) family are somewhat convoluted. Within the Department of Defense, the DD-21 ranked low among new systems to be funded, especially under the Bush administration's drive for "transformation" projects. As reported in this column last month, the DD-21 originally scored poorly in DoD evaluations of the warship's role in transformation to future systems and platforms.' Although Defense officials subsequently scurried to declare that the DD-21 did indeed reflect transformation criteria, support has been less than enthusiastic within the Office of the Secretary of Defense and limited within the Navy's top leadership.
Reactions to the DD-21 within the Navy have been mixed. Richard Danzig, Secretary of the Navy from 1998 to January 2001, was a strong supporter. However, retired Vice Admiral Arthur K. Cebrowski, now Director, Force Transformation, within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, prefers smaller warships, such as his proposed Streetfighter, a corvette-size combatant for littoral operations. Similarly, Rear Admiral Rodney P. Rempt, who succeeded Admiral Cebrowski as president of the Naval War College in August 2001, has sought more antiair/antimissile capability in the next surface combatant. (Prior to his appointment to the Naval War College, Admiral Rempt was the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Missile Defense and Director, Surface Warfare Division, within the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations.)
Beyond the surface warfare community the DD-21 had few friends within the Navy hierarchy. The aviation community saw the development costs of the new ship as a potential drain on its plans to construct the CVN-79, another supercarrier of the Nimitz (CVN-75) class, in fiscal year 2006. At the same time, the submarine community looked on the DD-21 as competition to the proposed conversion of Trident strategic missile submarines (SSBN) to a cruise missile/special operations configuration (SSGN). And both communities were concerned about the large-scale and innovative crew reductions planned for the DD-21, a feature that they have not stressed in their new ship platforms.
According to the proposed DD(X) program there will be a lengthy "risk mitigation" effort consisting of extensive prototype and land-based testing. Among the DD(X) technology development elements will be:
- Integrated electric propulsion system (for 30-knot sustained speed)
- Total ship computing environment (125-175 ship's crew)
- Enhanced survivability (reduced radar cross section and infrared, magnetic, and acoustic signatures)
- Enhance radar suite (multifunction and volume-search radars)
- Integrated undersea warfare suite (mine avoidance, antisubmarine sensors and weapons, torpedo defense)
- 155-mm advanced gun system
- Advanced vertical-launch cells
- Tumblehome hull configuration
Few experts in the relevant fields believed that these systems represent a high risk except in the context of total integration into a warship. The recent problems in adapting the cooperative engagement capability (CEC) to Aegis missile cruisers made some Defense official apprehensive of the DD-21's systems integration, but the problems and hence risks appear to be reduced significantly in a new ship in comparison to adapting and integrating legacy systems.
The notional DD(X) program timeline now put forth by the Department of Defense calls for the detailed design and construction of the lead ship to begin in fiscal year 2005, with completion expected in fiscal year 2011, only a one-year slip from the DD-21's last schedule. But the program change and the massive demonstration effort envisioned for the DD(X) make it highly unlikely the delivery schedule will be met.
The delays in the definition of the next surface combatant mean that production of the Arleigh Burke class will be stretched. The lead ship was authorized in fiscal year 1985 and the latest program change undoubtedly means that the DDG-21’s will be funded through at least 2006—the longest production run of any basic surface combatant design in U.S. history. The confused state of the Navy's future surface combatant programs means that Arleigh Burke-class destroyers probably will be serving in the fleet for another 35 years—and possibly longer.