Today's combat environment dictates JL that battlefield management be oriented to precision force application, especially in surveillance, reconnaissance, and precision weapon delivery. Commanders and mission planners must consider the impact of combat operations on civilians and civilian infrastructure, guided always by the need to limit collateral damage. Maritime units engaging hostile forces in the littorals and inland require precise and timely data to depict the battle space accurately. Surveillance and reconnaissance data must be available in real time over sustained periods, in all-weather conditions, and be accurate enough to deliver weapons precisely. Achieving information superiority quickly, with tactically relevant data accessible to theater commanders and forward-deployed forces, becomes the foundation for subsequent operations. However, limited sensors—in quantity and capability—handicap U.S. maritime forces. In brief, they are shooter rich and sensor poor.
Various factors challenge strike mission planners. Mobile targets in restricted battle space, slow data fusion to identify and confirm targets, and incomplete battle damage assessments compound the dynamic target selection process. Sparse reliable targeting information that results from inability—or limited ability—to acquire valid real-time or near-real-time sensor information further degrades planning efforts. Precision force execution requires not only precision weapons but also improvements in the precision targeting and surveillance elements of command, control, communication, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems.
Vice Admiral Arthur Cebrowski, former president of the Naval War College, characterized U.S. military forces in his testimony to the House Armed Services Committee in early 1999: "We have many weapons in the inventory which outrange our ability to employ them. While we control the range of our weapons, adversaries can control the range of our sensors. This is called engagement envelope management. War is a fully two-sided game, and potential adversaries will respond. Over time, our focus on long-range precision strike will result in increased expenditures by other nations on cover, deception, stealth and mobility. This means we must be prepared to maneuver sensors close in, and be prepared to respond on very tight timelines."
Precision strike targeting (PST) requires sensors that can detect, resolve, and maintain contact with multiple targets, thereby giving commanders the ability to engage them decisively as required. Sensors must be able to provide long-term, near-real-time, all-weather precision surveillance and targeting through a data stream common to all shooters and planners. The NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1999 is an excellent example of the need for precision sensors. Initially, 19 allied countries reviewed each target and often exercised veto power to mitigate civilian casualties. The political significance of restricted target selection (which was relaxed later in the campaign) increases the requirement for PST to achieve tactical success and broaden selection of available targets while minimizing collateral damage. The conflict also demonstrated the need for all-weather sensors. General Wesley Clark, U.S. Army, commander of NATO forces, estimated that during a three-week period the air campaign had only seven days of acceptable weather in which to engage targets. During one ten-day span, more than half the scheduled strikes had to be canceled.
The maritime patrol aircraft (VP) community provides long-range, land-based assets to operational theater commanders in the primary mission areas of undersea and antisurface warfare, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, and maritime strike. During the Kosovo conflict, forward-deployed VP aircraft in the Mediterranean area provided continuous armed surface combat air patrol coverage for the USS Enterprise (CVN-65) and USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71) battle groups. In addition, one P-3C Orion aircraft armed with standoff land-attack missiles (SLAMs) was under tactical control of the Commander, 5th Air Tactical Air Force combined air operations center in Vincenza, Italy. It was scheduled daily on the air tasking order either as a strike sortie or an alert asset. Targets included air defense systems, mobile missile launchers, radar sites, and missile storage facilities. Nationally directed sensors provided precision targeting data; however, configuration mismatch of platform sensors, weather, and competing sensor priorities often prevented development of target location data. When photos depicting actual target configuration and location were not available, the VP liaison officer at Vincenza would transmit representations—known as "cartoons"—to provide graphics for air crew strike briefings.
Following strike planning, aircraft preflight and weapon checks were conducted and parameters of the briefed targets were loaded into aircraft mission systems. The options were: launch and shoot, launch and stand by for in-flight PST updates; hold on the ground as a ready-alert asset until PST data became available; or cancel the sortie. NATO command-and-control agencies took myriad factors into account when authorizing launches, and on many occasions, fully "up" aircraft were not authorized to engage because of the absence of PST.
While Director of Air Warfare in the office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Vice Admiral John Nathman forecasted a revolution in strike warfare: "Network centric warfare (NCW) is about getting the right information to the shooter at the right time. . . . Because of the uniquely mobile nature of aircraft, naval aviation has more dispersed platforms and sensors on the engagement plane of NCW than any other force. The potent new-generation strike fighters, armed helicopters, and SLAM-capable maritime aircraft all deliver precision ordnance and provide today's strike force an unsurpassed level of lethality and versatility. . . . Synthetic aperture radar and electronically scanned radar systems will provide high resolution data for engaging targets at long range through all weather. These powerful systems will then be netted together enabling intuitive command-and-control decisions by operational commanders."
Given sensor data feeds capable of providing the requisite PST, maritime and patrol aircraft armed with SLAMs can execute maritime strike missions in the littorals. Other surface, subsurface, and air platforms enjoy similar precision strike capabilities, although they compete for limited PST that is not always available in a common data transmission. Delivery of precision munitions such as Tomahawk and SLAM requires sensors capable of providing PST in a common data format and in all weather conditions.
Maritime and patrol aircraft capabilities are evolving with programmed sensor, communications, and aircraft systems upgrades that are compatible with the network-centric warfare environment—but there have been cutbacks in procurement. Continued funding of developed and programmed sensor and weapon systems and supporting data communications architectures, such as the VP aircraft improvement program and tactical common data link, is needed to overcome the deficit in precision targeting sensors required to support operations. Coupled with current weapon capabilities, these expanded systems will add greater effectiveness to the strike mission.
Lieutenant Commander Miller was the operations officer of Patrol Squadron Ten during Operation Allied Force. He is now attending the Naval War College.