This html article is produced from an uncorrected text file through optical character recognition. Prior to 1940 articles all text has been corrected, but from 1940 to the present most still remain uncorrected. Artifacts of the scans are misspellings, out-of-context footnotes and sidebars, and other inconsistencies. Adjacent to each text file is a PDF of the article, which accurately and fully conveys the content as it appeared in the issue. The uncorrected text files have been included to enhance the searchability of our content, on our site and in search engines, for our membership, the research community and media organizations. We are working now to provide clean text files for the entire collection.
The Aegis system, theater ballistic missile defense, mine warfare, and adjusting amphibious warfare to the new littoral focus all stand out in this second part of our look ahead.
Surface warfare’s vision for the future rests upon the unique ability of naval surface forces to state or reinforce international policy and national will: “The surface ship is the keystone of any littoral operation because of its numerous capabilities and independent sustainability,” according to a capstone briefing prepared in early 1994. As the Director, Surface Warfare Division (N86), Rear Admiral Philip J. Coady remarked in February 1994, “we can continue to provide a superior component of our Navy’s enabling force, allowing us to support the complete spectrum of missions.”
But we have less—future ships, people, weapons, fuel, and dollars—than at any time since the Reagan administration’s defense buildup peaked in 1985. The August 1993 Navy publication. Naval Surface Forces: From the Sea into the 21st Century, provided “a reasonable estimate for the total naval surface forces in the year 2000,” although it admitted that these force projections—some 110- 116 surface warships in the active force, for example—“are being reassessed in light of continuing change throughout the world, and will undoubtedly be refined based on operational requirements and budget considerations in the years ahead.” In light of even more recent resource decisions, these projections and estimates look to be optimistic. The seven Spru- ance (DD-963)-class destroyers not outfitted with vertical-launch systems may be put in the Naval Reserve Force or decommissioned. More Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7)-class guided-missile frigates might be headed for the Naval Reserve or put in mothballs, and other more radical force reductions might come, as well, making a force of 85-100 surface warships a worst-case possibility.
By the turn of the century, all nuclear- powered cruisers will be gone, some very soon after completing New Threat Upgrade overhauls and refueling of their nu
clear cores. The Bush administration already had announced the retirement of the three oldest cruisers, the USS Long Beach (CGN-9) for August 1994, and the Bainbridge (CGN-25) and Truxtun (CGN-35) in 1995. Of the more modern ships, the Texas (CGN-39) was retired in May 1993 at the 16-year point in her service life, about half of what the Navy had planned for nuclear-propelled cruisers (30-35 years). The three other Virginia (CGN-38)-class cruisers will be decommissioned between 1994 and 1997. The USS California (CGN-36) and South Carolina (CGN-37) completed midlife overhauls, combat-system upgrades, and refueling in fiscal years 1992 and 1993,
The Ticonderoga (CG-47) and the new Port Royal (CG-73) represent the beginning and the end of an Aegis- equipped cruiser class. The Port Royal will join the fleet later in fiscal year 1994.
respectively—at a combined cost of more than $1 billion—and will be the last to leave service, sometime in 1998 or 1999.
83
Proceedings/July 1994
Similarly, all of the older guided-missile cruisers of the Leahy (CG-16) and Belknap (CG-26) classes will be decommissioned by 1999. All had or will have reached 30 years’ service, but many had received the New Threat Upgrade that in some tactical situations in the near-shore
littoral environment brings low-elevation war-fighting capabilities to the fleet. Still, these ships’ combat systems are no match for the Aegis warfare system fitted in the Ticonderoga (CG-47)-class guided- missile cruisers and the Arleigh Burke (DDG-51)-class guided-missile destroyers. Hence, the older ships were expendable in these tight fiscal times.
While surface combatants and amphibious ships will be fewer by the year 2000 than contemplated just two or three years ago, those ships will have a hard, qualitative edge. Compared to fiscal year 1987, by fiscal year 1997 we should see:
► 48 Aegis surface combatants compared to 9
► No steam-powered surface warships compared to 115
► 107 gas turbine-powered ships compared to 79
► Nearly 6,100 vertical launch system (VLS) cells compared to 480
► 3,162 Tomahawk cruise missiles compared to 280
► 26 modem mine countermeasures ships compared to 1
Aegis Warships. The 27th, and final, Ticonderoga-class Aegis cruiser will join the fleet in late fiscal year 1994, just in time—if threatened reductions cannot be dodged—to see the first five Baseline 1 Aegis cruisers mothballed for affordability and flexibility reasons about halfway through their service lives.
The near-term future of the Navy’s surface warship programs remains the Arleigh Burke Aegis destroyers, 29 of which have been ordered or approved through fiscal year 1994. For a time in 1993 the ultimate dimensions and future direction of the program remained unclear, with the Defense Department’s Inspector General in December 1993 questioning the requirements for and ultimate cost of the upgraded, Flight IIA DDG-51 design. This ship will have a hangar for two helicopters, either SH-60B LAMPS MK-III or armed helicopters, among other littoral- warfare enhancements. The Inspector General’s report noted that such major changes require that a Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analysis evaluate all possible alternatives. The Flight IIA Arleigh Burkes;, however, resulted from an internal Navy/Surface Warfare Destroyer Variant (DDV) Study charged with finding an affordable ship that still could meet the war-fighting requirements of the post- Cold War naval conflict environment. The DoD Inspector General recommended that near-term DDG-51 procurement be limited to two Flight II ships per year, compared to the Navy’s plan for annual buys of three of the Flight IIAs, until after the required cost analysis.
The tempest was resolved in early February 1994, when Under Secretary of De
fense for Acquisition John Deutch issued a Milestone IV Acquisition Decision Memorandum for the program. The acquisition board approved the upgrade, to be implemented with the final DDG- 51 procured in fiscal year 1994, and directed the Navy to plan for a production rate of three DDG-51s per year until it reaches the total program of 57 ships. The Deutch memorandum conceded, however, that the rate and total program might have to be revisited for affordability reasons. He also identified the SH-60 armed helicopter and the Evolved Sea Sparrow missile as “ key supporting programs” for the Flight IIA and approved engine im-
provements to the baseline design.
Important for the future, the Defense Acquisition Board accepted the Navy’s plans to begin the design of a new class of surface warships for the 21st century.
21st-Century Surface Combatant. Surface warfare—at least since Vice Admiral Joseph Metcalfs “Revolution at Sea” initiatives of the mid-1980s—has fostered a program of almost constant evaluation of future surface warships. The most recent effort—and only one of several under way in 1994—is the 21st Century Surface Combatant (SC-21) study. As Rear Admiral Thomas Marfiak, Director of Surface Warfare Plans, Programs, and Requirements (N863), acknowledged, “it takes at least ten years for a new surface ship design that incorporates emerging technologies to enter the fleet. We have to understand what the ‘tyranny of R&D’ means for us as we work to get
the finest technology into our future shipbuilding program.”
The ongoing SC-21 effort—an out growth of a long line of previous studies—has not developed a single-point design for a future warship. Indeed, that it not the intent, although it will address conventional, unconventional, and revolutionary hull-forms, along with all other hull/mechanical/electrical and combat- system considerations in an integrated total-ship approach. Rather, the first step was to develop a mission needs statement addressing the threat, the “fog of the littoral,” required surface-combatant fortf levels, required capabilities in critical warfare areas, and technology and design alternatives to meet the projected requirements.
According to the mission needs briefing presented to the Joint Requirements Oversight Committee in June, the Navy must “leverage new and emerging technology and implement total ship architecture and engineering” if it hopes to maintain an effective yet affordable surface-combatant force. Once approved, the statement will lay the foundation for further developments, culminating in a design decision for a ship to be requested in 2003 that will reach the fleet some seven or eight years later. (Among the several “material alternatives” outlined io the mission needs statement was a “littoral warfare ship”—something of a cross between the Arleigh Burke-class Aegis destroyers and the Wasp [LHD-l]-class amphibious ships—apparently favored by Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral William Owens.) This effort, moreover, will provide a foundation for still more initiatives to define a future surface combatant (CGX) to begin replacing the CG-47s in the 2015 to 2020 time frame.
Theater Air Defense. As one element of the wide-ranging initiatives within the Program Executive Office for Theater Air Defense, in June 1993 the Navy successfully demonstrated the Mk-1 Ship Self Defense System (SSDS) on board the USS Whidbey Island (LSD-41), indicating the significant progress in sensor-fusion and weapons direction systems and software for non-Aegis ships. The program’s goal is to integrate and automate the ship’s sensor/sensor-control functions and antiair weapons to enhance defense against a broad array of airborne threats. The sensor elements for the June demonstration system were the AN/SPS-49(V)1 two-dimensional radar with a radar-automation interface, the AN/SLQ-32(V)1 electronic countermeasures set, the AN/SAR-8 infrared search-and-track system, and the Phalanx close-in weapon system organic radar. Weapon elements included the Phalanx Mk-15 Mod 12 and
Proceedings/ July 1994
COURTESY Of TECHMATICS. INC.
the Mk-31 Mod 0 5-inch rolling airframe missile. Especially striking about the initial actual-fire SSDS test, according to Captain Francis Williamson, Technical Director of the SSDS Project, was that it demonstrated “a completely automated and fully integrated ship self-defense capability, involving sensors and weapons never intended to be integrated.” The SSDS upgrades are planned for aircraft carriers, Spruance-class destroyers, selected Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigates (probably only the active fleet assets), Whidbey Island-c\ass dock landing ships. Wasp and Tarawa (LHA-l)-class amphibious assault ships, future new-con- struction amphibious ships, and the Supply (AOE-6)-class combat logistics ships.
These SSDS elements will be augmented with a new, soft-kill capability offered by an active, off-board countermeasures system called “Nulka” that will be linked to the SLQ-32 electronic warfare system. A joint U.S. Navy-Royal Australian Navy program, Nulka (which means “be quick” in the aborigine language) is a hovering rocket/electronic countermeasures system intended to decoy active-radar seeker cruise missiles away from their intended targets. In 1993 tests, Nulka proved successful in defending cruiser/destroyer-size and smaller ships and is expected to be extremely effective when deployed in concert with other active countermeasures systems.
Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (TBMD) continues to be a prime focus of the future surface fleet. A sea-based TBMD capability could extend well over land, beyond the naval expeditionary force offshore. The concept continues, as well, to be the focus of some internal DoD squabbling in regard to the allocation of increasingly scarce resources to several alternative ground- and sea-based defense systems.
The Navy’s TBMD program is founded on modifications to the phased-array radars and weapons control systems on board the 22 Aegis VLS cruisers and per
haps as many as 57 Aegis destroyers (alone, these ships will account for 7,814 VLS cells), the linking of defense built upon real-time networking of sensors and fire-control systems, the Navy’s improved Standard Missile (SM-2 Block IVA upgrade to its sensor, fuze, and warhead), and new surface-launched missiles to provide both an area and theater-wide TBMD capability. Demonstrations aimed at extended-range tracking at sea and missile intercept tests during 1995 and 1997 will address key technical risk areas. An Aegis TBMD User Operational Evaluation System could be at sea as early as the last quarter of fiscal year 1997, with full- scale production scheduled for the end of the decade.
The cost of deploying a sea-based system would be about 10% of the some $42 billion already invested in the Aegis fleet. This is money well spent, in the Navy’s assessment, as a sea-based system will have none of the political impediments and infrastructure constraints of a land- based system, may be the only force available during the initial stages of a crisis or conflict, and clearly would complement those land-based systems. In some scenarios, according to an early February 1994 point paper, sea-based systems operating from international waters offer an unobtrusive presence and capability to provide quick-reaction TBMD, air defense, strike (using the Tomahawk missile to attack critical inland targets), and the other missions routinely assigned to Navy ships. Despite these attractive features, however, in early 1994 the Navy’s TBMD program experienced some uncertainty within the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, prompting some in Congress to rally to its defense.1 For one. Representative Owen Pickett (D-VA) wrote to Secretary of Defense William Perry on 16 March, complaining that the Navy’s upper-tier (i.e., theater-wide) TBMD program had been reduced in priority and requesting Perry to “promptly reestablish the Bottom-Up
i ship-
n out stud- int de- that it idress revo- other mbat- rated. ;t step :ment le lit- forcf 'itical lesiga d re-
brief- nents Navy tech- irchi- es to s sur- i, the r fur- a de- ested tome I the ed in “lit- cross iegis class |
d by 's of 1 s ef- ition lture t re- 1020 ;
nent I thin tater suc- Self the cat- -fu- and aro- late ons :nse ats. on- V)1 au- V)1 the ys- ;ys-
In June 1993, a demonstration of the Mk-1 Ship Self Defense System (SSDS) on board the USS Whidbey Island (LSD-41) included the Phalanx Mk-15 Mod 12 (right) and the Mk-31 Mod 0 5-inch rolling airframe missile.
Review priorities and readjust the program budgets for FY 1995-99 to reflect the appropriate balance of funding between sea-based and landbased TBMD systems.”
Related to these Aegis-focused efforts are two other TBMD elements. First, the Marine Corps programs for upgrading its TPS-59 radars for ballistic-missile cuing, improving the ability to share ballistic missile/threat cuing data with other forces by way of the Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (Link 16 JTIDS), and upgrading its Hawk missile batteries will complement the sea-based systems. Second, the Navy has embarked upon a joint program with the Army to develop and field Joint Tactical Ground Station (JTAGS) vans that will enable intheater processing of space-based warning data, thereby enhancing the effectiveness of both sea- and land-based theater-wide defensive systems.
Other significant ship self-defense initiatives involve cooperative engagement, combat identification, and battle management command-control-communication (C3) systems, all under the aegis of the Program Executive Office for Theater Air Defense. Cooperative engagement is a system aimed at enhancing surface capabilities in joint air defense and self defense against low-observable cruise missiles and other air threats by combining measurements from dispersed sensors into a real-time, accurate, fire-control- quality antiair warfare picture shared forcewide. As one way to confront the fog of the littoral, in which friendly, adversary, and “gray” aircraft commingle in highly compressed battle space, combat identification programs look for realtime cooperative and non-cooperative means to “sort-em” before shooting.
The specter of the downing of the Iranian Airbus by the Vincennes (CG-49) continues to haunt the Navy. These initiatives seek a comprehensive command- control-communications architecture, doctrine, and links to ensure that all elements of the Navy’s theater air defense system work together and complement other services’ systems. They also ensure that everything will be tested in mid-1994 by Joint Task Force ’95, centered on the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS Eisenhower (CVN-69).2
994
Proceedings/July 1994
85
Rising phoenix-like from what seemed to be the ashes of a program stillborn, the naval airship is once again being proposed for serious evaluation. Although a
tentative operational requirement for something called the Organic Long-Endurance Airborne Surveillance System was prepared in 1984, and the (Defense) Advanced Research Projects Agency has been investigating various national security uses for airships—including continental air defense—the Navy’s program never truly got off the ground. Fiscal year 1994 congressional language, however, clearly identifies “airship” as an “interest item.” And the need for a long- endurance airborne platform to provide surveillance and cooperative engagement capabilities against very low-observable missile targets similarly has been clear
On 23 October 1993, the USS Carter Hall (LSD-50) became the newest Harpers Ferry (LSD-49)-class dock landing ship/cargo variant to be launched. This is one of only three amphibious ship types to be retained at the turn of the century.
for some time, with the Navy now pursuing sensor development and evaluation under the Mountaintop Program. The various initiatives might meet in the middle, with a fleet airship demonstration suggested for a mid-1994 carrier battle group exercise off the Virginia Capes or with the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean. A variety of payload options are contemplated, with some visionaries focusing on systems for theater air defense surveillance and cuing in addition to area and unit cruise-missile defense; other military missions could be littoral antisubmarine and antisurface warfare. Still others have identified some civilian
dual-use mission concepts for the airship, including coastal zone/exclusive economic zone surveillance and coun- temarcotics interdiction.
Amphibious Warfare
The focus of the future expeditionary warfare fleet is on the need to provide sufficient lift for Marines and the means to get them from the ship to the shore in the most effective manner possible. This means, in addition to the V-22 Osprey tilt- rotor aircraft (or whatever platform is ultimately chosen to satisfy the Marines’ Medium Lift Requirement3) and the ad-
vanced amphibious assault vehicle, a critical need remains for amphibious lift to meet the 2.5 Marine Expeditionary Brigade objective, with each brigade today requiring about 20 amphibious and support ships, depending upon the available force mix. Near-term prospects look grim; as a result of decommissioning several classes of obsolescent amphibious ships, especially the Newport (LST-1179) and Iwo Jima (LPH-2) classes, perhaps as little as a 1.8 lift capability will be available. The future, however, offers slightly brighter prospects. From more than a half- dozen ship types in 1990, amphibious forces will “neck down” to just three by
the first years of the next decade: the Tarawa /Wasp LHA/LHD assault ships: the Whidbey Island and Harpers Ferrs (LSD-49/cargo-variant) dock landing ships; and the new-design LX (LPD-17) to replace 41 ships: the aging landing platform docks (LPDs), dock landing ships (LSDs), landing ship tanks (LSTs), and amphibious cargo ships (LKAs). The greater efficiencies of these ships will permit deployments of three-ship amphibious ready groups and still meet regional and theater lift needs in the future.
The Navy is planning to buy as many as 12 LX/LPD-17s, with the lead ship costing about $833 million in fiscal year 1996 and expected to be delivered in fiscal year 2002. Four more LX/LPD-17S are in the current program, two each in fiscal years 1998 and 1999, with the two- ship-per-year schedule continuing until all 12 are acquired through 2010. Congressional language in last year’s authorization bill called for incorporating an enhanced self-defense system (with capabilities similar to Aegis) and cooperative engagement in the LX design, which inspired some outside naval experts to identify Rube Goldberg-like “integrated" combat systems.4 One suggestion being 1 taken seriously, however, is incorporating SPS-48E three-dimensional radar systems cannibalized from the New Threat Upgrade cruisers now being mothballed to meet budget goals. Surface warfare planners indicate that this would provide a much better system at lower cost than two-dimensional SPS-49 radars. The Program Executive Office for Theater Air Defense in late 1993 and early 1994 conducted a threat- and requirements-based assessment, concluding that an affordable and effective combat system configuration be installed in the LPD-17 class. And cooperative engagement likely will be incorporated when it becomes available.
Detail design efforts will continue for a medium-size (approximately 24,500 tons full load), diesel-powered ship about 684 feet long, capable of carrying approximately 750 Marines, with 21,000 square feet of space for tracked/wheeled vehicles, 25,000 cubic feet of cargo space, two helicopters (CH-46 or smaller can be hangared; the heavy-lift CH-53 can be landed) or vertical take-off and landing aircraft, and two landing craft air cushion (LCAC) vehicles. The LX/LPD- 17 will not, however, have spaces for an embarked flag officer, as in the later Austin (LPD-4)-class dock amphibious transports or the heavy-lift capability of the Charleston (LKA-113)-class amphibious cargo ships it will replace.
86
Proceedings/July 1994
The Navy now plans at least a six-ship Wasp (LHD-l)-class helicopter/dock landing ship program as a result of congressional activism in fiscal years 1993
and 1994. (Originally, the Marine Corps at various times had indicated a preference for as many as ten LHDs, but the Navy truncated the program at five ships in 1993.) The $1.2 billion sixth ship, the Bon Homme Richard, stayed in the Navy’s budget last year, at the insistence of Congress, and indications are that the Navy would accept a seventh, if Capitol Hill offers it and the ship does not compete with other critical ship construction programs. Last year Congress appropriated (but did not authorize) $50 million for the seventh LHD, allowing the Navy—if full funding finally materializes—to exercise an option clause in the Ingalls Shipbuilding contract and get a “great deal” on this (perhaps) final LHD.5 Along with the five Tarawa (LHA-l)-class amphibious assault ships, the seven (plus?) LHDs and 12 LX/LPD- 17s are the core elements of the Navy’s 11-amphibious ready group force structure goal it expects to reach by 2008.
Critics deride her armament as “meager” and her armor as “transparent,” but the Cyclone (PC-1) got raves during her commissioning in August 1993 at the U.S. Naval Academy.
O. MATHIESON (MAI)
Mine Warfare
Major General Harry Jenkins, U.S. Marine Corps, Director, Expeditionary Warfare (N85), recognized that “in this era of fiscal austerity. . . we must make maximum use of existing platforms and capabilities as well as new technology to improve the Navy’s ability to conduct mine warfare. We are totally committed to this task.”6 With that philosophy in hand, the Navy’s 1994 Mine Warfare Plan proclaims the following priorities for the future:
► Develop a clandestine mine surveillance, reconnaissance, and detection capability without exposing the reconnaissance platforms. This is our top priority.
► Develop an all-source intelligence data base that will monitor ongoing mine research, development, and technologies throughout the world, coordinated with the Office of Naval Intelligence.
► Develop an organic mine-hunting and neutralization capability in carrier battle groups and amphibious ready groups. A key element of this is the development of mine countermeasures systems to be deployed on the multipurpose air cushion craft (MCAC) to provide such capability to amphibious forces.
► Develop an in-stride mine-detection and neutralization capability that will enable power projection forces to carry out amphibious operations from deep water, through the surf zone, to objectives ashore.
► Upgrade current capabilities of surface mine countermeasures ships, airborne
mine countermeasures helicopters, and command-and-control platforms.
> Develop a command-control-commu- nications-computers and intelligence (C41) capability for our Mine Force that is affordable but enables real-time data exchange among mine countermeasures units and between them and the senior expeditionary force commander.
► Integrate mine warfare with amphibious warfare in the areas of training and education, gaming and simulation, exercises, and deployments.
► Integrate regular and reserve units to establish efficient and effective mine countermeasures forces.
> Develop naval mines and the doctrine and tactics for their use.
The 1992 Mine Warfare Plan called for a force-level objective of 14 Avenger (MCM-l)-class ships and 12 Osprey (MHC-51)-class ships. This objective— 26 ships, all of which are to be home- ported at the Mine Warfare Center of Excellence in Ingleside, Texas—was revalidated by an internal Navy comparative force requirements assessment, independent assessments of surface and air mine countermeasures force requirements conducted for the Navy by the Center for Naval Analyses, and the joint littoral warfare analyses conducted as part of the investment balance review process conducted by the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. All 14 new Avenger ships will be in service with the active force by the end of fiscal year 1994. Two are planned to be transferred to the Naval Reserve Force in fiscal year 1995 and another two in fiscal 1996. And the 12 Ospreys will be in service by the end of fiscal year 1997. Eleven of the 12 MHC- 51s will transfer to the Naval Reserve Force after one year of service in the active fleet. All of the Navy’s aging, 1950s- era ocean minesweepers will be retired before 1995.
The mine crises of the mid-1980s and early 1990s underscored the requirement for a Mine Countermeasures Command, Control and Support Ship (MCS). During 1992-1993 the Navy examined issues
of new-construction versus conversion of an existing amphibious ship to serve as an MCS. Based on those studies, the Navy decided to convert an existing fleet asset, the USS Inchon (LPH/MCS-12), to satisfy the near-term requirement, funding for which was included in the fiscal year 1994 program.
Each of the Navy’s active airborne mine countermeasures squadrons, HM-14 and HM- 15, has eight MH-53E Sea Dragon helicopters and all necessary support and maintenance equipment. The total 45-aircraft acquisition program comprises 16 Sea Dragons for the active squadrons and 12 MH- 53Es for the reserve squadrons (six each for HM-18 and -19), with another 17 MH-53Es for fleet replacement squadron, pipeline and attrition, and test and evaluation commitments. These force levels and mixes, however, were reassessed in early spring 1994.’
The 1994 Mine Warfare Plan recognizes that:
Mine warfare is a “force multiplier” of pivotal importance in the joint naval expeditionary warfare context, especially in the littoral regions. The numbers and types of potential targets in such littoral conflicts are large and varied, from small diesel-electric submarines (including midget submarines) to small fast patrol boats and frigate- size combatants. Enemy operational practices will also have an impact upon our ability to conduct effective mining efforts.8
Although the policy rhetoric diverges from the reality of funding programs for mines, the Navy plans to begin research and analysis of systems concepts for three mine initiatives:
► Improving the maintainability, operational envelope, accuracy, launch quieting, and remote command and control of the Navy’s submarine-launched mobile mine (Mk-67) to enable clandestine minefields in defended areas
► Developing a littoral sea mine capable of being laid by aircraft, surface ships, and submarines, in shallow-to-deep water regions, which will be effective against a broad range of surface and submarine targets
► Developing and acquiring high-volume mine-delivery systems for cargo aircraft, surface ships, and submarines
Naval Surface Fire Support
87
Proceedings / July 1994
No current naval gun has the range to support the Marine Corps’ over-the-hori-
zon/maneuver warfare/from the sea concept, particularly if the MV-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft enters the fleet later in the decade to complement the landing craft air cushion. The 5-inch guns of various Navy surface combatants (no more than 160 weapons in the fleet in the year 2000) are proved weapons, albeit against a rather limited array of targets relatively close to the beach. The gun’s 12.8-mile range and 70-pound projectile are seen as inadequate for many future amphibious scenarios. Thus, proposals have been advanced to resurrect the Mk-71 8-inch Major Caliber Lightweight Gun intended for destroyer-sized ships and tested during the mid-1970s but canceled in 1978. (The gun was to replace the forward 5- inch mount on all 31 Spruance-class destroyers before failing to meet Defense Secretary Harold Brown’s expectations.) While offering a significant increase in projectile weight (190 pounds), its 15.5- mile range is only a slight improvement compared to the 5-inch gun. The development of a naval 155-mm gun, as some have proposed, would provide an increase in both range and projectile weight (similar to that of the 8-inch lightweight gun) compared to the 5-inch gun, but, also like the 8-inch gun, would result in significant start-up and life-cycle costs that might be unsupportable in today’s fiscal environment.
The Navy is therefore investigating prospects for improving the projectile technology for existing 5-inch guns, including rocket-assisted projectiles to increase range and semiactive laser-guided projectiles to enhance both range and accuracy. For the latter, a circular error probable of about 2.2 yards, significantly
The fate of the critically needed Supply (AOE-6)- class fast replenishment ship is still under evaluation. Of the original 12 ships called for, only four are currently under contract.
;-!W
CVN
CVN
GUli
CG.
CG.
CG-
CG-
GUI]
UDc &D( C>Ck Uck bt* &D< bD( bft bb b& IbD t>D bo 1 bD i bC be be be i be bC
?
bt
bt
bl
bl
less than the 328-yard error probability of current unguided 5-inch rounds, and ranges out to 15 miles and more are in the offing. An electro-thermal-chemical (ETC) cartridge for the 5- inch guns would capitalize on recent advances in capacitor-pulsed power supplies and advanced propellants investigated by the Defense Nuclear Agency, which promise ranges well in excess of 50 miles with current 5-inch payloads. A joint Navy/Defense Nuclear Agency program aims at a 1994-1995 demonstration of ETC technologies for both surface and air-defense applications.9
bl
s;
s-
S> 1 S' S:
By the end of the decade the Navy could have some 7,000 vertical-launch system cells in the fleet, making any VLS-capable naval surface fire support weapon an attractive prospect. A VLS- launched battlefield missile could meet the full over-the-horizon range requirement at an affordable price, but the only current U.S. battlefield missile is the 24- inch diameter Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS), which will be evaluated for VLS launch or launch from a modified ATACMS launcher fixed on amphibious ships. With its 500- to 1,000- pound payload and ranges of 60 to 160 nautical miles, ATACMS may prove effective in some scenarios, especially if provided with a Global Positioning System (GPS) capability, but its relatively high cost per round might still make it an uncertain player. (A similar industry- sponsored concept calls for a “navalized” Multiple Launch Rocket System modified for VLS launch, providing a much greater ability to put sheer tons of ordnance on target compared to 5-inch gun systems. But this would not have the range of the Navy ATACMS.) Still other battlefield missile concepts now being investigated for VLS surface warships.
The program also will address potential payloads, including enhanced unitary warheads, scatterable submunitions, and sensor-fused weapons. In this regard, both the Army’s Seek and Destroy Armor and Army/Air Force Brilliant Antitank munitions are being considered. Other Navy studies are concentrating on overall surveillance, targeting, and guidance technologies and systems architectures, reportedly leading some in the Army and Air Force to worry that the Navy is encroaching on their deep battlefield attack “turf,” while others are concerned that Navy studies are too narrow in focus.10
Naval Special Warfare
Through early 1994 the Navy took delivery of the first 4 of 13 CycloM (PC-l)-class patrol craft that will replace the 6 Pegasus (PHM-I)-class armed hydrofoils and the Sea Specter (PB Mk- III)-class patrol boats. Armed with shoul- | der-fired Stinger surface-to-air missiles. | two 40-mm grenade launchers, two 25- mm Bushmaster cannons (single), and two 50-cal. and two 7.62-mm machine guns, and capable of top speeds in excess of 35 knots, the craft have a crew of 28 and carry nine troops, including Navy SEALS | (Sea-Air-Land) forces. Marine Force Recon troops, and Army and Air Force special operations forces. Future plans call for these craft to be fitted with two Sta- bilized Weapon Platform Systems for firing Stingers as well as surface-to-surface missiles and a 25-mm cannon. While the Navy’s uniformed leadership praised the ship at the Cyclone’s commissioning at the U.S. Naval Academy on 7 August 1993, others have commented on the ship’s apparently “meager” armament, questionable stealthiness, and “transparent” armor for near-shore operations.
Other special-warfare programs include acquiring 72 10-meter/40-knot Rigid Hull Inflatable Boats to replace the obsolete Sea Fox craft, two research-and- development craft for classified tests, and the 80-foot/40-knot Mk V Special Operations Craft intended to support a SEAL platoon and complement the larger PC-Is. Working with the Navy’s submarine community to ensure compatibility with current and future submarines fitted with dry deck shelters for SEAL operations, the naval special warfare force will upgrade current Swimmer Delivery Vehicles and acquire new minisubs—the Advanced Swimmer Delivery System- improving range and payload, with each advanced vehicle capable of transporting nine special-operations troops and one crewman. Six advanced models will be acquired for about $270 million; the first unit is expected to be delivered in 1996. Three more upgraded Mk-8 SDVs will be acquired, in addition to the 14 now in service.
Combat Logistic Force/ Auxiliaries/Sealift
As the Navy’s Naval Surface Forces publication makes clear, the Combat Logistic Force requirement calls for one fast combat-support ship for each of the Navy’s carrier battle groups. Force-level requirements are continuing to be reassessed, and Military Sealift Command civilian manning alternatives are being considered for all combat logistic ships to meet operational requirements at much-
Proceedings/July 1994
Type/Hull
Number Name
FY
Program Builder
Status (June 1994*)
Type/Hull
Number
Name
FY
Program Builder
Status (June 1994*)
ak de- ■clont ;p1ace
d hy- Mk- houl- isiles. o 25- d two guns. :ss of 8 and EALs Force Force is call > Stair fir rface e the d the
AIRCRAFT CARRIERS
CVN-74 | John C. Stennis | 1988 |
CVN-75 | United States | 1988 |
GUIDED-MISSILE CRUISERS |
| |
CG-70 | Lake Erie | 1988 |
CG-71 | Cape St. George | 1988 |
CG-72 | Vella Gulf | 1988 |
CG-73 | Port Royal | 1988 |
Newport News Newport News
Bath Iron Works Litton/Ingalls Litton/Ingalls Litton/Ingalls
Lau. 13 Nov. 93 K.L. 29 Nov. 93
Com. 24 Jul. 93 Com. 12 Jun. 93 Com. 18 Sep. 93 Lau. 20 Nov. 92
at
gust
the
ient.
;par
. in-
cnot
: the
ind-
and
aer
M
get
na-
lity
ted
ra' r ce
at
he
ch n I ne he •st 6- ill w
guided-missilf. destroyers
DDG-53 DDG-54 ODG-55 ODG-56 DDG-57 DDG-58 DDG-59 DDG-60 DDG-61 DDG-62 DDG-63 DDG-64 DDG-65 DDG-66 DDG-67 DDG-68 DDG-69 DDG-70 DDG-71 DDG-72 DDG-73 GDG-74 DDG-75 hDG-76 hDG-77 DDG-78 hDG-79
SSBN-739 SSBN-740 SSBN-74I SSBN-742 SSBN-743
ATTACK SUBMARINES SSN-762 SSN-763 SSN-765 SSN-766 SSN-767 SSN-768 SSN-769 SSN-770 SSN-771 SSN-772 SSN-773 SSN-21 SSN-22 SSN-23
John Paul Jones | 1987 | Bath Iron Works | Com. | 18 | Dec. | 93 |
Curtis Wilbur | 1989 | Bath Iron Works | Com. | 9 | Jul. | 94* |
Stout | 1989 | Litton/Ingalls | Lau. | 16 | Oct. | 92 |
John S. McCain | 1989 | Bath Iron Works | Lau. | 26 Sep. | 92 | |
Mitscher | 1989 | Litton/Ingalls | Lau. | 5 May | 93 | |
Laboon | 1989 | Bath Iron Works | Lau. | 20 | Feb. | 93 |
Russell | 1990 | Litton/Ingalls | Lau. | 20 | Oct. | 93 |
Paul Hamilton | 1990 | Bath Iron Works | Lau. | 24 | Jul. | 93 |
Ramage | 1990 | Litton/Ingalls | Lau. | 12 | Feb. | 94 |
Fitzgerald | 1990 | Bath Iron Works | Lau. | 29 | Jan. | 94 |
Stethem | 1990 | Litton/Ingalls | K.L. | 10 May 93 | ||
Carney | 1991 | Bath Iron Works | K.L. | 3 Aug. 93 | ||
Benfold | 1991 | Litton/Ingalls | K.L. | 27 Sep. | 93 | |
Gonzalez | 1991 | Bath Iron Works | K.L. | 3 | Feb. | 94 |
Cole | 1991 | Litton/Ingalls | K.L. | 28 | Feb. | 94 |
The Sullivans | 1992 | Bath Iron Works | Ord. | 8 | Apr. | 92 |
Milius | 1992 | Litton/Ingalls | Ord. | 8 Apr. | 92 | |
Hopper | 1992 | Bath Iron Works | Ord. | 8 | Apr. | 92 |
Ross | 1992 | Litton/Ingalls | Ord. | 8 Apr. | 92 | |
Mahan | 1992 | Bath Iron Works | Ord. | 8 Apr. | 92 | |
Decatur | 1993 | Bath Iron Works | Ord. | 19 | Jan. | 93 |
McFaul | 1993 | Litton/Ingalls | Ord. | 21 | Jan. | 93 |
Donald Cook | 1993 | Bath Iron Works | Ord. | 19 | Jan. | 93 |
Higgins | 1993 | Bath Iron Works | Ord. | 19 | Jan. | 93 |
| 1994 |
|
|
|
|
|
| 1994 |
|
|
|
|
|
| 1994 |
|
|
|
|
|
LISTIC-MISSILE SUBMARINES |
|
|
|
| ||
Nebraska | 1987 | Electric Boat | Com. | 15 Aug. 92 | ||
Rhode Island | 1988 | Electric Boat | Lau. | 17 | Jul. | 93 |
Maine | 1989 | Electric Boat | Lau. |
| Jul. | 94* |
Wyoming | 1990 | Electric Boat | Lau. |
| Jul. | 95* |
Louisiana | 1991 | Electric Boat | Lau. |
| Jul. | 96* |
LHD-3
LHD-4
LHD-5
LHD-6
Columbus | 1986 | Electric Boat | Com. 24 | Jul. 93 | |
Santa Fe | 1986 | Electric Boat | Com. | 8 | Jan. 94 |
Montpelier | 1987 | Newport News | Com. | 13 | Mar. 93 |
Charlotte | 1987 | Newport News | Lau. | 3 | Oct. 92 |
Hampton | 1987 | Newport News | Com. | 6 | Nov. 93 |
Hartford | 1988 | Electric Boat | Lau. | 4 | Dec. 93 |
Toledo | 1988 | Newport News | Lau. | 28 | Aug. 93 |
Tucson | 1988 | Newport News | Lau. | 19 | Mar. 93 |
Columbia | 1989 | Electric Boat | K.L. | 21 | Apr. 93 |
Greeneville | 1989 | Newport News | K.L. | 28 | Feb. 92 |
Cheyenne | 1990 | Newport News | K.L. | 6 | Jul. 92 |
Seawolf | 1989 | Electric Boat | K.L. | 21 Aug. 92 | |
Connecticut | 1991 | Electric Boat | K.L. | 8 | Mar 94 |
| (1996) (Electric Boat) | (Proposed) | |||
IS ASSAULT SHIPS | |||||
Kearsarge | 1988 | Litton/Ingalls | Com. 25 | Sep. 93 | |
Boxer | 1989 | Litton/Ingalls | Lau. | 13 | Aug. 93 |
Bataan | 1991 | Litton/Ingalls | K.L. | 25 | Apr. 94* |
Bon Homme Richard 1993 Litton/Ingalls
Ord. 11 Dec. 92
°OCK LANDING SHIPS/LSD CARGO VARIANT LSD-49 Harpers Ferry 1988 Avondale
LSD-50 Carter Hall 1990 Avondale
LSD-51 Oak Hill 1991 Avondale
LSD-52 Pearl Harbor 1993 Avondale
mine countermeasures ships
MCM-10 Warrior
MCM-11 Gladiator
MCM-12 Ardent
MCM-13 Dextrous
MCM-14 Chief
Lau. 16 Jan. 93 Lau. 23 Oct. 93 K.L. 21 Nov. 92 Ord. 12 Oct. 93
1986 Peterson Builders Com. 3 Apr. 93
1986 Peterson Builders Com. 4 Jun. 93
1990 Peterson Builders Com. 18 Feb. 94
1990 Peterson Builders Lau. 20 Jun. 92
1990 Peterson Builders Lau. 12 Jun. 93
COASTAL MINEHUNTERS
MHC-51 | Osprey | 1986 | Intermarine USA | Com. 20 | Nov. | 93 | |
MHC-52 | Heron | 1989 | Intermarine USA | Lau. | 21 | Mar. | 92 |
MHC-53 | Pelican | 1989 | Avondale | Lau. | 27 | Feb. | 93 |
MHC-54 | Robin | 1990 | Avondale | Lau. | 11 | Sep. | 93 |
MHC-55 | Oriole | 1990 | Intermarine USA | Lau. | 22 May | 93 | |
MHC-56 | Kingfisher | 1991 | Avondale | Ord. | 29 | Mar. | 91 |
MHC-57 | Cormorant | 1991 | Avondale | Ord. | 29 | Mar. | 91 |
MHC-58 | Blackhawk | 1992 | Intermarine USA | Ord. | 22 Apr. | 92 | |
MHC-59 | Falcon | 1992 | Intermarine USA | Ord. | 22 Apr. | 92 | |
MHC-60 | Cardinal | 1992 | Intermarine USA | Ord. | 22 Apr. | 92 | |
MHC-61 | Raven | 1993 | Intermarine USA | Ord. | 31 | Mar. | 93 |
MHC-62 | Shrike | 1993 | Intermarine USA | Ord. | 31 | Mar. | 93 |
COASTAL PATROL BOATS |
|
|
|
|
|
| |
PC-1 | Cyclone | 1990 | Bollinger | Com. | 7 | Aug. 93 | |
PC-2 | Tempest | 1990 | Bollinger | Com. 21 | Aug. 93 | ||
PC-3 | Hurricane | 1990 | Bollinger | Com. | 15 | Oct. | 93 |
PC-4 | Monsoon | 1990 | Bollinger | Com. | 8 | Jun. | 94* |
PC-5 | Typhoon | 1990 | Bollinger | Com. | 12 | Feb. | 94 |
PC-6 | Sirocco | 1990 | Bollinger | Lau. | 29 May | 93 | |
PC-7 | Squall | 1990 | Bollinger | Lau. | 28 Aug. 93 | ||
PC-8 | Zephyr | 1990 | Bollinger | Lau. | 12 | Mar. | 94 |
PC-9 | Chinook | 1991 | Bollinger | K.L. | 16 | Jun. | 93 |
PC-10 | Firebolt | 1991 | Bollinger | K.L. | 19 Sep. | 93 | |
PC-11 | Whirlwind | 1991 | Bollinger | K.L. | 3 | Jan. | 94 |
PC-12 | Thunderbolt | 1991 | Bollinger | Ord. | 19 | Jul. | 91 |
PC-13 | Shamal | 1991 | Bollinger | Ord. | 19 | Jul. | 91 |
FAST COMBAT SUPPLY SHIPS |
|
|
|
|
|
| |
AOE-6 | Supply | 1987 | National Steel | Com. 26 | Feb. | 94 | |
AOE-7 | Rainier | 1989 | National Steel | Lau. | 28 Sep. | 91 | |
AOE-8 | Arctic | 1990 | National Steel | Lau. | 3 | Oct. | 93 |
AOE-11 | Bridge | 1993 | National Steel | Ord. | 15 | Jan. | 93 |
OCEANOGRAPHIC SURVEY SHIP (Military Sealift Command) |
|
|
| ||||
T-AGS-45 | Waters | 1990 | Avondale | Del. | 6 | Jun. | 92 |
T-AGS-60 | Pathfinder | 19 | Marine | Lau. | 7 | Oct. | 93 |
T-AGS-6! | Sumner | 1990 | Halter Marine | Lau. | 28 | Feb. | 94 |
T-AGS-62 | Bowditch | 1990 | Halter Marine | K.L. | 17 | Jun. | 93 |
OCEAN SURVEILLANCE SHIPS/SWATH VARIANT (Military Sealift Command)
T-AGOS-22 Loyal | 1989 | McDermott | Del. | 11 | Jun. | 93 |
(SURTASS VARRIANT) |
|
|
|
|
|
|
T-AGOS-23 Impeccable | 1990 | Tampa Shipyards | K.L. | 17 | Dec. | 93 |
OILERS (Military Sealift Command) |
|
|
|
|
| |
T-AO-191 Benjamin Isherwood | 1985 | Tampa Shipyards | Cane. 25 | Oct. | 93 | |
T-AO-192 Henry Eckford | 1985 | Tampa Shipyards | Cane. 25 | Oct. | 93 | |
T-AO-199 Tippecanoe | 1988 | Avondale | Del. |
| Feb. | 93 |
T- AO-201 Patuxent | 1989 | Avondale | K.L. | 16 | Oct. | 93 |
T-AO-202 Yukon | 1989 | Avondale | Lau. | 6 | Feb. | 93 |
T-AO-203 Laramie | 1989 | Avondale | Lau. | 10 Jan. | 94 | |
T-AO-204 Rappahannock | 1989 | Avondale | K.L. | 9 | Jun. | 92 |
OCEANOGRAPHIC (Military Sealift Command) |
|
|
|
| ||
T-AGOR-24 Revelle | 1993 | Halter Marine | Ord. | 11 | Jan. | 93 |
VEHICLE CARGO SHIPS - LMSR (Military Sealift Command) |
|
|
| |||
T-AKR-300 Bob Hope | 1993 | Avondale | Ord. | 2 Sep. | 93 | |
T-AKR-301 | 1993 | National Steel | Ord. | 15 Sep. | 93 | |
CONVERSIONS/REACTIVATIONS |
|
|
|
|
| |
AIRCRAFT CARRIERS |
|
|
|
|
|
|
CVN-65 Enterprise | 1990 | Newport News | Del. |
| May 94* | |
VEHICLE CARGO SHIPS - LMSR (Military Sealift Command) |
|
|
| |||
T-AKR-295 | 1993 | National Steel | Ord. | 30 | Jul. | 93 |
T-AKR-296 | 1993 | Newport News | Ord. | 30 | Jul. | 93 |
T-AKR-297 | 1993 | National Steel | Ord. | 30 | Jul. | 93 |
T-AKR-298 | 1993 | Newport News | Ord. | 30 | Jul. | 93 |
T-AKR-299 | 1993 | National Steel | Ord. | 30 Jul. | 93 |
* Indicates projected date
Proceedings / July 1994
89
reduced costs. In 1994, that requirement is being met by the four Sacramento (AOE-l)-class station supply ships, seven two-ship combinations of replenishment oilers and ammunition (AO/AE) ships, and the five Cimarron (T-AO-177)- class“jumbosized” oilers. The Supply (AOE-6)-class fast replenishment ship program remains an important—albeit uncertain—element in ensuring that all future needs will be satisfied. While 12 ships were to be acquired, at this time only four have been placed under contract with National Steel Shipbuilding Company (NASSCO) in San Diego, and no new AOE-6s appear in the still-underreview fiscal year 1996-1999 program.
In 1994 the Navy operated about 20 fleet auxiliaries, destroyer and submarine tenders, and other support vessels for forward-area operations, and the requirements for these ships were also being reassessed. Last year an ADC(X)—an auxiliary dry-cargo ship to serve in the shuttle role between forward area logistic sites and combat logistic ships—was in the ship construction plan. The lead ADC(X) was to cost about $540 million in 1998, and would be the first of several ADCs to replace the Mars (AFS-l)-class combat stores and Kilauea (AE-26)-class ammunition ships between 1998 and 2008. It, too, has been dropped from the current 1995-1999 plan, but remains under consideration “for future acquisition.” The future remains devoid of new- construction tenders.
The 1991 Mobility Requirements Study outlined an integrated mobility plan that includes new construction and conversion of sealift ships and an expanded Ready Reserve Force operated (and which also possibly could be maintained in the future) by the Military Sealift Command, additional afloat prepositioning assets for the Army, and continued procurement of the C-17 transport aircraft for the Air Force. The study concluded that the Navy should acquire additional sealift capacity equal to 20 large, medium-speed (24-knot sustained) Roll- On/Roll-Off (LMSR) ships in two basic configurations: 11 ships, each with a 380,000 square-foot capacity; and 9 prepositioning ships, each with a 300,000 square-foot capacity. The study called for a total of two million square feet of prepositioned and three million square feet of surge sealift capacity, as well as two container ships to be leased for Army prepositioning. It also cited the need to expand the Ready Reserve Force from the mid-1993 force of 98 ships to 140 ships—of which 102 are to be dry-cargo ships—and to increase the readiness of the fleet for a future major regional contingency. The study, however, is being readdressed to take into account the lift
requirements for the two-major-regional conflict (MRC)-scenario laid out in the
1993 Bottom-Up Review, leading some to believe that strategic lift requirements—both airlift and sealift—will be revised upward" while others have criticized the current plan as too expansive.12 Some analysts have noted that fast sealift—speeds in excess of 26 knots— will both complement the LMSRs and have dual-use commercial applications for high-value, time-sensitive economic cargoes too large for air delivery.
The Navy awarded the initial conversion contracts for the LMSRs called for in the study in July 1993 and the new- construction contracts in September; the converted ships are to be delivered to the Military Sealift Command in fiscal year 1995, and all new-construction ships, between fiscal years 1997 and 2001. The Navy awarded one contract worth $634,897,087 to NASSCO for the detail design and conversion of three former Maersk Inc. containerships (3,000 TEU); Newport News received a $425,591,681 contract for the conversion of two former East Asianic Company (triple screw, 26- knot) containerships. These five ships will result in about one million square feet of cargo capability, leaving an additional four million square feet to be acquired in new-construction LMSRs. Contracts ($ 1.33 billion each) for one lead ship and options for five additional ships each were awarded to NASSCO and Avondale Industries in New Orleans. In February
1994 the Navy announced that the first new-construction ship will be named after comedian Bob Hope, who spent most of his career, from World War II through the Gulf War, entertaining troops overseas. The 24-knot, 950-foot-long Bob Hope will be constructed by Avondale at a cost of $265 million. Unsuccessful bidders for the LMSR new-construction program were Bath Iron Works, Halter Marine, Ingalls Shipbuilding, Newport News Shipbuilding, and Tampa Shipbuilding.
A Smaller. . . More Capable Fleet
Military readiness is perhaps the key element of the U.S. ability to protect its citizens’ property, and important interests throughout the world. More than 200 years ago Edmund Burke commented that “it is the people; it is their attachment to their government, from the sense of the deep stake they have in such a glorious institution, which gives you your Army and your Navy, and infuses into both that liberal obedience, without which your Army would be base rabble and your Navy nothing but rotten timber.”
In his first State of the Union Address, President Bill Clinton again pledged emphatically—if briefly—to keep America’s
military the best-trained, best-equipped, best-prepared fighting force in the world. This is a tall order, especially as force levels and military personnel will continue to be reduced to meet the affordability goals of an administration and perhaps a nation focusing on internal concerns and external balances of payments. But without a concomitant reduction in commitments to allies and friends worldwide and to protecting vital U.S. interests wherever and whenever they might be threatened in the years ahead, the potential for the President to demand even more from the Navy and all other elements of the U.S- I Armed Forces will almost inevitably result in hollow forces—hollow in spirit if not in motivated and highly trained people, in well-maintained ships and aircraft, in sufficient numbers of weapons to , fill magazines, in fuel for steaming and flying, in spare parts, and in all manner and materiel provisions—if these three objectives are not met. Tomorrow’s fleet—effective fighting force or rotten timber—hangs in the balance.
'“U.S. Navy Fights BMDO for Antimissile Funds.” | Defense News, 11-17 April 1994, p. 8.
J“U.S. Atlantic Command to Test TMD Joint Operations,” Defense News, 14-20 March 1994, pp. 28,
30.
>“V-22 Considered in Congress as Pilot Acquisition | Program,” Inside the Navy, 7 March 1994, pp. 2-3- 4“Self-Defense Key as DAB and RFP Approach for New Amphibious Ship,” Defense Daily, 4 January 1994, pp. 3-4. See also, “Congress Prices LX Out of - the Market,” Navy News & Undersea Technology.
10 January 1994, p. 1.
5“Navy Places and Odd Bet on Seventh LHD,” Navy Times, 21 March 1994, p. 16.
"U.S. Navy Mine Warfare Plan, 1994 ed., (Department of the Navy, Washington, DC: February 1994). p. iii.
7“Navy Report to Congress Finds Few Holes in [AMCM] Minesweeping Capability,” Inside the Navy* ' 28 February 1994. Reportedly, however, the Navy may reorganize its airborne mine countermeasures i forces into two integrated active/reserve squadrons, HM-14 and HM-15, each possessing 12 MH-53E Sea Dragon helicopters.
'Mine Warfare Plan, op.cit., p. 30.
’“Use of Electric-Powered Guns Can Add Flexibility to Navy Operations,” Inside the Navy, 24 January 1994, pp. 1, 5-6.
l0“Navy Eyes Conducting Deep Attack Missions from Ships,” Inside the Navy, 31 January 1994, pp. 1,7; “CNA Sea-Based Fire Support Study Eyes Targeting, Surveillance Needs,” Inside the Navy, 21 February 1994; “OSD Paid Lincoln Lab to Study AT- ACMS, Standard Missile Fire Support,” Inside the Navy, 7 March 1994, pp. 6-7.
““Two-War Scenario in MRS Update Could Increase Lift Requirements,” Inside the Navy, 17 January 1994, p. 9. See also, “Draft Logistics Strategic Plan Pushes for Improvements in Mobility,” Inside the Navy, 7 March 1994, pp. 1, 14-18; and “Defense Trends: A Spacious Lack of U.S. Lift,” Navy Times,
21 March 1994, p. 30.“
,J“IG: DoD Spending $800 million for Sealift It Doesn’t Need,” Inside the Navy, 28 February 1994,
pp. 1-2.
Dr. Truver directs the center for Security Strategies and Operations, TECHMATICS, Inc., in Virginia.
Proceedings / July 1994