Second Honorable Mention, International Navies Essay Contest
The Bangladesh Navy has come a long way since its formation in 1972. It's time to begin upgrading to a force that can protect the country's many maritime interests.
The requirements of a navy stem from a country's interest in the use of the sea. The sea is used by nations for four purposes—maritime commerce, transportation of people, exploitation of sea resources, and military transportation. Of these, the first three are purely economic. Economics has made the oceans a contentious ground. Since the days of the galley, nations have maintained their interests at sea by influencing each other's activities.
Bangladesh is a small littoral state on the Bay of Bengal with vital interests at sea. Its limited land resources are inadequate to support its 130 million people. Dependence on sea resources is inevitable.
Fish are a major sea resource of Bangladesh. In our exclusive economic zone (EEZ), 475 species of fish are available. Of these, 65 have commercial importance. In the Bay of Bengal there are three major fishing grounds. The fish stock in the EEZ has eased protein shortage to a significant extent. In addition to trawlers, a large number of mechanized boats and country boats are engaged in estuarine, offshore, and deep-sea fishing. In 1985-1986 about 3,500 mechanized boats and 15,000 sail and oar boats were engaged in fishing at sea. Yearly production of marine fish also has been on the rise since independence. Today it is a major contributor to national economic growth.
Maritime commerce, an ancient economic activity at sea, is vital to Bangladesh. From 1967 to 1998, the sea accounted for 93.14% of total export and import. Maritime commerce rose to 10.3 million metric tons in 19941995 from 7.2 million metric tons in 1990-1991, with an average yearly increase of 11.63%.
Between 1984-1985 and 1996-1997, an average of 1,559 vessels were handled at the seaports of Bangladesh. Bangladesh also is heavily dependent on foreign-flag carriers for cargo transportation. The capacity of Bangladesh Shipping in 1994-1995 was 267,664 deadweight tons, and monthly trade turnover was 856,572 metric tons. Maritime commerce has been on the rise since independence and will continue to grow with gradual social, industrial, and economic development of the country. If the port facilities of Chittagong and Mongla are conceded at anytime in the future to India and Nepal, it will damage the trade volume involving tripartite interest in the Bay of Bengal.
The most significant economic event in recent days in the EEZ is the discovery of hydrocarbon. The EEZ has been divided into six blocks for exploration and a gas rig at Sangu Valley has gone into production. Bangladesh is optimistic about accessing more fields of hydrocarbon in the EEZ, and if successful, the need to protect them will be acute.
Bangladesh claims 70,000 square kilometers of EEZ. This zone faces counterclaims from India and Myanmar, which if allowed would make Bangladesh a landlocked country. With its disadvantageous concave coast, Bangladesh prefers maritime boundary delimitation based on equitable principle, while India and Myanmar (with convex coasts) opt for the equidistant principle. In an exercise of the power conferred by the Territorial Waters and Maritime Zones Act of 1974 (Act No. 26 of 1974), the Bangladesh government enacted a base line, which lies at the ten-fathom line. In 1974, both India and Myanmar protested Bangladesh's claim.
Foreign fishing trawlers throng into Bangladesh's EEZ for illegal fishing. There are no statistics about the frequency of these poachers or the amount of catch they take away, but judging from the number of trawlers seized, they use every opportunity to indulge in poaching. The fishery protection drive carried out by the Bangladesh Navy from 1985 to 1997 apprehended 50 trawlers.
The vastness of the sea provides the miscreants and the encroachers many opportunities to hide in the mist, haze, and beyond the horizon. The Navy has the exhausting business of finding them. From the quiet and desolate sea, smugglers can push illegal goods in bulk into the local market. In an unguarded or ill-protected sea, smugglers have things very much to themselves and can swamp local markets with contraband, including drugs. Between 1985 and 1997, the Navy seized 451 foreign vessels and native mechanized boats. Goods confiscated during this anti-smuggling and fishery protection drive were worth approximately $28.5 million.
With these interests in mind, the objective of the Bangladesh Navy should be to maintain territorial integrity, ensure safe seaborne trade, protect coastal and offshore assets and marine resources, support national industries through anti-smuggling campaigns, and control the maritime zones.
Naval Development in the Region
International politics and the accompanying security concerns of the regional states influence naval development in the area. In Sri Lanka, for example, Tamil insurgency had a positive effect on national naval programs.
Over the years, naval build-up in this region has occurred both through indigenous efforts and assistance from external sources. In indigenous efforts, India has had significant success and Pakistan is striving, but most others are dependent on external sources.
While indigenous programs provide slow growth, external sources give major boosts to naval modernization programs. With China as its major partner, Myanmar has started modernizing its navy, including the construction of a new naval base at Hanggyi Island at the mouth of Bassein River, and upgrading the naval bases at Sittwe (Akyab) near the Bangladesh border, at Mergui near the Thai border, and at Great Coco Island in the Bay of Bengal. Between 1990 and 1992, Myanmar received $1 billion in military aid and China reportedly is developing infrastructure in Myanmar to support submarine operation.
The development of submarine infrastructure is a matter of concern for two reasons: (1) Myanmar might have a long-term program to induct submarines into its naval inventory, or (2) China might use this facility to support submarine operations in this part of the world. The situation will be more complex if Myanmar provides a port facility for the operation of Chinese submarines in the Indian Ocean. The establishment of a U.S. logistics base in Singapore seemingly was prelude to growing Chinese interest in the Indian Ocean to secure the strategic choke point of the Malacca Strait.
Bangladesh is not likely to wage war against any country, but it might be drawn into a war. The nation's geographical location has strategic importance because of its close proximity to the Malacca Strait. Bangladesh needs to be strong at sea to remain out of war and maintain its own maritime interests.
The Navy's Growth
The Bangladesh Navy started making headway after the country became independent from Pakistan in 1972. It did not receive any of Pakistan's naval forces. Starting from scratch, the Navy emerged as an offshore territorial defence force. Two riverine patrol craft were built at Dockyard Engineering Works, Narayanganj, in Bangladesh. Patrol craft also were received from friendly countries such as India and the former Yugoslavia. It was proposed in 1972 to acquire patrol craft armed with missiles, and subsequently the Navy entered the missile era in 1982. Significant acquisition of ships began in 1976 with one Type61 frigate. Two more frigates, Type-41, joined the Navy in 1982. Until 1980, most of the ships were of British and East European origin. In 1982 there was a shift in the procurement of combat platforms and a good number of FAC(M), FAC(T), FAC(G), and auxiliaries joined the naval inventory from China. The FAC(M) became the power of the Navy.
In the following years, more ships joined the navy. As part of the indigenous effort, a few auxiliary ships were built in the shipyards of Khulna and Narayanganj. After the river class patrol craft, no attempt has been made to fabricate combat craft locally, although Bangladesh has the infrastructure to build ships of patrol-craft size, excluding the main machinery and armament. The Navy now has more than 50 ships and craft, although a Bangladeshi analyst opined, "Bangladesh has a rather small navy, virtually having no trade defence and sea denial force as well as no worthwhile EEZ protection capability and no sea lines of communication protection force, and possessing only a meager maritime surveillance capability." Naval thinkers' views on the Navy's combat capability might vary. Perhaps it will be agreed that the ships in the inventory have had immense training value and the time is ripe to switch over to a more qualitative fleet. The acquisition of Sea Dragon-class patrol craft and the DW 2000W frigate (set to join the Navy this year) are steps to that effect.
To maintain its maritime interest, the Navy needs to control the maritime zones. A balanced fleet is the best choice, but some of the essential elements of a balanced fleet are yet to be inducted into the naval inventory. Admiral Stansfield Turner acknowledged the changes brought about by the development of the submarine and airplane in the concept of sea control.
The submarine, a sea-denial weapon, is needed for all tactics of sea control. Its deterrent effect on an opponent is greater than its power of destruction. After the Gulf War, Admiral James Williams, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations of the U.S. Navy, said, "The fact that Saddam Hussein did not have any submarines had worked enormously to our advantage. If he had had the vision to buy six SSKs and deployed three of them on either side of the Strait of Hormuz it would have complicated matters. Even a diesel submarine makes a significant difference on how you drive your ship." During the Falklands War, an Argentine submarine did not achieve any kills but tied down the valuable time and resources of the British fleet.
Naval aviation is another sea-denial weapon and the extension of ship's firepower far beyond the horizon. Carrier-borne air power for Bangladesh is just an aspiration, but shore-based limited air power could be attainable. The vastness of the ocean puts emphasis on the surveillance system, ranging from satellites to a ship's lookout. The usual means of EEZ surveillance is a low-speed surface ship. Fixed-wing aircraft have a higher search rate than surface ships, and although they are regarded as an effective and economic means of surveillance for Bangladesh, this idea does not fly in the Navy. In addition to aircraft, shore-based long-range surface radar is another effective tool for surveillance.
For the protection of shipping, a light frigate/corvette with limited offensive capability can be employed. A surface ship can influence hundreds of square miles with an array of antiship, antisubmarine, and antiair stand-off capabilities. Jane's Fighting Ships 1999-2000 reveals that ships of patrol-craft size with conventional weapons dominate the Navy's inventory and large-to-medium size platforms with advanced technology are very limited.
The Bangladesh Coast Guard was formed in 1994 to relieve the Navy of the policing function. The Coast Guard began with two patrol craft on loan from the Navy. At the beginning of 2000, the Coast Guard purchased a patrol craft from Malaysia. To relieve the Bangladesh Navy of the policing function, the Coast Guard will need to have at least a fleet of patrol craft, a fleet that will take some time to acquire because of bureaucratic complexity and economic constraints. Until that time, the Navy will have to continue its constabulary role.
Future Options
To protect its national maritime interests, Bangladesh should be able to control the sea with a deterrent presence in a buffer zone abutting the EEZ. The Navy should be armed with subsurface, surface, and aerial platforms, each of which performs a different role. A conventional submarine would be able to undertake the subsurface role contemplated for Bangladesh. A combination of light frigates and corvettes with three-dimensional weapons to take charge of the surface, subsurface, and air threat could be a feasible choice. Air power, the long arm of the navy, allows an upper hand at sea. For the Bangladesh Navy, acquiring air power might begin with maritime patrol aircraft and a shipboard helicopter.
Political vision is the decisive factor for acquiring this force structure and financing will be an important ingredient. With the Navy receiving 13% (approximately) of the defense budget, it might be difficult to achieve the capability. It will, therefore, be essential to make a cost/benefit analysis of naval development against national maritime economic interests.
Commander Razzak is assigned to the office of the Commodore commanding the Bangladesh Navy Flotilla in Chittagong, Bangladesh.