"Euro-Army May Replace NATO"
(See N. Friedman, p. 6, February 2001 Proceedings)
Commander Christopher S. Real, U.S. Navy, Staff Officer for European Security Defense Identity Issues, Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic Representative Europe, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium—Dr. Friedman's thought-provoking article is severely flawed in its reasoning and conclusions. For the sake of brevity I will discuss only three main themes.
First, the article states that former U.S. Secretary of Defense William Cohen "warned that if Europe created a force independent of NATO the Alliance would begin to collapse." This gives a false impression that the United States has not been supportive of the European Union's (EU) goal of building a military capability. Secretary Cohen's statements made at the October 2000 NATO defense ministerial meeting clearly state this support: "It is right and natural that an increasingly integrated Europe seeks to develop its own Security and Defense Policy with a military capability to back it up. Let me be clear on America's position: we agree with this goal—not grudgingly, not with resignation, but with wholehearted conviction." U.S. support is based on the logic that an EU military capability also will improve NATO capabilities, because both organizations will share the same national forces. Most important, the building of an effective EU military force, without U.S. assets to draw on, will necessitate improvements to European military capabilities that the United States has been urging within NATO. If the United States wants European military forces to share more of the burden, then the EU might be more successful than NATO has been.
The second theme that I find questionable is the assertion that "as the EU enlarges, the argument will be made more and more that any national veto is impractical and that the Union can and must act as a unified government. Surely the veto of military commitment will not be an exception to that rule." It is not very likely that any of the EU nations would allow the use of its military forces without having either veto authority over the specific operation or the option not to participate. In NATO, each nation has the power to veto, and in the case of out-of-- area (non-Article 5) operations, each nation has a right not to participate. And although there are some Europeans who truly do seek a United States of Europe with some type of federal authority over national governments, this is not a feasible option.
The major flaw that I find most amazing is the theory that the EU's attempt to unify more closely actually might have the opposite effect and foster an anti-EU backlash, resulting in the coming to power of right-wing fringe political parties. In addition, the article argues, as recent history of European nationalism teaches us, this might even lead to another conflict on the continent. Although there is some sensitivity, within Europe on national sovereignty versus the EU I think the article's warning of a possible return of nationalistic extremism is a little extreme in itself. While there are those who oppose unification in Europe, it is a far stretch of the imagination to postulate that this might result in right-wing nationalistic political parties being swept into power throughout Europe and this same rise of nationalism result in another major European conflict. A more credible argument is that greater European unity will continue to moderate the forces of nationalistic extremism.
The EU is a very successful economic and political organization and has chosen to build a security and defense structure that will give it a military capability. This is a logical and laudable goal of an increasingly unified Europe. This building of a separate EU military capability also will improve the military effectiveness of NATO, since NATO will use these same national forces and capabilities. This development is in the strategic interest of the United States, which has often challenged European nations to improve their military capabilities and share the burden more equally within NATO. Europe has decided to do just that.
"Hazarding the Cole"
(See J. Cushman, p. 2, January 2001; R. Bowdish, P. McVety, pp. 12-14, February 2001 Proceedings)
Chief Warrant Officer Bruce Rossi, U.S. Navy (Retired)—I was a physical security officer on a forward-deployed tender in a hard-to-defend arena, as well as being the guy for security, physical security/antiterrorism/force protection, when the ship deployed to the Persian Gulf. Our ship virtually was welded to a pier for two months to support the fleet.
Inflatables—commonly referred to as Zodiacs—are in no way satisfactory for what General Cushman suggests. They are unstable, as well as easily deflatable, and would not support any type of armament except small arms, unless of course you had the luxury of a SEAL craft.
The harbors are controlled by foreign entities that set the rules. No foreign harbor that I know of lets the visiting ship deploy small craft armed with small arms, fixed guns, or any other type of guns. In fact, U.S. policy has been to work with the host country to set up security via a husbanding agent and an American consulate or attaché officer. Quoting what an officer of the 1960s said and did during that time frame is not realistic. Activities of the 1960s are in no way reflective of the stringent requirements put on our ships and sailors in today's force.
I also was stationed on and rode a number of submarines. I do not know of any submarine captains who routinely send a plethora of armed personnel topside to mingle with the maneuvering watch on the confined area of a submarine deck. The times I saw armed personnel topside they were either in the sail, which does not have a lot of extra room, or the submarine was in port, which usually involves only two men, topside watch and sentry. These watches are common throughout the fleet. I think perhaps the midshipman could have been exaggerating, or was confused, or perhaps even saw the exception to the rule.
It's hard enough in today's world for our sailors to do their jobs. Cutbacks, politics, ever-increasing demands with less money and bodies, and expanding roles in increasing areas of the world only add to the almost insurmountable odds of completing all the missions assigned to the Navy. Woulda, coulda, and shoulda are best left to the smoke deck and head walls, not in the high-profile criticism of our men and women putting it on the line.
"The Need for Speed"
(See T. Hunter. pp. 76-79, January 2001 Proceedings)
Captain Brian O'Keefe, U.S. Coast Guard, Commanding Officer, USCGC Munro (WHEC-724)—Mr. Hunter presents a list of reasons why the Navy should transfer seven patrol coastal (PC) vessels to the Coast Guard for use in counterdrug operations. Unfortunately, several of his reasons are contradicted in his own article, and these contradictions correspond to my own limited observations of the PC. The most compelling features stated of the PC are its speed and sea-keeping abilities as compared to the Coast Guard 110-foot Island class. However, Mr. Hunter also notes that operations in heavy seas have introduced hull cracks. I understand that the cracking also is attributed to high-speed operations. Similarly, he notes that the PCs must refuel continually to "stay with the fleet," translating to limited range at speed. As proposed for Coast Guard use, this situation would be rectified by the addition of an 18,000-gallon fuel tank. One must wonder what the effect will be on speed and hull stress.
The PCs "extensive communications capabilities" are noted, but in my direct observation the communications suite was very similar to that of the Island class, in some ways not as capable, and not near that of a Reliance (WMEC-615)-class medium-endurance cutter. The suggestion to use the PC as a mothership for Island-class operations is curious considering the aforementioned fuel constraints and is confirmed in light of Southern Command's consideration of assigning a mothership to PCs deployed for Caribbean counterdrug operations.
Coast Guard counterdrug operations are inherently small-boat intensive. I note that the small boat davit is all the way aft, far from the optimal position for launch and recovery via a boom, and certainly contributing to the Navy's action to replace this system with a stem ramp. I also question the PC's deck layout for towing or migrant "holding" situations, which are frequent Coast Guard evolutions. Finally, the most compelling issue is the very reason the PCs are looking for a new home. Where is the Cyclone (PC-1) today? I understand the vessel sits in the Coast Guard Yard for want of funding. We received a hull but no money and no billets. Like the Navy's guided-missile armed patrol hydrofoil (PHM)-class before, the PCs are capable naval platforms finding it difficult to fit into the big-ship Navy. The Navy operates the PC much as it did the PHM, allocating a substantial number of their operational hours to counterdrug patrols with Coast Guard law enforcement detachments (LEDets) on board. These operations curiously are consistent with recent articles in Proceedings, recommending increased use of LEDet boarding experts.
As Mr. Hunter writes, "It should not matter who is operating the PCs, but rather that the PCs are at sea." If the Coast Guard is to operate another hand-me-down platform, let's ensure it comes with the funding and support required to properly adapt the vessel to Coast Guard missions, man it, and maintain it. Without this support I fear they'll languish as hangar queens like the T-AGOS vessel that searched for a home so long after being "given" to the service.
There is a reason we've built Coast Guard cutters rather than recycle other platforms. Continue to support—fund—Deepwater. It can't happen soon enough for me.
"Deadly Force Is Authorized"
(See W. Parks, pp. 33-37, January 2001; P. Skuta, pp. 27-28, February 2001 Proceedings)
"Engagement Is What the Navy Must Do"
(See W. Carroll, p. 50, December 2000 Proceedings)
Captain Cody M. Weston, U.S. Marine Corps, Staff Judge Advocate, 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit—Rules of engagement (ROEs) already have a bad name. Colonel Parks just made the name worse. After a double dose of his article and the movie Rules of Engagement, one's perception of ROEs surely must be that of a confused Marine cowering on an embassy roof, pinned down by fire from a civilian mob, yet not shooting back because of overly restrictive and unrealistic ROEs devised by meddlesome, uncaring, and politicized leaders. Fortunately, this perception is inaccurate. Unfortunately, Colonel Parks adds his weighty imprimatur as a respected ROE scholar to this negative perception when he overstates and at times misstates his case.
Colonel Parks argues that the Joint Chiefs of Staff Standing ROE (SROE) provides "no answer" to the hypothetical question of when deadly force may be employed in self-defense against a civilian posing a direct threat of serious harm or death. However, the SROE unequivocally states that an individual has the "inherent right to use all necessary means available and to take all appropriate actions to defend oneself ... from a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent." The SROE goes on to define "hostile act" and "hostile intent" and provides guidelines for what is an appropriate use of force and when to use it. Only a careless reader would form the impression that the SROE provides "no answer" to when deadly force may be employed. The SROE unquestionably authorizes the immediate use of deadly force in response to the use or imminent threat of deadly force.
Colonel Parks further protests that an individual must first go through a complicated checklist of escalation of force continuum measures to exhaust all non-deadly force options before using deadly force in self-defense, citing the Army's VEWPRIK (verbal warning, exhibit weapon, warning shot, pepper spray, riot control, injure with fire, kill with fire) mnemonic as an example. This is both a misstatement and a misunderstanding of ROE concepts. As a lawyer charged with both learning ROEs and teaching them to others, I can attest anecdotally that the force continuum concept is not taught as a mandatory checklist prior to using deadly force. Moreover, the ROE Handbook, a recent publication by the Army's Center for Law and Military Operations, states that when using VEWPRIK, "soldiers are not required to attempt each step before using deadly force when necessary in self-defense" and that "[i]n some circumstances, the minimum force necessary is deadly force." The force continuum concept is used because not all hostile acts that Marines face are deadly. For example, if a civilian attempts to steal water jugs inside a perimeter, deadly force is not authorized, but an appropriate measure of force along the continuum is.
It is telling that Colonel Parks ridicules an old Marine ROEs card for using the "oxymoronic" language of "minimum deadly force." Actually, the card merely says "minimum force." Such critical misstatements detract from the many valid critiques that he does make and perpetuate the myth that Marines are not allowed to defend themselves.
Commander Mark Gorenflo, U.S. Navy—The Navy is finishing its investigation into the actions of the USS Cole (DDG-67) and her crew leading to her crippling terrorist attack. This is entirely appropriate given the Navy's long-standing tradition of accountability for the actions of its ships, crews, and commanding officers. No doubt, the "million candlepower" intensity of the investigation will uncover errors of omission and commission of varying degrees of significance. While combing through the details of the act, the Navy also needs to step back and consider the influence of its strategy and force structure in creating the circumstances in which the Cole found herself.
Why was the Cole in Yemen? There are two obvious answers, which are not necessarily mutually exclusive:
- To refuel because of a lack of deployed oilers to support underway replenishment
- As a considered part of the Navy's forward engagement process
If the Cole needed to return to port to refuel, rather than staying on station at sea, because of lack of oiler support, this reflects an imbalance in the fleet that requires serious reconsideration. It is undoubted that the force protection problem is best solved by not presenting a target in the first place. Rather than pulling into a port whose security is in doubt in a state that barely functions as such, the Cole should have been refueled at sea. If the Navy sacrificed the combat logistics force structure to build more ships like the Cole, it certainly seems like penny wisdom and pound foolishness in hindsight, where the visibility is, of course, unlimited.
If the Cole was engaged in the Navy forward presence role, other questions are raised. Commander Carroll evokes a rousing historical justification of this role in his note, but it's still not clear to me exactly what the Cole's visit to Yemen did to advance the Navy's forward engagement strategy, besides "being there," though that may reflect more on my ignorance than on the strategy itself. I suspect, though, that my ignorance may be shared by others. More interesting is the question of how effectively will we be able to "engage" in the future when the top item on any port visit agenda will be force protection? In his article, Colonel Parks refers to the U.S. predilection to "ninja turtle" postures in the face of any force protection threat. He also notes that this posture is viewed by our allies in Kosovo as incompatible with our peacekeeping mission. It would be equally crippling to an effective engagement mission.
Finally, the Navy is engaged in an intensive internal review of our force protection posture. Again, this is entirely appropriate. We should have a force protection strategy and with appropriate resources programmed to effect it. I would note, however, that the Navy used to have a real force protection strategy, with resources appropriate to the mission. It was called the U.S. Marine Corps. Trained as "Sea Soldiers," who were excellent shots, competent in small boat seamanship, experts in small unit tactics, and familiar with rules of engagement, the Marines provided force protection par excellence to their brethren in the naval service. Today, the Marine Corps treats the force protection mission with benign neglect. The last vestige of Marines as members of ship's company, aboard our aircraft carriers, were removed in the Johnson-Krulak era to stand up another Marine Corps antiterrorist company. I'm not quite sure what this organization does. Undoubtedly, it is manned by brave and intrepid souls. But it apparently did nothing for the Cole.
John P. Dineen II, former operations specialist second class, now a New York City policeman—This article is a watershed of military legal information. Colonel Parks outlines the legal burdens of our military when servicemembers decide to terminate the life of another human while believing they are engaged in combat, or are about to engage in combat.
These legal burdens need be clarified and simplified for operational safety. It is without doubt the hardest decision a servicemember will have to face in peacetime. In war, the decision is just as traumatizing but not as scrutinized. During peacetime operations, the chain of command is able to look back at actions taken and take corrective and or punitive actions if necessary. The decision to engage in combat is made in a time frame so small that can it can barely be measured.
In American law enforcement training and on patrol, the lesser amount of force is desired. I assume that this is true for members of the military community.
Force levels that can be used range from the shouted command to stop to the use of a firearm or weapons. This is called the ladder of force and there is more than one rung on this ladder. The use of force can and often does begin at the lowest rung—a verbal command. The use of force also can begin at the highest rung, which is the use of firearms or weapons available. Or the use of force can originate anywhere on the various rungs on the force ladder and can move up or down, depending on the evolving circumstances. A third option is to retreat, but is that viable in most circumstances?
Force consists of two separate and distinct levels. First there is physical force, which consists of shouted commands to stop; nonlethal devices for restraining or stopping an assault; batons to deter resistance and stop assaults; and calling for assistance. Second, there is deadly physical force, the last resort.
Commanding officers have an obligation to the people they lead to train, equip, and be out front to support those who are at the tip of the spear. When sailors are properly trained, we will not hear from officers that they would court-martial anyone who fires their weapon at another person without knowledge of the facts. I assume that the sailors of the USS Cole would have acted "reasonably and in good faith," which is the standard to which the United State Supreme Court holds police officers.
Simplify the thought/reactive process of armed sailors by teaching them the consequences of using the weapons they carry within the threat environment. Train all Navy personnel on all weapons carried aboard a Navy ship. Exercise firearms and scenario training frequently, as the Navy would do for damage/fire control, and with high passing standards. Perhaps create a personal qualification standard for port security training.
While I was on active duty aboard the USS King (DDG-41), a commanding officer remarked that he feared a sailor with a loaded firearm only slighter more than one who was using a spray painting applicator. I recall being on sentry/rover duty as a part of the personal reliability program. Our training was not intense. We fired weapons sporadically. However, the last standing order that I can remember dealt with hostages who were crew members. Those standing orders were to shoot the hostage, preferably wounding and not killing, and then shooting to kill the hostage taker. Cut and dry. Simple rules for a simple situation.
If sailors can't protect ships, perhaps each ship should have a contingent of Marines. These Marines would then provide port or overseas security with the orders of protect this ship and its crew at all costs.
Colonel Parks's writings have shown the Navy leadership the justification to use deadly physical force in protecting ships and their crews. The Navy leadership had better become sailors again or we will revisit sorrowful times soon and more frequently. Navy leaders should listen and learn from their experiences and those of others.
My time on police patrol was not spent requesting authority to draw my firearm and cover a suspect or point it in the direction of a perceived deadly threat. I have worked in some of the most dangerous areas and projects with homicide rates that rivaled those of war-torn parts of the world. I have applied physical force on numerous occasions and have pointed my firearm at another person, but I have not had to pull the trigger.
Let the sailors make the decision to protect the crew, the ship, and themselves in real time. Let our enemies know our sailors will shoot first if necessary and reasonable. Let the enemy be aware of their actions for they will be facing a most unforgiving nation. Let our leaders both political and military be reminded they are to lead our sailors and to protect them to the utmost of their abilities as the sailors would, and are doing for them.
Lieutenant Robert W. Thomas Jr., U.S. Navy—Commander Carroll's article provides a historical context concerning the terrorist attack on the USS Cole (DDG67). He explains the Cole's presence in Yemen as "how naval foreign presence serves diplomacy." Engagement may explain why the Cole and other naval vessels visit foreign ports, but it does not explain why 17 American sailors are dead and a billion-dollar warship lies broken in a Mississippi shipyard.
The lack of accountability demonstrated by the parties involved in the decision to send a U.S. warship to Yemen is extremely disturbing. As a company officer and instructor at the U.S. Naval Academy, it is my responsibility to teach future officers of our Navy and Marine Corps about the virtue of accountability. Yet when unfortunate events such as the attack on the Cole occur, I cannot use the example to demonstrate how leaders bear accountability and responsibility.
Engagement and forward presence are historical hallmarks of the Navy. Our sailors and soldiers, however, don't deserve to be sacrificed to fulfill a historical mandate. If our nation wishes to use the armed forces in serving diplomacy, then we must ensure that our sailors and soldiers are afforded the greatest protection possible. It is evident that the Cole was not granted this necessary protection. Insufficient intelligence, ignorance, or lack of resources on the part of those responsible for the Cole's presence in Yemen is inexcusable. This terrorist attack should not prevent engagement, but we should not allow misguided politics or insufficient resources unnecessarily to endanger members of the armed services.
Major Kevin Rardin, Tennessee Army National Guard, Judge Advocate General's Corps—My thanks to Colonel Parks for a thoughtful and timely article on rules of engagement (ROEs). As an assistant district attorney in Memphis, Tennessee, I am familiar with U.S. domestic law and local law enforcement policy on the use of deadly force. As a reserve judge advocate, I also have made it a point to study recent peace-support operations and the ROEs authorized for those operations.
I understand that the objectives of U.S. military forces engaged in peace-support operations are not identical to those of local U.S. police departments. Yet the potential threats faced by U.S. military personnel on peace-support operations are very similar to those faced by police officers on the streets of Memphis.
I agree with Colonel Parks that the guidance our military personnel receive in the form of ROEs is inferior to that extended to local U.S. police officers. Many ROEs I have read in recent years are so complex that I have wondered whether any soldier or Marine could follow them to the letter.
I further agree with Colonel Parks that military lawyers should review U.S. case law on police use of deadly force for guidance in drafting ROEs for peace-support operations. Such a review should result in rules of engagement that are understandable and that provide individual soldiers and Marines with a greater degree of protection.
"Total Force: We Aren't There Yet"
(See D. Roy, pp. 58-60, January 2001 Proceedings)
Major General Larry Taylor U.S. Marine Corps Reserve (Retired)—Captain Roy seems to think that the fact that the ongoing small Presidential Selected Reserve Call-ups (PSRCs) attract "little attention from the American public" is a good thing. I beg to differ. The total force concept, as formulated by then-Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird and envisioned by General Creighton Abrams, never considered PSRCs as anything other than a "significant event." Indeed, the writings of the day frequently equated the calling up of reserves with nothing less than expression of national will and commitment. Reserve mobilization, at any level, was intended to be seen in the newspaper on page one, not page 31. It should be a "big deal."
We should not let the fact that "active duty force structure is not adequate for peacetime operations" blind us to the intent of the original concept. I think what Secretary Laird and General Abrams had in mind, reflecting on the Indochina experience, was very far from what has become routine today. Those of you still in uniform know the reality of oppressive active-duty operational tempo, but the casual use of PSRCs has lulled the politicians and the rest of the nation into complacency about our inadequate active force numbers.
We must be more selective when we make decisions on operations other than war. If a peacetime operation cannot be done without reserves, maybe we ought not to do it.
"In Search of Real Leaders"
(See J. Kelly Jr., pp. 56-57, January 2001 Proceedings)
Captain J. M. Van Tol, U.S. Navy—Captain Kelly makes many good points and obviously is correct that cronyism is a stupid, self-defeating organizational practice. Citing unitary causes for significant problems, however, oversimplifies the issues. It is not correct that promoting "Washington officers" or executive assistants to senior leaders is necessarily dysfunctional. I have never been one, but it is true that executive assistants have the opportunity to become familiar with high-level issues facing the Navy and see how senior leaders deal with them. The reality is that the Navy must compete relentlessly in brutal fashion with other government entities as well as the other services for limited resources from Congress and the administration. Surely continued success in this complex political process requires officers with deep relevant experience in the Washington arena.
That said, the operational business of the Navy and the essence of the naval profession is to fight and win at and from the sea. Captain Kelly is right that "command at sea should be regarded as the main prize, not as a qualifier for bigger and better things" for those who should be the Navy's war fighters. Yet, as promotion statistics consistently show, officers assigned to training commands or to group/fleet staffs fare much worse professionally than officers sent to "career-- enhancing" bureaucratic billets for their shore duty. That is indeed bizarre.
The crux of the problem is that we have demanded officers be outstanding both as war fighters and as bureaucrats. Every officer must aspire to be the Chief of Naval Operations. But as the complexities of both war fighting and bureaucratic struggle increase, it may be time for more senior officers to choose to move down one of two separate tracks. Such a career split might best come for most officers after command at sea as commanders because success in the "Title 10" track still requires the professional credibility that comes only from proven success at sea. Appropriate numbers of officers from each track should advance to flag and higher leadership positions.
Such a dual-track scheme might have some significant advantages. It may dampen the often sterile debate between the relative importance of the operational and bureaucratic functions in the Navy. Winning in combat is indisputably the most important thing we can do-but major conflict is rare. At the same time, we can't count on winning if we can't make compelling arguments in the Washington arena to get the necessary resources to do so. Outstanding officers are required in both areas.
This system may also help address the perception that "too much" sea hurts promotion and selection board chances. We suffer from cognitive dissonance as an organization when the statistics show that staying operational is potentially damaging to careers. We have defined the naval profession downward in recent years by overloading the fleet with bureaucratic and administrative burdens and fostering the mentality that follows from this, at the expense of concentrating on real operational stuff, tactical excellence, and an aggressive offensive spirit. Colloquially stated, we've taken the fun out of the profession. If we punish those who devote their careers to operational excellence on top of that, we have sure-fire formula for repelling people and ultimately failing in combat.
The Navy needs experts in both war fighting and in fighting the never-ending bureaucratic battles to acquire the resources and capabilities needed to win in wartime. We should acknowledge the importance of each and facilitate the promotion of the best officers to accomplish each mission.
"PC Gaming and Simulation Support Training"
(See D. Coleman, pp. 73-75, February 2001 Proceedings)
Midshipman Second Class Jay E. Boyles and Midshipman Third Class Brian P Kezer, U.S. Naval Reserve—We enjoyed reading Captain Coleman's article regarding the use of PC war gaming as a training tool. We have used "Jane's Fleet Command" for our NROTC unit's war game for the past two years. We have found it to be an outstanding tool for teaching midshipmen about naval tactics and weapon systems. The graphics and pace of the game make it very playable and "user-friendly," so it is ideal for beginners, yet at the same time the detail and accuracy make it appealing to those more experienced with war gaming.
We agree with Captain Coleman that the realism exhibited by "Fleet Command "is an impressive way to learn and experience the capabilities of ships and aircraft within our Navy as well as the navies of other nations. The mission editor function within the game gives it great flexibility as a training tool for our purposes. A different war game can be produced each year with a different set of features. A new scenario can be created each time with different enemies, locations, or missions in mind. This gives us the advantage of being able to introduce and teach new concepts or tactics anywhere in the world against any enemy we choose.
We also agree that war gaming does have its disadvantages. While teaching midshipmen within our unit through war gaming gives them a good deal of experience, we certainly can never expect to replace the real experience that midshipmen receive in the fleet during summer cruises. Also, like all games, "Fleet Command" does have its limitations as to how many navies it has or what missions you can assign. For example, the game cannot conduct a full-scale amphibious assault or an actual underway boarding or replenishment. We look forward to future releases by Sonalysts that will expand on the successes of "Fleet Command".
"When Worlds Collide"
(See H. Raduege Jr, pp. 43-44, January 2001 Proceedings)
R. A. LeFande—General Raduege, as director of the Defense Information Systems Agency, sees bandwidth as a sociopolitical matter requiring careful negotiations with the frequency management community and with those who would divest public property for the benefit of commercial interests. Bandwidth "sharing" was the essence of the traditional frequency allocation process-anyone could use the spectrum unless they interfered with the assigned user. Selling the spectrum creates a proprietary interest that can be asserted even if there is no interference. Deliberate interference will be a basic weapon in the information war and neither allocation nor ownership will provide a defense.
Bandwidth to mobile users is limited by physics before it is limited by spectrum allocation or ownership. Increasing the number of information "bits" per hertz of bandwidth is very expensive in terms of energy per bit, which, in turn, requires more transmitter power, larger antennas, and/or reduced geographic coverage area. In military systems, it is necessary to increase the number of hertz per information bit by several orders of magnitude when resistance to jamming or interception is to be raised to warfighting levels.
Information can't be compressed and once a given message or stream of bits is encrypted, all of the bits are "information." Hardware for digital processing of information—or, at least, of data—is becoming cheaper all the time while the cost of moving bits across an "air gap" is becoming more expensive, especially when it must be defended against electronic attack. Gains in efficiency in using either bandwidth or energy will come only from a knowledge-engineering process that determines which data bits are the most valuable in the tactical warfighting situation of the instant. It will be necessary to extract the most essential knowledge and to assign the most valuable bit to the next available link, without regard to the historical assignment of frequency bands, hardware, or of a named link to the various warfare specialties.
Any message format or waveform can be created or interpreted on-demand if stovepipe hardware developments are ended and an "open" programmable communication architecture is adopted. Efficiency then can be measured in terms of the warfighting value of the next bit and the assurance with which that bit is delivered. The users' appetite for data always will grow beyond the physical limits of any communication system in a information war, and the tactical commander must have the ability to study and to manage the information resource as closely his magazine capacity or target list.
The vision of a smaller but more effective network-centric or knowledge-centric naval force will not be realized until the difficult relationships of data, information, knowledge, and war fighting outcomes are mastered, and the—always limited—communication "bandwidth" is used as a shared resource, assigned to optimize the tactical purpose of the instant.
"Manning DD-21"
(See J. Curdle, pp. 59-61, February 2001 Proceedings)
William R. Laraby—As I was reading Commander Cordle's article, I was struck by the fact that the medical side of manning was never mentioned. I am assuming this class of ship will never operate independently so that major medical emergencies will be handled by a ship carrying a doctor. But for the normal cuts and bruises I am assuming a first responder will handle the problems. He also stated that the ship probably will not carry a ship's boat and that a jet ski can handle man overboard or helicopter crashes. The last time I looked in a helicopter they carried more than one crew member. What if the ship is involved with a major rescue (i.e., sinking freighter/passenger ship) and cannot use the helicopter, assuming the ship is operating independently at the time?
If the officers are involved in more than one department and have to stand deck watches under way, when will they sleep? What if pay or other personnel problems still exist when the ship deploys?
On the subject of major battle damage, there are not enough personnel on board to relieve the repair party. This assumes a larger problem if that large-deck vessel also has sustained damage.
I also am assuming that the crew will have to do their own laundry. When will they find the time between watch standing and training sessions and any other work they are required to perform? And when the ship hits a liberty port, will they be restricted to the ship because they need haircuts and have no ship's barber? What about personnel inspections?
I hope this reduced manning idea is given a lot more thought. My nephew recently left active duty partly because he was standing four-and-four gunnery watches (under way) because of the lack of trained personnel.
"Ten Years After"
(See W. Boomer, J. Yeosock, S. Arthur, C. Homer, pp. 61-65, January 2001 Proceedings)
Admiral Henry H. Mauz, U.S. Navy (Retired)—Admiral Stan Arthur raises the issue of the location of his command during Desert Storm. He believes he would have been better able to interact with the CinCCent (Commander-in-Chief, Central Command) staff and other components had he been collocated with General Schwarzkopf.
As indicated, I had been the Commander of the Seventh Fleet since August 1988 and was nearing the end of that tour when Iraq invaded Kuwait in early August 1990. 1 was ordered to fly to the Persian Gulf soon thereafter and took over as Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command upon arrival. The flagship USS Blue Ridge (LCC-19) arrived about three weeks later. In the interim, my small staff and I shared the command spaces aboard the Middle East Force flagship USS La Salle (AGF-3). Until relieved by Admiral Arthur on 1 December, I was deeply involved in Desert Shield defensive operations, training and planning for Desert Storm, and a variety of other naval tasks.
It frankly never occurred to me to move to Riyadh. Command-and-control there was stone age, with the telephone being CinCCent's major means of communication. There was no real-operational picture except that provided by the AWACS aircraft, and we found that picture both fragile and focused primarily on the air corridor from Iraq toward Riyadh. The data link was a compromise at best and tried to display a theater wide picture. That picture was relatively weak on the flanks where the naval forces were.
I found it essential to stay plugged into the tactical picture at all times. There was an absolute requirement to control very closely the maritime intercept operations during Desert Shield. Throughout the fall of 1990, there were real-time air events over the Northern Persian Gulf that nearly resulted in shooting down Iraqi aircraft as they ventured south. There were surface combatant operations as far north in the Gulf as we could persuade CinCCent to allow. There was an immense amount of planning and exercising to do with own forces, other components, coalition countries, and other navies.
Looking ahead toward Desert Storm, I could see there being seven flag officers afloat in the Gulf—up to four carrier battle group commanders, an amphibious group commander (and a Marine major general air-ground task force commander), and a surface combatant commander (with two battleships). There also was a logistics and support commander located in Bahrain. There were allied and friendly naval and air forces in the Gulf with flag officers in command and with the need for continuous operational coordination. I strongly believe that all those commanders needed a common operational superior afloat.
Considering the complexity of operations in that confined area, with difficult water-space and sea-space management, with real-time tactical coordination required with other services, and considering that Iran was only 40 miles to starboard, it was (and still is) inconceivable to me that ComNavCent not be afloat on board the Blue Ridge with the best tactical picture available anywhere (maybe including Riyadh). Looking back, with all that was going on at sea, I would have expected General Schwarzkopf to toss me out of his office if I had asked to move to Riyadh. He needed someone in charge at sea and he made that clear to me from the outset.
That is not to say that there should not have been more naval horsepower in Riyadh. If I had it to do over, I would have tried to get a more-senior flag in Riyadh early and a somewhat larger staff assigned for the duration—hopefully without adding a layer in the chain of command. The Navy's approach to that demand was to assign officers who could be spared from other assignments on a shorter-term temporary-duty basis. It also is true that the Navy's support to CinCCent over the years had been less than enthusiastic. The naval component commander should have been better located and staffed so as to be a real player in Central Command affairs. My staff and I did in fact have to get up to speed quickly on central command matters, and a lot of "sniffing around" took place with the other components (especially air forces, central command) at the outset. Prior to Desert Shield, I don't think either the Army or Air Force components had ever worked with naval forces.
"Fire! Fire! Fire! All Hands Man Your Battle Stations!"
(See S. Truver, pp. 74-75, January 2001 Proceedings)
Lieutenant William A. Heidecker U.S. Navy (Retired)—The fire-resistance time of a material or assembly is, as indicated, measured in minutes or hours. One must note, however, that the test is based on a standardized fire. If the fuels involved are significantly different from the fuels used in the standardized test, the certified fire resistance times no longer are valid. These tests generally are designed to measure fire resistance in a typical building. One would expect that even the standardized fuel, when burned in a ship's compartment with a low overhead and a relatively confined space, would be far different from the tests simulating a room in a conventional shoreside structure.
The concept of fire barriers has its origins in insurance concerns for limiting their loss exposure. Rather than lose the entire contents of a large warehouse, for instance, insurance underwriters may require fire walls. In a worst-case situation, where automatic systems fail to extinguish the fire and public fire departments cannot extinguish the fire, the fire walls will limit the extent of the loss. This is not a sound concept for shipboard fire protection. In addition, where fire walls are in place, it is essential that the number of openings be limited and that each opening be protected. Barriers to prevent the spread of smoke—but not necessarily fire—on cruise ships are needed to protect passengers. While Navy crews need to be protected against unnecessary exposure to the products of combustion, the problem is quite different on a Navy surface ship than on a cruise ship. Submarines are yet another problem.
Intumescent coverings are very useful. However, surface preparation is more critical than for typical paints and coatings. One must be careful that the ship's crew is as adept at surface preparation as the manufacturer's representatives or the results could be quite different.
The article discusses the need for controlling the fire characteristics of bulkheads and overheads. Ironically, however, the article appears in an edition of the magazine that, according to the cover, has a "high-tech focus." As the Navy and much of the rest of our culture becomes more and more dependent on computers, it is wise to remember that, from a fire protection standpoint, a computer is essentially a combustible plastic box enclosing more combustible plastic. Plastics have been described in fire-protection literature as "frozen flammable liquids." Electrical cables also are a concern. The cables that connect the computer to its electrical power source and other computers are sheathed in plastic. The plastic cable insulation is designed to reduce flame spread and the evolution of toxic materials, but most electrical cable insulation remains combustible.
Automatic fire-systems should be used wherever feasible. However, overreliance on automatic systems is not prudent. Excepting automatic sprinkler systems, which are not suitable for many shipboard uses, most automatic fire-protection systems now available do not possess the requisite reliability that would justify the manning reductions that are being discussed. The crew of the Cole performed magnificently, but I have seen no reports of "extra" people who were not needed. In all the disasters on Navy ships described by Dr. Truver, damage control was truly an "all hands" evolution. Significantly reducing manning without a commensurate reduction in the fire hazards and other damage control concerns could be a recipe for disaster. Transferring technology and damage control practices from cruise ships and commercial buildings to Navy ships must be done carefully. One should note that in the description of U.S. and Royal Navy losses in Dr. Truver's article, the naval losses were associated with military fuels and munitions, which are not priority concerns for damage control/loss prevention for commercial ships and buildings.
"Regionalization Creates Confusion"
(See R. Dean, p. 78, September 2000; W. Zobel, pp. 26-27, February 2001 Proceedings)
Captain John E. O'Neil Jr., U.S. Navy (Retired)—Captain Dean rightly observes that regionalization has caused confusion. One only has to look at the colorful map of the Navy regional commander assignments to see it looks very much like the former naval district commander system that was abandoned years ago.
Civilian major staff specialists with fresh experience in the base closure and realignment process convinced the Navy that all shore installations could be broken down into "core business" models across the board. Captain Dean points out that under regional command, commanding officers (COs) no longer are COs in the traditional sense of Navy command—they are "program managers" for only one functional area, such as port or air operations.
Economies had to be made when the Department of Defense budget rightly slowed at the end of the Cold War. The Defense budget was reduced further after President Bill Clinton came into office in 1993. The Navy recognized that its complicated shore installation manning and funding streams had to changed. This has been done, however, at the expense of the station commanders being commanding officers as per Navy regulations and the myriad of instructions, policies, and traditions that distinguish Navy command from any other U.S. service. Traditionally, Navy stations/bases were commanded by senior warfare-qualified captains who were definitely in charge of their bases. This allowed base tenants, higher levels of leadership, and local communities to go to one source for information. Captain Dean states that bases now are organized along core business models-people performing in these core businesses do not work for the base CO!
The base reduction and realignment process has absorbed large amounts of money in closing installations, cleaning up environmental problems, and retiring and relocating personnel, ships, and planes. Thus Washington had less money to distribute to the commander-in-chiefs (CinCs) for their operational commanders and the fleet. CinCs covered operational requirements first, then doled out resources to their base COs. In addition, there were and are many other owners of Navy property and personnel around the world, all with large administrative overhead and command structures that all eat money. Naval reactors, the systems commands, hospitals, dental centers, warfare centers, technical centers, supply centers, weapons stations, shipyards, training centers/bases, recruiting command, space and communications, White House, State Department, Postgraduate School, and many others all have their own extensive staffs and budgets costing billions of dollars per year. These organizations have to take reductions for the Navy to make efficiencies and stay within the reduced budgets. These reductions were resisted and were very hard to do.
When you looked at large fleet concentration areas, it made sense to combine and reorganize organizations to streamline public works, payroll, communications and computers, bill paying, provisions, environmental staff, public works, and similar functions from all commands—not just those owned by the warfighting CinCs.
Captain Dean notes that under regionalization, many base administrative and operational responsibilities were stripped from the base CO and were placed under a CO at another base as a program manager for a particular function. Thus the CO of my former base command, NAB Little Creek, is now the program manager of DoD military police, fire, and safety for Hampton Roads!
This process has:
- Seriously shattered the Navy's civilian workforce sense of continuity and teamwork
- Ruined shore duty opportunities for sea-going sailors (through outsourcing)
- Evaporated the flexibility that base COs used to have to rearm or refuel after hours, and care for special community projects such as Scouts, Sea Cadets, and the local community
- Deprived a fleet base from the fresh leadership, and operational skills that a new warfare-qualified, senior captain brings to the command table every few years
Navy regulations, policy, instructions and similar documents have not been changed to match the program manager versus the commanding officer's reorganized responsibilities under regionalization. Leave the changes in place, but give the operational base COs total command of their bases again. The supporting pieces of all the in-place program managers must be repositioned to allow the commanding officers of the fleet bases to directly support the fleet again. The fleet needs a base CO they can go to directly, not a program manager hundreds of miles away.
"A Plague on Both Your Houses!"
(See A. Webb, pp. 38-42, October 2000 Proceedings)
Captain R. A. Bowling, U.S. Navy (Retired)—Andrew Webb's article fails to provide the reason why President Bill Clinton—or any other president—could not permit gays and lesbians to serve openly in the military by executive order. Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution vests Congress with the specific power "To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land naval Forces." When Clinton attempted to do so and after a series of hearings in both houses, Congress passed—by veto-proof majorities in both houses then controlled by Democrats—an amendment to the Defense Appropriations Act of 1994 that was signed into law by President Clinton. The enacting legislation expressed the incontrovertible intent of Congress by including the statement that "homosexuality is incompatible with military service."
As implemented by the armed forces, it is commonly referred to as the "don't ask, don't tell" policy. But that implementation has been inconsistent at best. In some cases, the spirit if not the intent of the policy has been violated. In other cases, civil suits against the policy have been settled out of court or individuals allowed to remain rather than the government appealing adverse ruling by lower courts all the way to the Supreme Court to get a definitive ruling on the constitutionality of the law. This less than enthusiastic implementation of the law by the government has resulted in the current situation—abhorred by Webb and many of those on both sides of the issue—wherein the military is hypersensitive to the charge of creating a "hostile environment" to the point of essentially establishing a prohibition against any discussion of homosexuality. On the other hand, gays and lesbians are supersensitive to any perceived "harassment" because of their suspected sexual orientation. This situation must not be allowed to continue.
The last paragraph of the article suggests a policy of "live and let live." But such a policy would be tantamount to accepting gays and lesbians and that would violate the law that specifically states that "homosexuality is incompatible with military service." A more appropriate remedy would be for the government to seek, on a fast track, a definitive ruling by the Supreme Court. If the court rules the law unconstitutional, open the doors. If not, the best solution would be for Congress to return to an unambiguous ban. Then the armed forces could "get on with their missions without undue disruptions."
"Reduced Manning and High-Tech Bridges Demand New Training Standards"
(See B. Boyce, pp. 106-107, October 2000 Proceedings)
"SWOs Need More Hands-On Shiphandling Training"
(See M. Crockett, pp. 76-78, November 2000 Proceedings)
Captain Robert Dell, U.S. Naval Reserve (Retired), shiphandling and bridge resource management consultant—Since the Standards of Training, Certification, and Watchkeeping (STCW) code went into effect in 1997, the international maritime community has been working under the demanding training and certification processes put forth in this international code. Officers of the deck (OODs) in the U.S. Navy, on the other hand, are not required to adhere to STCW standards. But it may be in the best interest of the Navy and its OODs to consider the value of these standards.
Training standards and certification are required and provided for in all areas of seamanship and engineering skills. The required STCW training in the United States is administered by the Coast Guard, and all mariners receive certificates from certified training sites. These sites are required by the code to train the mariner with classroom work first, and then to evaluate the mariner's competency through hands-on evaluation or approved simulation. Simulation facilities and the associated programs are monitored closely by various oversight agencies to guarantee a sophisticated—and true to life—final product. Such tools are effectively used for various custom shiphandling scenarios, bridge resource management courses, and radar training.
As the Navy continues to move into the world of high-tech bridges and the practice of reduced manning, these nontraditional training sites should be considered as cost-effective tools that are a viable resource for the Navy. Several facilities are in place and available to provide the training required for this new and challenging environment. The Navy's specific training needs for shiphandling and resource management, especially with the limited-manning requirements of the new classes of vessels, such as the DD-21 land-attack destroyer, can be well served by the dedicated staff of retired ship's pilots, master mariners, and naval officers that make up the faculty of these institutions. Navigating a vessel with a limited number of crew members in close-quarter situations is the hallmark of these professionals. Such skills can be transferred easily to the Navy.
One of the premier training sites for custom shiphandling and other required STCW certification is the Maritime Institute of Technology and Graduate Studies, conveniently located in Linthicum Heights, Maryland, between Baltimore and Washington, D.C.
The Maritime Institute offers comprehensive mariner training, including shiphandling courses that range from basic to advanced custom courses that are designed to meet customer needs for special ships and gaming areas; global maritime distress and safety system communications systems courses; various custom bridge resource management courses; electronic chart display and information systems courses; automatic radar plotting aids courses; weather courses, from basic to the most advanced heavy-weather and hurricane-avoidance seminars; medical courses for all levels of required mariner training; and all levels of fire-fighting courses, ranging from basic to the most advanced and specialized.
All other required STCW courses not listed above are taught, as are specially designed courses for mariner needs. Such a dedicated training facility can offer much to the Navy to help refine its many training needs.
The prime users of the various training sites are mariners actively sailing on U.S.-flag vessels, including Military Sealift Command ships. Many of these officers are in the U.S. Naval Reserve Merchant Marine program and require STCW certification to be employed as civilian mariners. The mission of this branch of the Naval Reserves is to provide a source of well-qualified merchant marine officers who will enhance Merchant Marine/Navy coordination in time of war and peace.
Bringing these two groups into the same training environment with similar but specially directed training can only strengthen the relationship between these two groups. For all Navy OODs to earn such certification would be a reflection of our naval service's desire to meet the same international regulations as required for all mariners afloat. Such training can be carried out in accordance with the Chief of Naval Education and Training Instruction 1500.29 and could only improve surface warfare officer qualifications as regards seamanship, shiphandling, and safety skills, particularly in the area of maneuvering vessels in naval scenarios in peacetime and war.
These skills of the seaman, clarified through the Standards of Training, Certification, and Watchkeeping code, have endured the passage of time and are still the skills that maneuver vessels as they are moved about the world's oceans and ports. And modern technology, through simulation, allows these skills to be learned and practiced without getting under way.
"Tricare from the Inside and Out"
(See L. Hieb, pp. 62-65, November 2000; R. Ryan, J. Sears, pp. 10-16, January 2001 Proceedings)
Dr. Lee D. Hieb, author of "Tricare from the Inside and Out "—Among many other characteristics of bureaucracies, I mention two: the view from the top is always different from the view from the bottom, and bureaucracies blame the end user for any failings. (Of course you didn't get your license, Mr. Jones, you went to the wrong office!)
Dr. Sears suggests that I could have resolved my problems had I contacted my local network, but who specifically? My office walls are papered with phone number for the local representative, for the office for outpatient surgery requests, which is different from the one for the office for inpatient surgery requests, etc. In addition to my Navy time, my office manager is a retired Marine Corps Gunnery Seargent-if we can't "work the system", who can? But even if I had solved all my problems, the fact remains that judging the appropriateness of medical care (in essence practicing medicine) from a distance is disingenuous.
Dr. Sears is only partially correct in stating that I "agreed" to the financial reimbursement given me by TriCare. Representatives from Tricare never negotiated any fee schedule with me directly. Rather, they negotiated a contract with our local IPA (a local physicians network). I am not a member of the IPA, nor do I have any say-so in its contracts. Simply by being located where I am, and being a nonmember provider for many other insurance plans, I am forced to accept the negotiated fee schedule. A more anti-free market arrangement could not have been created by Ayn Rand. Let me reiterate, however, that I did not leave Tri-Care on the basis of this financial arrangement. It may explain, however, why Mrs. Ryan could not find a dermatologist.
Finally, Dr. Sears emphatically rejects my suggestion that TriCare might be thought of not as a fight, but as an earned benefit. My avowedly capitalistic solution rewards active-duty members for their contribution to the system—their work, their educational level, and their longevity for example. Currently, we take from each according to their ability, and distribute TriCare on the basis of their need. Lenin opined that medicine was the keystone in the arch of socialism. It is regrettable that, in a country where young men and women have died upholding the principles of individual freedom, we would choose a socialist model for medical care.
Richard D. Munnihuysen Jr.—Dr. Sears's comments are disappointing, but not surprising. It would be interesting to see the results of a comprehensive survey of eligible active-duty members and their dependents and healthcare service providers to gauge the entire community's level of satisfaction with the service provided through TriCare.
The suggestion that the survey be targeted at those eligible versus those who use the service is critical. No doubt there are satisfied TriCare customers, but one suspects they represent a small segment of the total population that TriCare should be serving. Among my associates (retirees), most who have an alternate source of healthcare have long since given up at attempting to wrestle with TriCare. Dr. Sears's defense of the status quo at TriCare seems to indicate that significant change for the better is unlikely.