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By Norman Polmar, Author, The Ships and Aircraft of the U.S. Fleet
A Unified Strategic Command
Flug/General
Service | Officers | Officers | Enlisted |
Army | 0 | 23 ' | 5 |
Navy | 4 | 88 | 41 |
Marine | 0 | 2 | 0 |
Air Force | 4 | 712 | 1,223 |
For more than 30 years the U.S. Navy has fought the concept of an integrated strategic command—one command combining strategic bombers, intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). Even before the first Polaris missile submarine went to sea on the initial deterrent patrol in 1961, there was intense controversy over the command of strategic forces as the Air Force demanded a single, unified commander for all strategic weapons.
The Navy’s three-decade battle to keep exclusive control of the strategic missile submarines ended in June 1992 with establishment of the U.S. Strategic Command (StratCom), which received responsibility for all U.S. Air Force and Navy strategic nuclear forces. The end of the Cold War and the changing world situation “made possible the realization of an initiative that goes back to 1959, when the George Washington (SSBN-598) came into the inventory,” according to Air Force General Lee Butler, the first commander-in-chief of StratCom.1
A fast-rising Air Force star, General Butler became the commander-in-chief of the Strategic Air Command (SAC) in January 1991, the last head of that specified force that had operational control of the nation's land-based ICBMs, land- based bombers, and strategic reconnaissance aircraft. General Butler believes that the previous, divided command arrangement had worked for more than 30 years because:
- The Soviet threat was specific and very clear.
- U.S. strategic doctrine was set in policy—“everybody was marching to a pretty clear set of orders.”
- There was enough money so that the issue of which service controlled which strategic platforms and weapons never came to a head—“there were always more targets than weapons.”
In General Butler’s view, “a number of factors came together simultaneously to make the idea of Strategic Command not only achievable but almost essential.” General Butler strongly believes that the need for a strategic command was valid in 1958, when the U.S. unified commands were first established. The conditions that finally made StratCom possible are, in his opinion:
- The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, which increased the authority of the Chairman and Joint Chiefs of Staff, as well as the unified commanders
- The end of the Cold War and the reduction of the Soviet threat
- Declining defense budgets, which made it necessary to have more centralized management of strategic resources
General Butler believes StratCom’s Navy and Air Force personnel “for the first time are really understanding the richness that comes from the melding of Air Force and Navy strategic cultures, working in tandem, and all of the serendipitous things that come from looking at how you’ve been doing common things in isolation.” As an example, Butler cites the forthcoming amalgamation of the Air Force EC-135 strategic command aircraft and the Navy’s E-6A strategic communications relay (TACAMO) aircraft, with the Navy aircraft being refitted with Air Force “black boxes” to save hundreds of millions of dollars.2
But General Butler also believes that in the past the Navy suffered by not being a full partner in a unified strategic command. Even within the multiservice Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff (JSTPS)—which planned the use of strategic weapons and which had the head of SAC “double-hatted” as director of the staff and a Navy vice admiral as the vice director—the majority of the personnel were Air Force, as were almost all of the principal deputies. Indeed, as can be documented, there has been a great scarcity of strategic nuclear planners in Navy uniform.
The new StratCom organization, with headquarters at the former SAC facilities at Offut Air Force Base near Omaha, Nebraska, will alternate commanders-in- chief between an Air Force general and a Navy admiral. The deputy commander- in-chief will be from the other service; General Butler’s deputy is Vice Admiral Michael C. Colley, formerly the vice director of JSTPS.
The StratCom staff now has 2,102 uniformed men and women and 336 civilians, making it the second largest unified command staff. (The Pacific Command staff has more than 3,000 military and civilian personnel.) The breakout of StratCom military personnel is as follows:3
In the next few years the percentage of Navy personnel can be expected to increase.
General Butler states that there have been “simply no issues” or problems in standing up the unified StratCom staff; in fact, he calls Admiral Frank B. Kelso, the Chief of Naval Operations, the “hero” in establishing the command.4 Being politically correct, General Butler quickly includes kudos for General Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who often is given the major credit for the decision to establish StratCom.
But although he fully understands “jointness” and other political issues, General Butler also obviously understands the Navy’s problems and attitudes related to strategic forces. He quotes the arguments that had long been given by the Navy in opposition to a single strategic command, he knows the personalities of the protagonists, and he understands the problems now facing Navy strategic forces. The latter includes such issues as the number of Ohio (SSBN-726)-class missile submarines that should be kept in active service, whether some can be kept in some form of strategic reserve or storage, the costs of converting the early submarines from the C-4 to the D-5 missile, and the problem of downloading Trident missile warheads.
Proceedings / December 1992
StratCom Combat Command Relationships
StratCom
As Required t
Atlantic Fleet | 1 |
| |
SubLant | 1 |
SSBNs
Pacific Fleet |
|
| |
SubPac |
|
SSBNs
Air Combat Command |
|
| |
8th Air Force |
|
B-l.B-2, B-52
Submarine Group 8
Tankers
KC-10, KC-135
SratWing 1
20th Air Force
E-6, EC-135
ICBM
2nd Air Force
Battle Management E-4, RC-135, U-2
The StratCom staff performs the operational planning and control for all U.S. strategic forces, as well as assess- 'ng war-fighting requirements and participating in the development and acquisition of strategic weapon systems. When the current force reductions are completed and the last Ohio-class submarines and B-2 bombers are delivered, the U.S. strategic forces should consist of:
^18 strategic submarines with 432 Trident C-4/D-5 SLBMs (with up to eight multiple warheads)
^ 500 Minuteman III ICBMs (each with one warhead)
^ 20 B-2A “stealth” bombers ^ 97 B-1B Lancer bombers ^ 95 B-52H Stratofortress bombers
In addition, StratCom controls the nation’s strategic communications aircraft (EC-135, E-6A); strategic reconnaissance aircraft (RC-135, U-2); the President’s national emergency airborne command post aircraft (E-4); and the state-of-the- art command, control, communications, and intelligence activities that support strategic weapons.[1][2]
The strategic-missile submarines that are at sea on patrol are under the operational control of StratCom, exercised through its task force commanders: in the Atlantic this is the Commander Submarine Force Atlantic; in the Mediterranean it is the Commander Submarine Group 8; and in the Pacific, the Commander Submarine Force Pacific. All of these flag officers are thus “double-hatted” to StratCom. Those missile submarines not on patrol are controlled by their component service commanders, i.e., Commander- in-Chief Atlantic Fleet and Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet.
The situation with Air Force bombers is similar. The commander of the Air Combat Command “chops” bombers and other strategic aircraft and ICBMs to the operational control of StratCom as requested. Those bombers and missile units not on strategic assignment are under the control of Air Combat Command for training and maintenance, etc. When directed, the Air Combat Command’s Air Force commanders become task force commanders under StratCom. Similarly, when aerial tankers are required for strategic operations, they become a task force under StratCom.
The ICBMs always are assigned to StratCom, although Air Force wings have administrative/training functions for those weapons. The strategic communications and reconnaissance aircraft are similarly under StratCom, but these also can be assigned to other unified commanders when they are needed in a theater to support regional operations.
All U.S. theater and tactical nuclear weapons are being withdrawn from operational forces except for B57 and B61 bombs with Air Force fighter-bomber squadrons.[3] The question thus arises of the role of StratCom in potential the- ater/tactical use of nuclear weapons, as StratCom now has most U.S. military expertise in nuclear weapons, including overall targeting responsibility. This is
Air Force General Lee Butler became the first commander-in-chief of StratCom, with responsibility for all U.S. Air Force and Navy strategic nuclear forces. His deputy commander-in-chief is Vice Admiral Michael C. Colley.
one of several issues that were undecided when this column went to press and one of many complex issues facing the nation’s newest unified command.
Proceedings / December 1992
ft
'Interview with Gen. George Lee Butler, USAF, National War College, Washington, D.C., 12 August 1992.
:TACAMO—Take Charge and Move Out—aircraft serve as communication relay links to strategic- missile submarines; the 16 Navy E-6A aircraft form Strategic Communications Wing 1 being based at Tinker Air Force Base in Oklahoma.
■Data as of 1 October 1992, provided by LtCol. Paula L. Hoffmann, USAF, public affairs officer, StratCom.
The Navy’s support of StratCom can be seen in VAdm R. F. Bacon, USN, “Seizing the Strategic Baton,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, May 1992 (Naval Review), pp. 73-74.
[2]In addition to the Air Force-operated E-4 NEACP aircraft used by the president, StratCom has a team of about 40 people at the former alternate national military command center at Fort Ritchie, Maryland. They provide strategic data to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Command Center, and other commanders-in-chief, as required. In wartime, they also serve as a nuclear data collection and reporting agency.
ftSee N. Polmar, “Getting Rid of the Nukes,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, November 1991, pp. 121-122.