When the Bunker Hill moved into the Strait of Taiwan to patrol and to detect and track any Chinese ballistic missile tests she not only signaled U.S. resolve but also provided vital information to the Navy's theater ballistic missile defense program.
Slightly just more than three years ago a crisis in the Taiwan Strait evoked a U.S. response, carried out by the Navy, that illustrated fleet flexibility and tactical and technical achievement. The events that occurred on board the Aegis cruiser USS Bunker Hill (CG-52), serving at the point of the spear, also remind us that a surface Navy role in ballistic missile defense and emerging outside-the-Navy suggestions of possible fleet contributions to national missile defense repeatedly have been energized by real-world crises.
China Rattles Its Saber
At sea and east of Taiwan, tracking northward toward its home port in Yokosuka, Japan, the USS Independence (CV-62) carrier battle group was returning from extended spring training and regional presence operations throughout Asia. The Bunker Hill received an unexpected order to refuel immediately and to stand ready for a non-exercise mission.
At the time, the Taiwanese were about to hold their presidential election. One candidate represented a pro-mainland agenda and the other candidate a more independent Taiwan philosophy. The Chinese government appeared to decide to exert a bit of influence to sway the outcome. China ordered more than a week of military "exercise" operations, including extensive live-fire training inside the Strait of Taiwan. More ominously, it designated two special missile closure areas: one very close to the northeast coast of Taiwan and another near the southern tip of the island nation. Into these areas—carefully chosen to show missile accuracy, range, and reach, while disrupting sea and air traffic in and around Taiwan—China declared it would demonstrate its ballistic missile capability.
The Bunker Hill's short-notice operational tasking from her battle group commander was to select a patrol area adjacent to the Taiwan Strait and monitor Chinese and Taiwanese operations. The rest of the carrier battle group would conduct readiness operations east of Taiwan, more than 250 miles away. More important, the Bunker Hill was to detect and track any Chinese ballistic missile tests.
It would be essential to provide senior commanders throughout Asia, the Seventh Fleet flagship in Australia (already en route to the scene), and the government at home with the area's tactical picture of events. As Seventh Fleet's Task Force 70 air warfare commander, the Bunker Hill would capitalize on the ship's multifrequency satellite data link capability to become the "eyes" of the Indy carrier battle group and for the Nimitz (CVN-68) carrier battle group being surged out of the Arabian Gulf. The United States had opted for a two-carrier battle group response to the crisis.
The Bunker Hill received confirmation of the operation only a couple of hours following her first heads-up from the Independence battle group commander. She hauled out shortly after refueling and headed toward the southern missile closure area, which the ship's operations team had selected as the best vantage point. The USNS Observation Island (T-AGM-23), with her advanced tracking systems, was en route from Hawaii but would not arrive for several days. She eventually would take position at the northern station, and the detection coverage from both ends of Taiwan combined to provided the best surveillance posture.
Just after midnight, the Bunker Hill slid into her chosen patrol area between southwest Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait. The Chinese missile closure areas had been declared to activate at 0100. The theater ballistic missile surveillance and tracking computer program was loaded into the Aegis weapon system, and the ship's sensors were adjusted for this special capability by the cruiser's topnotch Aegis fire control and combat information center (CIC) team. All watchstanders were poised.
Ballistic Missile Inbound!
Less than an hour after the Bunker Hill arrived on station the first Chinese M-9 ballistic missile was detected breaking above the distant radar horizon over the Chinese mainland and tracking southward—toward the ship—from hundreds of miles away. The CIC watchstanders tracked the first missile continuously toward the ship's patrol area.
"General quarters! General quarters! All hands man your battle stations! Ballistic missile inbound!" The Bunker Hill brought full power back on line in just moments and maneuvered carefully, adjacent to the expected splash area. We could not guarantee that the ship would not become a target, either as a result of missile debris or directly, despite the Chinese claim to be only test launching a ballistic missile. Without hesitation, 400 young Americans slipped into their assigned GQ stations—confident in their own skills and in each other, a well-honed combat team.
One of our two HSL-15 Warlord LAMPS III helicopters already was airborne, watching and waiting. The missile raced closer and closer from extreme altitudes and at great speed, unlike any conventional air threat. The Bunker Hill maintained a firm radar track all the way and transmitted satellite voice and Link-11 track reports to the battle group commander, Commander, Seventh Fleet, and the operation's task force commander ashore in Japan. Our helo reported a brief orange flash and the ship's radar operators corroborated the splash nearby—very near the center of the designated missile closure area.
The whoop and holler in CIC following this detailed, unique, and successful tracking effort were not unlike the celebration following a successful missile firing. We followed with "flash" messages to the National Command Authority in Washington, summarizing the flight of this missile, providing critical information for the government's immediate use in diplomatic channels. More important, the launch and track had been taped in the Aegis weapon system's battle diary recorder for detailed reconstruction and intelligence assessment. Little did we know how essential that tape and each of the three following tapes would be to the Navy's embryonic theater ballistic missile defense program.
Two more Chinese M-9 ballistic missiles were launched in the next couple hours of that first night on station. In all, four missiles were launched during our nearly two week special patrol—the last almost a week after the first three, demonstrating the need for sustained readiness and alertness. The Bunker Hill easily detected, tracked, and taped all four events.
In general, all the missiles were detected and converted to firm tracks while they were still in the ascent phase of their trajectories and well over land near their launch areas. The Aegis weapon system's surveillance package established tracks for missile boosters, attitude control modules, and reentry vehicles in each event. The Bunker Hill operators had only static intelligence assessments from which to cue, few near-real-time and no real-time alerts. All missile detections were generated by the normal Bunker Hill watchstanders. We carried no special augmentees or civilian specialists. The ship had only the first series of SPY radar, the IA, and the fleet's first software for this kind of theater ballistic missile surveillance mission—and an early developmental version at that. The notification to execute this operation came on top of a normal underway period—with no fanfare and very little warning—and was absorbed into the normal course of business in Seventh Fleet.
The Bunker Hill's crew responded with ease, talent, and courage. They applied their technological skills and their cooperative team spirit to ensure that each knew his role and expectations. They recognized that the ship would be out there essentially alone, beyond ready air cover and very close to active operations in which even a minor shift (or error) of firing bearing could have resulted in an inbound hostile attack. Yet the Bunker Hill's crew went about their business with the professionalism that we commanding officers expect and rely on with confidence.
The Bunker Hill executed the operational task successfully—arriving on station on time, needing no special preparation, getting no special alert, and being ready for a full range of possibilities. The incident reports were used immediately in the White House and senior briefing rooms of the Pentagon. Within hours, senior Navy officials briefed then-Secretary of Defense William Perry on the tracking results.
The Chinese completed their military exercises inside the Taiwan Strait, including many surface-to-surface, air-to-surface, and air-to-air events that the Bunker Hill also observed. The Taiwanese completed their election apparently unperturbed.
Lessons Learned
Since the Bunker Hill's 1996 operation, other Aegis combatants have added to the global data base of ballistic missile tracking. Most recently, the Japanese Aegis destroyer Myoko tracked the surprise North Korean Taepo Dong I missile, launched over Japan into the North Pacific on 31 August 1998.
The Bunker Hill's taped data and event-by-event reconstruction from the China-Taiwan crisis operation still are being used extensively today in the Navy's research laboratories to develop new and advanced ballistic missile defense capabilities. The young sailors of the Bunker Hill later would read about the critical role they played as the lone forward surface observer for the two carrier battle groups that responded to the saber rattling in Asia. If one believes the rhetoric, the Bunker Hill was a potential linchpin in a real-world crisis, but her crew never flinched.
In part, what the Bunker Hill did was to inject energy into more than just a technological expansion of fleet air defense. She demonstrated the arrival of new mission capabilities today. She showed the likelihood that the fleet will be in the right place at the right time to bring stability to a hot spot. She illustrated the value to the nation of a full range of capabilities being brought to bear quickly through fleet flexibility, mobility, and standing readiness.
In summary, the Bunker Hill's superb young sailors and officers demonstrated today's Navy commitment to on call global responsiveness and flexibility, even in the face of unique and unprecedented challenges. In a larger sense, however, the China-Taiwan crisis illustrated the Navy's role in international diplomacy and crisis stabilization, the sustained preparedness and purpose behind the forward thinking vision of Navy leadership with regard to missile defense. All these elements are needed to put this kind of capability to sea in a timely manner and to ensure that precise follow-on capabilities, needed to pace the threat, will follow. Progress is under way and the debates over roles and missions, feasibility, and utility will continue. I am very proud that my Bunker Hill sailors and officers contributed in such a substantial way.
Captain Schnurrpusch was commanding officer of the Bunker Hill during the China-Taiwan crisis. He also commanded the USS O’Callahan (FF-1051) and USS Gary (FFG-51) during his career. Since retiring from the Navy, he has served as a senior defense analyst at Systems Planning and Analysis, Inc., as program manager for Joint Theater Air and Missile Defense, and as project leader/chief analyst for analysis of national missile defense.