Capstone Essay Contest
In 1670, Captain Henry Morgan of Jamaica gathered his forces off the coast of Hispaniola with an English commission to land and attack any Spanish location known to have magazines and stores for war or any place of rendezvous that had been assigned.1 Morgan and his forces attacked Panama and defeated Spanish forces led by the President of Panama, Don Juan Perez de Guzman. In the tactical conduct of this campaign against the Spanish colonists, each commander unconsciously drew upon principles of the Conduct and Theory of War and were subject to the Nature of War, as defined in FMFM-1 Weirfighting.
Captain Morgan first dispatched Colonel Joseph Bradley, an experienced leader of buccaneers, to take the fortress guarding the mouth of the Rio Chagres. After considerable losses—because of a direct assault using muskets, fire-bombs, and hand grenades in the face of heavy guns— the privateers managed to set the fortress on fire and take control of it and thus the river. The Spanish, intent upon taking no quarter, fought until nearly all were killed, the commander taking a musket-shot through the skull.2 Only 30 of an original 314 defenders survived, plus eight or nine who escaped to warn Don Juan in Panama. The privateers suffered more than 100 dead and 70 wounded of an original assault force of 400 men.3
Shortly thereafter. Captain Morgan and his party made a rendezvous at the Rio Chagres and sailed up the river toward the city of Panama. Captain Morgan decided to carry little food, certain that his men Would capture aliments at the numerous forts, plantations, and native villages lining the river. The Spanish, however, fearful of the size of the raiding party, retreated from fort to fort and left behind no means by which the privateers could satiate their hunger. After several days, Captain Morgan’s men became very weak and vulnerable to attack. What little food they did find only made their weakened stomachs sick, thus further degrading the unit’s ability to wage war. After eight days without food, the privateers came upon a herd of Spanish cattle and horses, which they promptly butchered and ate. From there, they advanced to a location near their objective, and the battle for the city of Panama was imminent.4
The Battle for Panama took place on 28 January 1671. Captain Morgan assembled his men into four squadrons in line, 300 men per squadron, armed primarily with muskets, cutlasses, and machetes. Don Juan set up his defense outside the city with his infantry, 1,200 inexperienced militiamen, and four squadrons of cavalry totalling 400 horsemen. Six hundred of the infantry were armed with arquebuses—firearms that have half the range of the buccaneers’ muskets—and the remainder carried halberds, lances, or bows and arrows. Don Juan positioned his infantry in double squadrons abreast, with the road to Panama in the center and a hill protecting his right flank. In addition, he had his cavalry guard the flanks and await the order to charge. Two large herds of oxen and bulls waited to be stampeded upon the rear of Morgan’s forces to push them into the pikes and lances of the Spanish infantry.5
Captain Morgan initiated action at 0700. Not knowing of the disposition, experience, or poor weaponry of the Spanish, he prudently maneuvered his army to take the hill on their right flank using the cover of a draw. From that position he could avoid an attack head on into the might of his foe, and the glare of the rising sun in the eyes of the Spanish would hinder their fighting effectiveness. Don Juan’s roaming cavalry attacked the first privateer squadron, composed of French buccaneers highly skilled in marksmanship. Under the accurate fire of the privateers, several horses fell, and the cavalry charge stopped. Meanwhile, the Spanish infantry's left flank, thinking the privateers to be fleeing in their maneuver into the draw, attempted pursuit, causing the Spanish officers to lose control of their units. Once within range of the buccaneers, the Spanish received such a devastating volley of fire that more than 100 fell—killed or wounded. Those still standing witnessed with horror the death brought by the overpowering strength of the invaders and fled in all directions, seeking the safety of the woodlands and mountains. The herds of bulls and oxen Don Juan had dispatched proved ineffective, being driven away by the din of battle.6 When the privateers achieved control of the field, they had lost about 200 men; the Spanish suffered three times as many losses.7
The tactical conduct of Captain Morgan’s Panama campaign can be analyzed using the principles in FMFM-1 Warfighting. How the individual commanders exploited principles inherent in the Nature of War—uncertainty, fluidity, and disorder—are evident in this campaign. Examples of exploiting vulnerabilities and opportunities and the concept of attrition (versus maneuver) warfare fall under the Theory of War. Finally, in the Conduct of War, this conflict serves as paradigm of maneuver warfare.
Uncertainty pervades battle in the form of unknowns about the enemy, the environment, and even the friendly situation.8 Captain Morgan was unaware of the disposition of the enemy. He knew that the relative size of his enemy was greater, but he did not know that they were poorly trained, poorly equipped, and frightened. Don Juan, however, knew well in advance of the enemy situation from numerous reports from his forward forces. He had eight days to prepare. Nevertheless, no amount of prior intelligence will totally erase the uncertainty of battle; even good intelligence does not promise victory.
Each episode in war is the temporary result of a unique combination of circumstances, each requiring an original solution. Success depends largely on the ability to adapt to a constantly changing situation.9 This is known as fluidity, and Captain Morgan definitely was a master of this idea—managing to avoid a direct confrontation on his enemy’s terms in an open battlefield against superior numbers of infantry and horsemen. When the Spanish left flank broke ranks to charge without command, Captain Morgan’s men adjusted easily and repelled their attack. Don Juan could not adapt as well, because the inexperience of his men created a difficulty in commanding them. Each commander’s ability to adapt had a direct effect on the outcome of the battle.
War gravitates naturally toward disorder. Plans go awry; instructions and information become unclear and misinterpreted; communications fail; and mistakes and unforeseen events become commonplace.10 Don Juan suffered the most from the disorder of battle. First, he attempted futilely to instill disorder on his enemy with the stampeding herds. Second, his battle plans were superseded when Captain Morgan maneuvered to the hill, his left flank charged, and his cavalry retreated. The more experienced privateers were less susceptible to disorder and adapted well to changes in the battle.
Warfighting states, “seek to strike the enemy where, when, and how he is most vulnerable. Generally avoid his front, seek out his flanks and rear.”11 This idea is common sense in battle planning, but it is one of the most difficult tasks to accomplish. Captain Morgan’s tactic of moving under the cover of low terrain to take the hill on Don Juan’s right flank was in accordance with the theory of exploiting vulnerability and opportunity. He planned to take advantage of the smaller volume of fire from the flank, the high position of the attack, and the rising sun on his back that would impair the vision of his enemies. In another case, Don Juan could have taken advantage of the starved and sickened state of the raiders by attacking them farther away from Panama, before the privateers managed to eat and rest.
Warfare by attrition seeks victory through the cumulative destruction of the enemy’s material assets by superior firepower and technology. In contrast, warfare by maneuver stems from a desire to circumvent a problem and attack it from a position of advantage rather than meet it straight on.12 Captain Morgan knew he was outnumbered, chose to avoid an attritional confrontation, and maneuvered to the Spanish flank to apply his strength against his enemy’s weakness. This maneuver was rapid, flexible, and opportunistic and gained his men a positional advantage atop the hill on the Spanish flank. The training of the buccaneers provided the faster operational tempo that allowed them the advantage over their foe.13 Don Juan, accustomed to the traditional styles of fighting, planned to go fist-to-fist against the raiding forces, winning with his superior numbers. As often the case, however, fighting skill defeated brute force.
Captain Morgan’s Panama campaign contains many tactical lessons on the conduct of an amphibious raid. A battlefield commander should remember:
- Expect uncertainty; use intelligence to reduce it, but do not let it cause timid decisions.
- Adapt to the enemy’s moves; mistakes in war games and training are lessons for battle.
- Expect disorder; be accustomed to the “fog of war”; seek ways to use it to your advantage.
- Watch for and exploit vulnerabilities and opportunities.
These are not new concepts. Contemporary Marine Corps fighting doctrine echoes Captain Morgan’s campaign three centuries ago.
1 Peter Earle, The Sack of Panama (New York: The Viking Press, 1981), p. 176.
2 Alexander O. Exquemelin, The Buccaneers of America (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1993), pp. 239-244.
3 John Masefield, On the Spanish Main (London: Conweay Maritime Press, Ltd., 1972), p. 178.
4 Earle, pp. 197-208.
5 Earle, pp. 217-219.
6 Earle, pp. 220-222.
7 Masefield, p. 201.
8 FMFM-1, Warfighting, p. 6.
9 FMFM-1, pp. 7-8.
10 FMFM-1, pp. 8-9.
11 FMFM-1, p. 35.
12 FMFM-1, pp. 28-29.
13 FMFM-1, p. 58.
Second Lieutenant Kerber is attending The Basic School in Quantico. Upon graduation, he plans to enter Marine Corps aviation.