From the Republican sweep of Congress to the continuing battle between Department of Defense requirements and available resources, 1995 was filled with events that will have a significant impact on the Navy of tomorrow. Many defense analysts maintain that we are in the first stages of a revolution in military affairs (RMA).1 The success of Coalition forces during Desert Storm—and U.S. military forces in particular—was the first widely covered demonstration of this revolution.
What is a revolution in military affairs? It has been defined as a period marked by a “discontinuous increase in military capability and effectiveness.”2 Put simply, an RMA occurs when there is a quantum leap forward in military capability, as compared to the normal curve of advancement. Typically the result of an advance in technology (the longbow, gunpowder, steamships), it also can be distinguished by changes in society (sociological, psychological, economic). In either case, the revolution alters military affairs fundamentally.
Today’s revolution springs from both. Americans no longer are willing to accept a large number of casualties or a sustained conflict. Desert Storm was so successful on the homefront, in large part, because neither occurred. Such technologies as stealth, precision-guided weapons, and stand-off capability have made the difference so far. Indeed, the decision to purchase quality over quantity has been the hallmark of the U.S. military. Such systems as Aegis have put the U.S. Navy ahead of the rest of the world technologically, but the RMA currently in progress may bring about a Navy tragically unprepared for the challenges of tomorrow.
The Navy we purchase always has been the result of several distinct—and at times opposing—forces. From the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) and Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System through the executive branch and Congress, acquisition is at best a compromise. Acquisition and planning also are limited by the five-year window of the POM. Secretary of the Navy John Dalton and Chief of Naval Operations Admiral J. M. Boorda recognized this limitation and are making deliberate efforts to look farther ahead. This year, for the first time, some acquisition scenarios and war games looked all the way forward to 2015. Various think tanks, the Navy Strategic Studies Group, and the CNO’s Executive Panel all were tasked to analyze and predict the security environment beyond 2000.
When these reports are studied, one constant emerges: change. This may appear obvious, but it has significant implications for the way we do business. With the Cold War won, the new military strategy is based on fighting two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts (MRCs). As a result of efforts by the Navy’s leadership, forward presence is recognized as a means of preventing an MRC.3
As budgets continue to decline, it is likely that the strategy will evolve to fighting a single MRC while filling a presence or military operations other than war requirement in some other region. This is one reason the Air Force and Army are trying to hang their hats on the presence hook with such concepts as “virtual presence.”
Whether our strategy is based on one MRC or two, the Navy we are planning for and buying today will be well suited for both regional conflict and a presence mission. In facing the harsh budget realities, difficult choices continue to be made with regard to the weapon systems and platforms that will be purchased over the next 20 years.
These new realities resulted in the New Attack Submarine, rather than more Seawolf (SSN-21 )-class submarines; the F/A-18 E/F and joint air strike technology, instead of the A-12 and other airframes; and SC-21, as the only major surface combatant of the early 21st century.
The result of rigorous analysis and tough decision making, these systems are well matched to today’s technology, but what comes next? The current RMA seems to be broken into two stages:
Stage 1
- Limited military casualties
- Stand-off attacks & platforms
- Precision
- Information dominance
- Missile defense
Stage 2
- Robotics
- Nonlethality
- Psychotechnology
- Cyberdefense
- Who knows?4
All of the systems mentioned previously exemplify Stage 1, but they may be incapable of dealing with the challenges Stage 2 will bring. The increasing pace of technological change is commonly accepted, but we have yet to plan how we will deal with it. Budget limitations are in part responsible for this potentially shortsighted approach. The result is that—despite the efforts of the Departments of Defense and the Navy—it still takes 10-15 years to take a ship from initial concept to fleet deployment. Software rather than hardware upgrades work around this problem to some extent—one of the most successful being the capability of newer Aegis platforms to upgrade baselines by loading new programs—but still, the fleet is consistently miles behind the cutting edge of technology.
Recent discussion on the arsenal ship concept exemplifies Navy efforts to look into the future and tailor new systems to meet it.5 Stage 2 demands that we take a look at the basis of our planning and determine if it still will apply. Deep strike is one area where each service is trying desperately to hold on to its missions.6 They all agree that deep strike is a requirement, but no one has seriously questioned whether the mission requires manned aircraft, missiles, or some other capability. As a matter of fact, 20 years from now deep strike may not even require the placement of explosives on a target; new, nonlethal, politically palatable, soft-kill systems may relegate missiles and bombs to a last-ditch category.
New developments in biotechnology, nanotechnology, and psycho-technology may totally redefine warfare. Imagine the ability to turn petroleum products into a solid. Imagine the impact this would have on a nation’s infrastructure as all machinery ground to a halt. Vehicles, aircraft, missile launchers, and perhaps even small arms all would be rendered inoperative. How would we employ this technology? More important, how would we counter it?
As the new military relies more and more on information technology, the vulnerability of our systems continues to grow. The Air Force recently stood up an information warfare squadron, and Fleet Information Centers recently stood up on both coasts to counter this threat.7 A cheap, non-nuclear electromagnetic pulse generator could wreak havoc on our systems. Think of the costs associated with a virus infecting and shutting down every NAVMACS communications system or the command-and-decision programs on our combatants.
We are making great strides in advancing the Navy’s technology, but we still lag far behind industry and even farther behind the leading edge. Our planners and programmers can’t conceive of all the possibilities out there because (1) they aren’t familiar with true leading-edge technologies and (2) an institutional mind-set still exists to improve what we are comfortable with rather than revolutionize what we do and how we do it.
Organizations such as the CNO’s Executive Panel, Navy Strategic Studies Group, and the Center for Naval Analyses make an honest attempt to look at the future and present it to the best of their knowledge or research, but they generally suffer from the institutional bias of active duty military, retired military, and DoD civilians. For example: How easily can a pilot advocate a Navy without planes? All too often the initial question is “How will we use/improve/justify/buy this system?” instead of the forward-looking “What can do this?” or “Do we need to do this?”
The time has come to look to the future and face it head on. Only by merging the best minds of defense, industry (including nontraditional defense-related industries such as agriculture and economics), and academia can we identify and prepare for Stage 2. An organization must be created that encourages innovative thought, asks tough questions, and has the funding and authority to test and evaluate new concepts. Like the role the Advanced Research Projects Agency filled years ago, this new organization will gather our best and brightest and actively pursue breakthrough technology rather than merely responding to it.
This investment in innovation should focus not on producing fleet systems but on concept systems. The charter should be to seek ways to jump, not 5 or 10 years ahead of present systems, but 25 or 50 years ahead. Unsuccessful systems should not be punished, but be accepted as part of the costs associated with innovation and making these leaps forward. When systems prove out, they can be integrated into current acquisition plans or used to replace them as needed. A program such as this may take five or ten years to bring success, but a failure to take a long-term view eventually will lead us down the road to a crash with mass obsolescence. The pace of technological change no longer affords us the opportunity to observe newly deployed technology and develop a defense. In a world where the concept of American forces taking the first hit is politically unacceptable, we cannot afford to be surprised.
1 Steven Metz and James Klevit, Strategy and the Revolution in Military Affairs: From Theory to Policy (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1995), p. 1.
2 Jeffrey R. Cooper, Another View of the Revolution in Military Affairs (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1994), p. 21.
3 John H. Dalton, Adm. J. M. Boorda, USN, and Gen. Carl E. Mundy, Jr., USMC, “Forward . . . From the Sea,” pp. 3-7.
4 Metz and Klevit, Strategy and the Revolution in Military Affairs, p. 7.
5 Robert Holzer, “Super Warship Shows Promise in Computer Trials,” Defense News, 28 August-3 September 1995, p. 3.
6 John Robinson, “Pentagon to Carry Out Most of Commission’s Proposals,” Defense Daily, 28 August 1995, p. 288.
7 Tat Cooper and Frank Oliveri, “Air Force Carves Operational Edge in Info Warfare,” Defense News, 21-27 August 1995, p. 1.
Lieutenant Klain, a 1989 graduate of the Naval Academy, recently reported to the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations staff. His previous assignments include the Thach (FFG-43) and the commissioning crew of the Vella Gulf (CG-72).