The most effective design for the new surface combatant may lie down a new path. A ship built along the design of a modern container carrier, with modular sensor and weapon systems, could be combined with smaller scout fighters to provide a flexible war-fighting platform.
The conceptual phase of the surface combatant for the 21st century (SC-21) is ongoing, but there is a strong probability that the ship chosen will resemble a classic cruiser, destroyer, or frigate; such a design would keep hull, mechanical, and electrical (HME) development risks and costs low. Moderate costs and risks will be acceptable for improvements in sensors, weapons, command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence systems (SWC4I). But will a new cruiser, destroyer, or frigate provide the flexibility, balance, and affordability that the Navy will need in the future? Perhaps it is time to consider a new approach.
Periodically, the Navy experiences a metamorphosis in ship design. In the mid-1800s, a number of ships—including the Fulton (1837), Princeton (1843), and Wabash (1856)—were built to explore such new technologies as steam propulsion, screw propellers, and shell-firing guns. It wasn’t until the Civil War that these technologies were tied together in one radical design, and even then, the Navy failed to recognize the Monitor's potential as a new warship prototype. Because the Monitor was seen as a highly specialized ship for use in shallow water, it took until the mid-1880s for this amalgam of 1830s technology to make it to sea in the ABC-class armored cruisers.
A similar combination of technology can be seen in the development of the aircraft carrier: the flattop HME design was wed to new sensor, weapon, and C4I systems in the form of aircraft. The entire process of technical and operational development—starting with the Langley (CV-1) and culminating in the Essex (CV-9) class—took more than 15 years. With Pearl Harbor, the battleship mentality dissipated and the naval establishment began to accept carriers as the major instrument for war at sea.
Today, we are in the early stages of a developmental era similar to that of 1820s and 1920s. A survey of recent events finds the following key factors:
► The Persian Gulf reflagging operations in the 1980s demonstrated that large merchant ships such as the Bridgeton could take battle damage better than either frigates—like Samuel B. Roberts (FFG-58)—or cruisers—like the Princeton (CG-59).
- The cost of modern combatants, like battleships before them, has become excessive. For example, an Arleigh Burke (DDG-51)-class destroyer costs approximately $900 million a copy.1
- The U.S. first-tier shipbuilding infrastructure has been reduced to a handful of competent yards. With excess capacity and no commercial outlets, not even all of these are expected to survive. By 2010, there may not be enough first-tier industrial base capacity or capability to build modern cruisers, frigates, and destroyers en masse—especially if mobilization is called for—and at reasonable cost.
- There is an imbalance between quantity and quality. We currently are producing high-quality combatants, but there is an increasing hesitancy to place the relatively few we have in harm’s way. The loss of an Arleigh Burke destroyer or a Ticonderoga (CG-47)-class cruiser could have a serious impact on the Navy’s reputation and capability.
What type of vessel is needed to address these issues? The answer may lie along a new path. The Navy needs a less-expensive ship with greater flexibility to carry a wider array of SWC4I. That ship should be built along the design of a modern container carrier, with a stern configured for wet-well operations.2 It should carry containerized SWC4I equipment that can be put together modularly and transported using modern commercial intermodal means. For war-fighting punch, it would be combined with small, low-cost fighter craft—called scout-fighters3—that would include air, surface, and subsurface units such as helicopters, vertical take-off and landing aircraft, Mark V swift boats, and air-cushion landing craft.
Future growth and development in HME and SWC4I could occur simultaneously and without long overhaul periods for ships to install new sensor and weapon systems— containers are simply sent back to the factory or to refit areas. Embedded systems, like Aegis, are complex to build, difficult to modify in place, and almost impossible to exchange for newer or different systems. Containers are not. Standard fittings and services in the mother ship are the starting points for modern SWC4I designers.
Modern warships with embedded SWC4I systems become dated in 10 to 20 years, but their HME remains useful for 30 to 40 years. This is a poor investment strategy. The concept of mothership, containerized SWC4I, and scout fighters disconnects HME investments from SWC4I investments. The result is increased flexibility in both. For example, without SWC4I on board, the ship is a nonthreatening platform for humanitarian and relief work. As a fully loaded warship, it allows the combat commander to task-configure the SWC4I containers and scout fighters for a mission, choosing some and leaving out others. Should the mission change or the enemy shift tactics, the commander can have the new containers and craft he or she needs shipped via commercial transport.
Large motherships also allow for greater operational radius between refueling or replenishments. This means more time on station to remain engaged with the task at hand.
Finally, and most important in an uncertain world, new SWC4I systems and scout fighters could be built and fielded rapidly. Second-tier shipyards, unlike first-tier builders, are relatively plentiful, flexible, and cost-effective. Should full mobilization be called for, this industrial base could shift production from commercial to military customers without a large national investment to create or expand it. Similarly, it could shift back to commercial production without creating excess capacity. Matching warship design to the industrial base—rather than the other way around—should be part of our new approach.
The mothership/scout fighter concept also addresses the need to balance quality with quantity. The cutting edge of the Navy would be the scout fighters. They would provide information and deliver weapons while the mother- ship remains just outside the operating area to deliver missiles on call or to send in replacement aircraft, surface skimmers, or submersibles. The loss of one, or several, fighters would not endanger the Navy’s operating ability or damage national prestige. War fighters would be able to learn from tactical mistakes in judgment without endangering the strategic balance between opposing forces.
There are some drawbacks to this new warship concept if past standards of performance are applied. Among the most arguable will be speed, maneuverability, stability, and damage control. Speed and maneuverability often are viewed in tactical terms, but what modern ship can outrun or outturn modem weapons? For the mothership, speed and maneuverability are not vital; they are more critical for the scout fighters and smart weapons they carry.
Similarly, stability and damage control in the mother- ship need to be reevaluated in terms of combat effectiveness and cost. Both are important only to get the ship to the combat area in time and in condition to launch its fighters and weapons effectively. Any more is excess. Already, bigger ships have proved that they fare better against modern air, surface, and subsurface weapons, as evidenced by the Bridgeton.
As regards the ability to fight through damage, most war fighters would prefer another ship to a damaged one. Few people believe a modern warship can survive a hit by a major weapon such as a Harpoon missile and be immediately useful to the warfare commander. At best, it would take a year to rebuild, as was the case for the Samuel B. Roberts. It may be wiser to design a Navy where wholesale replacement is cheaper than major repairs, keeping the big ship out of harm’s way as much as possible, while letting scout fighters wage the war of attrition.
A full concept of operations will need to wait for the fielding of a proof-of-concept mothership, containerized systems, and prototype scout fighters. This could be done by adopting the aircraft carrier development model. The first step would be a conversion using an existing hull, this time converting a containerized commercial carrier to military use as a proof-of-concept ship. The ship would remain mostly a large open hull, but would be modified with a dry well and a flight deck and hanger. The engineering configuration would be improved for electrical power and cooling air and water. Standard interface plugs for services would be developed with a list of engineering specifics available to users (volts, frequency, flow rates, temperatures, and pressures) and would include interfaces for local area networks and other C4I systems.
It would be up to program managers and manufacturers to encourage designers to produce containerized systems in standard configurations, including compatibility with commercial intermodal transport. Scout fighters would be tested using existing, second-tier manufactured platforms like LCACs and Mark V patrol craft. This would return the services to the era when private competition would supplement public research and development.
A design goal would be to have no unique military sizes or loads. If this is done, the commercial transport industry would be capable of national service in time of crisis.
Once the concept of operations is verified with a converted merchant ship, modified designs could be pursued, adding a wet well. Two ships would follow; one a modified military design and the other a modified commercial design. Cost and manpower requirements would weigh equally with performance criteria. Finally, after the two modified designs have been at sea and operations concepts have been fully explored, a new warship—designed and built from the keel up to meet military mission needs— could be funded and fielded. If all goes well, a production series could be authorized and funded.
The overall effect would be to provide a flexible keel on which the Navy can build its new surface combatant force for the 21st century.
1 Les Aspin, Annual Report to the President and Congress, January 1994, p. 254.
2 The mothership/smaller fighting craft idea was first conceived by Capt. Clark Graham and then-LCdr. Michael Bosworth in “Designing the Future U.S. Naval Surface Fleet for Effectiveness and Producibility,” published in proceedings of Ship Production Symposium, Arlington, Va. September 1989, republished in Marine Technology, May 1991. Their design was for a ship that could meet all current military specifications. Of note was their fleet architecture concept of D3S (distribute, disperse, disguise, and sustain), applied here.
3 Victor A. Meyer, “Naval Surface Warfighting Vision 2030,” Naval Engineers Journal, May 1992, pp. 74-88.
Captain Brown is a recent graduate of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces. His most recent assignment was as commanding officer of the Anchorage (LSD-36).