Truly new warships are developed infrequently; in the 50 years since the end of World War II, the nuclear-propelled ballistic missile submarine probably is the only new warship concept introduced into the world’s navies. However, a new ship type now may be in the offing—the arsenal ship.
Employing a hull built largely to merchant standards, the arsenal ship is envisioned as a floating missile battery. It would carry some 500 vertical-launch missiles; the Tomahawk land-attack missiles, for striking targets at distances of almost 1,000 miles; the Army’s tactical missile system (ATACMS), with a range of almost 100 miles; and possibly Standard surface-to-air missiles, and Standard missiles configured for the anti-theater-ballistic-missile role. These missiles would be controlled by other ships or forces under the “cooperative engagement capability.”
These weapons would provide commanders with massive amounts of firepower early in a crisis or conflict, while reducing the strategic airlift and sealift needed to move weapons in from the United States or other areas. The available (and generally limited) strategic lift resources then would be available to move combat and support forces rather than ordnance.
Political constraints and limitations on airfield and port facilities also can reduce the amount of firepower that can be brought rapidly to a crisis area. These were important factors in the buildup for the Gulf War. Indeed, Navy planners are quick to point out that on 16 February 1991 an Iraqi Scud-type missile hit close to the pier at Jubayl, Saudi Arabia. At the time, four cargo ships—as well as a U.S. helicopter carrier, two aviation support ships, a Polish training ship, and an Army barge—were alongside the pier and hundreds of vehicles and tons of munitions were on the pier. A few yards separated the near miss from a major disaster.
Arsenal ships standing offshore would have reduced greatly the need for cargo ships carrying munitions, the amount of ordnance piled on piers, and the need to transport missiles to Army and Marine firing batteries ashore.
The modem concept of a warship carrying hundreds of missiles is not new. Vice Admiral Joseph Metcalf III, while Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Surface Warfare, publicly advanced this idea in 1988, calling for a specialized warship with up to 200 vertical-launch missiles.1 The idea was elaborated on a few months later by Dr. Scott Truver, a naval analyst and frequent Proceedings author.2 But their goal was a warship to stand in battle with other naval forces to strike Soviet targets ashore and afloat. Their ship not only carried vertical- launch systems (VLS) but also had an antisubmarine capability with bow-mounted sonar and SH-60 Seahawk helicopters. Propelled by gas turbines, she would sail with other warships in the battle group.
The arsenal ship concept is very different from that proposed by Admiral Metcalf and Dr. Truver. The arsenal ship is “intended for presence, crisis response, and regional conflicts,” according to a Navy official.3 And it would be different from the VLS warship proposed during the Cold War. Merchant construction techniques would be employed, possibly with double-hull configuration with transverse frames and stiffeners. Various protective systems could be fitted within a double hull to help defeat attacking cruise missiles. The ship would have a small radar cross section and other passive defense features, as well as innovative damage-control systems. Indeed, the ship could have a semisubmersible hull; she would steam into a crisis area in a normal displacement condition, and then ballast down to a freeboard of only some five feet to further reduce the radar cross section. Still, in a combat environment the arsenal ship would probably need surface combatants as escorts.
Propulsion concepts being examined center on electric propulsion, to provide a transit speed of about 25 knots. The ship would have a high degree of automation, with a crew of about 25. The Navy believes that four to six such arsenal ships could provide a continuous war-fighting presence in two or three areas. To permit the ships to remain on station for long periods, the crews probably would be rotated, as is now done for some maritime prepositioning ships.
The arsenal ship’s missiles would be launched under the cooperative engagement capability concept by another platform—warship or aircraft. Targeting for those missiles could come from manned aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles, other ships, or observers on the ground. Modern command-control- communications “connectivity” permits this concept of operations.
The Navy hopes to begin concept studies in 1996-1997, responding to interest expressed by Chief of Naval Operations Admiral J. M. Boorda. The fiscal year 1998 budget would provide for a prototype arsenal ship—an advanced concept technology demonstrator (ACTD), in Defense gobbledygook—and a design contract could be awarded as early as fiscal 1997! Construction of the lead ship as an ACTD would shorten construction time and reduce technical risks, according to Navy statements. The most significant difference between the ACTD prototype and the envisioned operational units would be the number of VLS cells. A single 64-cell unit would be installed in the prototype, with the capability to upgrade to a full 500-missile battery. (The actual number of VLS cells installed would be a multiple of 64 VLS cells, possibly plus one 32-cell module, i.e., 480 or 512 missiles.) Some proposals call for 750 missiles.
Because the VLS and cooperative engagement systems already exist and are at sea, and most arsenal ship concepts use commercial design and construction standards, there appears to be little reason to construct a prototype. The only major areas left to be developed are the ability of a ground commander to control the launch of missiles from an arsenal ship and comparability tests of ATACMs with the VLS—and both of these areas could be tested with existing VLS ships. Rather, the accelerated development of an arsenal ship prototype (that could be upgraded to a full capability) appears to be largely political, i.e., to put such a concept to sea. But that in itself may be valid reason for the ACTD concept.
Most of the discussion of the arsenal ship centers on surface ships, but there is some support for an arsenal submarine. The Navy has 16 Ohio (SSBN-726)-class submarines in commission and two more under construction. The 1994 review of U.S. strategic forces provides for a force of 14 Trident submarines in 2000, meaning that four of the older units will be retired. Rear Admiral Dennis A. Jones, Director of the Submarine Warfare Division, touts the use of these nonstrategic Trident submarines in the arsenal ship role. He notes that there is no reason why any weapon in the military inventory “cannot be shot submerged. . . . We are also exploring this option: a sub-surface to air or a sub-surface to surface missile.”4 According to Admiral Jones, the Navy recently completed a feasibility study that showed the ATACM could be launched from a standard attack submarine VLS with only minor modifications.
The Trident submarine has the advantages of being readily available and having a high degree of stealth, and even rearmed with nonstrategic missiles, it would retain traditional torpedo/mine capabilities. Each Trident could be converted to carry 162 Tomahawk-size missiles in place of 24 Trident weapons.
Admiral Jones—who refers to the nonstrategic Trident as the LSC, or large stealth combatant—contends that the Trident submarines could “do, and do as well, in shallow water, every role that the present [SSN] 688 and the [planned] New Attack Submarine will be able to do.”5
But an ex-Trident boat in this role would still have a relatively limited missile load compared to a specialized arsenal ship, would be expensive to operate, and possibly would cause some confusion in strategic arms negotiations. (Significantly, the Russians have several former Yankee strategic missile submarines that have been reconfigured to carry the SS-N-21 Sampson land-attack cruise missile, which is similar to the U.S. Tomahawk.)
Simultaneously with the Navy’s studies, in November 1995 the Defense Department’s Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) initiated a study to determine how it could support the Navy in technology development for the arsenal ship. This effort resulted from discussions between Larry Lynn, director of ARPA, and Admiral Boorda. Former Marine Corps Commandant General A1 Gray, Vice Admiral Metcalf, and Rear Admiral Wes Jordon, along with members of ARPA’s Tactical Technologies Office are conducting the study.
There are many pros and cons to the arsenal ship concept. For example, the relative value of increasing the missile capacity of a variant of the Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class—rather than producing six arsenal ships—should be considered. Could a removable VLS module be dropped into the docking well of LSD-type amphibious ships (and building more LSDs, providing a more flexible force)? Should the relative cost of defending an arsenal ship with an Aegis destroyer be included in costing the program?
The submarine concept is more difficult to address. The issue of stealth, for example, could become moot if the submarine has to remain in a specific area or “box” for a sustained period, periodically shooting missiles at the orders of a ground commander, thus becoming highly vulnerable to detection. Also, if an Army or Marine commander needs an arsenal ship to provide his forces with missile support, there most likely would be amphibious and cargo ships in the area with their defensive escorts, alleviating the value of a stealth arsenal ship.
Some wags already are attacking the concept, pointing out— for example and accurately—that four arsenal ships would carry and hence put at risk all 4,000 Tomahawk missiles in the U.S. inventory.
It obviously is too early to make such definitive judgments on the arsenal ship concept. But as the U.S. Navy enters the 21st century, many of the weapons, ships, aircraft, and concepts that were employed in the Cold War will not be effective, especially if the future demands sustained operations in relatively shallow water, close to the shore. New weapons and new operations concepts will be needed. The arsenal ship may be one of the right ones.
What’s In a Name?
Probably the most negative aspect of the arsenal ship is its name. An “arsenal,” says Webster’s New World Dictionary, is “a place for making or storing weapons and other munitions.” The proposed arsenal ship certainly will not be a place for making weapons. The ship will store weapons, but the world's other arsenals and weapon storehouses are ashore, and the image may not be the one desired for a modem warship.
Vice Admiral Metcalf, in his January 1988 Proceedings article “Revolution at Sea,” used the term strike cruiser for his futuristic missile carrier. Actually, strike cruiser already had been assigned to a U.S. Navy ship type: The strike cruiser (CSGN) concept was developed in the early 1970s as an outgrowth of the nuclear- propelled frigate (DLGN), intended to carry the Aegis weapon system. As more weapons were added the ship was enlarged and the cost increased to the point that Congress refused to fund it, and the proposed CSGN disappeared.
Instead, the Aegis system was fitted into the Spruance (DD-963) design, resulting in the Ticonderoga (CG-47) class.
The designation strike cruiser (CSG) now has been proposed from several quarters for the arsenal ship concept. Strike is an active word, implying a hard-hitting capability, which certainly relates to a ship with several hundred missiles. Cruiser is a traditional naval term, implying a warship, and one that ranges far and wide.
What’s in a name? Quite a bit when you are trying to garner public and congressional support for an exciting new military program.
1 VAdm. Joseph Metcalf, USN, "Revolution at Sea," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, January 1988, pp. 34-39.
2 Dr. Scott Truver, "Whither the Revolution at Sea," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, December 1988, p. 68-74.
3 Capt. Mark Edwards, USN, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (N863), interview, 2 October 1995.
4 RAdm. D. A. Jones, USN, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (N87), address to the Naval Submarine League, Ft. Myer, VA, 8 November 1995.
5 Jones, op cit.