Communications in modem naval warfare is becoming more important as the technology continues to grow dramatically. In the Battle of Jutland, for example, divisions of battleships required signal flags flying from yardarms to transmit line-of-sight battle orders. In Operation Desert Storm, satellites and radios transmitted orders thousands of miles.
The Navy should not become comfortable with current or anticipated communications technology to solve its tactical needs. In Jutland, for example, visual signals took time to be broken, read, and passed from ship to ship. An ingenious tactical thought by a divisional commander conceived in one instant might, by the time the signal reached the last ship have, been made obsolete by a sudden tactical change.
In the Gulf War, a similar situation existed. Air-tasking orders transmitted over standard Navy circuits overloaded the system causing enormous delay in message processing. Despite the unimaginable difference in technology from flag hoists to satellites, the tactical problem remained the same.
According to retired Navy Captain Wayne P. Hughes Jr., author of Fleet Tactics, (Naval Institute Press, 1986) “From smoke signal to telegraph, from radio to communications satellite, technology is a snare that will trap an unwary military organization.”
Shifting paradigms can be useful when looking at ways communications can support modern fleet operations. We have become dependent upon a myriad of circuits, data links, and command nets to relay information. This is, of course, a necessity, given the perishable nature of information in modem combat.
It would make sense, however, to reevaluate the role of communications in some aspects of naval operations. Take underway replenishment (UnRep) of a surface action group for example. An ammunition ship and an oiler rendezvous at predetermined coordinates to refuel and rearm half-a-dozen ships or so. Rather tight formations are anticipated, and timely communications are important, especially when dealing with last-minute schedule changes or casualties.
In a real-world, forward-deployed scenario, friendly, neutral, and enemy sensors may be detecting or correlating our UnRep transmissions over bridge- to-bridge and radio circuits. Although our UnRep evolutions are routine and unclassified, a historical trend of our methods is easily developed by a foreign nation simply by cataloguing our activities.
In time, enough is known about the way we conduct replenishment to generate tactical planning against our forces. Tactically and navigationally, a surface action group is very vulnerable during UnRep.
An emissions-quiet UnRep is a sound method of protecting our operational methods from foreign analysis. This technique can be effective and safe only when practiced as standard doctrine. Imposed sporadically by tactical commanders today, however, it is the exception rather than the rule. In this case, operational security of units is enhanced, not by advances in technology, but retreats from it. Flashing light and semaphore easily can communicate all the signals relevant to underway replenishment. These signals and procedures already exist. They need only be put into practice. Tactically mindful officers-of-the-deck can call for the signalman, rather than reach for the bridge-to-bridge radio.
In this time of force reduction, deployed battle groups are becoming smaller. As a result, a conglomeration of our ships during an underway replenishment in the Mediterranean, for example, leads to concentration of most of the battle group in a tactically unsafe situation. Employment of silent-only replenishment greatly increases the safety of both combatants and supply ships.
The trend of moving toward a small number of technically advanced craft instead of a large number of low-tech ships, creates a need to safeguard our assets even more now than before. Use of alternate means of communications during underway replenishment would go a long way toward making a battle group stealthier and safer.
Ensign Czyzewski is the Communications Officer of the Barry (DDG-52).