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By most estimations, the British Dardanelles campaign of 1915 was a failure of major proportions. The effort to seize Gallipoli and to remove the Turks from the World War I was Poorly planned and poorly executed by the combined British, French, Australian, and New Zealand force. Ironically, this British defeat has been examined more closely and studied more intently than perhaps any other battle of that war. Chief among the students of Gallipoli are the U.S. Marines.
In the wake of its overseas service with the Army in World War I, the Marine Corps was fighting in Congress for a continuing role as an expeditionary force. Major General John A. Lejeune, Commandant of the Marine Corps and Commanding General of the Army’s 2nd Infantry Division in France during World War I, addressed the House Naval Committee in 1920. General Lejeune stated that “The Marine Corps will supply expeditionary forces for service with the fleets in the event of the Black Sea—represented a welcome change from the devastating trench warfare in the West. Germany had formed an alliance with the Ottoman Turks, as part of their strategy to construct a railroad from Berlin to Baghdad, assisting the weakening “Old Man of Europe” with supplies, military training, and martial leadership. In 1914, Turkey challenged the Allies by conducting a naval bombardment of Russia, who in turn requested a demonstration by the British Royal Navy, which eventually led to the ill-fated campaign.
The U.S. Marines learned many valuable lessons related to intelligence from the Gallipoli campaign. The first lesson was found in the planning stages. An attack upon the Dardanelles was not a part of the Allies’ prewar planning, but instead was a result of escalating pressure to end the stalemate on the Western Front and to repel Turkish aggression. When Lord Kitchener, commanding the British Royal Fleet in the Mediterranean, was tasked with stopping the Turks, he was forced into a region about which very little was known. He had scant information about the terrain, the number of Turkish defenders to be faced, and the abilities of those troops. The Marine Corps later concluded that there should be “a comprehensive study of the Theater of Operations and a complete study of those factors
War.”' He was fully aware of the valuable lessons that could be learned from the failed allied attack on Gallipoli, and under his leadership, extensive study of that campaign was integrated into the Field Officers’ Course and other officer training at Marine Corps Schools, Quantico, Virginia.2 As Brigadier General Eli K. Cole, a contemporary of General Lejeune, stated, “[in the Gallipoli-Dardanelles campaign] there were practically all the elements with which we, as Marine officers, should be familiar. . The lessons of Gallipoli and the Dardanelles campaign formed the basis of training in amphibious warfare that the Marines would practice in the World War II island-hopping Pacific campaign.
Prelude to War
The Dardanelles Campaign in 1915 began as a diversion to a battle that already was becoming stalled on the Western Front. The notion of forcing open the Hellespont—the gateway to
The U.S. Marines (pictured here coming ashore in 1930s training) learned by example after the failed Allied attack on Gallipoli in 1915. The lessons of the Dardanelles Campaign—specifically, mistakes not to repeat—provided a foundation for amphibious warfare in World War II.
governing the amount and degree of enemy opposition to be expected."5 The Marines also suggested that an intelligence base be built during peacetime, to lessen the extreme difficulties of compiling intelligence in wartime.
The Ground Phase
Under the leadership of Lord Kitchener, the combined British and French fleets began pounding the Turkish Army with naval gunfire. Lord Kitchener’s fleet then proceeded through the Dardanelles Strait to Gallipoli. After entering a mine field, however, three ships sank, and the Allied fleet was stuck in the
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Dardanelles. Seeing the naval forces losing momentum, General Ian Hamilton, the British army commander, suggested an amphibious landing. Lord Kitchener concurred and gave General Hamilton permission to proceed.
Without consulting the British War Council, Lord Kitchener requested additional allied troops, which soon poured in from Great Britain, France, Australia, and New Zealand. Because of poor communication, however, the troops and supplies were not embarked properly to land on such hostile terrain as Gallipoli. In time, General Hamilton was forced to return all of his forces to Egypt to off-load their crews and cargoes and to reembark them for combat. This cost the Allies precious months and allowed the Turks to entrench and prepare stronger defenses. The Turks also were able to get an idea of what the Allies intended by reading Egyptian newspaper reports of their daily activities.
After reembarking in Egypt, the Allies finally were in a position to mount an attack. General Hamilton studied the few available maps carefully and decided on a three-pronged assault on the Dardanelles: In the north, the French would make a feint on Bulair. In the south, the Australian and New Zealand forces would attack in Anzac Cove, while the British would assault Helles on the southern end of the peninsula.
General Hamilton was tasked with assaulting through unknown territory, using unfamiliar Allied resources against unknown enemy capabilities. The Marine Corps drew several practical lessons from the lack of intelligence available for the preliminary planning. First, accurate maps are essential to make best use of terrain. Second, the collection of intelligence prior to an attack is critical. Gallipoli taught that observation from ships was unsatisfactory, since it was limited by its inability to observe terrain beyond the shore. Ground reconnaissance was judged to be generally impossible. Air reconnaissance, however, was the most accurate and useful for the conduct of operations. Third, capable communications facilities were viewed as essential for both sending and receiving information. Fourth, intelligence must be accurate and fresh and must reach the person for whom it is intended.6
The intelligence failures of the Allies extend to the poor security that allowed the Turks to receive intelligence reports on the British fleet. The Marines appreciated the need for secrecy to maintain the element of surprise, but they did not want this need for secrecy to interfere with the dissemination of information to subordinate leaders. A careful balance was needed to conduct a successful amphibious operation.7
The Amphibious Assault
After a preliminary bombardment, the Allies began sending boats to the attack points in April. Once they landed, it became apparent that the available maps were greatly flawed. Instead of a sloping plain at Helles, the attackers discovered a series of washed-out gullies that were difficult to cross—and easy for the Turks to defend. As a result, the Allies found it extremely difficult to coordinate their advance, and the attack soon fell apart. The Allies managed to secure two small pieces of land at Helles and at Anzac Cove, but they were unable to link the two beachheads.
In August 1915, after weeks of secretly reinforcing the forces at Anzac Cove and Gebe Tepe, General Hamilton launched an attack on the unsuspecting Turks. The commanding general of these troops was General Birdwood of New Zealand, who did not support Hamilton’s plans enthusiastically. When the attack commenced, he failed to maintain contact with the Turks, overestimated the Turkish strength, and did not press the advantage of a defensive gap at Anzac Cove.
The high number of casualties suffered at both Anzac Cove and Helles made it clear to the latter-day Marine analysts that landing operations require higher percentages of officers than most other operations, and that all officers should be fully acquainted with the plans and orders of their next higher commanders, enabling them to assume command if required.8
With regard to naval gunfire, the Marine Corps decided to test methods for directing and controlling the fire of supporting ships. At Gallipoli, poor terrain intelligence hindered naval bombardments. Ships were unable to locate the position of troops with any degree of accuracy, and soldiers on the beach were unable to communicate their positions to the ships. The Marine Corps recognized this situation as a key component of failure.
After the second attack at Anzac Cove failed, contact with the enemy was seen as critical to maintaining operational tempo. Such contact could have been maintained by reconnoi- tering patrols, and the need to rest or reorganize troops should never be permitted to interfere with essential reconnaissance. This was not the case at Gallipoli. General Birdwood failed to ensure continuous collection of intelligence, and as a result lost what little awareness he had of Turkish capabilities and limitations.
Gallipoli was a tragedy for the Allies in World War I, but it was a failure in execution—not in concept. The lessons drawn from this campaign provided the framework for modern amphibious doctrine, which later would help the Marines defeat the Japanese in the Pacific. Everything is good for something—if only to serve as a horrible example.
'John A. Lejeune, “The Mission of the Marine Corps,” Army and Navy Register, January-June 1920.
2Gallipoli Studies at the U.S. Marine Corps Schools, Quantico, 1932. These extensive studies are compiled on five reels of microfilm, which were compiled at the U.S. Naval Academy in 1967.
Tbid.
4Report of Committee No. 5, Field Officers’ Course, 1932-1933: MH-2 (Quantico, Virginia: Marine Corps Schools), p. 1.
'Ibid. p. 35.
Ibid. pp. 35-6.
Tbid. p. 35.
Tbid. p. 35.
Tbid. pp. 35-6.
Lieutenant Haynes graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in May and reports to The Basic School at Quantico, Virginia, in June.
Pollyanna
HMS Albion, the British light cruiser, was paying a visit to a South American port on a round-the-world cruise. An ordinary seaman was much attracted by the parrots that were for sale, and in accordance with the ship’s orders requested the executive officer’s permission to bring one on board.
“But what about the smell?” asked the commander, realizing that the bird’s arrival on an already crowded mess deck might not be welcome.
“Oh, that will be all right, sir,” replied the seaman. “He’ll get used to it.”
R. D. Ross