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On 16 September 1994, a cold day, HMAS Anzac, the new Australian frigate, was launched at Williamstown in Victoria, Australia. Christened by a former Army nurse—a prisoner of war 50 years before—the new ship slid silently into the gray-green waters of Hobson’s Bay. First of a class of ten, she represents a new era for the navies of Australia and New Zealand—and the ships themselves are products of an international industrial program and of a labor and management revolution down under. The Anzac will commission in 1996.
Ten years ago, the Royal Australian and Royal New Zealand Navies were dead in the water. In 1983, Australia’s newly elected Labour government decided to scrap the carrier Melbourne. The six British-derived “River”-class frigates were more than 20 years old and faced block obsolescence. Plans to build up to six U.S.-designed Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7)-class frigates in Australia as follow-ons to four built in the United States had ground to a halt because of labor and management problems in the government-owned shipyard at Williamstown. The incomplete hull of the first Australian-built FFG sat rusting and neglected for years while the work force wrangled. The Cockatoo Shipyard in Sydney had similar problems; the French- designed replenishment ship Success took five years from laying down to launch.
Submarines were a different story. The six Oberon-class submarines were getting old and a proposed replacement submarine project clearly was likely to enjoy Australian political support.
Economics and politics clouded the Royal New Zealand Navy’s future. Four British-built frigates provided the fleet’s combat core; the oldest pair, in service since 1961, required replacement. A 1978 proposal to acquire Dutch Kortenaer-class frigates foundered under the economic impact of the 1979 oil shock and the Navy was told to settle for second-hand ships, eventually acquiring the Royal Navy’s Leander-class frigates Bacchante and Dido.
The Navy paused, evaluated life-cycle costs, decided to become a submarine- centered force—a radical approach— and joined the Australian’s new submarine project. The government endorsed the concept, noting that the fleet also would need two multipurpose surface ships.
In 1983 and 1984, the political left in Australia and New Zealand played on fears of global nuclear war—suggesting that U.S. President Ronald Reagan had stepped up the Cold War—and recommended that each nation reconsider its relationship with the United States. In Australia, the Hawke Labour government’s review of the Australia-New Zealand- United States (ANZUS) alliance actually led to a strengthening of the Australian government’s commitment to the 30-year- old partnership.
But in New Zealand, Labour played on fears of nuclear weapon deployments to sway public opinion. If elected, the new government implied that it would not abandon the alliance but would demand assurances that visiting ships and aircraft did not carry nuclear weapons—a policy that abruptly changed to exclude nu-
clear-capable ships. New Zealand’s part in the tripartite relationship broke down and the nation moved toward isolationism. Such a policy was widely assumed to mean fewer and less-capable military forces—and the new Prime Minister canceled participation in the Australian submarine project.
Australia was in the midst of a wide- ranging defense review that emphasized strategic denial and self-reliance, a strategy that appeared to diminish the role of the Navy, which would be reoriented to coastal defense; only the submarine force would retain an offensive role. The official 1987 Review, however, softened the report’s defensive emphasis and adopted a layered defense strategy in which the surface fleet played a substantial role. Plans to develop a new class of surface combatant to replace the “River”-class ships were approved.
In New Zealand, the Labour government accepted the logic that New Zealand needed a combat-capable blue-water navy and joined the project. Thus the two nations each came to recognize formally the need for replacement surface combatants: ► For Australia, which had decided to complete two more first-tier ships in the Australian-built FFG program, these would be second-tier ships.
>• For New Zealand, they would be first- tier combatants.
The project team specified capabilities rather than equipment. The project was intended to help revitalize Australia’s shipbuilding capability and a target of 80% local content was established. Many companies bid as the team evaluated 13 designs and narrowed the choice to two: the Dutch Karel Doorman M-Type and the German MEKO 200. Australian and New Zealand industry were encouraged to group into consortia for the actual construction of the ships.
Australian Warship Systems teamed up with the Dutch shipbuilder Royal Schelde to offer the M-Type, which was to be built in a modernized Newcastle Shipyard. Australian Marine Engineering Corporation (AMECON) proposed to build the MEKO 200 at Williamstown, near Melbourne.
The Australian government’s plan to rescue the FFG building project involved selling the yard to private industry and handing the project to a single, private prime contractor. Included was the commitment to resolve the labor problem. The federal government, with support from the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTUs), would assist the successful bidder in simplifying and unifying the union coverage at Williamstown Shipyard. AMECON won the FFG contract, sacked the workers, and spent four months cleaning up the incomplete hulk of FFG-05 while the unions, under pressure from the federal government and the ACTUs, negotiated an agreement. In the end, Australian shipbuilding got an industrial labor environment that matched the technological demands of modern shipbuilding.
In September 1989, AMECON also won the ANZAC frigate contract with the MEKO design; its edge was a superior industry package. Although Blohm + Voss had built the basic design for several navies, the specific requirements of the Anzac equipment and the needs of the two navies involved detailed redesign. Because of the commercial negotiations with the major component subcontractors and the demand on them for specific commitments to Australia’s and New Zealand’s industrial participation, the detailed design phase turned out to be an extended process, causing a five-month delay before achievement of the project’s first milestones. The result, however, was the most carefully designed ship in the MEKO series.
Between contract signing and the recent first launch, the shipbuilder itself was transformed. The name AMECON vanished; the firm is now Transfield Shipbuilding, with subsidiaries in Western Australia, Newcastle, New South Wales, and Whangarei, New Zealand. Another business subsidiary, Transfield Defence Systems, is collocated at Williamstown, where it manages integration and testing of combat and platform systems and provides training for the two navies. The $5- billion Australian project is the most valuable defense contract awarded in Australia, eclipsing the Collins-class submarine project and dwarfing the Royal Australian Air Force’s F/A-18 program.
The new frigates are being armed with the U.S. five-inch (127-mm) Mk 45 lightweight gun and an eight-cell Mk 41 vertical launch system for Sea Sparrow point-defense missiles. Space and weight are available for Mk 32 antisubmarine torpedo tubes, for the Phalanx close-in weapon system, and for a possible towed- array sonar. The hangar and flight deck can accept an SH-60 Seahawk helicopter, although the two New Zealand ships will not have RAST helicopter-recovery gear and are likely to operate smaller helicopters.
The Te Kaha, the Royal New Zealand Navy’s first ANZAC-class frigate, is scheduled to enter service in 1997.
Primary sensors are the U.S. SPS-49 long- range radar, the Swedish “Sea Giraffe” target-indication radar, and a German K-A 8600M for navigation and helicopter control. The hull- mounted sonar is the French Thompson Sintra “Spherion.” A Cel- ciustech 9LV 453 Mk 3 system which incorporates the Celciustech fire-control system will provide command-and- control. The software is built up on a modular concept whose core system has been proved in Swedish and Danish warships. Additional code is required only to integrate the specific weapons and sensors chosen for the ANZAC- class frigates.
Powering the frigates is a GE LM2500 gas turbine, cross-connected through a Swiss- designed gearbox to two German MTU V12 diesels. The propulsion system offers several operational modes that vary from using the gas turbine to drive both shafts for full speed—27 knots—to driving a single shaft with a single diesel for sustained low speed and quiet running.
All weapon systems and most of the ship systems—ventilation and air conditioning, radar and radio, and the power plants—are modular, in accordance with the MEKO design philosophy that emphasizes easy maintenance and low refitting costs. The approach also keeps the manpower requirement low; the ANZAC ship’s company is only 153, 100 fewer than a Leander. Transfield already is at work on the Te Kaha, the first of New Zealand’s frigates. From 1996—when the Anzac joins the Royal Australian Navy— until 2004, one ship a year will be commissioned.
To some, especially in New Zealand, it seemed that the frigate project was an expensive anachronism. Both nations were feeling the impact of recession and their defense budgets were eyed jealously by other departments, the parliamentary opposition and the general public. After all, the Cold War was over.
New Zealand, which had sent troops and aircraft to the Gulf and still contributes to many peacekeeping operations, at first saw the revitalized United Nations as an excuse not to invest in modern armed forces. New Zealanders celebrate memories of World War II with pride, but the heritage passed on to today’s generations is colored by the negative impression of wartime conscription. The armed forces are viewed as an imposition, and much of the New Zealand public questions the need for armed forces. The new government told them why in the 1991 Defence Review, which reshaped New Zealand’s policy from the South Pacific focus of the Labour years to one of partnership in collective security, encompassing the wider Asia-Pacific region.
The frigate project caused no enthusiasm in New Zealand, save for the various engineering firms that gained contracts with the major equipment suppliers. Only now, three years later, is the full extent of the industrial spin-off being understood, along with the value of the longer-term international business relationships created by the project.
Australia, in contrast, has a definite view of its place in the world, and its positive attitude toward the armed forces is shaped by the fact that, in two World Wars, all those who fought overseas were volunteers. As the string of World War II 50th anniversaries took place, a new generation of Australians was reminded of how close war came to Australia and of the role played by Australians in so many campaigns. The military’s achievements in the Gulf War and Operation Restore Hope, in Cambodia with the United Nations, and on other peacekeeping operations are seen as proof of the need for effective armed forces.
Of course, with the rapidly changing world scene, it is necessary to reassess defense policies frequently. The U.S. drawdown in the Pacific raised particular concerns for Australia—concerns shared by New Zealand’s policy makers. New Zealand’s “Defence Assessment 94” confirmed the essentials of the previous 1991 Defence Policy Paper, while in Australia, a Strategic Review released in early 1994 affirmed that nation’s commitment to Pacific and South East Asian regional security. In both nations, the reviews underlined the importance of modern naval forces, confirming the wisdom of the original frigate-project staff, who had made the case for the new ships on the fundamentals of geography and national interest, not on the narrow requirements of Cold War operations. Versatile warships are playing as active a role in peacekeeping as they ever did in Cold War confrontations.
The rationale for the ANZAC frigate project has not changed, even though the Asia-Pacific region appears to be more stable than in the last 50 years. There are problems, but the increasing openness of the region’s economies together with the absence of a widespread, militant ideology, point toward growing regional cooperation for common security. The Royal Australian and Royal New Zealand Navies will be well equipped to play a full part.
Commander Jackson, a 1972 U.S. Naval Academy graduate, is the Director of Corporate Relations Policy, Headquarters, New Zealand Defence Force, Wellington, New Zealand. He wrote “ ... an Orion was There!" in last month’s Proceedings.