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°ft security and harbor ^fense are vital to successful military opera- jons. For Desert Storm, security of port and ^ffield complexes at A1 '^bayl and Dhahran was critical to the .uUdup and supply of Coalition forces. The lye services must practice coordination and c°operation to accomplish this mission.
German General Erwin Rommel is best known for his successes in North Africa against the British Commonwealth in the first part of World War II. he also met with some significant failures. One was inability to take the Mediterranean port of Tobruk from l^e 9th Australian Infantry Division in the spring of
j., Tobruk was important to Rommel because, as Brigadier ^eneral Desmond Young wrote in Rommel:
^ well-constructed railroad ran from the Suez area to outer perimeter of Tobruk.
. The British Navy had organized coastal shipping in an j* 'hirable manner and in Tobruk had one of the best ports ^ ^iorth Africa.
t ^ Well-built road sufficiently wide for supply columns Pass was available.1
The British clearly understood the importance of this port complex as a thorn in Rommel’s side. Although hemmed in by Rommel’s German and Italian forces, the port city and airfield held out until relieved some eight months later. Contributing significantly to its defense was a small mobile contingent of tanks and armored cars— an army mobile force.
Almost 50 years later, on 2 August 1990, Saddam Hussein’s forces seized Kuwait, thus posing a significant threat to Saudi Arabia. Immediate targets for Saddam in Saudi Arabia, if he had chosen to attack, were the ports and airfields along the Persian Gulf coast, primarily those at A1 Jubayl and Dhahran. The reasons to secure these complexes almost immediately after the invasion of Kuwait were delineated in the report to the U.S. Congress entitled, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War. Some of the reasons given were:
>• The port and airfield complexes of A1 Jubayl and Dhahran offered some of the best unloading facilities in the area.
► Loss of or serious damage to the port facilities at A1 Jubayl and Ad Damman [port of Dhahran] would have made any force buildup in theater extremely difficult.
>• These two principal theater seaports had heavy lift equipment, warehouses, outdoor hardstand storage and staging areas, and good road networks around the port facilities.2
The reasons the Coalition forces in Desert Shield needed
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the port complex in Saudi Arabia roughly corresponded to those Rommel gave for capturing Tobruk.
The Coalition solution to securing the ports also bears some correlation to the Tobruk situation. But this time it was highly mobile U.S. Army military police, along with their Saudi counterparts, who were given the security responsibility on the ground “outside the perimeter” of the complexes.
Luckily, Saddam Hussein did not try what Rommel eventually did at Tobruk—attack and capture of the seaport complexes. In August of 1990, had Saddam tried to drive toward the ports, he would have encountered only lightly armed U.S. paratroopers with limited ground mobility. But Saddam is no Rommel; he missed an excellent opportunity to delay a Coalition ground offensive.
Today, the contribution of mobile formations to the defense and security of harbor and port facilities is as vital to successful operations as it has been in the past. In Southwest Asia, where there is again only limited U.S. on-the- ground presence, port and harbor operations remain especially critical. Here, also, there are few host nation agreements that call for coordinated indigenous and U.S. or U.N. security operations. In Somalia there is no government with which to conclude such agreements. The potential for such operations, in this part of the world in particular, requires the United States to focus on properly safeguarding key port and airfield complexes.
At first glance, port security and harbor defense appear to be exclusive sea-service responsibilities, or at least primarily Coast Guard tasks. But a closer look reveals that they are also Army tasks, and, if there is an airfield close to the port, the Air Force has a role to play as well. For the Vietnam War student, Da Nang comes immediately to mind, and that means the U.S. Marine Corps also may have an interest in such operations.
A joint and combined port security/harbor defense training exercise in Aqaba, Jordan, held in the summer of 1987, demonstrated the complexity of such operations. At the same time, it showed the need for interservice and host nation cooperation. Fortunately, the lessons learned there did not have to be applied three years later during Desert Shield. Saddam’s failure and the Coalition’s fast reaction negated the need to test the concepts in a combat environment.
From the perspective of the Army, whose major contribution at Aqaba was a mobile ground security force, it was possible to see how low-level enemy threats to harbors and ports can be defeated. This discussion is not about defending a port or harbor against a large-scale major attack of the magnitude feared by Coalition members in Desert Shield. Instead, a more-likely scenario involves special-operations force teams, sabotage squads, small submarines, underwater demolition swimmers, terrorist cells, or small units of airborne or airmobile assault troops (a Level I or II threat).
Within such parameters, the major Army mobile ground force that conducts security operations is the U.S. Army military police (MPs). In Desert Shield and Desert Storm, MPs from the 89th Military Police Brigade, the theater- area MP brigade, undertook this mission.
If there is an airfield in the port’s vicinity, the MPs
If there is a major U.S. Marine Corps element in the are' then the Marine provost marshal, as in the case of • Jubayl, is the point of contact for cooperation. The Corf Guard will have port security units present to work close! with the Army. The U.S. Navy also will have a variety units and countermeasures available, including antisiit marine warfare fixed-wing aircraft, helicopters, and ship small surface combatants; sonobuoy underwater detecti® systems; mine warfare elements; and mobile insho' undersea warfare units. Finally, add to these tb host nation military forces and—as was the case Somalia—even U.N. forces.
Basically, the task of the Army military police secufi1 forces is simply defined: keep the enemy away from ^ port or harbor. If the enemy does close on the harbor port, these forces attempt to repel the enemy as best the can, and, if the enemy force is too large, to maintain cof tact until the mission is handed off to a larger tactical corf bat force. They would accomplish their mission in the lowing manner:
► First, a joint concept of operations for harbor & fense/port security operations is determined, and into> service responsibility for directing operations is fixed- the harbor/port is outside the United States, the overt commander could be either from the Army or the rine Corps. Arrayed under his aegis would be Army Marine Corps personnel responsible for landward defert1 of the harbor or port. The Coast Guard would be charge with both seaward and landward port security opert tions. The Air Force would conduct airbase defense in ^ ordination with the appropriate Army, Navy, and Mari'11 Corps activities, e.g., with Army air defense coverage The Navy would have responsibility for seaward op&3 tions for harbor and port security. Such a concept mig look like that displayed graphically in Figure 1.
> Second, the Army military police units are given thd specific areas of responsibility by the Army’s Rear Art Operations Center, which fights the rear area battle. Trf MP combat support company is the unit that conducts re" area operations by using its mobility in detecting, rep o'1 ing, and combating low-level enemy Level II threrf1 through aggressive patrolling. Its area of responsibility landward, starting from easily recognizable terrain or rnf1 made features, or the most defensible terrain around ^ port complex. This perimeter becomes the key coordi"'1 tion line for ground defense of the port and harbor. It start at the waterline on one side of the harbor, encompass^ the port facility (which may include an airfield), and ert at the waterline on the other side of the harbor. This ima' inary line then serves as the inner boundary for empl°J ment of mobile formations.
>■ Finally, once the areas of responsibility have been e> tablished for deployment of the MP unit, it is critical effect coordination with the elements inside the perime1^ Chances are that the units adjacent to the perimeter are1,1 just those belonging to the Coast Guard. The Air Fort, could very well be defending an airfield, the perimeter1 which is also part of the port’s overall perimeter. The NaV
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................................................ Army/Marine Corps scope of responsibility
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o-o-o-o-o-o-o-o-o-o- Navy scope of responsibilty
a radio, which provides secure voice transmissions. In case of nuclear, biological, or chemical attack, the vehicle is equipped with a very effective detection system. For armament, the Humvee mounts either a Mk-19 40-mm automatic grenade launcher or an M60 machine gun.
Each team carries rifles, pistols, light antitank weapons, squad automatic weapons, and grenade launchers, in addition to its major weapon. Their communications capability enables the MPs to call for and adjust mortar and artillery fire, which they are trained to do.
Altogether, there are 44 of these teams in the company. An MP combat support company is a much-sought-after combat unit for fighting in areas behind the front lines.
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eriemy threat is multifaceted. The Climate danger is that the ag- lessor will penetrate to the vital co" "istallations at the same time that ^fenders—not having properly c°ordinated—are firing at each other. Consequently, individual J^'litary police patrols will locate 'kely landward avenues of ap- ^j°ach into the port area; arrange S|gnals for recognition and for Jessing into friendly positions; ^termine and report to higher ”eadquarters any free-fire sec- *°rs; check radio and other means
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'dcntification means for determining friend from foe—to name "t a few measures.
It is particularly important that “n-the-ground coordination be reported properly to the arbor defense commander, who, for combat purposes, s|k>uld have easy access to the Army’s Rear Area Operations Center. A detailed matrix showing the responsibly of each element contributing to the defense of the tr|tire area is necessary to allow for rapid reinforcement threatened areas and quick response to all types of emer- ^encies, whether combat related or not.
, Once the areas of responsibility have been delineated coordination made, the MPs move out to their reactive sectors. Because they are outside the perimeter, the area over which they will operate probably will e great, the key to success is in their mobility. A look sUch a unit will enable one to appreciate better what e MP combat support company can do.
The combat support company consists of 160 enlisted
the company’s potential is to describe some scenarios that suggest its employment. First, consider an MP platoon operating outside the perimeter adjacent to a Navy mobile inshore underwater warfare unit (MIUWU). Then observe a similar platoon operating in conjunction with a Coast Guard port security unit. Finally, look at a platoon working with the Air Force, which has part of its outer perimeter as part of the harbor’s outer perimeter.
The MIUWU has an important detection mission, which calls for it to collect information by providing surface and subsurface sur-
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veillance in places like harbors and their approaches. But, except for a few rifles, it lacks a self-defense capability. Because the information it gathers can be quickly processed into valuable intelligence, the relatively unprotected MIUWU is an attractive target for the enemy.
The military police platoon, to protect the Navy unit, could be expected to include the MIUWU within its protective envelope. It would supplement the few rifles with machine gun positions the MPs could occupy quickly. But primarily it would hold any small aggressor ground attack units away from the Navy’s radar-sonar surveillance central van (AN/TSQ-108). The MIUWU would have a direct link with the MPs using its FM radio trans- mitter/receiver system. Thus, while members of the MIUWU manned the rifle pits, the MP platoon would first attempt to drive off the enemy, call in artillery or close air support, or divert the enemy away from the MIUWU. Only as a last resort would the platoon give up its mobility and man its predesignated positions on the MIUWU’s perimeter.
Normally, the MIUWU accumulates information through its detection array and communicates it directly to aircraft, helicopters, antisubmarine warfare ships, or small boats to counter a threat from seaward. The van’s
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link with the Rear Area Operations Center and the center’s subsequent passing of the information to the MP platoon permits the MPs to pick up any aggressors landing on the beaches from the sea or other bodies of water. In any emergency situation, the MIUWU talks directly to the MP platoon, since both units, when coordinating, will exchange their communications operating instructions. At the same time communications are maintained with other elements in the chain of command.
Close coordination not only is possible; it is mandated. A small enemy advance party allowed to establish a beachhead and link up with an aggressor land-based reconnaissance party could prove to be the successful precursor to a major operation to capture the port. MPs can thwart such attempts by enemy naval infantry recon parties or other special operations forces.
In the second example, the ability of the Coast Guard port security unit to defend itself is important. But the unit has limited firepower and no mobility. It is also more concerned with security than it is with defense. In other words, it can be proactive in forestalling sabotage and pilferage, but it is necessarily reactive in defending itself against outright attack. The military police combat support companies provide the missing link to defense and to defeating a low-level enemy threat.
The best thing the military police can do here is to keep the aggressor away from the port area. This is accomplished by aggressive patrolling; bringing artillery, naval gunfire, and close air support to bear on enemy forces; and rigorously regulating traffic well outside the perimeter. As the threat is identified and attacked, the military police maneuver to keep the enemy under constant surveillance without becoming decisively engaged. If the MP element gets in a situation where the enemy tries to destroy it with overwhelming force, the military police must be able to maneuver away from the direct attack to retain their advantage in mobility. MPs must remain in contact to fix the location of the enemy for the tactical combat force. Upon arrival of this force, the military police hand off the battle and become a part of the larger unit.
A third example places a similar onus on the MPs. Inside its airbase perimeter, the Air Force is particularly concerned that the enemy stays well away from landing and takeoff flight paths. This means that the military police work three to five kilometers outside the airfield perimeter, seeking out and destroying not only potential infiltrators, but those armed with heat-seeking missiles as well. This has to be accomplished by proactive MP action in the form of aggressive and detailed patrolling using the inherent mobility of the unit’s vehicles as well as patrolling on foot.
The importance of discovering and stopping both infiltrators and missileers has led to a close examination of how best to coordinate Army and Air Force ground defense activities. Because the Army has taken the lead in airbase ground defense, the military police plan to protect airfields the same way they would a port or any critical installation. Each installation is given a priority, and the military police are then distributed to protect those installations with the highest priorities.
The Air Force controls its ground defense operations defeat Level I and II threats through the Base Defense 0 erations Center. This center, along with all Army, Na Coast Guard, and Marine units, is linked to the Rear A Operations Center, which directs the entire land battle the rear area. In addition to its normal missions of ide tifying and holding off possible attacks by vigorous p trolling, the MP unit responds to orders from the Re Area Operations Center in protecting the airbase.
Any enemy will be looking for seams in this defe sive setup. He will seek to interject himself into one more of the seams to rip apart the defenses of the port harbor. It is therefore necessary to look at the more portant seams.
► First, there is jurisdiction. Unless there is agreem® among the services on who does what and where, imp® tant issues may go unresolved—for example, the locati® of the harbor’s landward perimeter. Each service shod1 go a little further than it ordinarily would in establishing overlapping procedures to cover the seams. Instead 0 weak spots, seams in jurisdictions should be strong bond
► Second, there is command and control of the harbd and port operation. Today it is highly likely that all se( vices could be involved in operations at a port/harbor/af field complex. So command-and-control procedures a"4 lines of authority must be clearly established and cof rectly used. A subset of the command-and-control chd lenge is the need for understanding by each service of d*: chain of command for rear area operations. It is n0' enough just to understand one’s own command-and-coH trol arrangement.
► Third, a perceptible seam is the lack of joint traini11-1 among the services in harbor defense and port securib Nuances and service-particular procedures and jargon $ important in fast-moving situations. It is mandatory tb3' each service feels comfortable operating with the othefS, A major part of operating in each others “comfort zone5 is knowing the capabilities and limitations of each se(' vice’s contribution. This is particularly noticeable in rad|1" communications compatibility. On the other hand, $ MIUWU commander needs to know when he is to recei^ MP support that five 60-ton M1A1 tanks are not going be rolling to his rescue.
Today, each service has staked out a position in harb°( defense and port security. The Army is working assid0 ously with the other services to keep ports and harbod of the United States and its allies free of enemy interf# ence. The challenge is quite real in Southwest Asia a® exists elsewhere in the world as well.
‘Desmond Young, Rommel (New York: Harbor Brothers, 1950), p. 236. (£l
2U.S Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, Final Repo*1 Congress, April 1992, p. 403.
General Bell is a graduate of the U.S. Military Academy and atten1 the National War College. In 1987, he commanded the 220th Mil*1^ Police Brigade, which deployed troops to Aqaba, Jordan, and Mogadb3 Somalia.
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