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J. JACOBS
As the mission of the Navy changes, so must the support it receives from the reserve component. Providing people and equipment tailored to support fleet training and reinforce active forces—here, a reserve naval aviator flying an F/A-18A from VFA-303 conducts carrier qualifications on the Nimitz (CVN-68)—must be the focus of the Naval Air Reserve force.
The threats we as a nation are likely to face have changed fundamentally. Gone is the specter of protracted global war with the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact, and with it our focus on a near single-scenario mobilization plan. They have been replaced with the long-existing, but now primary, threats of regional con-
flict in any of many remaining areas of historical tension8 and continuing strife. Because the Navy’s unique cap3' bilities (powerful yet unobtrusive presence, extended and continuous on-scene response, etc.) “are particularly well-tailored for the forward presence and crisis response missions articulated in the President’s National Security Strategy,” naval forces can expect continued heavy use.
For the Naval Air Reserve, this creates a unique op' portunity for fundamental changes—both in missions and organization. These changes will allow more effective use of the reserve component across the wider spectrum of anticipated conflict and will structure the Naval Air Re' serve for immediate crisis response, while placing a long' overdue premium on peacetime support for the active fleet-
Yesterday and Today
The Naval Air Reserve force has changed significantly | in just the last few years. This article will focus on the (
Short of major and protracted conflict, the statutes that pertain to reserve mobilization limit the usefulness of reserve commissioned units, which currently comprise the bulk of the reserve segment under discussion Specifica y, “members of units organized and trained to serve as units who are ordered to (active) duty without their consent shall be so ordered with their units.”4 This may have made sense in the global war scenario, but the necessity to deploy as a unit may response. In the most glaring case, compliance with this statute means none of the people or equipment assigned to any of the 14 squadrons that comprise the two reserve carrier air wings-arguably the most current and capable units in reserve tactical air (TacAir)-could be mobilized short of deploying as a unit, an entire squadron, and perhaps even a complete air wing. Because every carrier capable of responding to the crisis already would have an air wing assigned, however, there would be no compelling need to mobilize an entire reserve air wing.
Though other reserve units, such as patrol or mine countermeasures squadrons, obviously are less constrained than the reserve carrier air wings, the crises envisioned for most regional contexts do not meet the criteria for any involuntary reserve mobilization. Judging from dozens ot examples since the Korean War, it appears that four criteria must be met before the President will augment the active force under Title 10.
V A large number of reserve forces are required, at least
> An anticipated duration of several months or longer
> A crisis severe enough to involve all the services ana
At thesecriteria (although not for most Naval Air Reserve um personnel), but Earnest Will (reflagging Kuw«utiAanker in the Persian Gulf) and Just Cause (Panamaiaretwo the many operations that did not. A recognition of the po litical realities associated with mobilization, ow ’ give us a starting point from which to build effective Ld usable Naval Air Reserve forces for the next century.
[“flying” organizations, which are organized (and perhaps | pipped) to operate aircraft in a wide variety of missions. The Naval Air Reserve segment this article will assess consists of the following commissioned units (which are organized, trained, and equipped to deploy as units):
* CVRW (carrier reserve air wing), which contains seven squadrons (two VF [fighter], two VFA [strike fighter], one
' VA [attack], one VAQ [electronic warfare], and one VAW [airborne early warning])
► HCS (strike rescue/SEAL support)
* HM (mine countermeasures)
^ HS (helicopter antisubmarine warfare)
► HSL (helicopter antisubmarine warfare light)
► VFC (fighter composite)
► VP (maritime patrol antisubmarine warfare)
► VR (fleet logistic support)
Until very recently, the Naval Air Reserve also contained two other related but distinct unit types. The first, called squadron augment units (SAUs), did not own aircraft but contained the air crews and enlisted personnel Who would augment fleet commands in the event of mobilization, to bring the gaining command to M+l personnel allowance.2 Similarly organized, but custodians of their own aircraft, were the VP master augment units (MAUs),
: Which existed to provide both replacement airframes and trained personnel to active patrol squadrons in the event of mobilization. Despite their great popularnywnh the fleet, both programs were disestablished in the fis | year 92 budget process.3
Limits in Law ______________
Crisis Response and Contributory Support____________
Several of the Navy’s “air missions” reside exclusively in the reserve component, and for some others the reserve perform 100% of the mission within the continental1 Unitea States. Examples include dedicated strike rescue and SbAL support, fighter composite (air services and adversary support for antiair-warfare-capable ships and squadrons), logistics. The latter two, in particular, reflect the use reserves in continuous fleet-support roles that essentially are transparent to crisis response mobilization requir- ments. These success stories shed light on the dtrectio we can take for other missions for which the Naval Aar Reserve is uniquely suited to execute a larger, if not complete, share of the fleet support burden.
Within the active Navy, there is an entire shore-based community dedicated to providing adversary support (i.e bogey aircraft) to the fleet replacement and active fighter squadrons. These units typically operate non-cimer-ca- pable aircraft (F-5, F-16, A-4) colocated with the fleet squadrons they service, and often with the similar^y equipped adversary capable reserve fighter squadrons. As their services would remain in demand to accomplish training even in the global war scenario, the announced transfer of these squadrons to the reserve component will accomplish two ends. First, it will provide meaningful and rewarding reserve billets to those geographical areas usually rich in recruiting assets (ex-fleet aviators). Second, i will free more active-duty aviators for joint professional military education and joint or Washington duty, which is being heralded as vital to their future value.
Similarly, the Navy is considering plans to move its shore-based electronic warfare support (VAQ) squadrons whose mission is to provide airborne electronic warfare simulations for fleet surface-to-air and air-to-air training to the reserves. While in the past these have created many assignment opportunities for active-duty female flight crew, changes in assignment policies will remove this as a force driver Their location in or near major metropolitan areas also makes them attractive from a reserve recruitment
^tt of those war-fighting communities whose skills are required, at least partially, in the active faces? Clearly, the changing complexion of the threat could a soned shift of a larger share to the reserves. Examples of
Transferring the adversary support function to the reserves— here, an F-14A Tomcat flies with two F-I6N adversary training aircraft near Yuma, Arizona—will provide rewarding reserve billets for ex-fleet aviators and release active-duty aviators for professional military education and joint or Washington duty.
A related issue is active and reserve horizontal modernization. As major new weapon systems like the F/A-18E/F or the AFX come on line, there will be a requirement to upgrade the supporting reserve structure accordingly. Augment units will require near-simultaneous transition to new platforms if their mission is to remain viable.
Next, I propose a reserve force less capable, in some mission areas (notably TacAir), of rapidly deploying entire, stand-alone units to reconstitute the battle force- The many constraints against deploying complete reserve earner air wings, combined with the more immediate benefits to be gained from ready access to replacement aircraft and personnel, more than outweigh the risks involved- Some would argue that having the reserves provide the bulk, if not all, of some support services would decrease the quality of the training, as the reserve crews would be perhaps years removed from first-hand experience with fleet tactics and doctrine. But the highly experienced, high- flight-time reserve aviators would provide tactical acumen and standardization adequate to compensate for their lack
this segment might include maritime patrol aircraft (VP) and mine-countermeasures helos (HM). The active forces need to retain adequate slices of these mission capabilities to be able to meet both peacetime levels of effort and surge requirements for reasonable regional contingencies. Beyond that, more can and should be demanded of the reserves.
Gone are the days when every out-of-area Soviet sub must continuously be tracked, and gone with them is the requirement to have entire VP squadrons deployed over all portions of the globe at all times. In the event of a conflict in which antisubmarine warfare plays a major role, land-based reserve VP squadrons clearly would be more accessible to the theater commanders-in-chief than their carrier counterparts and could be deployed and brought home on relatively short notice. So, too, would be the HM squadrons, whose primary mission is limited to wartime and clearly linked to crisis response.
The Naval Air Training Command requires large numbers of instructor pilots and needs to expand rapidly in time of protracted conflict. Limited recruiting demo-
U.S. NAVY (D. BARANEK)
graphics, based on the remote locations of these sites, may argue against assigning a major portion of this mission to the Naval Air Reserve, but transferring at least one of the several training squadrons at each base to the reserves merits further exploration.
The plan to decommission one of the two existing reserve carrier air wings, to provide augment assets for active TacAir squadrons, is another step in the right direction. Current and projected active force levels all reflect one less active air wing than active carriers. This disparity reflects the historical norm to have at least one carrier in complex overhaul or service life extension at any given time, with that ship perhaps a year or 18 months away from deployable status. The two reserve air wings existed, therefore, to man both this carrier when it became available and another “reserve” carrier, notionally though1 to be the training carrier.6 With the planned decommissioning of the USS Forrestal (CV-59), however, two complete reserve air wings are excessive to any reasonable requirement short of global conflict.7 Alternative proposals to deploy these wings as land-based assets duplicate Air Force roles and missions and are not supported by any land-based, deployable aircraft maintenance capability-
Caveats and Risks
In the recommendations for a revitalized Naval Air Re' serve, there are some risks to be weighed. First, any in" crease in reserve forces requires an assessment of the recruiting demographics, not only at a national level, but also for the specific geographic area affected. As the Navy builds down, reserve recruiting opportunities are likely t0 be enhanced by the large numbers of active-duty aviators and enlisted personnel reentering the civilian woik force. As an example, active carrier air wings currently consist of squadrons from as many as five differ ent, geographically dispersed air stations. This equates to a wide dispersion of qualified personnel who likely would be attracted to the reserves. And while this bodes well for the traditional catchment areas like San Diego and Virginia Beach, it may not equate to the numbers required to man an adversary squadron at Naval Air Station Fallon, Nevada- for example.
Second, any complete shift of a mission capability to the reserves will mean that continued force modernization for that community, i.e., funding and procurement of new aircraft, will become a reserve issue, and thus potentially subject to less support within the active Navy. The sheer importance of these missions to fleet training and readiness, however, should foster active and vocal fleet sponsor- m ship and support.
°f more current deployment experience.
Finally, any increase in the reserves’ share of shore-based missions necessarily results in a decease in the number of aviation shore-duty billets bailable for active aviators and enlisted technicians, *dth a potential negative impact on their subsequent retention. In the near term this might be of less concern as the fleet downsizes, but eventual stability >n force levels will require other personnel management initiatives to mitigate this impact. The positive impact, even in the near term, is to free more qualified active personnel for joint or headquarters duty, recruiting, recruit training, and education.
Recommendations
. The restructured Naval Air Reserve would shift emphasis from one of a “strategic reserve to 'hat of a flexible fighting and sustaining force that can meet operational requirements in crisis or convict situations, while performing a greater share of the daily fleet-support mission. Additionally, it Would still offer a hedge, albeit reduced, against the hmited likelihood of protracted conflict requiring tnajor mobilization and force reconstitution.
The most significant near-term proposal is to redistribute the aircraft and billets of the proposed decommissioned reserve carrier air wing and one carrier-based reserve ASW helo squdron to new “TacAir Master Augment Units” (TacMAUs). TacMAUs—consisting of a pool of aircraft, air crews, and maintenance technicians would he colocated on both coasts with the squadron communities they would reinforce in a crisis scenario. This would Provide a readily deployable pool of personnel and equipment to reinforce the active forces in the event of hostil-
8|Korsky
Several of the Navy’s air missions already reside exclusively in the reserves; for others the reserves perform 100% of the mission within the continental United States. These include dedicated strike rescue and SEAL support—performed by HCS squadrons flying HH-60s—which illuminate a direction naval air can take for other missions.
Freed from the task of tracking every out-of-area Soviet submarine, patrol squadrons no longer must be deployed over all portions of the globe. Land-based reserve patrol aircraft—here, the first P-3C Orion assigned to reserve squadron VP-65 arrives at Point Mugu, California—would be more accessible and available to be deployed (and brought home) on short notice.
ities. TacMAUs would add replacement aircraft pools to the proved and popular squadron augment unit concept so recently done away with. Needing only carrier qualification refresher training before deployment (nominally a 2130 day evolution, and another argument for not deploying the training carrier), fully 85%-90% of a reserve air crew’s mobilization time, under current Title 10 restrictions, would be available at the scene ot conflict.
The remaining reserve air wing, acting as a strategic reserve, would be augmented by an antisubmarine warfare helo squadron and a newly commissioned reserve VS (S-3 air antisubmarine) squadron, so that its composition would exactly mirror that of an active air wing. The planned reduction in active force structure frees approximately 23 S-3A aircraft for assignment to the Naval Reserve.8 This dissolution of active VS squadrons should make these aircraft and talent pools readily available within a five-year time frame. Clearly, if Navy and Marine Corps air-wing integration proceeds as planned, the composition of the reserve air wing should continue to mirror that of a representative carrier air wing, perhaps gaining a squadron from the reserve Marine air wing to remain “in the fleet’s image.
M 1 also propose reconstituting the patrol ~ *$$$! squadron (VP) MAU concept, to provide the
same capability to the land-based antisubmarine warfare arm. A tried and true concept, and with aircraft made available by fleet downsizing, a VP MAU located at each major VP installation would provide ready access to aircraft and personnel needed either to rein-
may be the most contentious, and, in any event, canno1 be dealt with until ongoing studies and initiatives to per' form multiservice training are complete. However, 8S' suming Navy-only training in the long term, the Naval Air Reserve potentially could contribute one fixed-wing/h^0 training (VT/HT) squadron per wing, i.e., about one-third of whatever TraCom evolves after downsizing.
Conclusions
The Naval Air Reserve can do much more to reflect tN new world order and the resulting military strategy, whk'1 places more emphasis on contingency operations ^ crisis response. The mission of the Navy is changing dramatically, and with it the support it can expect and rruN demand of the reserve component. Providing people and equipment tailored to reinforce active forces and suppofI fleet training, and, when required, providing those combat missions that have little peacetime utility must be the focus of the Naval Air Reserve forces for the beginning of the 21st century.
force active squadrons or to round up reserve VP squadrons before deployment.
No changes are envisioned for the logistic support (VR) or the reserve LAMPS-I (HSL) squadrons. The latter community should be sized to support the eight Knox (FF-1052)-class Naval Reserve Force training frigates, and would only fluctuate as a function of the number of reserve frigates. Strike rescue/combat support squadrons are a more difficult issue. Given the current joint shortfall in active strike/combat rescue, valid arguments easily can be made that this mission—a capability needed rapidly when called—ought to reside in the active force. But for the purpose of this article, I will assume reserve component retention of this mission.
Airborne mine countermeasures and patrol squadrons are good candidates for bigger shares of the reserve pie in the near term. These communities already contain sig-
♦Percentages will change as result of fleet build-down but are calculated here as function of existing force structure.
**No change
'CVWR-20 to contain nine squadrons (add HS, VS; USMCR?).
Potentially larger percentage than currently.
'Sized to augment fleet squadrons to M+l for aircraft and personnel.
Percentage ol U.S.-based capability only. VFCs located overseas (Hawaii/Gitmo/ Roosevelt Roads) would remain in active component.
Table 1: Naval Air Reserve Force Changes
Type | Mission | Number | Percentage* |
CVWR | Carrier Air Wing | 1 | 8 |
HCS | Strike Rescue/ |
|
|
| SEAL Support | 2 | o o * * |
HM | Mine countermeasure | UNK | ?2 |
HSL | LAMPS ASW | 3 | 33** |
VP | Maritime Patrol (ASW) | UNK | ?2 |
VR | Fleet Logistic Support | 12 | 100** |
TacMAU | TacAir Master |
|
|
| Augment Unit | 14 | ___ 3 |
VP MAU | VP Master Augment |
|
|
| Unit | 2 | ___ 3 |
VAQ | Fleet EW Support | 3 | 100 |
VFC | Fighter Composite/ |
|
|
| Adversary | 4 | 1004 |
nificant reserve components, and, as reserve squadrons typically operate at “about 50%-55% the manpower cost of their fleet counterparts, and about 45%-50% the operating cost,” declining budgets make these communities especially attractive ways of retaining required force structure at an affordable cost.9
Naval Air Reserve force changes for the near-term would appear as shown in Table 1.
One remaining active mission with potential for a major shift to the reserves is the Naval Air Training Command. Currently comprised of numerous wings containing various squadron stages (basic and advanced jet, for example), TraCom is labor-intensive and places high demands on the fleet, primarily for instructor crews. This proposal
. . From the Sea,” Navy and Marine Corps White Papet' September 1992, p. 1. (See U. S. Naval Institute Proceeding1 November 1992, pp. 93-96.)
Through a program known as Fleet Fly, SAU crew meinbT were affiliated with fleet squadrons, maintained currency 111 their gaining command’s aircraft, and represented kno",n gains in the event of mobilization. They brought their ow"1 operating funds with them, minimizing their impact on the gaiD- ing squadrons’ funds, and, in fact, enabling the squadrons t° fly more with no increase in direct funding.
5Cdr. Warren E. Zander, “Less Integration? Why?” U.S. Na'al Institute Proceedings, January 1992, p. 37.
4U.S. Laws, Statutes, etc., “General Military Law,” U.S. Cod(■ Title 10—Armed Forces, 1988 ed. (Washington: U.S. Goved1' ment Printing Office, 1989), sec. 672(c).
’Capt. J.R. Avella, “It’s the ’M’ Word—Mobilization,” U.S- Naval Institute Proceedings, January 1991, p. 45.
‘Until the planned assignment of the USS Forrestal (CV-59)- no past training carrier has been even remotely capable deploying with modern fleet aircraft. Despite a need to reiP' stall or reactivate (from lay-up status) some major pieces 0 the combat suite in the event of fleet activation, the Forrestcd would have given planners a reason to expect that use of th*s asset was at least a possibility, if only in the most protracted scenario.
’With the planned decommissioning of four conventionally poV' ered carriers in the next few years, 9 of the 12 remaining cat- riers will be nuclear-powered and will have their complex oven haul schedules linked for the most part to nuclear refueling- This process is so lengthy, so disabling to the engineering plant, and so constrained by valid safety and environmental concerns, that there is little way to accelerate it, even if a reserve air wing were fully trained and ready to deploy. Additionally- the requirement to fully restock these surge carriers with spare parts and avionics and ordnance not to mention the requirement to form, organize, and work up the accompanying battle group—all argue against the likelihood of these decks being made available in any but the most protracted national crises.
"This Year on Capitol Hill,” NRA, May 1992, p. 9.
“RAdm. James D. Olson II, “COMNA V AIRESFOR,” Wings of Gold, Spring 1992. P- 21.
Captain Prendergast, a 1992 graduate of the Naval War College, is currently assigned to the Counterdrug Division of the J-5 Directorate oh the staff of the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command. Previously, he served as commanding officer of Fighter Squadron 24 (VF-24), and operations officer on board the USS Midway (CV-41).