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Contents:
What Men or Gods Are These?—16
Voices from the Central Blue—18
Gator Aid—18
Should the Coast Guard Stay in the Icebreaking Business?—20
Two Wrongs Don’t Make It Right!—20
Savo Island—20
The Path Ahead for Gators and Marines—20
Why No Gays?—21
Strike Rescue Requires the Active-Duty Touch—23
Commanders Must Command—23
Build the Striker—A Tough Ship—24
Cost-Effective Mine Warfare—25
ENTER THE FORUM
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“What Men or Gods Are These?”
(See J. L. Byron, pp. 28-32, December 1992
Proceedings)
Dr. James E. Colvard, former Deputy Director of the U.S. Office of Personnel Management and former Deputy Chief of the Naval Material Command—Captain Byron wrote: “A reformed system of blunt honesty and genuine statistical relevance can only enhance our ability to find those most fit.” Fortunately—or unfortunately—life is not that simple. Captain Byron falls into the standard trap of assuming statistics apply equally well to inanimate and animate objects. If humans were non-reactive objects, it would be appropriate to apply statistics to them. But, while a coin does not react to being tossed, humans do. Thus, fitness reports—while not statistically valid for inanimate objects—do work quite well for humans.
In my 30-year career as a civilian in the Navy I worked with officers from ensign to full admiral and became acquainted with leaders of industry, political appointees, and senior-career civil servants. While, in terms of personality, the jerk-to-jewel ratio was about the same in all these communities, I found that, in terms of professional competence, Navy officers were far superior and that the products of the selection process, especially captains and admirals, were exceptionally good.
Why is this so for a system that is clearly distorted statistically? The answer is quite simple. The fitness report represents personal communication between officers and, therefore, must be positive in order to enhance teamwork and cooperation. The actual selection of officers for advancement is done by selection boards looking at a collection of fitness reports and hearing opinions expressed by board members. This helps to make the selection process as objective as one involving humans exercising personal judgment can be. It also allows the nonselectee to be angry at a “board,” while continuing to work effectively with individual officers. Because the Navy is a career service and the candidates have similar experiences and know each other
reasonably well, the imperfect tool—the fitness report—is able to meet the needs of the process.
One of the major problems on the civilian side of the Navy is that performance evaluations directly affect annual pay and the requirement for supervisors to make “bluntly honest and statistically sound” decisions flies in the face of all their efforts to practice Total Quality Leadership and enhance teamwork. The uniformed side of the Navy neatly avoids this problem with a statistically sloppy— but humanly sensitive—system.
Sensitivity has nothing to do with softness or lack of resolve. It merely recognizes that most humans consider themselves above average and any system that requires their superior to tell them directly and bluntly that they are below average is not sensitive to human nature. The current system combines the folklore and informal understanding of how to write fitness reports—which is part of the Navy’s culture and is the informal system—with the formal system of selection for advancement, and allows it to work within a community of humans who must risk their lives collectively, but who are advanced as individuals. □
Captain Torrey A. Sylvester, U.S. Naval Reserve (Retired)—Please list me among those commending Caption Byron for his fearlessness in stating that the emperor has no clothes.
In the early 1980s, I sat on three se- j lection boards for field-grade Naval Reserve line promotions. Even then, it was } clear that the left shift—so ably commented on by Captain Byron—was pushing everyone into the superstar status of ! the top 1%. Clearly, not all naval officers are in the top 1%. Therefore, Captain Byron’s suggestions about using a bell curve with these reports and being realistic will bring a new honesty, straightforwardness, and accuracy to the Navy’s fitness report system. □
Captain James L. Burke, U.S. Navy— Bravo Zulu to Captain Byron for his excellent article on the current fitness-report-mess! Every senior officer knows the
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system is polluted but is unable to do anything about it because only his subordinates would suffer if he did.
Recently, I attended a briefing by an admiral concerning a board on which he had served. He described the numerous ways that reporting seniors could hurt their people unintentionally—especially if they indicated any weaknesses whatsoever. Responding to questions, he defended the system. He went so far as to claim that reviewers could read between the lines, register what was omitted, and fathom what was meant though not written. Utter nonsense!
In a previous assignment, I prepared fitness reports on Royal Navy exchange officers. The British report form was very simple and covered no more than a single sheet of paper. More impressive was the fact that the instruction on how to prepare the report also fit on one piece of paper! (Compare that to the compendium that we use for ours.) A Royal Navy officer told me that the reports written by senior U.S. Navy officers were considered worthless because they were always perfect.
While Captain Byron was concerned only with officers’ fitness reports, the Navy is well on the way to achieving the same results in enlisted evaluations. The evaluations for chief petty officers are starting to look as meaningless as officers’ fitness reports—and for the same reasons.
Our system started to go awry when, with the best of intentions, it was mandated that officers be shown their fitness reports. Anyone who was around before that time has only to review his own record to find early fitness reports that, today, would end the career of any young officer. But, no one had to read between the lines or guess what was intended in those reports. Although it goes against the current concepts of openness, restoring the private nature of the fitness report as a communication between a senior officer and the Bureau of Naval Personnel is an essential first step if we are to solve the problem. □
“Voices from the Central Blue”
(See W. J. Luti, pp.33-38, December 1992 Proceedings)
Colonel Robert M. Johnston, U.S. Air Force, Director, Airpower Research Institute—Commander Luti’s article merits kudos for its probing analysis, deep insights, thorough scholarship, and sage conclusions.
The Persian Gulf War certainly provided impetus for doctrinal change— whether it be in one service or throughout all the services. Accordingly, I am eager to invite closer dialogue with all Proceedings readers on the evolution of aerospace doctrine, based on the promising new technologies and the Persian Gulf War experiences.
I also appreciate Commander Luti’s willingness to air his views. All too frequently, our uniformed colleagues stay out of the doctrinal fray, for fear they possess too much airspeed or lack sufficient firepower. However, there is no better time than now to surface proposals, based on combat experience, for a doctrinal shift.
At the Airpower Research Institute at Maxwell Air Force Base, we have the proper target in sight, and we’re engaged. We solicit any and all contributions that will aid us as we search for—and seize—- timely opportunities to improve aerospace doctrine. □
“Gator Aid”
(See A. M. Smith, pp. 67-75, October 1992; S.
A. Ross, p. 21, January 1993 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Douglas D. Wright, Dental Corps, U.S. Naval Reserve—Captain Smith’s article provided an excellent review of medical care available to embarked Marines in time of conflict. He rightly concludes that a highly practiced team of health care professionals is needed to provide life-saving trauma care to wounded personnel. I agree, too, that the Navy needs and deserves high quality trauma-care personnel and equipment to support amphibious operations in isolated, hostile environments. However, Captain Smith neglected to mention the excellent capabilities of the Dental Corps—and the superb contributions it has made—as a valuable and long-standing member of the Navy’s casualty-care team.
Dentists and dental technicians are assigned to all amphibious transport docks (LPDs), amphibious assault ships (helicopter) (LPHs), and amphibious assault ships (LHAs). The dental officers complete the same combat-casualty-care program as their medical counterparts before assignment to duty at sea. At general quarters, dental personnel man battle dressing stations, where they are expected to provide advanced traumatic life support without the direct supervision of a medical officer.
Historically, the Dental Corps has been a strong partner in the Navy trauma-care team. It deserves, therefore, to be included in Captain Smith’s appeal for adequate training and funding. □
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“Should the Coast Guard Stay in the Icebreaking Business?”
(See N. Venzke, pp. 97-98, December 1992 Proceedings)
Editor’s Note: Because of an editorial error, the hull numbers of the Coast Guard’s two polar icebreakers were transposed. The correct hull number of the USCCG Polar Sea is WAGB-11; for the USCGC Polar Star, it is WABG-10. We regret the error.LI
“Two Wrongs Don’t Make It Right!”
(See J. Luddy, pp. 68-70, November 1992 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Philip David King, U.S. Navy—Our “pristine notions of equality” just happen to be what we are out there risking our lives for. I, for one, want the most capable person fighting next to me. It is time disperse this smokescreen of sexism and get down to the job of building a military that will carry us into the next millennium. □
Lieutenant D. Haseley, U.S. Navy—To those like Mr. Luddy who claim that the “high testosterone” levels of military men would force them to make an unsound military decisions, I say that military professionals have overcome far greater emotional hurdles. For example, I have never met a pilot who did not have a great respect for human life. Yet, I also have never met a pilot who would not drop a bomb that could kill hundreds of people. These pilots would drop the bomb because they are professionals carrying out a military mission.
Those who think they would be prevented from performing their duties in a professional manner because they cannot overcome their sexual urges should be weeded out of today’s Navy. In the Navy, the only concern should be who is best for the job.Q
Lieutenant Commander C. William Stamm, U.S. Naval Reserve—In the process of trying to justify his claim that women in combat would be a disaster, Mr. Luddy manages to insult both sexes. He classifies women as either sex objects to be enamored with or to be treated like one’s sister (not necessarily a positive statement). At the same time, he degrades men by stating that “[ujntil women stop turning heads when they walk down the street,” they will “jeopardize the lives of others by disturbing the essential cohesiveness of a fighting unit.” It is an insult to men in general to assume they are dominated by their hormones or an overwhelming sense of machismo. □
“Savo Island”
(See J. Sweetman, pp. 78-79, August 1992
Proceedings)
James F. Phelan—As the officer in charge of the forward secondary battery of the USS Chicago (CA-29) on 9 August 1942, I might be able to add a couple of interesting, but little-known, facts to Dr. Sweetman’s account.
First, the Chicago’s radars were shut down, except for one search sweep every hour with the SC radar. Now, it might have been every 30 minutes, but I do know that the Japanese approach and attack came between sweeps.
Second, during the battle, every star shell in the 5-inch battery’s magazines was fired, but not a single one worked.
1 thought I had been firing antiaircraft common ammunition until a gunner’s mate told me that he had hand-set the last star shells. The next day, we tested 25 star shells by hand—not one functioned.
Dr. Sweetman mentioned that the Northern Force was not warned of the Japanese force’s approach, and the three cruisers were caught unawares. It may seem unbelievable, but it was common knowledge among the crew of the Chicago that even though we had been hit and HMAS Canberra was burning, our captain would not permit any transmissions on the talk-between-ships radio.
Finally, I know that, as late as December 1942, Admiral Ernest J. King had not received any reports on the action. One day 1 received orders from his staff to report to a conference on special electronics. Upon my arrival, I discovered it was a subterfuge for him to glean information on the battle—which I spent more than an hour giving Admiral King.Q
“The Path Ahead for Gators and
Marines”
(See J. B. LaPlante, pp. 34-38, November 1992
Proceedings)
Captain Richard B. Laning, U.S. Navy (Retired)—Admiral LaPlante reiterates the need for gunfire support, which the Navy finds difficult to provide landing forces. However, an accompanying photograph of a helicopter hauling a heavy artillery piece suggests a solution.
New technologies—the global-positioning system, unmanned air vehicles, modern computers and communications equipment, and efficient stabilization gyroscopes and servos—could be combined with a heavy gun, a power source, a supply of ammunition, and any additional deck-structural support in a kit that could be installed on any medium or large ship. These kits would be kept in storage and loaded on board either merchant ships or amphibious ships as needed. Manned by reservists, this type of system would help provide expeditionary forces with the gunfire support they will need.O
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“Why No Gays?”
(See E. T. Gomulka, pp. 44-46, December 1992; J, R. Williams, p. 13, January 1993 Proceedings)
Dennis B. Noonan—Commander Gomulka believes that homosexuality is a matter of choice and quotes General Colin Powell’s refutation of the analogy between African-Americans and homosexuals. However, I know—as millions of other gay men and lesbians do—that I was born this way. I could no more choose my sexual orientation than I could the color of my eyes.
I served my country for four years as a Navy officer—two-and-a-half of which were in a destroyer—and I was honorably discharged. During that time, however, I was forced to lie about who I Was—not what I chose.
Opening the door to gays does not mean condoning sexual misconduct. Gays Would still have to live and work with their shipmates. It is juvenile to think that lifting the ban on homosexuality would give homosexuals carte blanche to have orgies in berthing compartments. Nor does it mean that people will “come out” in droves. It does mean, however, that there will no longer be the fear of being discharged on suspicion.
During my time at sea, I never had sex °n board—I knew it was against the rales. The same cannot be said for my heterosexual shipmates who brought women on board while we were in port. I was never intimate with any enlisted men—I knew that was against the rules, too.
Gay men do not enter the military to have sex or be around guys. We enter for the same reason heterosexual men do— to serve. We know that homosexuals who serve in the military will have to live up to the rules of conduct. That’s no problem because we are not demanding special rights—just equal rights.□
Rear Admiral Alexander Sinclair, U.S. Navy (Retired)—Commander Gomulka’s Points were well-articulated, compelling, and timely. This subject has not been openly discussed by the military. The debate has been carried on primarily by the advocates of gays and lesbians—and, consequently, disproportionately displayed to the public in the news media.
As President Bill Clinton considers lifting the ban on gays in the military, it ls important for him to ask the advice of toilitary leaders—as he promised he would do during the campaign. If President-elect Clinton could convene a meetIng of 300 economists and business executives for their opinions on the economy, then President Clinton should call in military leaders for advice on military matters.
I would hope that the Navy’s representatives on this matter would be active- duty flag officers who understand the constitutional, legal, practical, and moral implications of the issue, who can dispel the fog of disinformation, and who can make their case—either in front of congressional committees or on televised news programs.□
Andrew G. Webb—I am a 1975 graduate of the U.S. Coast Guard Academy who, after five years of service, went on to work for a Congressional subcommittee and, later, the National Security Agency (NSA)—a Department of Defense (DoD) agency—as an intelligence analyst. It was while working at the NSA that I realized I was gay, and it was for being gay that I was fired from the NSA—although I was open about my sexual orientation. Therefore, it is with some experience that I can address Commander Gomulka’s arguments against the full integration of gays into the armed forces.
By repeatedly harping on the distinction between behavior and orientation,
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Commander Gomulka actually furthers the case for dropping the ban. He writes that, . . many persons with a homosexual orientation would experience difficulty controlling their behavior in the unique circumstances of military life.” What does he think virtually all homosexuals in the military now do?
If the ban were lifted, he believes, heterosexuals would be forced to compromise their already-scarce privacy, and would become sex objects—a situation, he assumes, that would adversely affect recruiting and retention.
Working for a fire department entails giving up privacy and the possibility of being ogled by someone of the same sex. But, there is never a lack of applicants for any opening on a fire department.
Commander Gomulka assumes lifting the current ban would eliminate restrictions on inappropriate sexual behavior. He believes it would give license for older homosexuals to prey on younger men and women and thinks that homosexuals will be unable to control their lustful urges if closely confined with members of the same sex for extended periods of time.
But, why well-adjusted people who are openly gay would voluntarily court frustration—not to mention physical violence—by pursuing those almost certain to reject them is beyond me. Moreover, the articles of the Uniform Code of Military Justice which address rape and other forms of inappropriate or criminal sexual behavior could be rewritten easily to cover situations concerning inappropriate behavior among people of the same sex.
Commander Gomulka likens admitting openly gay men and women into the armed forces to the hiring of an alcoholic by a liquor store. Whenever a business hires anyone, it must take risks into account—e.g., a bank manager likely won’t hire a person convicted of armed robbery. But, if the Navy recruits an openly gay person, its risks (vis-a-vis predatory sexual behavior) would be the same as recruiting a heterosexual person—because both are otherwise unknown quantities, differing only in sexual orientation.
If homosexuals are allowed to live in the same berthing areas, Commander Gomulka claims, unmarried heterosexuals would have to be allowed the same right. While the logical extension of lifting the anti-gay ban would be ending the ban against coed berthing, it does not mean that ipso facto inappropriate behavior would go unchallenged and unpunished. Furthermore, Commander Gomulka seems to think that lifting the ban will open the door to all kinds of inappropriate behavior. He is naive if he thinks heterosexual hanky-panky isn’t already going on in barracks and even in ships.
The next flaw in Commander Go- mulka’s essay lies in the sentences:
They [opponents of the ban] give the impression that homosexuals are separated simply because of a discovered nonthreatening orientation. However, many separation cases involve instances of homosexual behavior, which will only increase if known homosexuals are allowed to enlist.
Well, about a dozen men and women I personally know were thrown out of the military merely because their sexual orientation was discovered—and they were not exceptions to the rule. Just what percentage of the separation cases to which Commander Gomulka alludes involve “homosexual behavior,” he doesn’t say. But, in a recent article by Jeff Stein in The Washington Post National Weekly Edition, it is revealed that in the Persian Gulf theater—where more than 195,000 troops were deployed—from August 1990 to July 1991, the Army prosecuted only four cases of homosexual misconduct. There were many more cases of heterosexual misconduct.
Actually, rescinding the current policy would probably end up saving money. The U.S. military would no longer have to spend money trying to catch consenting adults engaging in behavior that is either legal or not prosecuted in most states and trying these cases. Nor would it have to pay for replacing the highly trained and experienced people who are removed from the military simply for being gay.
Commander Gomulka cites a number of studies on the number of sexual partners homosexual men have annually as evidence of their sexual compulsion. One study was published in 1978—and, therefore, probably based on data collected in 1976—so I’m wary of statistics on such a subject that were collected well before the onset of the AIDS epidemic. While the findings of the two 1985 studies he cited likely have been outpaced by events, the decreases in sexual activity indicated—from 70 to 50 partners per year (29.6%) in one study and from 76 to 47 partners (38.2%) in the other—are significant and show a definite trend away from promiscuity.
Gay men, however, don’t have a corner on the promiscuity market. Talk to anyone who has witnessed the behavior of heterosexual sailors on liberty in Olon- gapo City. And, does it really matter if a gay man leads an active sex life? There is an analogy that can be drawn here between the U.S. military’s approach to al
cohol abuse. The current policy tacitly < says that only when someone’s drinking adversely affects her performance of duty is it considered grounds for separation. If a gay man is sexually compulsive, his behavior is inconsequential unless it ad- i
versely affects his performance of duty. j
I agree with Commander Gomulka that t
the statistics on suicide and alcoholism (
among gay men are appalling. But, when 1
society tells us at every turn we’re ab- j
horrent, is it any wonder they are so high? i
Recognizing of the uselessness of such .
numbers as indicators of “normal” be- ]
havior for gay men, he American Psy- ;
chological Association and American 1
Psychiatric Association took homosexuality off their lists of mental disorders al- 1 most 20 years ago. (
Also, the “homosexual lifestyle” which ;
people like Commander Gomulka portray <
as a threat to U.S. society is a myth. As (
Eric Marcus wrote in the 14 September |
1992 issue of Newsweek: ,
I
One may choose a country-club <
lifestyle, a Western lifestyle, a city ; lifestyle, but there is no such thing ] as a gay lifestyle—just as there is no i such thing as a heterosexual lifestyle. i Homosexual lifestyles . . . run the gamut. They defy classification. :
i
President Clinton was correct in saying that behavior was the key to allowing homosexuals in the U.S. military. The DofD should promulgate and strictly enforce regulations against any behavior that is truly detrimental to good order and , discipline. Those who want to abolish the current ban want no criteria other than dedication, performance, and behavior to be used in judging the fitness of a man > or woman for military service.□
Lieutenant Commander Stephen W- Surko, U.S. Navy—Despite Commander Gomulka’s claims that his article “is not criticism or an attack on homosexual persons as individuals or as a group,” his scare mongering only clouds the issues. He paints an image of homosexuals as alcoholics who cannot control their behavior, who have sexual relations with hundreds of partners, and who might be billeted with the readers’ children.
Why is it ironic that those who oppose sexual harassment in the military should also endorse homosexuals serving in those same armed forces? Behavioral problems that adversely effect good order and discipline should be treated as such— not used as a rationale to exclude qualified Americans from serving their country in the armed forces. □
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“Strike Rescue Requires the
Active-Duty Touch”
(See P. A. Kelleher, pp. 108-109, August 1992
Proceedings)
Commander Dan C. Pinkerton, U.S. Naval Reserve, Commanding Officer, Helicopter Combat Support Squadron-5 (HCS-5)—In the early 1980s, a few Naval Reserve officers convinced Congress that the Navy needed a new strike- rescue/special-operations aircraft. Congress directed the Navy to buy the HH-60H and designated that the aircraft and the mission be assigned to the Naval Reserve.
In August 1989, HCS-5 received its first HH-60H and since then it has accomplished a great deal. It was the first aviation unit to deploy on board a carrier with the HH-60H, the first to load a HH- 60H on board a C-5A Galaxy transport, the first to use night-vision devices operationally under starlight conditions, the first to validate operationally all SEAL special-operations procedures and tactics, and the first to fly the HH-60H in support of carrier air wings at Naval Air Station Fallon, Nevada. In fact, HCS-5 performed the first rescue with the HH-60H.
The squadron attained its initial operating capability only nine months after receiving the first aircraft, and, eight ntonths later, was sent to the Persian Gulf War. In fact, HCS-5 was alerted for possible deployment in early August 1990. Within hours of receiving the initial warning order, four aircraft and their support equipment were ready to be loaded on hoard two C-5As. We finally went to the Persian Gulf region in December 1990.
The personnel of HCS-5 and its East Coast counterpart, Helicopter Combat Support Squadron-4 (HCS-4), are handpicked for their combat experience. The Pilots have faultless safety records and average 2,617 hours of flight time. The fact that the people in these units have operated together for years gives the squadrons an unbeatable consistency in tactics and predictable battlefield performance. Both squadrons have fully banned and fully equipped detachments, capable of shipboard and shore-based operations, standing by for deployment within hours of call. They are manned 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. The two squadrons have maintained a full-mission-capable rate 12% above the goal set l hy the Chief of Naval Operations, plus a flawless safety record—while devoting tttore than half of their flight hours to direct fleet and joint-operations support.
The Reserve HCSs are not only capable, they are a bargain as well. Each squadron operates at a full-time manning
level that is 45% of a like active-duty squadron, which means an annual payroll savings of $1.9 million and an additional savings in benefits of $2.1 million. So, over five years, these reserve units will save the Navy $40 million—in pay and allowances alone. Furthermore, reservists do not draw retirement pay until age 60— and then, at rates less than 50% of their active-duty counterparts.
The reserve HCSs provide the Navy reliable combat search-and-rescue and special-operations capabilities, with a superb safety record and unquestioned economy. □ “Commanders Must Command”
(See E. Hebert, pp. 55-59, September 1992; E.
B. Hontz, p. 14, October 1992; K. A. Eubanks,
pp. 13-14, December 1992; J. E. Lyons, p. 18,
January 1993 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Mark Morris, U.S. Naval Re- serve—I could not disagree more with Commander Herbert’s assertion that “engineering skills are overemphasized” and his recommendation that the engineering training requirements be reduced so that officers can spend more time learning tactics. A ship’s mobility, survivability, and weapon and sensor systems support (engineering) are part and parcel of tactics. I think the Navy strikes the right balance by requiring that all surface-warfare officers who wish to command must earn the qualification as an Engineering Officer of the Watch (EOOW).
I can remember the days before the EOOW requirement was ironclad. As a M (main-engines) Division officer and main propulsion assistant in a destroyer, I had a captain who had no engineering experience. His lack of engineering knowledge and, therefore, operational knowledge of his ship, showed when the engine room received 10 to 20 engine orders a minute while maneuvering alongside a pier. Had the captain ventured below the main deck, perhaps he would have been surprised to find that his ship had steam turbines with manual throttles, not gas turbines. Once in the midst of a boiler casualty, I was dumbstruck when the captain called down from the bridge and asked which specific tube in the boiler had ruptured. The most memorable demonstration of his ignorance came when a line shaft bearing overheated and failed. We were steaming independently, in daylight, and in open water, but captain ordered the EOOW—a chief petty officer—not to stop and lock the shaft as required by the casualty procedures. The reason given was that we were “a bit behind schedule.” Fortunately, the squadron
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commander was on board and intervened before further damage occurred.
Normally, I would have dismissed these experiences as the shortcomings of one man. But whenever engineers got together at squadron- or group-sponsored meetings, stories like these abounded. For bluejackets, this type of captain was horrifying. “Snipes,” whose daily work environment is dangerous, are not an easily frightened bunch. However, they were terrified that they might be injured or killed because their captain did not know engineering.
A warship captain must be versed thoroughly in all aspects of his ship’s operations. Certainly, tactics and warfighting are important—but engineering must be considered in any tactical equation. While standing watch on the bridge or in the combat information center, whenever I was informed of a problem with a piece of equipment, I knew immediately which weapons or sensors were affected. Because I could calculate the limitations to the systems, I knew, in an instant, the casualty’s impact on the tactical capabilities of the ship. I cannot imagine a captain or tactical action officer who could not accurately gauge the tactical abilities of his ship in relative to any problems in the engineering systems. The officers who can most successfully do this are the ones who are EOOW- qualified.
During the heat of battle, the success of a ship and the lives of her crew will depend on the captain’s tactical abilities. Without the current balanced approach to training and qualification—which includes engineering—the tactical proficiency of surface-warfare officers will suffer. □
“Build the Striker—One Tough Ship”
(See R. Loire, pp. 90-93, July 1992 Proceedings)
Mark Diamond—Rene Loire’s design should be placed under the heading, “Everything old is new again,” not only because it looks curiously like a Civil War ironclad, but also, despite its updated design, the Striker appears to suffer from the same infirmities that made the ironclads ground-breaking yet vulnerable ships.
The concept of “lying low” has been adopted by modem defensive architects in everything from 19th- and 20th-century fortresses to modem tanks. However, it is not a sound concept for seagoing ships for the same basic reasons that caused it to be rejected by post-Civil War
ship designers.
First, ships with relatively high freeboards have a reserve buoyancy that low- freeboard designs—like the Striker—do not. The lack of reserve buoyancy almost caused the sinking of the CSS Virginia when she rammed the USS Cumberland and was almost pushed under by the sinking Union warship. The lack of reserve buoyancy caused the sinking of the USS Monitor in a minor storm.
Second, the negative psychological impact of a ship that “lets waves freely flush the bare deck,” as Mr. Loire notes, cannot be underestimated. Going to sea in a ship with scant chance of catching a glimpse of sea, sun, and sky—those things that make going to sea worthwhile—would certainly be unpopular with any sailor.
Mr. Loire notes that today’s sea-skimming missiles are unable to fly lower than ten feet above sea level and, thus, would overshoot a ship with ten feet of freeboard. More than likely, however, the next-generation of anti-ship missiles will be downward-firing, such as those developed to destroy armored vehicles whose tops are thinner than their sides. Not to beat a dead horse, but if such a weapon hit a low-freeboard ship—with little reserve buoyancy—the result would be devastating. □
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“Cost-Effective Mine Warfare”
(See C. H. Fries and G. M. Slusher, pp. 95-98, August 1992; L. E. Dove, pp. 21-22, October 1992 Proceedings)
Carsten H. Fries and Ensign Gerald M. Slusher, Supply Corps, U.S. Naval Reserve—Lieutenant Commander Dove correctly asserts that a stern-towed side- scan sonar cannot see forward of a craft- of-opportunity-program (COOP) platform’s survey track. However, his subsequent conclusion that a platform must traverse a mined area and, therefore, jeopardize itself is a faulty leap of logic.
A COOP platform, like any other mine-warfare asset, performs hydrographic survey and mine hunting in overlapping tracts. By combining the 200- yard-wide transmission/reception beams emanating from both the port and starboard sonar transducers, the current side- scan sonar can survey 400-yard-wide swaths of the ocean bottom on extended tract runs.
One way to approach a mine field Would be to begin within a secure zone and run a tract parallel to the field. Either the port or starboard transducer Would peer 200 yards into the threat area—slightly less when a margin of error is calculated into the platform’s initial tract run. If the zone is free of contacts, then the COOP platform traverses 75 to 100 yards into the threat area to begin the next tract. In this way, the ship can halfstep its way through the assigned survey region without running the ship or its sonar over a mine.
The present COOP platform—typically a converted yard-patrol boat—has a draft °f less than six feet when fully loaded, during sonar operations, which are performed at a speed of three-to-four knots, lookouts can be placed at the bow and on the bridge—approximately 14 feet above the waterline—in order to detect any Semisubmerged mines and mines just below the waterline before the ship closes With them.
Commander Dove makes a good point concerning the lack of mine-avoidance s°nar and, in fact, the COOP has exper- 'mented with several makeshift, forwardlooking units. It is hoped that a workable variant may be found.
Admittedly, there are several cost-intensive improvements that would make hie COOP platforms safer and more effective operationally. However, in times °f rapidly dwindling defense budgets, defense programs—active or reserve—that demonstrate a “can-do” attitude with exiting resources will be better able to Weather the lean years.□
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When Thirteen ;
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Paul Stillwell
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At a time when the United States was fighting a global war to free the persecuted, its naval officer corps was, ironically, as white as it had been a century earlier, before the Civil War. Some 100,000 African American enlisted men were in the Navy at the midpoint of U.S. involvement in World War II, so its leaders timidly, reluctantly set about to commission a few black officers as well. To be sure, the step was a political one, taken in response to growing pressure from U.S. civil rights organizations. The national consciousness was slowly beginning to realize that the elimination of injustice abroad could hardly be served by a military force that perpetuated injustice at home.
In January 1944, 16 black enlisted men gathered at the Great Lakes Naval Training Station in Illinois to begin a crash course that would turn them into the first African American naval officers on active duty. Although the Navy had to be compelled to take this step, it chose the officer candidates well. All had demonstrated top-notch leadership as enlisted men. The pace was demanding and forced the 16 men to band together so that all could succeed. Their common perception was that they would set back the course of racial justice if they failed. All 16 passed the course, but not all became officers. Twelve received commissions as ensigns; the 13th made warrant officer. The three who did not fit within the quota returned to enlisted duty.
Years later the pioneer officers came to be known as the Golden Thirteen. In 1944, however, Navy leadership
treated them more as pariahs than pioneers. In many instances they were denied the privileges and respect routinely accorded to white naval officers. Once commissioned, their assignments were usually menial and not worthy of their abilities and training. They were token blacks. But they had at least opened the door for all those who would follow. In the years since 1944, the Navy has kept pace with the nation in racial awareness and integration. In some cases it has made even greater strides. The Golden Thirteen were there at the outset.
For a variety of reasons, only one of the 13 made a career of the Navy, and he was instrumental in opening still more doors for those to come after. Other members of the group made their marks in civilian life. Their achievements provide a measure of their talents and their determination to deal with a society that was too often reluctant to deal with them. Their number included a professional engineer, a justice of a state appellate court, the first black member of the council of the National Collegiate Athletic Association, a respected social worker, a successful attorney, a teacher and coach who inspired a generation of students, an official of the Urban League, a professional model, and the first black department head in the city government of Dayton, Ohio.
In 1986, at the suggestion of Lieutenant Mark Crayton of the Great Lakes Naval Training Station, I began an oral history project to capture the memories of the eight surviving members of the Golden Thirteen; one
Justice William S. White
“Prejudice is not a logical thing,” Justice William S. White told Paul Stillwell in this excerpt from the new Naval Institute Press book, The Golden Thirteen. Here, in conjunction with Black History Month, Justice White recalls how the Navy defied conventional logic and commissioned the first black naval officers—he was one of them.
My father was a chemist and a pharmacist, a graduate of Fisk University and the University of Illinois. My mother was a public school teacher, a graduate of Fisk University and the University of Chicago. During the Depression, they sacrificed and sent their only child to college and law school.
I knew that the opportunity to go to school was a precious opportunity which should not be wasted. Civil ser-
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has since died, hater the project grew to include the recollections of three white officers who served with and supported their efforts during World War II. In all, the transcripts comprise more than 2,000 Pages. A new Naval Institute Press book hy the same title is a compilation of the hest material from those oral inteviews.
Few oral history Projects have provided me with so niuch satisfaction and enjoyment. In Part that is because the men of the group were so kind and cooperative and tn part because the stories of these extraordinary individuals probably would have been lost if not for oral history. If Written records of the group’s training still exist, they are buried so deeply that they have not resurfaced, despite numerous inquiries. Thus, the only record likely to survive and perpetuate the achievements of the Golden Thirteen is this collection of their own oral recollections. Memory is admittedly an imperfect tool, but it °an convey a great deal of authentic human experience.
Graham Martin, for example, remembers the 1930s When boxer Joe Louis and sprinter Jesse Owens stunned the world with their athletic achievements. He found it difficult to reconcile their success with the oft- repeated notion that black people were inherently inferior. James Hair, the son of a slave, broke down in tears during one interview as he recalled the lynching of a brother-in-law whom he had idolized. George Cooper told of going out of his way to convince white enlisted men that he was a fellow human being, not “a black son of a bitch wearing officer shoulder boards. ” Jesse Arbor told of shaming a white senior officer who referred to a “goddamned nigger in the woodpile ” after he lost a game of poker. Sam Barnes recalled that white people in the South preferred to address a black man by his first name rather than according him the respect that went with the term “Mister Barnes. ” John Reagan, given only menial duties in World War II, had the satisfaction of being recalled to active duty shortly before the Korean War and eventually becoming executive officer of a fleet unit. Frank Sublett looked back on his naval experience as the highlight of his entire life. Justice William Sylvester White suggested that the Navy could have come up with many more capable black officers than just 13 when it finally decided to integrate its officer corps.
The Golden Thirteen demonstrated repeatedly that they were a remarkable group of men. This, the medium of ora! history, preserves their stories so that others may benefit and learn from their example.
vants and small business people don’t live so high on [he hog that they can afford to waste a chance for their son to go to school. My father used to tell me that his Mother told him that almost anything you get, the white folks can take away from you, except learning.
Few professional fields were open to blacks when I "'as going to school. The choices were essentially law, Medicine, religion, and education. Early on I found that depended more on the powers of reasoning rather lhan memorization, so I preferred it to medicine, where Vou call a certain bone the tibia simply because that is its name. . . .
In 1939 a friend of mine who had gone both to Hyde
Park High School and to the University of Chicago asked me how I would like to be an assistant United States attorney. I said, “I’d like it very much. I’d like to be a United States senator. I’d like to be President of the United States. What else is new?”
He said, “No, no kidding.” It developed that he had worked with a man who was about to be appointed the United States attorney, and he was going to clean the office and put in new people. He asked this friend of mine, Charles Browning, to suggest who should be the token black. Almost everything good that has happened to me since then has happened as the result of that chance con- verstion I had with Charles Browning. . . .
Ensign White—pictured here, seated, with Ensign Phillip Barnes, also a member of the Golden Thirteen—became a justice of the Illinois Appellate Court in Chicago. Years before his retirement from the bench in 1991, he visited the bridge of the guided-missile destroyer Kidd (DDG-993).
As the draft board looked at me with more and more interest, I turned to Lewis Reginald Williams, a friend who was in the Navy.... He was in the selection office at Great Lakes Naval Training Station, so he said, “You ought to do well on the tests that they give you, and that ought to give you the preferment of getting into the service school of your choice.” So I enlisted in October 1943 and went to boot training.
The experience to some extent followed the pattern of the outside world, in that blacks did play on the Great Lakes football team, because in those
days there were a few blacks playing on college football teams. It sounds ridiculous now, but blacks could not play on the Great Lakes basketball team. You wonder now how they could get ten white guys who knew how to play basketball, don’t you? But they did. Imagine, blacks played football but not basketball. Prejudice is not a logical thing. So why was it all right for them to play football ? I guess because they had more clothes on. I don’t know.
I had intended to go to quartermaster school. A quartermaster deals with navigation and is in one of the most intellectual of the Navy’s enlisted ratings. But the officer school came up so quickly that I never got a chance to be a quartermaster. I recall being summoned to Camp Lawrence, which was one of the Negro camps, and told that I was wanted on the main side. . . .
One part of the interview I well remember is that one of them said, “Now, the policy of the Navy regarding the utilization of Negro personnel is being attacked by
some Negroes. The Negro newspapers have been particularly vigorous in their attacks upon the Navy’s policy. If the Navy makes decisions regarding the utilization of Negroes and that decision comes under attack by Negro leaders and Negro writers in the press, would you be able, still, to carry out the Navy policy?”
I said, “Well, we are at war and men are dying in following orders. And if men can die to follow orders, I guess I can follow orders.” That’s about all I remember. I don’t know whether my being chosen for the program depended on my answer to that question. It was a question I was not prepared for, but, mind you, this was 1943. I was very conscious of the fact that this is still a democracy- I lauded the efforts of the black newspapers to change the policy through mass pressure. But I thought my duty on the inside was to follow orders, so, although I wasn’t prepared for the question, my answer was forthcoming.
Going through that officer training was kind of like fighting in the dark. It was demanding, I thought. I thought they worked us pretty hard. 1 thought they didn’t know what they were going to do with us. It seemed to me that they were trying hard to make us prepare for any eventuality. I didn’t really desire to go to sea at that point. If they had started me down a different path, yes, I would have. But I was totally unequipped. I had had this officer training thing, but I didn’t feel I knew enough. If they had let me go to quartermaster school, I would have wanted to go. But I didn’t think I had learned enough signaling and navigation to put me aboard a ship. Maybe I did. I just wouldn’t know, because that was never an option. . . .
Of our group undergoing the training, Reginald Goodwin had been in the Navy longest and had the ear of those in power. He was probably closest to the principal Annapolis graduate associated with the Negro program, Commander Daniel Armstrong. I spoke at Goodwin’s funeral. I said then that he played a difficult role. I believe that the white power structure would make known their desires to him, believing that he would transmit those desires to us. And we did the same thing in the other direction. He also carried information back and forth. His role was one that really I didn’t appreciate too much while he was performing it, because it smacked of being an Uncle Tom. From the vantage point of more than forty years, I can say what he did was useful for both sides. He did it in a way that he held our respect because he was smart, and his information and assistance were accurate.
Looking back over those years, I can tell you now I resented it some, but I never resented it so much that I would say, “Goody, I don’t like what you’re doing.” Just down deep, I guess my resentment was part of not liking the position I was in, where having such a courier and such an emissary was necessary.
I remember Armstrong as being southern, aristocratic, egotistical, and sincerely interested in advancing the status of Negroes in the Navy—according to his viewpoint.
I think he was sincere when he told us that we were officers, but we should remember we were colored officers and not do all the things that white officers do. In particular we were not supposed to go to the officers’ club. He thought by that course we would ensure the success of the Program. We hated it, but I’m sure he thought it best. I guess, in a sense, it was rather like Branch Rickey in talking with Jackie Robinson, the first black player in major league baseball. Robinson was feisty by nature, so Rickey told him, “Don’t let that show. You’re a pioneer, and that might hamper others coming along.”
There was one sad aspect to the program. The man who Urged me to get into the Navy, Mummy Williams, was also selected as an officer candidate. He went through the training with us, and then at the very end, although he had Passing grades, he was not commissioned. I don’t know why, but he wasn’t. Three people did not get commissioned, and my friend was one of the three, and he was crushed.
After the other thirteen of us were commissioned, I was uiade a public relations officer at Great Lakes. The Navy at that time wanted to service the Negro press, so my staff and I ground out press releases. There was also a CBS radio show called “Men of War, brought to you by the tnen of the Negro regiments at Great Lakes.” Then they eliminated the Negro regiments, so we proudly went on With our radio show “brought to you by the men of the Negro companies at Great Lakes.” Then pretty soon you had no more Negro companies as the integration went on, and we had no radio show either. . . .
The newspapers were receptive to our efforts; we got lineage in the black press. It was not equal to the amount °f space given the Army. Of course not, because the Army had generals and whatnot that were black, and the Navy °nly had us. I remember a paper in New York. In a political cartoon that characterized the Navy, it showed the Navy a proud ship going through the waves, and a towline out pulling a little rowboat. It had, under the big ship, The Navy,” and it had under the rowboat, “Negro programs. ” So ninety-nine percent of the blacks coming through the selection process would pick the Army. They hid not want the Navy, because the Navy had a history of mistreating blacks. I don’t know that the Navy is yet the preferred service.
In one sense, it is not entirely admirable that we black officers got along so well with the white power structure at Great Lakes. Maybe I should have been more feisty. For instance, I remember a time after I had been commissioned when Commander Armstrong came in to me, and he said, “Did you hear what happened up at Hastings?” That was the site of an ammunition depot.
I’d heard two things happened up at Hastings. I heard there had been an explosion there. I had also heard that there had been a near mutiny. I said, “Are you referring to the explosion, sir?”
“No, I’m referring to that ruckus up there.” I had heard a little bit about the meeting up there, but I didn’t become a naval officer to become a stool pigeon. What I heard was thirdhand, anyhow. If there had been some real insurrection there, I would have reported it. I don’t hang my head in shame about my relations with the white officers, although I don’t go around and boast about them either.
An incident one night remains as a vivid memory of the racial situation at Great Lakes. On this night the word came to me that company so-and-so, an outgoing unit of black sailors, was not going to obey when they got orders to shove off for duty. From a public relations point of view, I knew hell was going to break loose. So I went over to the barracks, even though I had no authority to be there. I guess I went with the petty officer who told me about this. Everything in the barracks was quiet and orderly, so quiet and orderly I was suspicious.
So I asked to speak to the petty officers there, and they said they had been introduced to a white officer who was going to take them overseas as a logistic support company. And this guy, in introducing himself, had acquainted the company with some of his philosophy something to the effect that the only good nigger was an obedient nigger, and they ought to know that. If those weren’t his words, “nigger” was in them or something equally derogatory. He let them know how tough he was and how he wasn’t going to take any crap.
These men in the barracks weren’t a bunch of Ph.D.s that I was talking to. But they were guys who had feelings and who could reason, and they had discipline. They had some petty officers that really had their men under control. They weren’t being disorderly. They had made up their minds. They were not going to be disorderly. But if they were ordered to go with this officer who had talked the way he did, they weren’t going to go.
In trying to respond to all this, I said to the guys, “Cool it. Right now, if we let things stand as they are, the fault’s entirely on him. If you guys disobey the orders, they’ll forget why you’re doing it, and the fault will be on you, and they’ll never get to what is the real cause of it. So please, cool it. Let me get this information into the right hands.”
After leaving the barracks, I sought out somebody in authority, and 1 may not have been the only person to report this incident to the appropriate officer. What happened? The officer who made these remarks did not go with that company. I’ve long wondered—did he do that
on purpose? Maybe he didn t want to go to Manus. Maybe he didn’t want to go to New Guinea. One way of getting out of it was to do that.
In the summer of 1944, two ammunition ships blew up in Port Chicago, California. The cargo handlers were mostly black sailors, and the horrible explosion blew away many a black man. That had a chilling effect, as you can imagine. I think they put out a rule that no more than such and such a percent of any shore installation should be black. I think from that and from the experience with the PC-1264 and the Mason, two ships with black crews, the Navy became integration minded. At the end of the war,
I received a letter from one of the enlisted men who worked under me in public relations. He had later gone out to the Pacific, and he wrote, “I’m coming back to the States as a part of the Navy that’s much more democratic than the nation it serves.”
... In 1945 I was transferred to Washington, D.C., where I was put in the press section of the public information office and had a desk with other lieutenants. I had no staff. I was staff then to the commanding officer, and we were doing stories. In that job I was more conscious of myself as a lawyer than I had been at Great Lakes, because I had to do the writing of the stories myself and not direct that they be done. Newsmen can sit down and think into a typewriter, but I can’t. . . .
One of our biggest battles during that period was against the formation of the Defense Department. We in the Navy didn’t want that. I even convinced people that, from a black perspective, there should be competition among the services as to who could do the best job in the utilization of black personnel. Because everything I was doing was from the point of view of utilization, not necessarily because it’s good and fair and integration, but because that’s the most efficient way to use your personnel. I guess I was closer to administration than a public relations officer should be, but I was involved in it.
The Secretary of the Navy was James Forrestal by this time, and he had picked an old Dartmouth chum, Lester Granger, who was black, to make the rounds of the shore installations that had goodly numbers of blacks, to see to what extent the Navy’s integration policy was being implemented. We first made some trips around the United States. I know we went to New Orleans, among other
places. ... .
To sum up the substance of Lester Granger s trip, the purpose of it was to see whether the Navy, in its remote places, was taking advantage of the opportunity to utilize fully Negro personnel, or were people restricting them to the more traditional roles. Lester Granger s findings, as I remember, were the farther you got from Washington, the less impact the words of the Secretary of the Navy had in affording Negroes an opportunity make a useful contribution to the war effort. . . .
After the war I left the service and returned to the U.S. attorney’s office. After working there for a number of years, I received an appointment from Otto Kerner, who had been my boss when he was U.S. attorney. When he became governor of Illinois in 1961, he asked me to join him in the cabinet. I was Director of the Department of
else cares. . . .
In 1980,1 was appointed to the Illinois Appellate Court, where I sat until retirement as a presiding judge of the Third Division. A few years after my appointment, I was the judge who was author of the opinion that settled legally and judicially the fact that Harold Washington’s forces were in control of the city council. Washington was Chicago’s first black mayor and had established a very sound principle that majority rules. Isn’t that profound? I took about twenty pages to say it, but it boiled down to that.
In looking at the group that came to be known as the Golden Thirteen, I’ve always said that we were lucky. The Navy reached down into a group of over 100,000 "black enlisted men and picked up thirteen of us to be trained as officers. They could easily have dipped this hand into that pool and come up with thirteen more and thirteen more and thirteen more. We were not unique. There was a lot of talent to choose from.
As the years passed and the original black officers got together again, some people suggested that a ship might be named for us. Nothing ever came of it. I think that I’m one of those who came up with the idea that, "Since we can’t get a ship named after us, why not a building?” Some other people came up with the idea, too, but I know that I advanced it. In June 1987 the in-processing center at the Great Lakes Naval Training Center was named for the Golden Thirteen. I think it’s appropriate, because most of us were not on ships, and this will reach a whole lot more people than a ship would.
The admiral at Great Lakes then was a woman named Roberta Hazard. As one of the Navy’s early woman admirals, she explained to us, “I, too, am a pioneer. And I want to be part of the celebration, where we’re celebrating your pioneering efforts.” She did a great job with that dedication. It’s ironic that we are now revered, because back in 1944 we were reviled. There were articles in the newspapers and Life magazine. People intelligent enough to read Life decried the fact that the Navy was lowering its standards to admitting blacks to the officer ranks.
Much progress has been made since 1944. Sam Gravely was commissioned shortly after we were and eventually became a vice admiral in the 1970s. Certainly a vice admiral is the equivalent of a president of a corporation. I don’t think General Motors or United States Steel has made the progress that the Navy has. Going back to the letter I received from one of my enlisted men at the end of World War II, I still think, on the whole, that the Navy is more democratic than the country it serves.