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Pick the Best Unmanned Air Vehicle
By Captain David L. Dickerson, Captain Jeff R. Wiechmann, and CW02 James G, Herring, U.S. Marine Corps
Although unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) have been around in one form or another for decades, they did not truly come of age until the Pioneer system demonstrated its capabilities during the Gulf War. But the war also showed that there were not enough assets to handle all the tasks battlefield commanders wanted UAVs to support.
These unmanned vehicles—sometimes referred to as remotely piloted vehicles (RPVs) or drones—perform many vital missions, including: indirect fire adjustment; target acquisition; surveillance; reconnaissance; battle damage assessment; and rear area security.
During Operation Desert Storm,
ceedings, pages 47-80).
The OV-lOs are almost gone, and, until the F/A-18Ds get a camera platform, the Pioneer RPV will be the U.S. Marine Corps’ primary tactical airborne reconnaissance platform.
The Joint Project Office for UAVs (JPO-UAV) is currently selecting a replacement for the Pioneer. Unfortunately, the requirements for the new follow-on system, designated the “UAV-Short Range (SR),” permit contenders to develop a system that is too cumbersome in terms of aerial vehicle size and support equipment to deploy effectively. The official requirement has other shortcomings as well.
Most users agree that the current Pioneer RPV has a fairly large footprint, i.e., support equipment, which has been a tactical concern. The UAV-SR’s projected footprint, however, is approximately 33% larger. Moreover, there will be three UAV-SR systems per company, instead of the single system found in current Pioneer RPV units, thus effectively quadrupling the RPV company footprint.
The increased UAV-SR assets will require additional airlift, a commodity already difficult to acquire: two C-5s and three C-141s were required to move each Pioneer RPV company to the Persian Gulf. One UAV-SR detachment of the
mall Pioneer unmanned air vehicles worked fine in Desert torm, upgrades will improve them, and these vehicles institute just one-half of one company. Why are we buying system that requires even more airlift?
newly configured company, with detachment support assets, will require a minimum of four C-5s and two C-141s. Pioneer RPVs already have been dropped from major exercises because of the enormous airlift requirements. How can the JPO-UAV and the Marine Corps justify increasing the already excessive airlift requirements?
In turn, the larger UAV- SR's survivability may dramatically decrease. The Pioneer weighs approximately 450
Marines from the I Marine Expeditionary Force led Coalition forces in the number of UAV missions. All three Marine Corps RPV companies supported the Gulf War. Their importance and effectiveness were stressed by all four of the key ground commanders and the overall Marine air commander (see interviews with Lieutenant General Boomer, Lieutenant General Moore, Lieutenant General Keys, Major General Flopkins, and Major General Myatt in the November 1991 issue of Pro-
I
pounds, is 14-feet long, and has a 17-foot wing span. The UAV-SR aircraft, TRW/Israel Aircraft Industries’ Hunter, weighs approximately 1,400 pounds, is 22-feet long, and has a 29-foot wingspan. It is nearly impossible for a ground observer to acquire a Pioneer visually at its normal operating altitude; the Hunter will be much easier to acquire and, thus, should be easier to destroy with small arms or antiaircraft artillery.
Enemy radars will probably find it easier to acquire also. Of course, only tests will confirm this.
The Pioneer has limited range—110 nautical miles (185 kilometers). The UAV-SR will not resolve this problem; its requirements state only a need to fly the new system 81 nautical miles (150 kilometers) beyond the front lines.
The Pioneer’s remote receiving station also has a limited range: advertised as 3040 kilometers, in practice this range can be extended to 60-70 kilometers. Once again, the UAV-SR requirement does not resolve the problem; it specifies only a 40-kilometer distance for the UAV-SR
equivalent—the remote video terminal___
to receive the aircraft video up.
The UAV-SR maintenance table of organization is inadequate. The system assets will quadruple; but the maintenance platoon only doubles in size. This understaffing cannot support a three-detachment company.
The UAV-SR maintenance concept is inadequate. The concept authorizes the company first- and second-echelon organizational maintenance, leaving third- and fourth-echelon maintenance to be performed at the Force Service Support Group (FSSG). This can be very costly in training and equipment for the FSSG, and adding another maintenance and supply agency will only increase down-time. In addition, FSSG staffing is not being increased to handle the increased workload; presently, intermediate maintenance is handled by a civilian contractor with the unit performing limited third-echelon maintenance. The using unit should be authorized to conduct maintenance up through the fourth echelon, which will decrease training and equipment costs, minimize downtimes, and make it easier to manage maintenance support (internal vice external) when deploying a detachment. There are several precedents in the Marine Corps for this all-in-one maintenance philosophy; specifically, artillery electronics maintenance platoons of Marine artillery regiments have second- through fourth-echelon capability.
The UAV-SR concept does not modify the current table of equipment (T/E), and a modification will be required. The present T/E does not contain the density of equipment to support three complete systems; indeed, many densities are sufficient for only one system.
The UAV-SR concept of employment states that Marine UAV companies can conduct shipboard operations when Navy UAVs are unavailable. Will the UAV-SR have the capability of performing such operations? The official position of the project office at Marine Corps Systems Command is: “No, the UAV-SR is not compatible with shipboard operations.” Are such operations a valid requirement? If so, once again, the UAV-SR falls short (see following Professional Note).
The concept of employment also states that the Marine Corps UAV-SR will be a ground maintenance managed system, rather than the Naval Air Systems Command maintenance program for Pioneer. This will present unique problems in itself, for the ground system has provisions neither for aircraft safety nor for the logs and records required for aircraft. Regardless of its designation as a ground asset, it is still an airborne weapon system, and must comply with strict aviation safety standards. Ground maintenance manuals will require extensive modifications to provide for this airborne platform.
The UAV-SR Joint Integrated Logistics Support Plan lists UAV-SR reliability requirements that are simply unacceptable. When calculating these figures—time between failures plus time to troubleshoot, acquire parts, and repair—the end result is one six-hour flight in a 24-hour period. We must not be satisfied with inadequate reliability because of present technology; realistic reliability requirements must drive technology to build a better mousetrap.
The Hunter does have significantly better endurance than the Pioneer—eight hours aloft to the Pioneer’s four. Another major advantage, operationally vice logistically, is the Hunter’s redundant control station. Used mainly for mission coordination and video-intelligence exploitation, it is a copy of the flight control station and can assume those duties in the event of a problem with the primary system.
Pioneer Issues: The Pioneer system was effective during the Gulf War, but as discussed, did have shortcomings. Much time and money can be saved by initiating a service life extension program and a product improvement program for the Pioneer instead of buying the entirely new UAV-SR. The major improvements needed to make the Pioneer even more effective include:
- All-weather capability
- More powerful engine
- Faser designator
- Increased range and endurance
- Target-location graphics available at the remote receiving station in addition to the ground control station
- Better reliability
- Reduced susceptibility to electromagnetic interference and jamming.
There are numerous other minor modifications that would enhance the Pioneer’s capability to serve the fleet better.
The UAV-SR is not what the Marine Corps needs as a follow-on system to the Pioneer. Its very few improvements do not outweigh its unrealistic embarkation requirements and operational capabilities. For a lot less money, the Pioneer can achieve nearly everything the Marine Corps wants in a UAV-SR. The Corps should explore upgrading the Pioneer, at least until a more practical, and transportable, alternative can be developed.
Captain Dickerson commands the 1st RPV Company at Twentynine Palms, California. Captain Wiechmann is the unit’s operations officer, and Chief Warrant Officer Herring is the maintenance officer. The unit is assigned to the 1st Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Intelligence Group.
Navy UAVs Need a Sponsor
By Commander Edward C. Ferriter, U.S. Navy
The Navy’s unmanned air vehicle (UAV) program needs stronger emphasis, particularly from the office of the Director, Air Warfare (N-88), to keep a small, successful, and exceptionally cost-
effective system going.
There is no need to delve into history. Simply, the Pioneer unmanned air vehicle was originally purchased by the Navy in 1985 through a bureaucracy-slashing procurement program called Operation Quick-Go, and early versions were basically off-the-shelf purchases of an Israeli system proved during the 1981 war with Lebanon.
Close
Range
All Ranges Approximate
Beyond Forward Line of Own Troops (Flot)
650 Kilometers
150
Kilometers
30
Kilometers
Flot Data Point
Medium Range
Endurance
Short Range
The Pioneer subsequently became one of the low-budget stars of the Persian Gulf War. Not only did it provide realtime tactical intelligence to the battlefield and battle group commander, it captured the intelligence gathered on videotape and gave the Navy some highly visible ammunition to fight in the media wars. History’s first known surrender of soldiers to a robotic—an incident involving 40 Iraqi soldiers on Faylaka Island in the Gulf—was recorded on videotape and subsequently received worldwide intelligence and media coverage.
The current Pioneer UAV is operated by two detachments of Fleet Composite
Squadron (VC)-6, based at Patuxent River, Maryland. Among the capabilities demonstrated to date are reconnaissance, naval gun fire spotting, over- the-horizon-targeting, and battle damage assessment.
The system’s first U.S. Navy mission was to provide gunfire spotting corrections for the 16-inch guns of the newly recommissioned battleships. The accuracy of the Pioneer/16-inch gun team is
well documented. Almost simultaneously, the U.S. Marine Corps acquired a land based-version; three of these units deployed to the Persian Gulf for Operation Desert Storm. (See preceding Professional Note “Pick the Best Unmanned Air Vehicle.”)
During the Gulf War, when the lack of battlefield intelligence became a critical issue, the U.S. Army established a Pioneer unit, almost overnight, as a stopgap measure pending development of the next-generation of short-range UAVs.
The success of the UAV is self-evident. Compared to manned systems, UAVs are relatively inexpensive. They can be flown in areas that manned craft should avoid. They eliminate the problem of downed air crews becoming prisoners of war. If required, they can be sent on one-way missions. In practice, the UAVs are best employed as complements to other manned systems, a combination that allows UAV strengths to be exploited with a human’s uniquely unprogrammable intelligence, flexibility, and decisionmaking abilities.
The Navy’s UAV program is part of a larger Joint UAV program coordinated by the program executive officer for UAVs and cruise missiles within the Naval Air Systems Command. The joint program office manages a family of UAV programs that the Department of Defense has designated mission-critical. The family encompasses systems differentiated by range and endurance requirements (see Figure 1). The Pioneer was procured to fulfill a specific need and, because it preceded the joint approach to UAV plans
aviation enlisted with experience in UAV maintenance and operating procedures. Two UAV Navy Enlisted Classification (NEC) codes already exist; 8361 and 8362 are currently Pioneer-specific, but could easily be expanded to general UAV systems. Each detachment should have one of each specific NEC assigned, and other enlisted members assigned should be awarded UAV NECs after demonstrating their competence. y Manpower, both officer and enlisted, must be carefully managed by aviation planners to ensure that competitive personnel are detailed into the key initial detachments. Once a cadre of sharp, aggressive fleet sailors sets up the initial maritime UAV detachments, they will be promoted and advanced and the program will pick up momentum of its own. But manning must be front-loaded to ensure aviation personnel do not perceive the UAV community as a career deadend.
The combat success of the UAV concept is a reality. In each of our modem conflicts, UAVs have played an-important, if often short fused, role. In World War II, it was unmanned, remote-controlled bombers. In Korea, it was the DASH. In Vietnam it was a modified AQM-34 Firebee. In Kuwait, it was the Pioneer. The military should learn from those combat successes now and push the development of UAV systems. There is no need to wait until the next war to find out we need UAVs for real-time tactical reconnaissance or other critical missions.
Aviation planners must recognize the importance of detailing competitive sailors to these technologically advanced, and expanding, aviation asset.
and requirements, it does not fall neatly into DoD’s approved categories of UAVs.
The Navy’s UAV program has reached a crossroad; critical decisions in the near future will affect the direction the program will take. The maritime version of the short-range UAV is expected to replace the Pioneer system in the late 1990s. Its shape, size, composition, and capabilities are critical to future naval forces. Large numbers of maritime UAVs are currently envisioned and will operate on several classes of surface ships. The Navy alone plans to purchase as many as 75 systems, which are being developed as a surface-Navy asset, coordinated and controlled by the Director, Surface Warfare (N-86).
But the maritime UAV is foremost an aerial platform and, as such, it is imperative that N-88 and the naval aviation community be closely involved in the procurement and coordination of the program. We do not have to look back very far to see what can happen when an inherently aerial system is forced on a surface platform. Without proper training, background, and attitude of the participants, the failures of the QH-50 or Drone Antisubmarine Helicopter (DASH) system could easily be repeated as the maritime UAV is introduced to the fleet. Manning to support the system, both officer and enlisted, should come from the aviation community. Naval aviation training and operational procedures standardization (NATOPS) and other aviation maintenance manuals and technical publications should guide the system.
As a program the maritime UAV should be coordinated exactly like the LAMPS-III system. Aviation- and surface-Navy elements must be integrated into a single ship system and, most importantly, the aviation and surface warfare communities must be integrated when planning and structuring the system. The hard-earned lessons from the LAMPS-III must be incorporated in this system’s procurement.
There are several things the Navy needs to set in motion, now, to ensure the successful introduction of the maritime unmanned air vehicle:
- The aviation community, NavAir, and N-88 specifically, must take the lead in manpower training issues. The system must be properly led and staffed to succeed. Naval aviation already has a small cadre of personnel with extensive experience in operating UAVs in the demanding sea-based environment. Officers and senior enlisted from the Pioneer community should be identified and groomed to be part of the initial cadre picked to lead and develop the maritime system.
- High-quality, and—very importantly_
promotable officers should be phased into this initial group of innovators with the intent of qualifying as UAV detachment officers-in-charge. These officers will organize and lead the detachments that will install and deploy the systems on an initial group of surface ships. The officers should be aviation warfare qualified, filling billets designated as disassociated sea tours, just like other ship’s company tours to which aviators are currently assigned. It is absolutely essential that an aviation officer be assigned to these detachments. In addition to leading the detachment and maintaining the equipment, the OIC will act as the ship’s air element coordinator, and will be responsible for coordinating integration of the maritime UAV in multiplatform, multiservice airspace. An in-depth functional knowledge of aviation issues is required, just as it is for the air operations officer on a dock landing (LPD)-class ship, for example.
- It is important to maintain a cadre of
Commander Ferriter. a naval flight officer, commands VC-6. He has served with Patrol Squadron (VP)- 49, VP-5, on the staff of Commander, Carrier Group Eight, and as battle group operations officer with Commander, Patrol Wings Atlantic.
LX: Key to the Future of the Amphibious Navy
By Major J.R. Webb, U.S. Marine Corps
In August of 1990, President George Bush announced four pillars of the national security strategy of the United States:
► Strategic deterrence ► Forward presence in key areas > Worldwide crisis response > Force reconstitution
In projected support of this strategy, the Navy-Marine Corps team may be called upon to perform missions ranging from humanitarian assistance to counterinsurgency and crisis-response operations. Amphibious shipping will play an essential role in projecting sustainable combat power ashore for these missions. Unfortunately, amphibious operations have become increasingly difficult as the Navy has largely ignored the ‘Gator fleet, concentrating instead on updating surface combatants, submarines, and aircraft to wage naval war with the Soviet Union. Slight improvements to the amphibious fleet have reluctantly been made, but only when the Marine Corps has pressed the issue. The result is an amphibious fleet
that is rapidly reaching the end of its service life.
Continuing Department of Defense budget cuts have only worsened the problem, prolonging an already sluggish ef- j fort to revive the aging amphibious armada. The scheduled retirement of 28 amphibious ships between 2002 and 2007 demonstrates the seriousness of the problem. More dramatically, all 20 Newport (LST-1179)-class tank landing ships, all 5 Anchorage (LSD-36)-class dock landing ships, all 5 Charleston (LKA-113)-
Figure 1
class amphibious cargo ships, 6 Iwo Jima (LPH-2)-class amphibious assault helicopter carriers, and all 11 Austin (LPD-4)-class dock amphibious transports will reach the end of their service lives within the next 20 years. With this decommissioning plan, the entire complement of six ship classes will vanish. The result is a tailspin of ship retirements that is leading the U.S. amphibious fleet down the road to block obsolescence.
In the past, government officials have not considered a modem amphibious fleet vital to national security. In 1950, General Douglas MacArthur silenced critics when he orchestrated his brilliant amphibious landing at Inchon during the Korean War, once again demonstrating the value of an ability to project combat power from the sea. The Cold War, however, and events like the Cuban Missile Crisis, soon drew the attention of the Navy back to building large combatant vessels to thwart the Warsaw Pact, allowing U.S. amphibious forces to once again slip into the subordinate position they currently maintain.
Today, the recent successes of programs like Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) shipping only cloud the issue of maintaining modern combatant amphibious forces. It is true that during the Gulf War, MPF shipping proved the value of using prepositioned armored vehicles, trucks, and other items of heavy equipment as a strategic deployment option for combat. The mobility and timely response of these forces proved instrumental in the rapid buildup of combat power ashore. Although highly successful, the Gulf War MPF operations would not have been Possible without a friendly port facility such as A1 Jubayl, Saudi Arabia. In addition to a secure port, the area offered ihe air facilities and road network required to facilitate the MPF off-load process. But the luxury of such a facility may not exist in our nation’s next conflict. If enemy defenses require forcible entry from the sea, tanks, trucks, and supplies will have to be delivered across the beach by amphibious ships and landing craft of the U.S. Navy.
It is imperative, then, that the Navy continue to maintain a viable, combat- ready amphibious fleet capable of transporting the supplies and vehicles necessary to support a myriad of Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) operations. A recent Brookings Institution study supports this claim, verifying that “amphibious forces were used in 33% of the incidents in which the United States was involved between 1945 and 1975.” This figure increased to nearly 70% as recently as 1988. Recent operations in Lebanon, Grenada, and Somalia all serve as vivid reminders that “ since World War II, U.S. forces have been called on more than 200 times to demonstrate national resolve in response to crises. Most of those responses were naval, and most naval responses were amphibious.” Fortunately, the Navy recently acknowledged that aggressive efforts were urgently needed if the amphibious fleet intended to keep pace with our new security strategy. In 1990, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, headed by the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, validated a Mission Need Statement for the LX, a ship design that would assume the roles of the 38 retiring vessels of the Austin, Raleigh (LPD-1), Anchorage, and Newport classes. Although not the only program involved in the Navy’s fleet modernization effort, the LX is the best bet to lead the amphibious fleet out of block obsolescence as it has made the greatest advances in the tortuous ship
The LX needs some refinements, among them a radar-approach control facility and some offensive weaponry—a gun, Standard Missiles, and Tomahawks.
procurement process. The ship’s characteristics were discussed ably in these pages by an officer involved in the procurement process (see “Picking the Latest ‘Gator,” Proceedings August 1992, pp. 91-93) and there is no need to replow that ground.
There remains the requirement to lift the assault echelons of 2.5 Marine Expeditionary Brigades, which would “take just about every vessel the Navy owns,” according to a visiting speaker at the 1992 Marine Corps Command and Staff College. Unfortunately, the amphibious fleet has historically fallen short in finding deck space for a task force’s vehicles and cargo. Accommodating troops, landing craft, and helicopters has not usually posed such a problem, and the new ship must have more cargo and vehicle storage space.
Planners have allowed for several new systems that will help ensure that LX is not obsolete before it hits the water. First is the use of Copernicus, a satellite communications system that far exceeds the capabilities of systems currently used in the amphibious fleet. Although impressive, planners realize that Copernicus may not be the best system available when the LX enters fleet service. So the Navy is using a turn-key approach in designing the LX’s communication system, providing weight and space reservations for incorporating the most modern communication equipment available at launch
time. .
It is also refreshing to note that LX is currently designed to be capable of supporting day and night, helicopter and ver- tical/short takeoff and landing (VSTOL) flight operations. Included in this package will be the appropriate aircraft aids to navigation, the latest version of the optical landing system, and a night vision goggle-compatible flight-deck lighting system. To support its embarked aviation unit, LX will provide the necessary ground support equipment, maintenance facilities, and aircraft hangar spaces, as well as specialized handling areas for the buildup and storage of helicopter weapons. Additional refinements include the planned use of a gas-turbine power plant instead of the traditional steam plant so familiar to the ‘Gator Navy, offering increased maintenance reliability and performance. For protection, LX engineers are installing the Mk-15 Phalanx Close- In Weapon System (CIWS), and are planning to install the Stabilized Weapons System Platform, a pedestal-mounted unit that contains Hellfire and Stinger missiles, 2.75 inch rockets, and a 40-mm gun. If needed, LX will be capable of handling numerous casualties with its two operating rooms and more than 100 beds.
It is indeed regrettable that with all these improvements, the LX will be lacking in a number of areas. (See Figure 1.) ► The Navy has still not included aircraft radar-control equipment as part of the ship’s aviation support package. If the ship is to be truly aviation capable, then consideration should be given to including a radar-approach facility similar to the ones used on the LPH- and LHA- class vessels. This capability would provide increased aviation flexibility in allowing LX to approach all-weather operation, facilitating independent ship employment.
- No provision has been made for bomb buildup areas on the LX. It makes no sense at all to make the vessel capable of supporting AV-8B operations if she cannot handle the ordnance associated with the airframe.
- Planners have apparently chosen to ignore the gasoline storage problem. The MAGTF uses many items of special equipment that require gasoline for operation, including outboard motors for rubber boats, motorcycles, and generators for chemical decontamination units. This equipment is so prevalent that a MEB can use up to 51,000 gallons of gasoline in 30 days. The problem is that no amphibious ship has a tank certified to carry the fuel, and, as of now, the LX will be no exception. With the technology that is available today, why has a suitable gasoline storage tank not been developed?
- Finally, the most glaring issue of neglect in the LX development is the lack of offensive weaponry. When the LX was first presented to Navy officials, it incorporated a weapon system very similar to the Kidd (DDG-993)-class destroyers—a 5-inch gun, a Standard Missile-2 (SM-2) package, and a Tomahawk Mk- 41 vertical-launch cruise missile system. But according to the official view, the LX would not need these weapons; the amphibious platforms would be accompanied by carrier battle groups dur
ing times of crisis, so the LX should be outfitted with defensive weapons only. Unfortunately, there have been several occasions when a carrier force was too far away to assist the amphibious ready group had the need arisen. In these times of reduced budgets and shrinking carrier forces, it makes sense to equip the LX with the weapons needed to conduct offensive warfare.
It is unlikely that the naval battles of tomorrow will take place on the high seas. Massive conflicts involving hundreds of U.S. ships are a part of history now; in their place will be ‘Gators navigating the brown-water littorals of nations plagued by instability and tension. To be successful in the persecution of this forward presence strategy, continued modernization of the amphibious fleet must carry on.
The LX is a significant step in the right direction, if only because the step is being taken now. As such, leaders of the Navy’s amphibious community must be wary of attempts by submarine and aircraft carrier proponents to redirect further funding away from this vital modernization program. Likewise, the Marine Corps must continue to support this program with all means available. To do otherwise will most certainly result in an amphibious fleet that is obsolete by the 21st century.
Major Webb is serving with Headquarters, U.S. Forces Japan in Tokyo. He is a naval aviator and a CH-53E pilot. He graduated from the United States Marine Corps Command and Staff College this year.
The Best Kept Secret in Pentagon Room 4E-686
By Commander Robert W. Selle, U.S. Naval Reserve (Retired)
There is growing concern that the Department of Defense has been too hasty in the downsizing and the so-called (and utterly misnamed) build-down of our defense establishment begun before the Gulf War and continued thereafter.
Now we see back pedaling and consternation in the Defense Department confirmed by last year’s public pronouncement that the United States must be ready to fight two wars simultaneously being juxtaposed against this year’s statement that we will no longer strive to be the only superpower and will no longer attempt to keep another superpower from emerging.
Back in the real world, with the extinction of the Soviet Union, we have exchanged one known enemy for a host of unknown enemies. Santayana’s prescient observation, “Those who do not learn the lessons of history are condemned to repeat them,” has relevance as never before.
Almost as if the current situation in the real world did not exist, cutbacks, closings, and eliminations continue except in those politically sensitive systems of dubious defense value, e.g., the Sea- wolf. Thus, as the cuts affect the Navy, naval aviation and submarines continue to dominate, while surface ships and the Marine Corps suffer major cuts.
A significant date in this mad march is 31 March 1992, when the battleship Missouri (BB-63) was decommissioned for the second time. Now all four of the Iowa (BB-61)-class battleships—includ
ing the New Jersey (BB-62) and the Wisconsin (BB-64)—are safely mothballed, although we are assured that they will be ready to fight again on a moment’s—at least nine months—notice. One might well ask how long it will take to assemble and train a crew. For example, where are all the chiefs?
This date also marks the moment when the U.S. Marine Corps, for the first time in its entire history, lost its naval gunfire ' support advantage. That this situation has been allowed to develop and brought to fruition is incomprehensible.
What About the Small Wars? The real change we are all looking for lies right under our eyes. It is in actual fact “hidden in plain sight,” and all it involves is ■ an open and objective appraisal of al-
They’ve tied up the battleships—here, the USS Wisconsin (BB-64)—once more, despite their proved capabilities in littoral warfare. The nation may well need their capabilities.
ready-existing military assets and capabilities. Enter the Maritime Commando Force, which consists of five ships: a battleship; an LPH, LHA, or LHD; and three frigates or destroyers (or perhaps one guided-missile cruiser and two frigates) serving as support. A grouping of these five ships would bring together a force of such overwhelming superiority in firepower and strike capability as to assure quick success in practically all low-intensity conflicts.
Now that the four /owa-class battleships have been mothballed, new roles for these great ships can be addressed on their merits alone and without the wrenching emotional strains brought on by successive commissionings and decommissionings.
The $2 billion spent on bringing them out of mothballs in the late 1980s has proved cost-effective beyond our greatest expectations—witness the superlative performance of the Missouri and the Wisconsin in the Gulf War. They performed every mission from all-weather, day-and-night sustained shore bombardment against all types of targets, to precision attacks by Tomahawk cruise missiles on the very center of Baghdad.
In addition, they performed a wide variety of critically important support roles including refueling, transfer of personnel, and communications links.
In recent years, Proceedings has published several excellent articles on rethinking the role of the battleships over the next 10-20 years. These articles include a number of the following ideas that should be implemented to make the Maritime Commando Force a reality.
^ Extend gun range to 75 to 100 miles by using 13-inch submunitions in place of 16-inch rounds. This quadruples current range and increases the area of coverage from 830 square miles to 15,780 square miles. The indisputable fact is that all the technology exists for this long- range gun capability. This is not a “Star Wars” theory, but rather a proved capability that is available today. The new generation of remotely piloted vehicles (RPVs)—plus increasingly reliable guidance techniques—will permit improved accuracy even at these great distances.
Such a profound increase in coverage °f more than four times in range and more than nineteen times in area coverage fits right into and complements the over-the-beach envelopment tactics that are becoming part of the new Marine Corps assault doctrine for either large or small forces. Naval gunfire support is a quintessential requirement that cannot be compromised; in conducting this elementary mission the battleships have no equal.
- Eliminate the six remaining secondary batteries of 5-inch/38-caliber gun mounts. These have a nine-mile range and represent perfect 1930s state-of-the-art technology. Each mount requires at least 55 men to operate a single battery—loading, arming, firing—thus a total of 330 men are required to operate this entire secondary battery system. Removing these batteries and their associated machinery will eliminate at least 330 men from the ship’s company of about 1,400. Such a reduction would represent a savings of approximately 20% in manpower requirements and is consistent with present and current manpower reduction planning.
- Replace these batteries with vertically launched cruise missiles, the SM-2 standard missile, or other missiles now in development. As noted by William R. Nichols in his Proceedings article “Battleships 1991: An Assessment,” June 1991, pages 73-75, these missiles can be linked directly to weapons control systems on board other ships in an assault force, thus providing both force multiplier effects and redundant capability.
This is an important capability, and an understanding of it is absolutely critical to any evaluation of the new role for the battleships.
Since each silo could hold a mix of approximately 25 missiles, a total of 150 additional missiles, cruise missiles (Tomahawks), SM-2s, etc., could be added to the existing 32 already housed in box launchers above deck. This four- to fivefold increase in missile capability can be achieved with almost no addition in personnel. Furthermore, it may be possible to store many more missiles of all types below decks, thereby increasing the total number.
The technology surrounding cruise missiles is expanding rapidly, particularly in the mission planning area, which will add materially to its battlefield flexibility and combat capability. Shortly it will receive stealth attributes as well. Also, second generation cruise missiles soon to arrive will have longer ranges and greater payloads.
„ 103
Proceedings / November 1992
Is There A Place For The Mk-71 8-inch Gun?
Yes, there is, and it is another good idea whose time has come. The ideal (made to order, actually) location for it is on the Arleigh Burke (DDG-51)-class destroyers, replacing the present Mk-45 5-inch/54 gun.
All of the operational characteristics and exact firing data were developed and proved some years ago when this weapon was installed on board the USS Hull (DD-945), a vessel approximately half the size of the Arleigh Burkes. The engineering data suggests the Arleigh Burkes can take the additional weight of approximately 40,000 pounds—or one-third more some of it topside, and that such an exchange would open up vast opportunities for productive, new operational employments.
Using conventional 8-inch ammunition, such an upgrade would give an immediate increase in range from nine to fourteen miles, and increase area coverage by a factor of 2.5. If however, a sabot were employed using 6-inch
submunitions, a profound increase in range___
on the order of 25 to 30 miles—and corresponding coverage can be achieved. When
The Mk-71 may have been too much gun for the USS Hull (DD-945)—a 3,900-ton
Forrest Sherman (DD-931)-class destroyer__
but it would work just fine on the new, Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class (inset).
compared with conventional 5-inch ammunition, these numbers represent increases of 300% in range and approximately 600% in area coverage. Furthermore, using existing guidance systems (laser, infrared, the global positioning system) phenomenal accuracy can be achieved even at extended ranges. Manning requirements and firing rates—20 rounds per minute—are identical for the Mk-71 8-inch and the Mk-45 5- inch/54. Q,
By the skillful use of existing technology and assets a cost-effective way exists for a major gunfire upgrade and improvement in versatility on the U.S. Navy’s 21st century destroyers.
- The amphibious assault ships would carry a mix of Marines, helicopters, and a number of Harriers, perhaps four to six, to provide additional attack and defense capabilities.
- The three support ships (a frigate, destroyer, or cruiser or any combination thereof) would provide all manner of picket, surveillance, and support capabilities. As presently envisioned, the force will consist of a maximum of 3,500-4,000 Marines and sailors. (See Figure 1.)
Gone, at least for now, are the days of blue-water navies fighting on the high seas. Nearly all future conflicts, especially those of low-intensity threats and guerrilla actions, will come from multiple and unexpected places in the Third World.
These conflicts near oceans (6/7ths of the entire globe) will involve brown-water littoral actions and engagements.
Into this milieu the Maritime Commando Force can bring speed, a high degree of stealth, unquestioned offensive capabilities, gunfire superiority, mobility and flexibility, and sustainable relief and defensive capabilities. Such a force could execute nearly all the missions assigned to deployed Marine expeditionary units, as well as some other Special Operations units. Other assignments can well include support of friendly governments, developing and devising new techniques for drug war interdiction (particularly in the drug growing and processing areas), and hostage rescue and retrieval of the kidnapped, as well as embassy relief operations such as Operation Sharp Edge in Liberia and Eastern Exit in Somalia. To a seemingly unending list can be added humanitarian and disaster relief efforts of all kinds as they occur.
Our Young Battleships. The battleships are really a gift to us from a previous generation. They were built in the 1940s without the constraints of the London and Washington Naval Treaties and are the best-designed warships ever built. With their guns and armor plate, they can “take” as much as they can “give” in combat. Unlike today’s carriers, they were built to transit the Panama Canal, which gives them considerable flexibility, and, for conventionally powered ships, have unparalleled range at high speed—14,800 nautical miles at 20 knots.
Their top speed is in excess of 33 knots, and they are among the fastest ships in the fleet. With their 2.5 million-gallon fuel capacity, they can sustain themselves as well as refuel other ships. With eight boilers and four shafts and screws, the power and machinery have a high degree of redundancy. While the armor belt on the waterline and interior armor provide superior side protection, the entire deck from stem to stem is covered by a spe
cially formulated thick layer of high-tensile steel to absorb shots coming in from above. Needless to say, the turrets and barbettes for the entire length of many decks are almost impenetrable for conventional munitions.
Each one of these ships now has from 10 to 20 years of useful life remaining. Battleships provide an exceptional platform from which advanced weapons can be developed and exploited. For example, think of the elements of a sea- based antitactical ballistic missile Patriot II system installed for shipboard use. In addition, prepositioning one ship at Diego Garcia and one at Guam in a modified maintenance status (with crews flown to the sites for full activation) is compatible with both Navy and Marine Corps thinking. Also, retention of two battleships, one on each coast, in Ready Reserve status and a redefinition of their roles for ready response, etc., has merit. Further, these formidable, versatile ships can be seen as a bridge between today’s Navy and the Navy that will evolve by the period 2025-2050.
Given the certainty of future conflict, the Maritime Commando Force combines the best aspects of immediate and certain response while acceding to real-world economic constraints. All of these ships exist today in our arsenal. The imperative is for us to think this bold new idea through now (even with present fiscal constraints) and go down the learning curve to develop the required doctrine.
The old saw “we like the battleships, but they are too expensive to operate, misses the point completely. The battleships are not part of the problem they are part of the solution! Within this context perceptions by friend and foe alike are oftentimes as important as reality, and the battleships must be seen by all as the cop on the beat. They just look like they mean business. In his sagacious and poignant article “Dreadnought Farewell Again,” [Proceedings June 1992, pages 71-73], Paul Stillwell addresses the notion of perceptions and reality knowingly. What is required is straight, logical thinking and objectivity to understand the new roles these capable vessels can play now and over the next 20 years.
Commander Selle is an investment counselor and economist in Boston, Massachusetts, and holds an MBA from Harvard University. While not a graduate, he attended the U.S. Naval Academy, and is a life member of the class of 1949. He served in the Office of Naval Intelligence (Reserve) for 17 years in various posts throughout the United States, and has studied battleship issues for many years.
Seahawk or Sitting Duck
The LAMPS-III, call sign Tango One, was on picket duty at altitude, 100 miles from its cruiser. Using its data link, it was the eyes of a U.S. Navy surface action group shadowing a Russian battle group, that was steaming 1,500 miles off the coast of Japan. Tensions between the superpowers had escalated. The economic crisis in Russia had reached famine proportions.
The U.S. helicopter’s airborne tactical officer reported a blip leaving one of the Udaloy-class destroyers and beginning a low-altitude run toward their position. It looked like a typical Ka-27 Helix antisubmarine warfare profile, with the helicopter going into a hover every few minutes and dipping its sonar.
All this information was instantly and automatically relayed to Tango One’s cruiser, call sign Mother, and from there to the rest of the force.
“Tango One, Mother, the Helix appears to be on an intercept course with you.”
“Roger. Probably coming up to look for you.”
The conversation was normal as the Russian approached. He looked pretty fast, but then the Helix with its contrarotating twin main rotors was faster than the LAMPS-III. When the Russian helicopter was five miles away, it began to climb, confirming the tactical officer’s prediction of its real mission—radar picket, same mission as theirs. The U.S. surface action group would soon be on the Soviet screens.
The Russian helicopter passed below the Seahawk and disappeared into the Seahawk radar's blind spot. The SH-60B tactical officer forgot about it as the Russian ships began to increase speed and a targeting radar painted them. Electronic support measures alarms sounded and the LAMPS-III went active with electronic countermeasures. The rear half of the radar screen went dark.
The airborne tactical officer looked up
By Thomas Anderson
to find the rear-view mirror full of helicopter—not a Helix, but a Hokum. The LAMPS-III cockpit exploded. The cruiser’s urgent calls went unanswered as the Russian battle group pressed on into the Pacific.
The Problem. The correct application of specialized weapons can drastically alter a military situation. If we continue to think of naval air power as the sole province of the aircraft carrier and fixed- wing aircraft, then we may be greatly
surprised. .
The aircraft carrier may be the ultimate navy weapon, but it is limited, not by capabilities, but by numbers. There are so few and the oceans are so big. There is a way, though, to increase naval power without increasing the number of aircraft carriers, or having aircraft carriers at all.
Helicopters have reached a level of sophistication that places them on a par with attack aircraft in terms of destructive power. These new capabilities could pos-
U.S. Navy helicopters are vulnerable to a new threat—sea-based Hokums with an air-to-air capability. Given the Russians’ need for hard cash, Navy crews can expect to see the ominous Hokums around the globe.
sibly decide the outcomes of naval battles, just as fixed-wing aircraft did during World War II.
The SH-60 Sea- hawk and the SH-2 Seasprite, mainstays into the 21st century, can conduct reconnaissance, surface and subsurface attack and defense, and search- and-rescue missions.
But for all this capability, they lack a selfdefense capability, which makes them vulnerable to air attack. Of course, the cruiser could have defended Tango One with missiles, you might say. Could missiles have been used successfully in the opening scenario?
The Russians have a helicopter fighter, not yet operational, but there nonetheless.
The Hokum, was designed from the outset for attack—it is a fighter—and it poses a grave threat to our antisubmarine warfare helicopters and our surface action groups.
The Hokum, unlike our Marine AH- lW’s, seems to have the same folded envelope as the Helix. Thus it will fit in the same hangar. In a force of two or three ships, each with one or two helicopters on board, one or two Hokums could be carried with no real loss of ASW capability from the remaining Helix helicopters.
If this were the case, a LAMPS-III on outer zone patrol might very well see the Russian ships and observe a helicopter launch, but would the helicopter be an ASW Helix, or would a Hokum? Assuming a crisis existed, what would the U.S. Navy’s rules of engagement prescribe? Would the LAMPS-III remain on station and risk an air intercept, or retreat? Either way, the surface action group gives up its eyes. In the worst case, the LAMPS-m also would be lost.
The Solution. There is a basic solution to the probability of Hokum attack helicopters on Russian ships—arm the Sea- hawk and SeaSprite.
The Stinger missile has been test mounted on the main landing gear spon- son of the Army Black Hawk, of which the Seahawk is a variant. Such a mount
could be located on the Seahawk spon- son, though the modification would have to take into consideration the flotation bag located there. The Seasprite has less room and payload, thus the missile system might have to replace some mission equipment. Even so, it is desirable to incorporate self-protection provisions on our helicopters.
On the other hand, the Navy could create its own naval attack helicopter force with either AH-lWs or naval versions of the U.S. Army’s AH-64. Both helicopters, however, would have problems operating from small decks.
The fully shipboard compatible AH-1W is mission-capable now, but for a surface action group it is not compatible with the small hangars of the group’s frigates and destroyers. It does not fold and it does not have wheels, which makes it difficult to store and to maneuver
The AH-64 is very capable and can be partially folded, but its landing gear is designed for operations ashore. The main gear’s narrow track and the location of the tail wheel would cause problems on a pitching, rolling deck, and the helicopter would require redesign in order to conduct all-weather operations from frigates. The basic helicopter, though, can be operated from larger amphibious assault ships (LPHs, LHAs, and LHDs). With new landing gear, both helicopters would at least be small-deck compatible, and could provide an interim attack-helicopter capability for a surface action group.
Both the Apache and the Sea Cobra are ground attack helicopters. How would one make a naval antiair-antisurface aircraft out of them? One must remember that the Russians have the Hokum at an operational or near operational stage, so any modifications to this aircraft would have to be accomplished in a short time to be of any use.
Short-term modifications would be limited to items required to fit them for small-deck operations: wheels and a winch-down capability for the AH-1W Sea Cobra; 12- feet per second landing gear and winch- down capability for the AH-64 Apache. Mission equipment would not change, since the passive targeting systems are just as capable at sea as on land an each helicopter has air-to-air missile capability. A mission package of two drop tanks and two Sidewinders, or Stingers would create a more than credible fighter- interceptor.
Radar capabilities could be provided by employing hunter-killer tactics. The helicopter fighter-interceptor could be vectored by the radar-equipped LAMPS-III, allowing the fighter to use its passive sensors.
The outcome of the opening scenario might have been reversed—or prevented—if Tango One had been able to call for a deck-alert fighter-interceptor helicopter to handle the threat.
The Russians may have developed a naval aviation weapon that has added a substantial unforeseen threat to our surface action groups and ASW escorts. The simple fact is that enemy helicopter fighters stationed on destroyers and frigates must be countered, or they will wreak havoc on our unarmed helicopters.
Mr. Anderson is a logistics engineer at Sikorsky Aircraft with a continuing interest in naval aviation and tactics.
By Captain Robert A. Whitters, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve
In the years since the Vietnam War, the U.S. military has recognized the requirement for special units trained to deal with the civilian populations in a war zone. The Army’s Special Forces receive extensive training in the customs, languages, and lifestyles of the indigenous populations in their assigned areas of the world. In the Marine Corps, civil affairs involvement can be traced back to the Combined Action Platoons (CAPs) in Vietnam.
The program was successful and provided a foundation on which future civil affairs doctrine could be built. The 3d and 4th Civil Affairs Groups (CAGs) were established in the Marine Corps Reserve to provide a capability. The 3d CAG is based in California and the 4th CAG is based in Washington, D.C.
With the buildup of U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf in the fall of 1990, the 4th CAG was called to active duty to join the 2d Marine Division. After an initial training period at Camp LeJeune, North Carolina, the unit deployed to Saudi Arabia by 1 January 1991—but there were no civilians in the division’s area of operations! As a result, when it became clear that there were not enough military police to meet their missions requirements, the 4th CAG was assigned to assist them in handling prisoners of war. This collateral mission was the unit’s primary mission until the maneuver elements encountered built-up areas with civilian populations.
Instead of the normal organization of three detachments, the unit was divided into five detachments and a headquarters element. One detachment each was placed in general support of the 8th Marine Regiment, 6th Marine Regiment, 4th Marine Regiment, 10th Marine Regiment, and the 2d Tank Battalion. Additional personnel were assigned as liaison to 3d CAG, 3d Marine Aircraft Wing, and Army Central Command. Each detachment was responsible for establishing an S-5 (civil affairs section) within each regimental headquarters and for providing both civil affairs training and planning in coordination with the conduct of operations.
Prior to the start of offensive ground operations, the detachments were on call to provide assistance in the processing of Iraqi prisoners and deserters, who occasionally crossed the border to surrender. Such assistance involved setting up temporary holding compounds, retrieving prisoners from the various battalions, and arranging for their transportation to the main division compound. Once offensive ground operations began, the 6th Marines’ detachment and the headquarters element were fully employed in receiving, searching, and feeding all prisoners before they were placed in the division compound under MP control. The other detachments supported their regiments by coordinating escorts for prisoners being transported to the main compound and providing any other assistance as required.
After the ceasefire, all detachments camped near Kuwait City and became basically unemployed while awaiting retrograde to Saudi Arabia and the United States. During this time, personnel were not allowed to provide assistance to the civilians in the area. It was not entirely clear whether this was a political decision or one of safety.
The basic lesson learned during the Persian Gulf War was that the regimental and battalion commanders were not familiar with what expertise and advice the CAG could provide, and did not know how to employ its personnel effectively. This is not entirely the fault of the commanders. In spite of a CAG presence at many of the exercises held each year, very little civil affairs planning occurs prior to the exercises and there is little or no civil affairs play during the exercises. In contrast, the Army has S-5 civil affairs personnel with every unit to provide basic support. For specialized support the Army has civil affairs battalions. While the Marine Corps does not require the force structure that the Army uses, there is a lot that can be learned and adopted from this structure.
The Army’s civil affairs requirements revolve around what is commonly called nation building. In plain terms, the Army civil affairs units have the capability to enter a country and provide assistance to that country’s government and citizens in rebuilding the basis for self-government. This includes establishment of a police force, food distribution, and medical assistance, plus many other functions. In the Marine Corps, however, the civil affairs effort is broken into phases. Prior to the commitment of ground forces, personnel center their efforts on the study of the country in question and in providing the maneuver unit commander with information on such items as water, power, food, and medical sources that may be used by U.S. forces if the need arises. The civil affairs study includes information on the local economy, religious practices, customs, history, etc. All of these bits of information can have a major impact on the operations plan developed by the maneuver element.
Once military operations are under way, the detachment is responsible for advising the unit commander on how best to avoid unnecessary civilian interference and casualties. The ideal situation would be to remove the civilians from the contested area, but this is not always possible. The civil affairs officer also has the responsibility to advise the unit commander on questions concerning the Law of War, treatment of displaced persons and refugees, and use of civilian facilities by the U.S. forces. Once the requirements of the U.S. forces have been met—always the top priority—the detachments will use the knowledge acquired from the area study to assist civilians in the operating area whenever possible. Once again, the mission comes first.
Because of the nature of the area of operations assigned to the 2d Marine Division. the 4th CAG detachments were not called upon to address the tasks outlined above except for developing an area study. Although the initial Coalition attacks were in unpopulated areas, the final objectives were in or near populated areas around Kuwait City. As a result, the 4th CAG could have been better employed.
With the benefit of hindsight it is easy to argue that the method of employing all U.S. forces during the Gulf War was exactly as it should have been. During planning, however, there was no certainty that we would accomplish our objectives as quickly as we did—evidence the expected casualty figures. When the 4th CAG was divided into detachments and assigned to their supported units, the commanders of those units expected to have full control over them. It is with this expectation that, at least in the 6th Marines, a CAG team was scheduled for assignment to each battalion. Because of the collateral mission of prisoner support, each detachment was held at the regimental level until a particular battalion required support. Unfortunately, this placed most of the CAG assets too far from the battal-
ions to be of any immediate help, particularly in an environment where the maneuver elements were all mechanized.
When detachment assignments were being made, the author fully expected to be assigned to a battalion with small team (two to four) of Marines. Civil affairs planning, training, and support would have been conducted on a more personal basis, and the team would have been on the spot when required. While this would have reduced the number of personnel
Marine Corps Reserve civil affairs units helped handle prisoners of war during Operation Desert Storm, but they can do lots of other things. The active-duty Marines should try to integrate these units more fully into peacetime exercises.
available for use at the prisoner compound, actual events proved that the situation could have been handled with fewer personnel. Even if an increase in personnel had been required, it would have been a simple matter of siphoning off excess headquarters personnel for this duty.
A CAG presence at battalion level prior to the ground offensive would have alleviated problems experienced while retrieving prisoners and transporting them to regimental holding areas. Never having been to the battalion areas before, the retrieval teams often had difficulty finding the pickup points, particularly after dark. Had teams been assigned to each battalion, they would have been required to visit the regimental headquarters many times for meetings, planning, etc., learning the routes to and from various locations.
Once the battalions neared the vicinity of Kuwait City, the CAG teams would have come into their own. Although the Gulf War ended without serious street to street fighting or any fighting in a built- up area, this was not a foregone conclusion at the beginning of the ground offensive. Since the 2d Marine Division’s final objectives were between Kuwait City and Iraq, it was safe to assume that once the fighting started in Kuwait City detachments would be swamped with refugees, surrendering Iraqis, and Iraqis still willing to fight. Given this scenario, the logical step would have been to provide each battalion with a CAG team prior to the ground offensive.
Coming in cold to a battalion in a combat situation, the CAG team would have had a difficult time in becoming integrated into the command group and in gaining the confidence and trust of the battalion staff.
After the ceasefire, little or no civil affairs work was encountered. Some CAG members did participate in some restocking of Kuwaiti medical supplies and food distribution, but the involvement was very limited. It was a missed opportunity for CAG personnel to earn the U.S. and the Marine Corps a lot of money. Units had the assets, willing personnel, expertise, and time to go into various population centers and assist in reestablishing some sense of normalcy. Future planning must take into consideration what will happen after the fighting is over. If Marine units are still in place for any period of time after a ceasefire, they should be given employment assisting the civilians and building a basis for goodwill and future friendship if at all possible.
Marine Corps Civil Affairs personnel should pay heed to the lessons learned in Desert Shield/Storm and work harder at integrating themselves into the staffs they are assigned to support during various exercises. While the CAGs are going about selling themselves to the active-duty regimental and battalion staffs, these same staffs will require better training in the employment of a CAG detachment. The Army currently operates a Civil Military Operations school at Ft. Bragg, North Carolina, and Marine CAG officers currently attend this school prior to obtaining the Civil Affairs military occupational specialty. It would be to the benefit of each division, regiment, and battalion staff if at least one officer from the G/S- 3 were to attend this school. This officer, along with a staff noncommissioned officer, would then act as the G/S-5 during those times when no CAG personnel have been assigned to provide preliminary civil affairs planning and training.
Commanders should attend some form of the course; not only has world awareness of human rights violations increased in recent years, news agencies, such as the Cable News Network can bring any violations of these rights or the Law of War into living rooms around the world. Commanders can ill afford to have their faces or those of their subordinates flashed across millions of television screens in conjunction with another My Lai. At the same time this widespread “real-time” reporting of our actions can, and should, be used to our advantage, by showing us at our best.
Although individual Marines are responsible for their actions toward civilians in a war zone, each commander has the ultimate responsibility to ensure that his subordinates do not jeopardize the mission or future relations by abusing the civilian population in any way. History is full of examples of abuses that completely altered the course of events. For example, the Ukrainian people originally welcomed the Germans in World War II as liberators, but German atrocities caused them to turn and fight for the Soviet Union. In the United States, there were abuses during the Indian Wars in the late 19th century. Only by providing the proper training and exercising of civil affairs requirements can we avoid potentially dangerous or embarrassing situations.
The 4th CAG has initiated a training course for civil affairs that is tailored to Marine Corps requirements that is scheduled to become the official MOS evaluation course. This course, which has already been given to selected officers in each of the three active-duty divisions, lasts two weeks and provides the basics necessary for the establishment of a small cadre G/S-5.
Overall, the experience gained by the 4th CAG during the Gulf War was profitable. It is now incumbent upon the current members of the 4th and 3d CAGs, Headquarters Marine Corps, and active- duty Marines to absorb the lessons learned.
Captain Whitters is a civil affairs team leader in the 4th Civil Affairs Group in Washington, D.C. He served in the Persian Gulf from 1 January to 15 April 1992 with the 2d Marine Division, participating in the recapture of Kuwait.
The Gulf War’s Patched-Together Air Intelligence
By Master Sergeant Douglas G. Armstrong, U.S. Air Force
U-2 pilots flew missions lasting up to ten hours each while supporting Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm.
By the time Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990, the U.S. government and the military had long anticipated problems in the region. For several years, we had prepared for possible conflict in the area, albeit not with the same vigor with which we had prepared for conflict on the Central European plain. The U.S. Central Command had fostered joint exercises in the area and even prepositioned combat materiel in the region.
Intelligence was considered “good.” But we were preparing for another kind of war: the Soviet invasion of Iran. In August 1990, we were woefully short of solid information about even the most basic topographical and cultural features of the new adversary. Iraq had not been considered the threat that Iran was. Through the 1980s, Iran had been the object of interest. Gazetteers had been compiled, analyses conducted, and detailed descriptions made available to the front line forces expected to be involved in combat in or near that nation
We had attempted to duplicate for the fighting forces exactly what had been done for our forces in the Central European region in the past: contingency plans, operations plans, contingency packages, cartographic products, even es- cape-and-evasion plans. We had not invested the same level of effort in a study of Iraq. One might not think that one desert nation is much different from another, but We learned a lesson here—suddenly, in the fall of 1990, all the resources of the U.S. intelligence community and the DoD Were scrambling to make up for a huge deficit in information.
Iraq is as different from Iran as chalk >s from cheese. Modern warfare relies heavily on detailed information, especially exacting geographic and positional data on the enemy and his environment. The U. S. government’s position on minimizing civilian collateral damage is a driving force in the fine-tuning of armed response. The requirement to inform the National Command Authority, using homb damage assessments in a near blow-by-blow account, is a reality. But collecting the information, analyzing it, and then disseminating it up and down the chain of command is not a simple matter.
We knew Saddam Hussein was a customer of the former Soviet Union. We knew he had the most modern Soviet hardware in his air, ground, and missile forces. We knew that he had thrashed Iran in the Iran-Iraq War in the mid-1980s. We also knew though, that Iraq had employed its Scud missiles poorly during the “Battle for the Cities” in that conflict, and that only the Republican Guard was equipped with the most-modern armor. All this knowledge notwithstanding, one of our biggest problems during the Desert Shield buildup and the Desert Storm fighting was determining the location of these forces and their state of readiness and willingness to deploy and engage.
Future conflicts may not be repeats of Desert Storm, but they will certainly be similar with regard to intelligence requirements and the continuing assessment of the strength and disposition of opposing forces. We should develop our intelligence and surveillance plans now.
The United States already possesses sophisticated technical means of collecting intelligence in the broadest areas of the electromagnetic spectrum. Twenty years of research and development have brought us to the threshold of complete tactical and strategic surveillance of both the battlefield and the hinterland—most of it in near real-time. The process is filled with problems, though. The right questions must be asked. The right priorities must be assigned to collection objectives and to the reports disseminated to those who are asking the questions— who, in turn, must know how to use the information they receive. The right people must be given access to the data. This is the science—and art—of the intelligence production cycle.
All sorts of communications connections were available in Saudi Arabia; it is a modem state, after all. Yet, it took months of preparation to bring us to the point where we were confident of our intelligence architecture in the Gulf War, and General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, the commander-in-chief of the U.S. Central Command, still said that intelligence support was lacking.
What will happen if the next conflict occurs in an area without such modern communications? Part of the answer must include developing efficient portable communications for immediate intelligence support to the field commanders.
With the requirement for superior communications comes a requirement of responsive collectors. To date, commanders-in-chief have depended on national intelligence-collection assets for support in day-to-day decision making during peacetime. When they turn to those same assets during a conflict, the national “birds,” as they are called, do not fill the bill. But, then, they were not designed to support combat; they were designed for treaty monitoring and strategic indications and warning—and a lot of people have demands on them. What
These two RF-4Bs from Marine Photo-Reconnaissance Squadron 3 (VMFP-3) were photographed over Southern California on 10 July 1990, one month to the day before the squadron was decommissioned. VMFP-3 detachments spent the 1970s and 1980s flying from the USS Midway (CV-41), then homeported at Yokosuka, Japan.
a commander-in-chief wants is real-time news—a picture of the adversary now. He wants access to it 24 hours a day. He wants his own intelligence collection, exploitation, and dissemination assets; organizations and equipment that he can hold accountable. He does not want to compete with other users for intelligence.
The future holds new possibilities. In the aftermath of the Gulf War, national collection activities have designed new communications paths to the combat forces. More intelligence-derived information is being passed to the shooters and to those planning the shooting at the lower command echelons. In the meantime, the research and development that has been under way for several years in the tactical forces has come to fruition.
Tactical reconnaissance and the requirements for tactical intelligence are not new. Billions of dollars have been invested in technologies conceived, designed and fielded in attempts to provide accurate and timely intelligence information in support of combat operations. The Vietnam War spawned the development of the Air Force’s WS-430B for the processing and exploitation of imagery collected by squadrons of RF-4C aircraft. The Navy’s carrier-based intelligence centers (CVIC) and the whole family of tactical imagery intelligence facilities that followed, in their myriad configurations and incarnations as the U.S. Marine
Corps’ Marine Air-Ground Intelligence System (MAGIS), the Army’s Mobile Army General Imagery Interpretation Center (MAGIIC), and the Air Force’s Tactical Information Processing and Information (TIPI) center were third-generation airborne reconnaissance systems; the first being pre-World War II and the second World War II itself.
The first three generations of aerial reconnaissance had one element in common: aircraft had to be launched and recovered before any information collected during a mission could be exploited. By the end of the 1970s, data-link advances had begun to overcome these constraints. The concept of near-real-time (NRT) tactical reconnaissance became a reality, and it spawned a fourth generation of sensors and interpretation facilities.
Throughout the 1980s, more and more effort was spent, primarily by the Air Force, to develop NRT reconnaissance. Prototype systems proved feasible and led Pentagon planners to adopt this technology as the future for airborne reconnaissance. It was—and continues to be—an expensive venture.
Budget cuts in the mid- and late-1980s hit tactical reconnaissance programs hard. The aging fleets of Air Force RF-4Cs and Marine Corps RF-4Bs, along with their outdated processing and interpretation facilities, cost too much. Carrier-based Navy F-14s with their tactical airborne reconnaissance pod systems (TARPS) were reaching the end of their life cycle, and all Pentagon attempts to redefine the mission of the SR-71 for tactical purposes were dashed when that program was ended completely in the spring of 1990. In August 1990, as a result, the U.S. military was able to field only a handful of third-generation reconnaissance platforms and exploitation facilities.
In the early fall of 1990, during the Operation Desert Shield buildup, planners were able to assemble a few—very few—fourth-generation prototype systems to provide direct support to the U.S. Central Command headquarters in Saudi Arabia. TR-1 and U2-R reconnaissance aircraft carrying signals-intelligence and imagery-intelligence sensors capable of NRT-intelligence collection were deployed and contributed significantly to the overall effort.
The systems were able to meet the requirements for timely and accurate collection. exploitation, and dissemination of intelligence information. Imagery intelligence collection, in particular, proved invaluable in providing the precise geographic targeting information required for modern weapons, and answered most of the “Where?” and many of the “Who?” questions discussed earlier. The conglomerate intelligence take of all the TR-1 and U2-R systems also provided information about the “When?” throughout the Desert Shield-Desert Storm period as they were among the earliest deployed intelligence collection assets. In a nutshell: they worked.
We might have been left in the lurch, though. What would have happened if those fourth-generation tactical reconnaissance systems had not been far- enough advanced to permit their deployment during the Gulf War? We had already essentially mothballed our third- generation assets (the Marine Corps’ RF-4B photographic reconnaissance squadron, VMFP-3, was deactivated on schedule on 10 August 1990—just days after the invasion) and our national systems were simply not capable of the throughput necessary to meet the demand for products. This one was close. We do not want to leave ourselves in this position again.
The Gulf War proved that we can constitute a massive force, deploy it, and fight a formidably equipped foe while sustaining minimum casualties. The war and the months leading up to it, also showed us that we continue to experience problems in dealing with the three essential elements—who, where, and when—that circumscribe the personnel, materiel, and fiscal costs of conflict. Solving the problems depends on whether we resolve to invest in improving tactical reconnaissance technologies.
We are on the verge of fifth-generation reconnaissance technology. It supports the “Global Reach-Global Power” doctrine of the U.S. Air Force, and will be built around rapidly deployable tactical reconnaissance systems that can meet the requirements before, during, and after combat operations. Critics say it will cost too much and will not work. But when one considers the savings in tailoring the size and composition of deploying forces, identifying and prioritiz- •ttg their combat objectives, and then assessing their successes in interdicting their targets, one cannot escape the conclusion that sophisticated, timely, and accurate intelligence systems will be a hey force multiplier in any future conflict.
Master Sergeant Armstrong is assigned to the Plans and Programs Division of the Tactical Reconnaissance System at Metro Tango, Germany, a U.S. Air Uorce, fiur0pe ((JSAFE) project developing a U2-R ased reconnaissance capability. He deployed from Metro Tango back to MacDill Air Force Base, wrida, during Operation Desert Shield to manage intelligence collection at the U.S. Central Command headquarters (Rear). He returned to Europe at the beginning of Operation Desert Storm, where he directed the production of special imagery targeting Materials in support of USAFE forces deployed to fetation Proven Force. He has spent his career as an imagery intelligence analyst.
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Ship name, hull number, and year aboard OR Aircraft type and year ! ( )Matte ( )Glossy
- ( )Matte ( )Glossy
- t )Matte ( )Glossy
( ) If photo is not available, please substitute sister ship photo.
Member photos @ $6.40 x---- $--------- :-----
Non-Member photos @ $8.00 x---- $--------- :-----
Subtotal $------ :-----
MD residents add 5% tax $------ :-----
Shipping and Handling $------------------------------------------------------------------ 2 °°-
Total enclosed $----------------------------------------------------------------------------- :----
Please allow four to six weeks for delivery. Send order form and payment to. and Aircraft Photo Collection. U.S. Naval Institute, Annapolis, MD 21402
Choose from over 35,000 photos housed in the U.S. Naval Institute SHIP AND AIRCRAFT PHOTO COLLECTION, including U.S. Navy and Coast Guard vessels commissioned since 1883 and extensive aircraft shots. All photos currently available for sale are black and white with your choice of glossy or matte finish.
IS YOUR SHIP OR AIRCRAFT AMONG OUR 35,000 PHOTOS?
Members save 20% on photo orders from our ship and aircraft photo collection.