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ident-
-is an inspiration to those, like me,
of th Juumanne utticer on tne start ty- e Admiral, British Joint Services lssion, in Washington. This was fol-
Johnnie Coote has written a most entertaining autobiography that mainly covers his life as a submarine officer in the British Royal Navy. Indeed, the first two- thirds of the book relate to his experience <ts a seagoing submariner. In the preface he claims that that part was written at the end of World War II, and I found it particularly interesting as an account of the attitudes and conditions which applied under those circumstances. The language quoted is sometimes rather fruity, but it ls always appropriate to the situation quoted and typical of the British sailor.
The submarine war in the Mediterranean was a hard and bloody battle; t e on patrol was always tense, with lite opportunity for relaxation in the har- °r. The high morale—reported and ev- „ o d'd not experience submarine life under fire,” but have had to cope with e challenges common to anyone who °Pts for such a seagoing career, even in Peacetime. Life may be more comfort- j e 'n a nuclear submarine, but the high eegree of professionalism, though differ- nt in detail, is equally vital for survival.
he descriptions of Johnnie Coote’s JUrierous patrols as a watchkeeper in the en,lrin!i led me, who served as his executive officer in his last command some • n years later, to better understand his sistence on the highest standards of per- ^ nuance, whether at work or play. These ^ere standards he consistently set for ^imself, as the reader will appreciate to.-111 Coote’s colorful, yet always real-
lstlc> narrative.
rr) *“0ote s first full job upon being pro- h0?,ec* t0 commander finds the author the highly prized appointment as
enior Submarine Officer on the staff ot the A r
Mi: ...........
^ an appointment as the Fleet Op- Ch' nS ?/hicer to the Commander in j0L*e ’ British Home Fleet. Both of these exn credit to Johnnie Coote’s wide fes<;enenCe anc* highly developed pro- f0re'0nai ability. The imagination and esight he possessed come through
Lieutenant Coote strikes a jaunty pose in his casual wartime uniform on board the Untiring off Scotland in 1942.
clearly in what is nevertheless an always attractive, modest approach.
After a brief—and in my view, inadequate—account of his ocean racing experience in sailing yachts, the book ends with a brief recountal of how the Royal Navy, through bad management, lost an extremely promising senior officer to the cut and thrust of life in the newspaper business.
Without hesitation, I recommend this book to anyone interested in naval life and, furthermore, to any student of human nature, for it is written by an expert in that business.
Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fieldhouse, GCB, GBE, died on 17 February 1992 at the age of 64. He was Commander-in-Chief of the task force that recaptured the Falklands from the Argentinians in 1982 and was later Chief of the Defence Staff from 1985 to 1988. As his daughter commented in a recent letter. "Dad had specifically set himself the task of getting the review of [Submariner] to you before he went into hospital. and it was a task he undertook with great pride and pleasure "
Dauntless
Barrett Tillman. New York: Bantam Books, 1992. 413 pp. Append. Bib. Gloss. Maps. $20.00 ($18.00).
Reviewed bv Captain Rosario Rausa,
U.S. Navy (Retired)
No one is better equipped to write a novel about the Battle of Midway than Barrett Tillman. He is, with little argument, naval aviation’s most prolific author. In addition to his hundreds of magazine articles, he has written six nonfiction books on Navy aircraft (including the SBD Dauntless, centerpiece of this novel), and coauthored books on aircraft carriers and the air war in Vietnam. Tillman demonstated his deft hand at fiction with the novels Warriors (Bantam, 1991)—modem air war in the Middle East—and The Sixth Battle (Bantam. 1991)—superpower carrier warfare invoked by troubles in South Africa.
In Dauntless, Tillman goes back to piston-powered planes, and through protagonist SBD pilot, Ensign Phil “Buck” Rogers, he renders a compelling account of aerial combat from the aviator's point of view during the perilous days of the Battle of Midway in June 1942.
With his father, Tillman restored and flew an SBD-5, an experience that led to his first book, The Dauntless Dive Bomber of World War II (Naval Institute Press, 1976). Building on that exposure, and fortified with exhaustive research and countless interviews with veterans of the epic and complex confrontation between the United States and the Japanese in the Pacific, he has captured the rugged ambiance of the cockpits, ready rooms, captains’ bridges, and shore stations at Midway and Hawaii during a tense time in U.S. history.
Buck Rogers is the personification of the brave, young combat pilot determined to get his licks on the enemy. Referring to the SBD’s engine, Buck listens as its “sewing machine beat seemed to purr, ‘Gonna get a hit, gonna get a hit.’”
Tillman dramatically, and with impeccable attention to detail, recounts the battle and the havoc at Midway Island. He injects two parallel narratives into the text: one portrays the battle from the vantage point of Japanese air and naval participants, and one describes the valiant struggle to save the fatally damaged York- town (CV-5). Buck’s romantic interest comes in the person of a comely librarian in Hawaii.
Subtly, but with moving effect, Tillman reflects the dichotomous nature of the relationship between officers and enlisted personnel in the U.S. Navy as compared to the enemy’s. The intimacy and mutual respect advanced by Buck and
and
Bill Barnes, his radioman/gunner in the Dauntless (rear seat), contrast vividly with the harsh treatment enlisted personnel suffered at the hands of Japanese senior officers.
Notable pearls of revelation are present throughout. Conversing about carrier qualifications, a pilot remembers “flying solo the first time to the ship with a sandbag strapped in the gunner’s seat because nobody trusted a fresh-caught nugget aviator.” There’s the vintage acronym GUMP: a gimmick aid to ensure proper completion of the landing checklist: gas, undercarriage, mixture, prop.
While Rogers and other leading characters are fictional, Tillman infuses the text with the courageous, real-life figures who participated in the battle, amplifying the novel’s sense of authenticity.
This book should especially appeal to those who were America’s young warriors in the Pacific 50 years ago because it resurrects those dangerous days with the clarity and uninhibited prose of a private journal. Devotees of military history will appreciate the story for its adherence to the facts of a battle that signaled the beginning of the end for the Japanese in the war. Others will be attracted by the abundance of well-paced aerial combat scenes. Tillman has a way of inserting the reader into the cockpit right along with Buck Rogers.
The author has added a poignant touch to the novel by dedicating it to the legendary Edward H. Heinemann, designer of the SBD Dauntless, who died last November. Heinemann was terribly proud of the Dauntless and the men who flew it at Midway. Tillman’s story vividly reminds us why we are, too.
fDauntless, incidentally, is the first of a trilogy. Tillman is already at work on Hellcat, which we await with eager anticipation.)
Captain “Zip” Rausa is the editor of the Association of Naval Aviation’s Wings of Gold magazine. He has written, or coauthored, five nonfiction aviation titles, including Ed Heinemann: Combat Aircraft Designer (Naval Institute Press, 1980) and Gold Wings, Blue Sea (Naval Institute Press, 1981).
Rogue Warrior
Richard Marcinko, with John Weisman.
New York: Pocket Books, 1992. 336 pp. Gloss. Ind. Photos. $22.00 ($19.80).
Reviewed by Dale Andrade
Say the word SEAL and people conjure up visions of secret warriors on shadowy missions. In part, the image is real; SEALs are on the cutting edge of the U.S. military’s special operations community. And with the threat of Third World conflict and terrorism rising to the forefront of strategic concerns, the SEALs will be ready and willing.
Enter Richard Marcinko, one of the best-known SEALs of all time. He began his special warfare career in Underwater Demolition Teams, then joined the SEALs in 1966. Along the way he developed a reputation for bluntness and controversy, traits that reached a pinnacle when he became the godfather of SEAL Team Six, an elite within an elite. SEAL Team Six was—and is—a quick- reaction counterterrorist unit established in the wake of the 1979 Desert One fiasco in Iran. Marcinko selected and trained the original team, stressing aggressiveness and individuality above all else. A hard-drinking (“You can tell a lot about a man by the way he handles his alcohol”), tough-talking, and profane and irreverent man, Marcinko was a maverick who went against the Navy’s grain. But he also looked out for the men under his command, and many of them worshiped the ground he walked on. To Marcinko, “unit integrity” was everything; that meant “screw everybody but us.” With that attitude, it was only natural that friction between Marcinko and nearly everyone outside his unit would become commonplace.
As history, Rogue Warrior gives off more heat than light. Far from being a “controversial” or “explosive” expose, it is simply Marcinko’s use of a pen to excoriate fellow officers who did not agree with his roughshod methods. You were either for him or against him, for Marcinko lives in a black-and-white world. Solutions to problems are simple: Marcinko has all the answers and SEALs can tip the balance if only they weren’t constrained by the rest of the Navy. Above all, Rogue Warrior is a negative memoir; those who do not agree with Marcinko’s viewpoint are the enemy, labeled either incompetent, unqualified, or both.
Very little in the book is true. Marcinko has altered almost every incident to fit his strange reality. For example, Aircraft Machine Gunner Third Class Clarence T. Risher was the only SEAL killed while under Marcinko’s command, a fact that clearly hurt him deeply. According to Marcinko, Risher “took his Stoner and walked out into the middle of the street, screaming and firing. It was Dodge City, Vietnam.” But others remember that Risher was on a rooftop when a lucky Vietcong bullet hit him in the head. In fact, no one recalls Marcinko actually being on the scene; he was in the tactical operations center, and did not arrive until later. If Marcinko—or better still, his coauthor, John Weisman—had taken the time to check out some of these incidents, such discrepancies might have been cleared up.
At its core, however, Rogue Warri°r raises important questions about the Navy’s specwar program. Since their lir<'t trial by fire in the swamps and rice pad' dies of Vietnam’s Mekong Delta, the SEALs have been surrounded by con' troversy and arguments about their ap' plicability on the battlefield. Marcink0 encountered these problems firsthand' and one of the central themes in the book is his constant battle with bureaU' cratic forces inside and outside the specwar community. He definitely add* an intriguing personal perspective ,0 the old debate about the correct use 0 special operations forces within a con' ventional military matrix. On the one hand, specwar forces cannot be allowed to run their own war; on the other, the) are often misused by commanders ^°A do not understand SEAL strengths
Six
s most well-known exploits (Grenada
weaknesses. This is a central bone of contention between specwar enthusiasts and their nonspecwar detractors, but Marcinko fails to resolve it.
Once Marcinko retreats from his simplistic criticism of policy and gets back fo his real forte as specwar operator, he raises crucial issues. Terrorism, he correctly argues, is a concern that will outcast the Cold War; to combat it, specwar rorces must view terrorism “through the Warrior’s clear glass.” Marcinko’s glass ls extremely so: As the first commander °f SEAL Team Six, he honed his men lnto a superbly trained counterterrorist organization with a worldwide rapid deployment capability.
Despite the proclamation on the dust J'fet promising “you’ll learn more about EAL Team Six than you’ll get from any °P Secret Pentagon briefing,” there is 'We hard information in the book. Part ° this is because most of SEAL Team ar|d the Achille Lauro incident are the ■dost notable) occurred after Marcinko ,e t in July 1983. In lieu of providing ■ntorrnation on SEAL Team Six, arcinko blasts those he regards as landing in the way of winning the war ‘■gainst terrorism. “Diplo-dinks,” who arcmko defines as “cookie-pushing iplomat apparatchik type[s],” dilute the AL Team Six counterterrorist mandate by failing to send them into action.
■s the diplomats, argues Marcinko, ^ 0 lack the will to use the SEALS, tie he is quick to criticize those non- !jr,°rs who intrude in the specwar ^ea m, Marcinko is not hesitant to sec- thi ^uess the art of diplomacy, some- He0^ knows nothing about.
chch °UC*S messaSe with rhetoric and
w This memoir is first and foremost a it toT S t3'e—what Marcinko intended ilv bC ^Ut concentrating so heav- ch °n PseU(ioanalysis and simplistic thaT hCter'Zati°n the military system his * rou8ht him down, Marcinko does sur Iieac'ers a disservice. Most people are thg6J rnore interested in reading about Red °f SEAL Team Six and
ass' sPeciahzed group of SEALs
faci'iv'6^ t0 test lile security of naval how^h65 Wori(iwide) than they are about Mar 1 t conspired to destroy Dick in„ c,n'co- When he writes about train- good'111^ °Perati°ns’ Marcinko tells a Proh t!it0r^’ t^lough many readers will lan..a ^ Put off by the endless pro- Wor/' II on|y takes a few four-letter Mar .S to get the point across, but
regularit° USCS t^em W't*1 m'nc*~nurnb'ng According to many of those who
served with him, Marcinko was a charismatic leader with a flair for organization whose career was marred by arrogance and an uncompromising personality. Perhaps coauthor John Weisman is correct when he says Marcinko’s “sin was that he believed the end was worth the means; his hubris, that he thought he could get away with it.” But the real tragedy is not that he didn’t get away with it, but that Marcinko’s escapades damaged the already fragile relationship between the Navy and its specwar program. When all is said and done, Marcinko’s message may be the right one, but he is the wrong messenger.
Mr. Andrade is the author of Ashes to Ashes: The Phoenix Program and the Vietnam War (Lexington Books, 1990), as well as numerous articles on special operations and the history of naval special warfare.
Keepers of the Keys: A History of the National Security Council from Truman to Bush
John Prados. New York: William Morrow and Co., 1991. 569 pp. $24.95 ($22.45).
Reviewed by Commander Carl O. Schuster, U.S. Navy
Keepers of the Keys represents an honest attempt to provide a comprehensive history of the National Security Council (NSC) and the various National Security Advisors who have served on it since its formulation under the National Security Act of 1947. It is an organization to which many have assigned an almost mythical place in U.S. government. Much of this is a result of the NSC’s apparent growth from an obscure advisory body intended to assist the President in developing his national security policy to its more visible role in the early 1970s and late 1980s as a dominant force in U.S. foreign policy. That visibility has made the NSC the focal point upon which most recent administrations’ foreign policy opponents concentrate their ire. The Irangate affair has exacerbated this process, assigning the NSC a mysterious and generally misunderstood place in the public eye.
Prados’s book does much to clear these misperceptions away, tracing the evolution of the NSC from its early days under President Harry S Truman to its equally quiet contribution to President George Bush’s policies in the Persian Gulf War.
Despite the bombastic rhetoric of the book’s overleaf, it is a generally unbiased account that tries to place the NSC and the National Security Advisors and their actions in the context of the administrations they served. It is that point which the book makes best: the NSC and its advisors serve the President in a fashion suited to his needs, preferences, and temperament. The personality conflicts, power struggles, and actions undertaken by the principles involved serve only to accentuate the methods and processes by which each administration chooses its national security policies.
Keepers of the Keys is a highly readable account in which the author’s political preferences only leak through occasionally, especially in the latter chapters. The only negative comments one can make about the book are the author’s apparent ignorance of naval forces (assigning battle cruisers to the Sixth Fleet in 1958) and his strong criticism of President Dwight Eisenhower’s use of U-2s when surveillance satellites were only a few years from development. Gone, in the author’s eyes, were the risks and uncertainties involved in relying on a previously untested and generally—up till the late 1950s—unsuccessful technology. Compared to the depth and breadth of issues Prados had to cover, however, these criticisms are quite minor. He has done an outstanding job of presenting the NSC’s story to the reader. Every serious student of U.S. National Security Affairs should tackle this book. It is heavy reading, but well worth the effort.
Commander Schuster works in intelligence at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe.
To the Shores of Tripoli: The Birth of the U.S. Navy and Marines
A. B. C. Whipple. New York: William Morrow and Co., 1991. 357 pp. Append.
Bib. Ind. Notes. $23.00 ($20.70).
Reviewed by Colonel Joseph H. Alexander, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired)
Some scenarios in U.S. foreign policy change very little over the years. Picture this. A Mideast tyrant takes several hundred U.S. citizens hostage and demands an exorbitant ransom. The President of the United States is furious—and virtually helpless. Although under intense pressure from the press and the public to take action, the President is blocked on one side by a hostile Congress disputing his war-waging authority, and on the other side by his parsimonious cabinet. Deployment of even token naval forces
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to the Mediterranean takes months of wrangling. Military commanders are shackled by restrictive rules of engagement; naval missions change.
Neither an economic blockade nor a show of force have any effect on the hostage-takers. Escalation of the conflict into actual naval bombardment of the enemy capital, unaccompanied by ground assault or diplomatic initiative, fails to solve the problem. Meanwhile, the hostages languish in prison, while the
Arab despot threatens to burn them alive as reprisals for further attacks.
Sound familiar, contemporary? Actually, the time was the early 1800s, and the President was Thomas Jefferson, not Jimmy Carter or Ronald Reagan. The “evil empire” was neither Iran nor Iraq, but Tripoli, one of four Barbary states whose raiding corsairs dominated the Mediterranean for nearly 150 years. The difficult choice faced in succession by Presidents Washington, Adams, Jefferson, and Madison was whether to pay tribute or to go to war. Neither option was politically or economically attractive. Was there possibly a naval solution short of war?
A. B. C. Whipple enhances his account of the early years in the diplomatic history of the republic by adroitly drawing contemporary parallels. Technology and communications may change, but democracies will always face the same excruciating dilemma that hounded Jefferson: how to free hostages taken in a self-styled holy war at the least cost and risk.
Whipple’s second thesis helps make To the Shores of Tripoli of such interest to the Sea Services. The prolonged crisis with the Barbary states caused the nation to re-establish the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps, and it gave sailors and Marines an opportunity for combat experience and a chance to develop in close quarters what has endured as a “sibling relationship.” Both of these developments were invaluable advantages in the War of 1812 and the conflicts thereafter.
A retired executive editor at Time-Life Books, Whipple is at his best when he describes everyday life on board the new fast frigates or the exploits of genuine naval heroes like Edward Preble, Stephen Decatur, or the irrepressible Marine, Presley O’Bannon. Some of the military episodes in that long conflict are truly artifacts of our national treasury: the re- | capture and burning of the frigate Philadelphia in Tripoli Harbor; the failed attempt to sink the enemy fleet with the fire ship Intrepid; and the incredible march of naval agent William Eaton, O’Bannon, and their “international army’ | across 500 miles of the Libyan desert to capture the city of Dema.
My criticisms of To the Shores of Tripoli are few. While Whipple’s bibliography is comprehensive, his extensive footnotes fail to identify sources; they : merely provide distracting parenthetical background. Some of his conclusions are not supported by the facts. The Barbary incidents, for example, were not “the firs1 foreign policy decision faced by the United States”; the preceding undeclared war with France has that distinction. Jefferson did not “betray” Eaton by authorizing a diplomatic deal for the hostages in Tripoli; he had no word of Eaton’s sue- f cessful capture of Derna, nor any idea where in the world his agent was at that ^ time. Sending observers overseas does not “inevitably lead to a full-fledged war.” Bureaucratic caution was not “already a tradition in the U.S. armed forces” in 1805; witness the unhesitating decisiveness of Preble and Decatur in the Mediterranean.
Whipple’s is a fine book and a wel' ‘ come addition to the professional library of any member of the Sea Services- There’s always comfort in the realization that we wrestle with many of the sarne nagging problems that our naval anceS' tors did. They prevailed. With this pef' spective, so may we.
v-uiuuci /Alexander served years as an assauu «• , phibian officer, including assignments as Chief 0 Staff, 3rd Marine Division, and Director of Corps’ Development Center. Since his retirementlfl 1988, he has been building houses for Habitat Humanity, Inc.
Books of Interest
By Lieutenant Commander Thomas J. Cutler, U.S. Navy (Retired)
American Defense Annual 1991-1992
Joseph Kruzel, editor. New York: Lexington °°k\ 1992. 325 pp. Append. Figs. Gloss. Ulus, "d. Maps. Notes. Photos. Tables. $49.95 ($44.95) Hardcover; $19.95 ($17.95) paper.
Experts in the field write of the economics of ® ense, post-Cold War trends, the coming ap- P'cations of sea power, analysis of the Gulf ar> P^nds in arms control, and a host of other re evant topics. Many tables and appendixes Provide useful data as well. Current military P anners will do well to make use of this in- flsive and balanced analysis of the U.S. de- rense posture.
P Captain Hook: A Pilot’s Tragedy and r,umph in the Vietnam War
CJL\Wynn F. Foster, USN (Ret.). Annapolis,
InH n!aval Institute Press, 1992. 288 pp. Append.
' Photos. $28.95 ($23.16).
26 June 1966, while flying his 163rd comte* m'ssion over North Vietnam, Captain Fosswas hit by antiaircraft fire. His right arm Vered at the elbow, his right hand lying on
A-4St<a'0ar<* console. Captain Foster flew his
eJected ThaWk °Ut °Ver Tonkin Gulf and
of n„ " ,s *s his story. It is an insider’s view of frua av'ation during the Vietnam War. full 'sin itratlon’ camaraderie, tragedy, and hero- With b- IS a*S0 dle slory °f Foster’s struggle his f,„IS terr'hie injury and with the Navy over Ure' Most of all, it is an uplifting account of the power of the human spirit in the face of daunting odds.
Desert Storm
The editors of Military History magazine. Leesburg, VA: Empire Press, 1992. 176 pp. Ulus. Maps. Photos. $34.95 ($31.45).
Full-color photography and quality writing are blended to produce this impressive chronicle of the Gulf War. Background history, descriptions of weapons and other technology employed, and the roles of the various services are all included.
Experience of War
Robert Cowley, editor. New York: W. W. Norton, 1992. 590 pp. $35.00 ($31.50).
MHQ: The Quarterly Journal of Military History began only four years ago but already has earned a reputation for excellence. This book is an anthology of 51 articles from that journal and covers a wide diversity of topics, from the tactics employed by Alexander the Great against elephants to the little known relationship between Rod Serling (of Twilight Zone fame) and the Pentagon. Publishers Weekly describes this book as “informative and entertaining,” and writes that, for the most part, the articles in this collection “eschew battles and campaigns and concentrate on the less often considered manifestations of war.”
George F. Kennan and the Making of American Foreign Policy 1947-1950
Wilson D. Miscamble. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992. 440 pp. Append. Bib.
Gloss. Ind. Notes. Photos. $35.00 ($31.50).
One cannot seriously study the Cold War without acknowledging the role of George Kennan. As author and statesman, his impact on U.S. foreign policy was considerable. This biography casts new light on the origins of the Cold War and the response of the United States to the challenges, both real and perceived, caused by it.
Gettysburg: A Battlefield Atlas
Craig Symonds. Baltimore, MD: Nautical and Aviation Publishing. 1992. 110 pp. Append. Bib. Illus. Ind. Maps. Photos. $19.95 ($17.95).
Those familiar with Professor Symonds’s previous atlases on the American Revolution and the Civil War will welcome this more-detailed rendition of the monumental struggle at Gettysburg. Combining the excellent cartography of William J. Clipson with the cogent analysis and concise prose that has made his other battlefield atlases so successful, Professor Symonds paints a clear and dramatic picture of those momentous events that captured the world’s attention in July of 1863. No serious student of military history can afford to overlook Gettysburg, and no one interested in that battle will want to miss this unique account.
The Imperial Tradition: The New World Order and America’s Purpose
Robert W. Tucker and David C. Hendrickson.
New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1992. 240 pp. Ind. Notes. $22.50 ($20.25).
Professors Tucker and Hendrickson take a sure-to-be controversial but thought-provoking look at the role of the United States in the Gulf War, performing what they term an “autopsy” of the conflict and concluding that the Bush administration succumbed to “an imperial tradition that has seduced and corrupted other great powers in the past.” Their assessment goes beyond mere criticism, however; they make a compelling plea for a return to “the guiding principles set forth by the Founding Fathers ’ and offer a prescription for future U.S. foreign policy.
The Military Balance 1991-1992
The International Institute for Strategic Studies. Riverside, NJ: Brassey’s (US), 1991. 250 pp. Append. Figs. Gloss. Maps. Tables. $67 95 ($61.15).
The strength of every nation of the world that possesses armed forces is assessed in this detailed compilation of military and economic data. The information is arranged by country and includes military organization, listings of equipment held, manpower data, economic indications, and much more. Lending perspective to those arrays of data are analytical essays that focus on regions and major nations.
Pride of Baltimore: The Story of the Baltimore Clippers
Thomas C. Gillmer. Camden, ME: International Marine, 1992. 240 pp. Append. Figs. Illus. Ind. Notes. Photos. $24.95 ($22.45).
Baltimore Clippers had a considerable influence on naval architecture and an unusual place in American history. When outfitted as privateers, these swift clippers wrought havoc on British convoys during the War of 1812. Later, they contributed significantly to the golden age of commerce when American sailing vessels carried goods the world over. This excellent book recounts the history of the Baltimore Clippers, including a renewed interest in them during the 1970s, the tragic loss of the replica ship Pride of Baltimore, and the
ongoing career of the newly built Pride of Baltimore II.
Robert Taylor Air Combat Paintings, Volume II
Charles Walker and Robert Taylor. St. Catherines, Ontario: Vanwell Publishing, 1991. 130 pp. Ulus. $65.00.
Twenty-four full-color paintings and numerous sketches illustrate the talent of this artist and capture the dynamic excitement of aircraft in battle. These renditions are truly stunning in their detail, lighting, and perceived motion. Taylor places a decided emphasis on the European theater of World War II, but he also includes scenes from the Pacific and from World War I. Of added interest are some of the exploits of the youngest commissioned pilot in the U.S. Navy during World War II— an 18-year old flyer by the name of George Bush—and the recollections of many other aviators of bygone days.
Rules of Encounter
William P. Kennedy. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992. 358 pp. Maps. $21.95 ($19.75).
Set in the days of World War I, this suspense- filled novel involves an international cast of characters whose lives and exploits are enmeshed by the historic sinking of the British passenger-liner Lusitania. Romantic and patriotic passions collide as wartime love, honor, and betrayal dominate the lives of Royal Navy Commander William Day, Jennifer Beecham (the headstrong daughter of a British attache to the United States), Shiela McDevitt (a young Irish radio operator), and Peter Beecham (who will go to any length to ensure that the United States will enter the war on the side of England).
The United States Navy: A Dictionary
Bruce W. Watson and Susan M. Watson, editors. New York: Garland Publishing, 1992. 980 pp.
Bib. $110.00 ($99.00).
Focusing on the post-World War II U.S. Navy, this comprehensive reference work covers thousands of naval terms and acronyms. Particularly useful are the bibliographic entries included with each definition, which conveniently direct the user to further information on the topic if desired.
Science and the Navy: The History of the Office of Naval Research
Harvey M. Sapolsky. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990. 155 pp. Append. Figs. Gloss. Ind. Notes. $24.95 ($22.45).
The Office of Naval Research functioned in its earlier days as a “surrogate national science foundation,” playing a significant role in scientific advances in the so-called Golden Age of American Science. Sapolsky contends that important lessons can be gleaned from this experience, and he poses some challenging questions regarding the future of U.S. scientific development.
Other Titles of Interest_________________
The Europeanization of the Alliance
Robbin Laird. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991. 143 pp. Ind. $28.50 ($25.65) paper.
Shipwrecks of Florida
Steven D. Singer. Sarasota, FL: Pineapple Press, Inc., 1992. 368 pp. Append. Bib. Ind. Maps. Photos. $24.95 ($22.45).
Silent Wings at War: Combat Gliders in World War II
John L. Lowden. Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1992. 187 pp. Append. Bib. Illus. Ind. Maps. Photos. $24.95 ($22.45).
There’s a War to Be Won: The United States Army in World War II
Geoffrey Perret. New York: Random House, 1991. 623 pp. Ind. Maps. Notes. Photos. $30.00 ($27.00).
The United States and the USSR in a Changing World: Soviet and American Perspectives
Andrei G. Bochkarev and Don L. Mansfield, editors. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992. 412 pp. Ind. $19.95 ($17.95) paper.
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Order Form
FOR OFFICE USE ONLY
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Qty
U.S. Naval Institute
2062 General’s Highway Annapolis, Maryland 21401
Book Titles/Item | ISBN/ITEM # |
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Name_______________
Address-------------------
City, State, FPO---------
Membership No---------
- Check or money order enclosed
O Charge it to my □
- Bill me
. Zip Code.
Shipping fees (refer to shipping chart). . Maryland residents, please add 5% sales tax. .
Total. S_
Account Number
Expiration Date
Signature
SHIPPING CHART
Add postage & handling to each order tn accordance with the following schedule: All U.S. Naval Institute books, prints, and insignia items:
For delivery in the U.S.
Orders up to $30.00-83.50 Orders of 830.01 or more—$4.50
For delivery outside the U.S.. invoices will include actual postage & handling costs. All special order books.*
Invoices for special order books will include actual postage & handling costs for all orders regardless of destination.
•(The special order book service Is provided for USNI members onlyl: