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Norman Polmar, Author, The Ships and Aircraft of the U.S. Fleet
Conditions of War
Even before the Gulf War ended, generals, admirals, journalists, analysts, and other assorted pundits were suggesting the “lessons” of the conflict. Some of those lessons were obvious: well-led, overwhelming military force wins . . . well, almost always. The Air Force lessons include the need for the B-2 Stealth bomber; the naval air community needs more large carriers; the submariners need the Seawolf (SSN-21); and the Army needs more Ml tanks.
Many lessons will be drawn without examining the “conditions” that affected the Gulf War. These conditions helped to determine the tactics and weapons that were employed in the conflict. For example, if the existing modern airfields and ports had not been available in Saudi Arabia and the U.S. government deployed a large military force, a massive, time-consuming, and highly vulnerable construction effort would have been required. Alternatively, if Iraqi forces or Saudi opposition groups had posed more of a threat, a heavier rapid-reaction force might have been needed.1
Six major conditions affected the Gulf War.
► The Buildup: Saudi Arabia, with its highly developed infrastructure (communications, ports with large-ship berths, numerous jet-capable airfields, etc.), facilitated the U.S. buildup in the Gulf. During the initial Desert Shield buildup the arriving U.S. troops were vulnerable to Iraqi attack. In that period, Saudi Arabian F-15 Eagle fighters and E-3 Sentry AWACS (airborne warning and control system) aircraft worked with U.S. carrier- and land-based aircraft to provide air defense of the area. In fact, there was no opposition to the buildup of U.S. and Coalition forces by either Iraqi government forces or (as had occurred in Vietnam) by guerrillas.
This condition, while not unique to Saudi Arabia, contrasted to the British experience in the Falklands War and the U.S. situations in Vietnam in the 1960s (where there was an active Vietcong resistance movement) or Korea in 1950 (where the communist forces overran all
allied airfields in South Korea during the opening days of the conflict).
^ The Middle East: The Gulf War was fought in a region ideal for air operations. For the most part the weather in the Middle East is clear. Even during the rainy season, the air campaign against Iraq virtually continued unabated because of allweather aircraft and the intermittent nature of the fronts.
Ground targets generally are easy to locate in the area. There are no woods, jungles, or mountains in which to hide troops, vehicles, and buildings. Optical
search and weapon guidance systems work well in the desert in daylight. At night, the lack of cover facilitates the use of infrared guidance against both moving and fixed targets. Tanks or other vehicles exposed to the sun during the day will continue to retain the heat into the night, making them readily identifiable.
Soviet military doctrine for desert operations calls for screening tanks and other vehicles with nets or covers and then piling dirt or sand over them to reduce the heat signature. The Iraqis failed to follow this procedure, making it simple to distinguish between real tanks and mockups with infrared detection.
► High-technology Weapons: The Gulf War truly was a high-tech war. Although the term “surgical bombing” had been touted since World War II, it was not achieved until Desert Storm. For example, during the Vietnam War more than 700 bombing sorties over seven years
U.S. NAVY (W. A. LIPSKI)/INSET: U.S. NAVY (W. A. LIPSKI)
Of the tons of ordnance delivered by U.S. and allied forces, 7% were high-tech “smart” weapons (inset, laser-guided bombs loaded on an A-6E), effectively hitting their targets 90% of the time. Low-tech “dumb” bombs (here, an A-6E with 500-pound bombs), though less effective on point targets, still played a significant role.
using iron bombs” failed to destroy two critical targets near Hanoi—the Paul Doumer and Thanh Hoa (Dragon’s Jaw) bridges. More than 30 U.S. Air Force and Navy aircraft were lost over the Thanh Hoa bridge alone. In May 1972, U.S. F-4 Phantom aircraft attacked both bridges with early model electro-optic and laser-guided bombs. Using fewer than 20 guided bombs, the attackers dropped both spans.
Efficient smart weapons were used against Iraqi targets. U.S. and allied air forces in Desert Storm dropped 88,500 tons of bombs on targets in Iraq and occupied Kuwait. About 6,520 tons (7%) were smart or guided bombs; they hit their targets some 90% of the time. In contrast, the majority of the bombs, 81,980 tons (93%), were unguided and were much less effective against point targets. (The B-52 bomber strikes with 50 750-pound bombs being carried on each sortie did have a devastating psychological effect on entrenched troops.)
Similarly, on the ground, laser and infrared devices enhanced the effectiveness of Coalition troops in the frequent night operations. Coalition troops could locate and evade or engage Iraqi forces before they even knew of the allies’ presence. The Iraqis had some night-vision devices, but were ill-equipped and poorly trained for a high-tech war.
High-tech considerations in conflict include the use of warning and surveillance systems, “blinding” an enemy’s systems (as was done effectively against Iraq in the Gulf War), and various types of electronic countermeasures. While the Army’s land-based Patriot surface-to-air missile provided a highly effective defense against an Iraqi modification of an outdated Soviet ballistic missile,2 more modem tactical ballistic missiles are being developed in several nations. These weapons—as well as advanced cruise or guided missiles—are also a threat to naval forces. With respect to the latter, active missile intercept as well as passive defenses must be considered for future naval operations.
► Low-technology Weapons: Low-technology weapons had a major impact on the Gulf War. The Iraqis employed extensive minefields on the ground, particularly in the defenses along the boarder of occupied Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, and laid naval mines in large numbers in the Gulf. Both types of mines are relatively cheap and can be employed (or floated) by inexperienced troops.
Minefields on the ground must be evaded or, using considerable resources, neutralized. Minefields at sea, especially in restricted waters such as the Gulf, are
extremely dangerous, as was demonstrated by the damage inflicted on the Aegis missile cruiser USS Princeton (CG-59) and the helicopter carrier USS Tripoli (LPH-10) during the conflict and the near sinking of the USS Samuel B. Roberts (FFG-58) in 1987. The U.S. Navy’s vulnerability to mines is exacerbated by the lack of mine countermeasure technology, tactics, and platforms. The Navy’s mine countermeasure helicopter and ship capabilities are improving as the result of the Reagan-Lehman programs of the 1980s, but the most effective mine countermeasure efforts in the Gulf region were (and continue to be) those of several allied navies.
Low-technology does not necessarily mean low cost. The B-52 strikes employed “dumb” bombs dropped by relatively low-cost aircraft; the shore bombardments by the battleships Missouri (BB-63) and Wisconsin (BB-64) employed “dumb” projectiles but high-cost platforms. As has been regularly debated in these pages, the battleships provide a useful capability with their 16-inch guns, but their 1,600-man crews, their need for antiair (and, in some situations, antisubmarine) defense, and their rate of fuel consumption make them very high-cost platforms.3
Other relatively low-tech weapons, such as ground artillery and rocket launchers, were available to both sides and played important roles in the conflict.
► Military Leadership: In every respect U.S. military leadership was superior to that of Iraq’s. First, the relationship between the national leadership (President) and the defense establishment, within board guidelines, allowed the military to plan and direct the war. Second, an effective working relationship existed between the civilian and senior military leaders. This was particularly the case with Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Colin Powell, and Commander in Chief Central Command H. Norman Schwarzkopf. Third, Central Command’s component commanders (Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps) and the command’s planning staffs worked well together. And, fourth, at all levels, the U.S. forces showed initiative and ingenuity.
One aspect of the Gulf War that is not clear is the role of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) in the chain of command. Recent congressional legislation and defense reorganization made it clear that the JCS is a “player”, but a simplified command relationship seems to have been evident in the Gulf. Also, in effect, General Schwarzkopf appears to have had two ground force commanders, both his
Army and Marine subordinates (although there was joint planning). At the same time, the lack of an overall Marine commander afloat until January may have been an early indication that no amphibious landing was planned.4
Leadership was in many ways the most significant difference between the U.S’ and Iraqi forces. Saddam Hussein had surrounded himself with yes men. Although several of his generals had shown great ingenuity in the Iraqi-Iran War ot the 1980s, few appear to have survived or have had any impact in the Gulf War. Field Marshal Saddam Hussein appears to have personally directed Iraqi strategy- The description of Saddam by General Schwarzkopf was accurate: “He is neither a strategist, nor is he schooled in the operational arts, nor is he a tactician, nor is he a general, nor is he a soldier. Other than that, he’s a great military man.”
Unquestionably, there are many good military leaders in the Third World. The United States learned that in Vietnam and other Third World military commanders have been successful in waging war against superior military forces in Asia and Africa.
These conditions—and others—•
should form a backdrop to those attempting the derive the specific lessons of the Gulf War. Drawing the right lessons is particularly important at this time because of the massive reductions in the U.S. defense establishment, changes as well as reductions in Soviet strategy and forces, and the unquestionably troubled world that will exist in the 1990s and beyond. Care must be taken not to build a U.S. defense structure that can refight the last war—with the Gulf conflict as the paradigm.
The first U.S. ground troops to reach Saudi Arabia comprised the ready brigade of the Army 82nd Airborne Division, a “light” combat force.
2The surface-to-surface Scud missile, which was used in a modified form by the Iraqis against targets in Saudi Arabia and Israel, became operational in the Soviet Union about 1965.
3Thc battleships also carry 32 Tomahawk cruise missiles. The Ticonderoga (CG-47)-class cruisers, however, can carry up to 122 Tomahawk-size missiles, while the modified Sprucmce (DD-963)-class destroyers can carry 61 missiles—both at much smaller operating costs (calculated on either a cost-per-ship or cost-per-missile basis) than the battleship.
‘‘There were two Marine expeditionary brigades and one separate Marine expeditionary unit embarked in amphibious ships in the Gulf.
’General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, U.S. Army, News briefing, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, 27 February 1991.
Editor's Note: Mr. Polmar is coauthor, with Thomas B. Allen and F. Clifton Berry, and editor of War in the Gulf, just published by CNN/Turner Publishing Inc.